Studies in the Book of Wisdom

Edited by

GÉZA G. XERAVITS & JÓZSEF ZSENGELLÉR

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CONTENTS

Preface vii
Abbreviations ix

Matthew Goff
Adam, the Angels and Eternal Life:
Genesis 1-3 in the Wisdom of Solomon and 4Q*Instruction* 1

Michael Kolarcik, S.J.
Sapiential Values and Apocalyptic Imagery
in the Wisdom of Solomon 23

Luca Mazzinghi
Law of Nature and Light of the Law
in the Book of Wisdom (Wis 18:4c) 37

Moyna McGlynn
Solomon, Wisdom and the Philosopher-Kings 61

Tobias Nicklas
"Food of Angels" (Wis 16:20) 83

Angelo Passaro
Cosmology and Music
Wis 19:18 and the Concept of Creation in the Book of Wisdom 101

Friedrich V. Reiterer
Philosophische Lehre und deren Wirkung aus der Sicht
eines Weisheitslehrers. Untersuchung von Weish 1:1-15 125

Greg Schmidt Goering
Election and Knowledge in the Wisdom of Solomon 163

Stefan Schorch
Jacob's Ladder and Aaron's Vestments
Traces of Mystical and Magical Traditions in the Book of Wisdom 183

József Zsengellér
"The Taste of Paradise"
Interpretation of Exodus and Manna in the Book of Wisdom 197

Index of authors 217
Index of passages 222

PREFACE

The present volume contains papers read at the Fourth International Conference on the Deuterocanonical Books, organised by the Shime'on Centre for the Study of Hellenistic and Roman Age Judaism and Christianity of the Reformed Theological Academy, Pápa, Hungary. The topic of the conference was the Book of Wisdom or the Wisdom of Solomon.

The editors express their deep gratitude to series editor Hindy Najman, who kindly accepted this book for publication in the series of JSJ Supplements; and also to Ben G. Wright, who gave invaluable editorial advice during the preparation of the manuscript.

Budapest, Hungary
10. February 2010

the editors

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AB	Anchor Bible
AGAJU	Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums
ALGHJ	Arbeitum zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistchen Judentums
AnBib	Analecta Biblica
ANRW	*Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*
AOAT	Alter Orient und Altes Testament
ATD	Das Alte Testament Deutsch
BBB	Bonner Biblischer Beiträge
BEATAJ	Beiträge zur Erforschung des Alten Testaments und des Antiken Judentums
BETL	Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium
Bib	*Biblica*
BiLe	*Bibel und Leben*
BJS	Brown Judaic Studies
BThSt	Biblisch-theologische Studien
BZAW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
BZNW	Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
CBQMS	Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series
CEJL	Commentaries on Early Jewish LIterature
CRINT	Compendia rerum iudaicarum ad novum testamentum
CSCO	Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium
DBS	*Dictionnaire de la Bible Suppléments*
DCLY	Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook
DJD	Discoveries in the Judaean Desert
DSD	*Dead Sea Discoveries*
FAT	Forschungen zum Alten Testament
FoSub	Fontes et Subsidia ad Bibliam pertinentes
FRLANT	Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testament
GAP	Guides to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha
GCS	Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller
HTR	*Harvard Theological Review*
HTS	Harvard Theological Studies
Interp	*Interpretation*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JBTH	Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie
JJS	*Journal of Jewish Studies*
JSHRZ	Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit
JSJ	*Journal for the Study of Judaism*
JSJSup	Journal for the Study of Judaism Supplements

JSNTSup	Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplements
JSOTSup	Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplements
JSP	*Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha*
JSPSup	Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha Supplements
JTS	*Journal for Theological Studies*
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LeDiv	Lectio Divina
NEB	Neue Echter Bibel
NEB.AT	Neue Echter Bibel. Altes Testament
NETS	The New English Translation of the Septuagint
NovTSup	Novum Testamentum Supplements
NRT	*Nouvelle revue théologique*
NSK.AT	Neue Stuttgarter Kommentar. Altes Testament
OTL	Old Testament Library
OTP	*The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (ed. J.H. Charlesworth)
PVTG	Pseudepigrapha Veteris Testamentae Graecae
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*
RB	*Revue biblique*
REG	*Revue des études grecques*
RevQ	*Revue de Qumrân*
RGRW	Religions in the Graeco-Roman World
RHR	*Revue de l'histoire des religions*
RivBibS	Rivista Biblica Supplimenti
Sal	*Salamanticensis*
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series
SBLSP	*Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers*
SBLSymposium	Society of Biblical Literature Symposium Series
SFSHJ	South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism
SKK	Stuttgarter kleiner Kommentar
SPB	Studia Post-Biblica
SPsA	*Studia Philonica Annual*
STAC	Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum
STDJ	Studies on the Texts of the Desert of Judah
StUNT	Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments
SVF	Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
SVTP	Studia Veteris Testamenti Pseudepigrapha
TBN	Themes in Biblical Narrative
ThLZ	*Theologische Literaturzeitung*
TSAJ	Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum
TWNT	*Theologiches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*
VT	*Vetus Testamentum*
VTSup	Supplements to Vetus Testamentum
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WUNT	Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament
ZNW	*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*

ADAM, THE ANGELS AND ETERNAL LIFE: GENESIS 1-3 IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON AND 4Q*INSTRUCTION*

Matthew Goff
(Florida State University)

INTRODUCTION

For many years scholars have observed that the Wisdom of Solomon draws on both Hellenistic philosophy and Palestinian Jewish traditions. The Wisdom of Solomon's reliance on post-exilic Palestinian traditions can now be assessed in light of the full publication of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Of particular importance is the largest sapiential text from Qumran, 4Q*Instruction* (1Q26; 4Q415-18, 423), which was published in 1999.[1] 4Q*Instruction* is normally dated to the second century BCE.[2] It is a Hebrew wisdom text with an apocalyptic worldview. Not surprisingly, the composition has rejuvenated the study of the apocalyptic aspects of the Wisdom of Solomon.[3]

[1] J. Strugnell and D.J. Harrington, *Qumran Cave 4.XXIV: Sapiential Texts, Part 2. 4QInstruction (Mûsār Lĕ Mēbîn): 4Q415ff. With a re-edition of 1Q26* (DJD 34, Oxford: Clarendon 1999). They name the composition "Musar Le-Mebin" ("Instruction for a Maven"). Elgvin is the official editor of 4Q423. For scholarship on 4Q*Instruction*, see M.J. Goff, *Discerning Wisdom: The Sapiential Literature of the Dead Sea Scrolls* (VTSup 116, Leiden: Brill 2007) 9-68; D.J. Harrington, "Recent Study of 4QInstruction," in *From 4QMMT to Resurrection: Mélanges qumraniens en hommage à Émile Puech* (eds. F. García Martínez *et al.*, STDJ 60, Leiden: Brill 2006) 105-23. For older scholarship comparing the Wisdom of Solomon to the Qumran scrolls, see M. Delcor, "L'immortalité de l'âme dans la Sagesse et à Qumrân," *NRT* 77 (1955) 614-30; M. Philonenko, "Le Maître de justice et la Sagesse de Salomon," *TZ* 14 (1958) 81-88.

[2] See further Goff, *Discerning Wisdom*, 65-67.

[3] J.J. Collins, "The Reinterpretation of Apocalyptic Traditions in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology* (eds. A. Passaro and G. Bellia, DCLY 2005, Berlin: de Gruyter 2005) 143-57; idem, "The Mysteries of God: Creation and Eschatology in 4QInstruction and the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls and in the Biblical Tradition* (ed. F. García Martínez, BETL 168, Leuven: Leuven University Press and Peeters 2003) 287-305; idem, "Apocalyptic Eschatology in Philosophical Dress in

Both 4Q*Instruction* and the Wisdom of Solomon utilize Gen 1-3 to articulate several core themes that resonate with the apocalyptic tradition.[4] When describing the elect status of the addressee and his affinity with the angels, and when asserting that there are "fleshly" and "spiritual" types of humankind, 4Q*Instruction* adapts elements from these chapters, above all the figure of Adam and the garden. The Wisdom of Solomon employs tropes from Gen 1-3 when recounting the opposed fates of the righteous and the wicked. The work also associates the ultimate reward of immortality of the soul with Adam. Karina Martin Hogan has examined the "exegetical background" of Gen 1-3 in the Wisdom of Solomon in relation to Philo, Pseudo-Solomon's probable contemporary.[5] The emergence of 4Q*Instruction* allows us to go further back. Neither 4Q*Instruction* nor the Wisdom of Solomon is exegetical in the sense that they strive to explain or interpret elements of the biblical text. But an examination of the ways they use Gen 1-3 suggests that the Wisdom of Solomon draws on older interpretive traditions that influence 4Q*Instruction*.

THE MYSTERIES OF GOD AND THE COSMOS

Some background discussion regarding 4Q*Instruction* is necessary to understand the role of Gen 1-3 in the work. The composition is aptly classified as a wisdom text. It frequently uses the admonition form and offers instruction on mundane, worldly topics including marriage, bartering goods and the payment of debts. The document was written by a teacher to a student who is typically referred to as *mebin* (מבין), or "understanding one." 4Q*Instruction* stands in the tradition of the

the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Shem in the Tents of Japheth* (ed. J.L. Kugel, JSJSup 76, Leiden: Brill 2002) 93-107; M. Gilbert, "Sagesse 3,7-9; 5,15-23 et l'apocalyptique," in *Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls*, 307-22; S. Burkes, "Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Wisdom of Solomon," *HTR* 95 (2002) 21-44.

[4] Gen 1-3 is important for numerous other early Jewish texts, including Ben Sira and the Treatise on the Two Spirits. See further J.J. Collins, "Wisdom, Apocalypticism and the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *Seers, Sibyls and Sages in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism* (JSJSup 54, Leiden: Brill 1997) 369-83; J.T.A.G.M. van Ruiten, "The Creation of Man and Woman in Early Jewish Literature," in *The Creation of Man and Woman* (ed. G.P. Luttikhuizen, TBN 3, Leiden: Brill 2000) 34-62.

[5] K. Martin Hogan, "The Exegetical Background of the 'Ambiguity of Death' in the Wisdom of Solomon," *JSJ* 30 (1999) 1-24. For the provenance of the Wisdom of Solomon and an overview of its affinities with Philo's writings, see Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 20-25, 59-63. Consult also M.-F. Baslez, "The Author of Wisdom and the Cultured Environment of Alexandria," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 33-52; C. Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse ou la Sagesse de Salomon* (3 vols., Paris: Gabalda 1983-85) 1.141-61; G. Scarpat, *Libro della sapienza: testo, traduzione, introduzione e commento* (3 vols., Brescia: Paideia 1989-99).

practical wisdom of Proverbs. Unlike this biblical book, however, 4Q*Instruction* demonstrates extensive reliance on the apocalyptic tradition. This is above all evident in the prominence in the work of the enigmatic רז נהיה, which signifies a form of supernatural revelation and has been translated "the mystery that is to be."[6] This is arguably the most important expression in the composition. The phrase *raz nihyeh* occurs over twenty times in 4Q*Instruction* and elsewhere only thrice—twice in the Book of Mysteries and once in the Community Rule (1Q27 1 i 3-4; 1QS xi 3-4). The word *raz* is of Persian origin and is attested in early Jewish literature, often to denote heavenly revelation. The word רז is used repeatedly in Daniel 2, for example, to signify God's disclosure to Daniel of Nebuchadnezzar's dream (vv. 18-19, 27-30, 47 [2x]). נהיה is a Niphal participle of the verb "to be." While it has been argued that the participle refers to a future action, it often signifies the entire range of history—past, present and future.[7] This is the case, for example, in the Treatise on the Two Spirits of the *Community Rule*: "From the God of Knowledge stems all there is and all there will be (כול הויה ונהייה)" (iii 15).[8] The participle in 4Q*Instruction* appears to have this broad chronological range as well. The mystery that is to be is associated with a tripartite division of time in an unfortunately fragmentary passage: "Everything that exists in it, from what has been to what will be in it (כול הנהיה בה למה היה ומה יהיה בו)… His period which God revealed to the ear of the understanding ones through the mystery that is to be" (4Q418 123 ii 3-4; cf. 4Q417 1 i 3-4). The mystery that is to be signifies a divine deterministic plan that guides the entire range of history and creation, presented to the addressee as a revealed truth. He can attain knowledge of the full extent of God's dominion over the cosmos.

Though not as prominently, the Wisdom of Solomon, like 4Q*Instruction*, uses the term "mystery" to refer to knowledge about God and the cosmos that one needs to be pious and just. The work claims that the wicked do not know "the mysteries of God" (μυστήρια θεοῦ)

[6] A. Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination: Weisheitliche Urordnung und Prädestination in den Textfunden von Qumran* (STDJ 18, Leiden: Brill 1995) 60; T. Elgvin, "Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Early Second Century BCE—The Evidence of 4QInstruction," in *The Dead Sea Scrolls Fifty Years After Their Discovery: Proceedings of the Jerusalem Congress, July 20-25, 1997* (eds. L.H. Schiffman *et al.*, Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society and Shrine of the Book 2000) 226-47 (esp. 235); D.J. Harrington "The Raz Nihyeh in a Qumran Wisdom Text (1Q26, 4Q415-418, 423)," *RevQ* 17 (1996) 549-53; idem, *Wisdom Texts*, 49.

[7] Note, for example, Milik's translation "mystère futur" in the Book of Mysteries. See D. Barthélemy and J.T. Milik, *Qumran Cave 1* (DJD 1, Oxford: Clarendon 1955) 103.

[8] Cf. CD ii 9-10; 1QH xix 13-14; 4Q402 4 12. נהיה can also exclusively refer to the past or the future. For further discussion, see M.J. Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom of 4QInstruction* (STDJ 50, Leiden: Brill 2003) 54-61.

(2:22; cf. 1QS iii 23).[9] One can infer that the righteous do. Solomon purports to possess knowledge about creation and history that is broadly analogous to what the *mebin* can attain through the mystery that is to be. In Wis 7:17-18, for example, Solomon claims that God has given him "unerring knowledge of what exists (τῶν ὄντων), to know the structure of the world and the activity of the elements; the beginning and end and middle of times," an assertion that parallels 4Q418 123 ii 3-4 (cf. Wis 3:9).[10] The Wisdom of Solomon does not emphasize study as the means by which such knowledge can be attained, whereas this mode of acquisition is stressed by 4Q*Instruction* (e.g., 4Q417 1 i 6-8; 4Q418 221 2-3). Rather wisdom is given by God, following the example of Solomon in 1 Kgs 3. One should pray for understanding (Wis 7:7-22; cf. 4Q416 2 iii 11).

Who can attain genuine knowledge of God and the cosmos? According to the Wisdom of Solomon, the righteous, who are sharply distinguished from the wicked. In 4Q*Instruction* the answer is the elect community to which the composition is addressed. Its members are distinguished from the rest of humankind. 4Q418 81 states that God has separated the addressee from the "fleshly spirit" (רוח בשר), an important expression that I deal with below that probably refers to the non-elect (l. 2). This fragment also claims "With all the [div]ine being[s] he has cast your lot" (ll. 4-5). The separation from the rest of humankind and the addressee's affinity with the angels, along with his access to supernatural revelation in the form of the *raz nihyeh*, suggest that the composition was written to a specific community that considered its members to have elect status.[11] The group had some sort of sectarian mentality, although little about its structure can be recovered. The Wisdom of Solomon was intended for a specific community, presumably the Jews of Alexandria, but it is not the product of a

[9] Collins, "The Mysteries of God," 287-88; Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse*, 1: 264-65. Note the later parallel in *3 En.* 11:1, in which Metatron says: "all the mysteries of the world and all the orders of nature stand revealed before me."

[10] There is a similar revelation in *Ezekiel the Tragedian*, in which Moses' dream is interpreted: "As for beholding all the peopled earth, and things below and things above God's realm: what is, what was before and is to come you shall see" (89).

[11] The work often addresses the *mebin* in the singular but also uses this word in the plural—the understanding ones. See 4Q415 11 5; 4Q418 123 ii 4; 4Q418 221 3. There is not enough evidence to suggest that the intended audience of 4Q*Instruction* should be equated with the Dead Sea sect, although its members surely read, and were influenced by, this wisdom text. For the view that the work was written to anyone in society, see E.J.C. Tigchelaar, "The Addressees of 4QInstruction," in *Sapiential, Liturgical and Poetical Texts from Qumran: Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the International Organization for Qumran Studies, Oslo 1998* (eds. D. Falk *et al.*, STDJ 35, Leiden: Brill 2000) 62-75.

particular sect that differentiates itself from other Jews.[12] The work is addressed to all the rulers of the earth (1:1; 6:1). In principle anyone can join the ranks of the righteous.

TILLING AN ILLUMINATING GARDEN

The addressee of 4Q*Instruction* can acquire knowledge of various topics through the contemplation of the mystery that is to be. In this way he can, for example, learn who will inherit glory and how to raise a successful harvest (4Q417 2 ii 11; 4Q423 3 2). He can also attain the knowledge of good and evil. 4Q417 1 i states that from the *raz nihyeh* "you will distinguish between [goo]d and [evil according to their] works" (l. 8). Since the mystery that is to be makes this knowledge available, it signifies more than understanding the difference between right and wrong. Acquiring the knowledge of good and evil signifies the possession of wisdom about the divine framework in which human life is to be understood (cf. 4Q417 1 i 18-19; 4Q418 77 2).[13] The Treatise of the Two Spirits, which has much in common with 4Q*Instruction*, presents the knowledge of good and evil in a similar way. After laying out a deterministic, dualistic formulation of the natural order, the text concludes by stating that God "knows the results of their [humankind's] deeds for all times [everlas]ting and has given them as a legacy to the sons of man so that they know good [and evil]" (1QS iv 25-26).

Likening the *mebin* to Adam is an explicit goal of the composition. The best example of this is 4Q423 1. This fragment begins:

> …every fruit that is produced and every delightful tree, pleasing to give knowledge (כל עץ נעים נחמד להשכיל). Is [it] not a ple[asant] garden [and pleasing] to gi[ve] g[re]at knowledge? He put you in charge of it to till it and keep it

[12] Biblical Israel is presented as a paradigm for understanding the righteous. The righteous are consistently equated with Israel in the Exodus story of Wis 11-19. Barclay understands the Wisdom of Solomon as an example of "cultural antagonism," whereas Collins discerns a tension in the work between Jewish nationalism and a philanthropic ethos that espouses a love of humankind. In 4Q*Instruction* the elect are never equated with either the righteous in a universal sense or biblical Israel. It is easier to label 4Q*Instruction* as a sectarian work than the Wisdom Solomon. See Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 218-21; J.M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1996) 181-91; L.L. Grabbe, *Wisdom of Solomon* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1997) 60-61.

[13] The knowledge of good and evil is also associated with revelation in 4Q*Instruction* in its Vision of Hagu passage, which I discuss more fully below.

(בו המשילכה לעבדו ולשמרו) … [the earth,] thorns and thistles (קוץ ודרדר) it will sprout for you, and its strength will not yield to you… (ll. 1-3).[14]

There are several striking elements in this passage. Most importantly, it claims that the *mebin* has been placed in charge over the garden of Eden. 4Q423 1 borrows language directly from Gen 1-3. The statement "every delightful tree, pleasing to give knowledge" of line 1 combines material from Gen 2:9 and 3:6. 4Q423 1 1 includes the phrase כל עץ נעים נחמד להשכיל. Gen 2:9 has the expression נחמד כל־עץ and 3:6 נחמד העץ להשכיל.[15] The request to "till" and "keep" the garden reformulates the command to Adam in Gen 2:15 to maintain the garden (לעבדה ולשמרה). 4Q423 1 2 uses the verb המשיל to describe the bestowal of authority over Eden to the addressee. This word refers elsewhere in 4Q*Instruction* to his elect status. 4Q416 2 iii 11-12 reads, for example "he has given you authority (המשילכה) over an inheritance of glory" (cf. 4Q418 81 3). המשיל may also allude to the grant of dominion in Gen 1:28. The biblical text itself uses the relatively rare verb רדה, but early Jewish texts that retell this story often use המשיל to describe the authority given to Adam.[16]

All the trees of the garden provide knowledge. There is no sense that any of them are forbidden.[17] 4Q423 does not turn to Adam to understand the creation of humankind as a whole. The tropes of Eden and Adam are metaphors that describe the elect status of the intended audience.[18] That

[14] 4Q423 2 mentions the knowledge of good and evil in a context that is unfortunately not well preserved. Elgvin, the official editor of 4Q423, connects fragments 1 and 2 by a distant join, but it is not clear that they are from the same column. The two fragments are not presented as from the same column, for example, by Tigchelaar. 4Q423 2 i 7 reads: "[rejecting] the evil and knowing the good." See DJD 34: 507-8; E.J.C. Tigchelaar, *To Increase Learning for the Understanding Ones: Reading and Reconstructing the Fragmentary Early Jewish Sapiential Text 4QInstruction* (STDJ 44, Leiden: Brill 2001) 141; E.G. Chazon, "The Creation and Fall of Adam in the Dead Sea Scrolls," in *The Book of Genesis in Jewish and Oriental Christian Interpretation: A Collection of Essays* (eds. J. Frishman and L. van Rompay, Leuven: Peeters 1997) 13-24.

[15] DJD 34: 509; B.G. Wold, *Women, Men and Angels: The Qumran Wisdom Document 'Musar leMevin' and its Allusions to Genesis Creation Traditions* (WUNT 2/201, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2005) 114.

[16] See, for example, 4Q287 4 2; 4Q422 1 i 9-10; 4Q504 8 4-6. Wis 9:2-3 praises God who has "formed humankind (Adam; ἄνθρωπον) to have dominion over the creatures you have made, and rule the world in holiness and righteousness, and pronounce judgment in uprightness of soul." See further Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 101-2.

[17] This is also the case in Ben Sira. Sir 17:7 reads: "With wisdom and knowledge he fills them; good and evil he shows them."

[18] While the passage is difficult to interpret because of its fragmentary condition, the "eternal planting" in 4Q418 81 13 has been reasonably understood as a reference to the flourishing of the elect community. See further T. Elgvin, "An Analysis of 4QInstruction" (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1997) 273; L.T. Stuckenbruck, "'Angels' and 'God': Exploring the Limits of Early Jewish

the *mebin* must "till" and "keep" the garden illustrates that his special status before God and access to supernatural revelation are not simply gifts. They require effort and study to be realized. The addressee must fulfill the promise of his elect status through right conduct and contemplation of the mystery that is to be. Line 3 of 4Q423 1 states "[the earth,] thorns and thistles (קוץ ודרדר) it will sprout for you, and its strength will not yield to you …" The phrase "thorns and thistles" is a clear allusion to Gen 3:18, in which the expression describes the harsh condition of the land Adam must work once he is out of Eden.[19] Since the fragment never describes an expulsion from Eden, line 3 presumably reformulates Gen 3:18 so that the "thorns and thistles" describe the condition of Eden *itself* if the addressee does not maintain it properly.[20] A garden that is flourishing and well maintained represents the addressee's genuine commitment to the ethics and study advocated by 4Q*Instruction*. Eden, if in a state of decline and disarray, functions as a metaphor for taking the wrong path.

ADAM AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

In 4Q*Instruction* Adam represents an ideal for the addressee to follow in his acquisition of knowledge, since he is to learn the knowledge of good and evil. By contrast, the Wisdom of Solomon does not emphasize the wisdom that Adam possessed. Woman Wisdom is the provider of knowledge (e.g., 8:7). But in a sense this work, like 4Q*Instruction*, lays out the possibility to return to the garden. The Diaspora text claims that the ultimate reward of eternal life that the righteous can attain represents a fulfillment of humankind's original destiny, as exemplified by the creation of Adam. To demonstrate this requires an examination of the themes of death and creation in the Wisdom of Solomon.

The composition asserts that death was not part of the natural order, as originally formulated by God. Wis 1:13 boldly claims "God did not make death." Wis 2:23 asserts that death entered the world because of

Monotheism," in *Exploring Early Jewish and Christian Monotheism* (eds. L.T. Stuckenbruck and W.E.S. North, JSNTSup 263, New York and London: Continuum 2004) 45-70 (esp. 65-66); P.A. Tiller, "The 'Eternal Planting' in the Dead Sea Scrolls," *DSD* 4 (1997) 312-35.

[19] The line seems to adapt language from Gen 4:12 as well. See J. Dochhorn, "'Sie wird dir nicht ihre Kraft geben'—Adam, Kain und der Ackerbau in 4Q423 2$_3$ und Apc Mos 24," in *The Wisdom Texts from Qumran and the Development of Sapiential Thought* (eds. C. Hempel *et al.*, BETL 159, Leuven: Leuven University Press and Peeters 2002) 351-64.

[20] There is room for only a few words between the statement in line 2 that the addressee is to maintain the garden and the "thorns and thistles" of line 3. This topic is introduced without enough space, it seems, to recount any sort of expulsion from Eden. Cf. 1QH xvi 24-25.

the envy of the devil, which is generally understood as a reference to the snake (cf. 14:13-14).[21] As Kolarcik has demonstrated, the Wisdom of Solomon is intentionally ambiguous with regard to death.[22] The wicked, according to the argument they lay out in Wis 1:16-2:20, consider physical death to be the final end of the human being, a position that forms the basis of a nihilistic and libertine approach to life. The righteous, by contrast, know that the soul is immortal and that they will enjoy a blessed afterlife after the death of the body. The death that "God did not make" is reasonably understood to be not physical death but, in the words of Kolarcik, "ultimate death," the death of the soul that represents a complete rupture from God and his creation.[23] The positions of both the righteous and the wicked are in a sense correct. The wicked, through their heinous conduct, surrender any chance of an afterlife and thus physical death is for them the end (cf. 3:10). They do not understand that the fate of the righteous is different, even though they too experience the demise of the body: "in the eyes of the foolish they seemed to have died" (3:2; cf. 4:17).[24] Righteousness is immortal, according to Wis 1:15, and it follows that the righteous are as well (cf. 6:19; 8:17; 15:3). The Wisdom of Solomon takes on the basic Platonic view that the world of appearances, including physical death, is less important than the immaterial realm of ideal forms, which in Middle Platonism is associated with the heavenly world.[25]

The Wisdom of Solomon posits that creation itself was designed by a God of life and the forces of evil and "ultimate death," while present, are eventually expunged when they enter the fabric of creation. Pseudo-Solomon explains the view that God did not make death by stating "he created all things so that they might exist (εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα); the generative forces of the world are wholesome (σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου), and there is no destructive poison in them, and the dominion

[21] This has also been considered a reference to the Cain and Abel story. See Collins, "The Mysteries of God," 299; Hogan, "The Exegetical Background," 22-23; Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 121.

[22] M. Kolarcik, *The Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1-6* (AnBib 127, Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblico 1991). See also Grabbe, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 52-53; Y. Amir, "The Figure of Death in the 'Book of Wisdom,'" *JJS* 30 (1979) 154-78.

[23] Philo also makes an explicit distinction between physical and spiritual death (*Leg*. 1.105-7). See further Kolarcik, *The Ambiguity of Death*, 180; H. Engel, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk 1998) 57; Hogan, "The Exegetical Background," 11; M. Gilbert, "La Relecture de Gn 1-3 dans le Livre de Sagesse," in *La creation dans l'Orient Ancien* (LD 127, Paris: Cerf 1987) 323-44 (esp. 326).

[24] W. Werner, "'Denn Gerechtigkeit ist unsterblich': Schöpfung, Tod und Unvergänglichkeit nach Weish 1,11-15 und 2,21-24," in *Lehrerin der Gerechtigkeit* (eds. G. Hentschel and E. Zenger, Leipzig: Benno 1990) 26-61 (esp. 46).

[25] Ibid., 43; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (rev. ed., Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 [orig. publ. 1977]) 48.

(or palace; βασίλειον) of Hades is not on earth" (1:14).[26] Philo also describes creation as having an inherent proclivity towards life, preservation and thus a kind of eternity.[27]

The elements of creation ally themselves with God in his destruction of the impious. Wis 5:17-23 reads in part, for example: "The Lord will take his zeal as his whole armor, and will arm all creation to repel his enemies … and creation will join with him to fight against his frenzied foes" (vv. 17, 20).[28] The author, in his retelling of the Exodus story in chapters 11-19, explains the plagues by writing: "For creation, serving you who made it, exerts itself to punish the unrighteous" (16:24; cf. 19:6).[29] The cosmos plays a different role in the implementation of judgment in 4Q*Instruction*. In 4Q416 1 the natural world trembles in reaction to the advent of God to destroy the wicked. The "heavens will be afraid" and the "[s]eas and depths" will be in terror" (ll. 11-12).[30]

Both the creation theology and anthropology of the Wisdom of Solomon rely on an interpretation of Gen 1-3.[31] Wis 1:13-14, with its

[26] NRSV. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 100, translates the first half of 1:14 "he created all things that they might endure. All that has come into existence preserves its being." As he explains (pp. 108-9), the word σωτήρ denotes the preservation of one's being in Greek philosophy, and that nature's inclination for self-preservation is a basic element of Stoic thought. Consult further M. Gilbert, "The Origins according to the Wisdom of Solomon," in *History and Identity: How Israel's Later Authors Viewed its Earlier History* (eds. N. Calduch-Benages and J. Liesen, DCLY 2006, Berlin: de Gruyter 2006) 171-85 (esp. 172); H. Hübner, *Die Weisheit Salomons* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999) 35; M.V. Fabbri, *Creazione e Salvezza nel Libro della Sapienza: Esegesi di Sapienza 1, 13-15* (Roma: Armando 1998); W. Vogels, "The God Who Creates is the God Who Saves: The Book of Wisdom's Reversal of the Biblical Pattern," *EgT* 22 (1991) 315-35.

[27] *Opif*. 44 states "For God had decided that nature should run a cyclical race, thereby immortalizing the kinds (ἀπαθανατίζων τὰ γένη) and giving them a share of eternity (ἀιδιότητος)" (cf. *Aet.* 35). The terminology is similar to that of Wis 2:23 (see below). This and subsequent translations of this work are from D.T. Runia, *On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses: Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (PACS 1, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature 2001). Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 60, states that the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo "have virtually identical theories of creation." See also idem, "Philo and the Wisdom of Solomon on Creation, Revelation, and Providence: The High-Water Mark of Jewish Hellenistic Fusion," in *Shem in the Tents of Japhet*, 109-30.

[28] Kolarcik, *The Ambiguity of Death*, 175; M. McGlynn, *Divine Judgment and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom* (WUNT 2/139, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2001).

[29] This is contrasted with God's use of creation to sustain the Israelites in the desert with fire and manna. Cf. Sir 39:25-31.

[30] See the reconstruction of this passage in Tigchelaar, *To Increase Learning*, 185. 4Q418 69 ii 9 states that the foundations of the firmament will cry out when the wicked are judged.

[31] Gilbert, "The Origins," 171-75; idem, "La Relecture," 323-44; Hogan, "The Exegetical Background," 15-18.

account of God's creation, implicitly alludes to Gen 1 and may adapt phrases from the biblical text.[32] The incorporation of language from Genesis is explicit in Wis 2:23: "for God created Adam with incorruption (ἐπ' ἀφθαρσίᾳ) and made him an image of his own eternity (εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδιας ἀϊδιότητος)."[33] The phrase "image of his own eternity" is a patent reference to Gen 1:27. This suggests that the phrase τὸν ἄνθρωπον of Wis 2:23 should be translated as "Adam," who represents the creation of humankind. The claim that he was created as the "image of God" is in parallelism with the statement that he was fashioned to be without decay. Wis 2:23 asserts that Adam was designed to have immortal life and thus be like God—aspirations which are considered transgressions against God in Genesis itself (3:22). Presumably the Wisdom of Solomon refers to the immortality of the soul rather than perpetual existence of the body. The term ἀφθαρσία ("incorruption") is important in Epicurean philosophy, referring to the eternal yet material existence of the gods.[34] The claim that he was created with "incorruption" may also be a kind of allegorical reference to the tree of life.[35] The immortality of the righteous is presented as a restoration of Adam's original condition. This has a Palestinian parallel in the conviction held by the Dead Sea sect that its members will attain the "glory of Adam" (כבוד אדם), an enigmatic term that probably denotes the prospect of eternal life for the elect.[36] As Gilbert and Larcher have observed, Wis 2:23 states that the man is made

[32] Gilbert, "La Relecture," 324, suggests that Wis 1:13-14 evokes the assertion in Gen 1 that God made the heavens and the earth. As he notes, the phrase αἱ γενέσεις of Wis 1:14 may allude to word תולדות of Gen 2:4. See also Werner, "Denn Gerechtigkeit ist unsterblich," 51.

[33] J.M. Reese argues that ἐπί with the dative in this verse should not be translated "for," on the grounds that this usage is found 22 times in the Wisdom of Solomon and never indicates finality. See his *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences* (AnBib 41, Rome: Biblical Institute Press 1970) 66. The text may state that Adam was made in the image of God's own "proper being," reading ἰδιότητος instead of ἀϊδιότητος. But since God's being is eternal, it is not clear that there is a major semantic difference between the two variant readings. See Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 121; Werner, "Denn Gerechtigkeit ist unsterblich," 35.

[34] Wis 6:18-19 claims that one can attain "incorruption" through fidelity to the laws of God and that it makes one near to God (cf. 12:1; 18:4). See also Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 186-87; Reese, *Hellenistic Influence*, 65-69.

[35] Engel, *Das Buch der Weisheit*, 76.

[36] 1QS iv 7, 22-23; CD iii 20; 1QH iv 15 (cf. 4Q171 3 1-2). See further C.H.T. Fletcher-Louis, *All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls* (STDJ 42, Leiden: Brill 2002) 95-97; K.P. Sullivan, *Wrestling With Angels: A Study of the Relationship Between Angels and Humans in Ancient Jewish Literature and the New Testament* (AGJU 55, Leiden: Brill 2004) 85-90.

the image of God, not *in* the image of God, as in the biblical text.[37] Adam is himself the image of God—a copy or reflection of the deity's eternal nature.[38] Philo puts forward a similar scenario, understanding the creation of humankind to be a "copy" and "archetypal seal" of the Logos or God's image, making humanity "an image of an image" (*Opif*. 25).[39]

Immortality, the original condition of humankind, was corrupted by the introduction of death into the world by the Devil (2:24). Thus the Wisdom of Solomon can be understood as incorporating the transgression in the garden, which Genesis associates with death (2:17; 3:19). But death is presented as an intrusion into the natural order rather than a consequence of Adam's free will and personal decision to eat from the tree. The fall is not a major topic in the composition. The Wisdom of Solomon actually claims that Adam was cleared of any wrong-doing. Wis 10:1 states that personified wisdom "delivered" Adam "from his transgression." The "deliverance" of Adam is apparently derived from the fact that he was not killed as soon as he ate the fruit.[40] The Diaspora text mitigates any sense that Adam sinned probably because the work associates eternal life with the patriarch. This interpretation of Genesis is compatible with that of 4Q423, which removes any sense of prohibition from eating of a tree in the garden and associates Adam with the elect rather than sin or transgression.[41]

A fall of Adam also plays no role in his mortality, according to the Wisdom of Solomon. In Wis 7:1 Solomon stresses that he is mortal, being a "descendant of the first-formed child of earth" (cf. v. 6; 9:5).[42] This adapts language from Gen 2:7 to understand the finite nature of the

[37] LXX Gen 1:27 includes the phrase κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ. See Gilbert, "La Relecture," 326-27; Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse*, 1: 268; Runia, *On the Creation of the Cosmos*, 149-50.

[38] Wis 7:26 asserts that Wisdom is "an image of his [God's] goodness."

[39] Cf. 134; *Leg*. 3.95-96; Plato, *Timaeus* 37D.

[40] Gen 2:17: "in the day that you eat of it you shall die" (cf. 3:17, 19). See U. Schwenk-Bressler, *Sapientia Salomonis als ein Beispiel frühjüdischer Textauslegung: Die Auslegung des Buches Genesis, Exodus 1-15 und Teilen der Wüstentradition in Sap 10-19* (BEATAJ 32, Frankfurt: Lang 1993) 65-66 (I thank Matthias Weigold for this reference); Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse*, 2.612-14; Hogan, "The Exegetical Background," 18-20.

[41] The compositions' focus on Adam impacts their instruction regarding daily life in different ways. 4Q*Instruction* incorporates passages from Gen 1-3 with regard to the theme of marriage. 4Q416 2 iii 21, for example, reads: "Walk together with the helper of your flesh," conflating language from Gen 2:18 and 24 (cf. 4Q416 2 iv 1). This basic advice is consistent with the view of 4Q423 1 that the addressee should be like Adam. Like Adam, the addressee should have a wife. The Wisdom of Solomon, by contrast, shows much less interest in family life. Childlessness is actually endorsed, provided one is virtuous (4:1; cf. 3:13-14). The text does not allude to Adam with regard to marriage. See further Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 183-240; Goff, *Discerning Wisdom*, 49-53; Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 190-93.

[42] Collins, "The Mysteries of God," 300-1; Gilbert, "La Relecture," 330.

body. This verse states that Adam was created from the dust of the earth into a "living creature" (נפש חיה) (cf. 1:20; 9:16). The Wisdom of Solomon associates physical death with this patriarch but without any negative connotation. The text alludes elsewhere to Gen 2:7 when discussing human finitude.[43] The Wisdom of Solomon turns to Gen 1-3 to understand the human condition—the immortal nature of the soul is associated with the "image of God" of Gen 1:27 and the mortal nature of the body with Gen 2:7.

The anthropology of the Wisdom of Solomon is similar to the "double creation of man" of Philo.[44] He explains the differences between the characterizations of Adam in Gen 1-3 by positing the creation of two different Adams—an heavenly Adam related to Gen 1:27 and a creaturely one based on Gen 2:7:

> After this he says that "God moulded the human being, making clay from the earth, and he inbreathed onto his face the breath of life" (LXX Gen 2:7). By means of this text too he shows us in the clearest fashion that there is a vast difference between the human being who has been moulded now and the one who previously came into being after the image of God (κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα θεοῦ). For the human being who has been molded as sense-perceptible object already participates in quality, consists of body and soul, is either man or woman, and is by nature mortal. The human being after the image is a kind of idea or genus or seal, is perceived by the intellect, incorporeal, neither male nor female, and is immortal by nature (*Opif.* 134; cf. 69; *Leg*. 1.31).

This scenario, informed by Platonic dualism, lays the groundwork for the two different types of humankind, each corresponding to a type of Adam. The Wisdom of Solomon puts forward an anthropology that is similar to, but different from, *Opif*. 134. Both texts describe two opposing types of humankind, but unlike Philo, in the Wisdom of Solomon one kind is more like Adam than the other. The righteous can attain the immortality with which Adam was originally endowed and the wicked cannot. The former enjoy immortality of the soul and the latter have only their doomed flesh. The Wisdom of Solomon understands Adam's association with the righteous in relation to the soul and his connection

[43] Hogan, "The Exegetical Background," 15, has suggested that there is an ironic allusion to Gen 2:7 in Wis 2:2-3, which depicts the impious recounting their mortality—"the breath in our nostrils is smoke … the body will turn to ashes, and the spirit will dissolve like empty air." The word "breath" (πνοή) may relate to the assertion that God created Adam by breathing into him (πνοὴν ζωῆς; LXX Gen 2:7). She also contends that Wis 15:8-11, which recounts a man who makes idols from clay, ironically adapts language from Gen 2:7. See also Gilbert, "La Relecture," 325, 338.

[44] Hogan, "The Exegetical Background," 7; T. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation* (CBQMS 14, Washington: The Catholic Biblical Association 1983) 87-101.

to all people in terms of their flesh, rather than juxtapose a corporeal Adam with one that is incorporeal in the manner of Philo. The mortality of Adam is explicitly connected to Gen 2:7 in Philo, whereas the Wisdom of Solomon only alludes to this verse when discussing Adam's mortality.

THE FLESHLY SPIRIT AND THE SPIRITUAL PEOPLE

4Q*Instruction* utilizes Gen 1-3 to understand humankind in ways that are similar to the Wisdom of Solomon (and Philo). To illustrate this involves an examination of the well known "vision of Hagu" passage (4Q417 1 i 13-18). Lines 15-18 of this column read:

> The book of remembrance is written before him for those who keep his word—that is, the vision of Hagu for the book of remembrance. He bequeathed it to אנוש together with a spiritual people, be[cau]se he fashioned him according to the likeness of the holy ones. But no more did he give Hagu to the fleshly spirit because it did not distinguish between [go]od and evil according to the judgment of its [sp]irit.[45]

The goal of the vision of Hagu passage is for the *mebin*, to whom the passage is addressed, to identify with and emulate the spiritual people (l. 13). "The vision of Hagu" (חזון ההגוי; l. 16) is equated with a heavenly book and thus represents a form of supernatural revelation, like the mystery that is to be.[46] However, there are no calls for the *mebin* to contemplate the vision of Hagu as is repeatedly the case with the *raz nihyeh* (cf. 4Q418 43 4).

The vision of Hagu passage lays out two different types of humankind—spiritual and fleshly.[47] The former is connected to angels (קדושים) and revelation (Hagu). The latter is associated with a lack of revelation and of the knowledge of good and evil. The "spirit" of the spiritual people represents affinity with the heavenly world and the

[45] Scholarship on this passage includes Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 80-126; Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 124-49; J.J. Collins, "In the Likeness of the Holy Ones: The Creation of Humankind in a Wisdom Text from Qumran," in *The Provo International Conference on the Dead Sea Scrolls* (eds. D.W. Parry and E. Ulrich, STDJ 30, Leiden: Brill 1999) 609-19; Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination*, 80-90.

Materially the passage is in poor condition. See further DJD 34:160-66; Tigchelaar, *To Increase Learning*, 52-54.

[46] This vision can be compared to the "book of Hagu" mentioned in the *Rule of the Congregation* and the *Damascus Document* (CD x 6; xiv 6-8; 1QSa I 6-7).

[47] J. Frey, "Flesh and Spirit in the Palestinian Jewish Sapiential Tradition and in the Qumran Texts: An Inquiry into the Background of Pauline Usage," in *The Wisdom Texts from Qumran*, 367-404.

"flesh" of the fleshly spirit signifies separation from this realm.[48] The expression "spiritual people" occurs nowhere else in 4Q*Instruction* aside from this passage. In 4Q418 81 1-2 the addressee is told that God has separated him from the fleshly spirit. The judgment scene of 4Q416 1 states that "every fleshly spirit will be laid bare," that is, destroyed (l. 12). The term is used elsewhere in early Jewish literature, as in the *Hodayot*, to emphasize the creaturely and base aspect of the human condition.[49] The phrase "fleshly spirit" denotes the mortality of the body. The term can be reasonably understood as referring to the rest of humankind, the non-elect, who cannot attain eternal life. The situation is different with the spiritual people. They are associated with the angels. Elsewhere 4Q*Instruction* asserts that the angels enjoy eternal life (4Q418 69 ii 13). The spiritual people can thus be linked to eternal life as well. It can be inferred that they have the prospect of life after death, whereas the fleshly spirit does not.[50]

The spiritual people are not only connected to the angels. The vision is also given to אנוש (l. 13). Strugnell and Harrington, the official editors of 4Q*Instruction*, suggest that this is either a reference to the patriarch Enosh or humanity in general.[51] Both interpretations are possible but difficult to sustain. Enoch is never depicted as a recipient of revelation in early Jewish literature. If אנוש refers to humankind in 4Q417 1 i 16, the line states that humanity receives the vision of Hagu. This accords poorly with the assertion in line 17 that this vision is not given to the fleshly spirit.[52] John Collins has reasonably argued that אנוש is a reference to Adam.[53] The word is used this way in the Treatise on the Two Spirits when referring to the grant of dominion given to Adam (1QS iii 18). The reference to the knowledge of good and evil in the Hagu passage also evokes Adam. The phrase "according to the likeness of the holy ones"

[48] Collins, "The Mysteries of God," 304.

[49] The speaker, for example, uses the term to refer to himself: "[What is] the spirit of flesh to under all these matters [heavenly revelation] and to have insight in [your wondrous] and great counsel?" (1QH v 19-20).

[50] Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 134, understands the fleshly spirit to be "just as immortal" as the spiritual people because "they survive for punishment in the hereafter." The fleshly spirit is destroyed in the final judgment and may be consigned to eternal punishment, as discussed below. This sharply distinguishes any type of immortality possessed by the fleshly spirit from that of the spiritual people.

[51] DJD 34: 164. Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination*, 87-88.

[52] The "book of remembrance" is established "for those who keep his word" (ll. 15-16), presumably a reference to the elect or at least the righteous. Humankind writ large does not have access to this book, which is equated with the vision of Hagu.

[53] It is unusual that Wold, whose book surveys allusions to Genesis in 4Q*Instruction*, argues against reading אנוש as Adam, one of the most important Genesis allusions in the composition. He favors the translation "humanity." See his *Women, Men and Angels*, 139; Fletcher-Louis, *All the Glory of Adam*, 114.

(כתבנית קדושים) can be understood as a paraphrase of the expression "in the image of God" (בצלם אלהים) from Gen 1:27, with אלהים interpreted as a reference to angels.[54] The "image of God" language of Gen 1 is reformulated to assert that the spiritual people (עם רוח) are "fashioned" in the likeness of the holy ones (יצרו).[55] "Likeness" signifies an angelic and heavenly prototype after which God fashions the spiritual people. If the angels have eternal life and the spiritual people who are like them have the prospect of eternal life, one can posit that Adam, who is linked to both groups, was created to have a blessed afterlife as well. This interpretation is also suggested by the fact that the *mebin*, by modeling himself after Adam through proper maintenance of the garden, can acquire a blessed afterlife, as I discuss below. The author of 4Q*Instruction* may have understood Adam as immortal but never asserts this as explicitly as Wis 2:23.

The two contrasting types of humankind in 4Q*Instruction* are similar to the "double creation of man" in Philo, who, as discussed above, argues that Gen 1:27 and 2:7 describe the creation of two different Adams. Since the spiritual people correspond to the Adam of Gen 1 who is made in the image of God, the fleshly spirit can be plausibly associated with the creaturely, mortal characterization of Adam in Gen 2:7, although the Hagu passage admittedly never alludes to this verse.[56] Philo may appropriate an older tradition of distinguishing between "spiritual" and "fleshly" types of humankind that influences 4Q*Instruction*, which he transforms in light of a Platonic dichotomy between the corporeal and incorporeal.[57]

The Wisdom of Solomon also has significant points in common with the two types of humankind laid out in the Hagu passage. The spiritual people of 4Q*Instruction* and the righteous of the Wisdom of Solomon are associated with "the image of God" trope of Gen 1, a motif which both works understand as a reference to eternal life. The Qumran text construes the "image" as a sort of heavenly paradigm that influences the creation of one type of humankind, whereas in the Wisdom of Solomon humanity itself was originally created as the divine "image," a reflection or copy of God's being.

[54] Collins, "In the Likeness of the Holy Ones," 613, 615; DJD 34: 165-66.

[55] The text can also be read as mentioning the inclination, or *yetzer*, of these spiritual people. Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 148, understands the suffix of יצרו as referring to all of humankind, rather than just the spiritual people.

[56] The phrase רוח בשר may paraphrase the expression נפש חיה ("living being") of Gen 2:7. See Goff, *Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 98-99.

[57] Collins, "In the Likeness of the Holy Ones," 617. Writing before the emergence of 4Q*Instruction*, Tobin suspected that Philo's "double creation of man" relies on older tradition because he often adapts the dichotomy so that it refers not to two men but two minds. See his *On the Creation of Man*, 137.

The recipients of a blessed afterlife in the two texts—the righteous in the case of the Wisdom of Solomon and the spiritual people of 4QInstruction—have some sort of affinity with Adam. Despite the association of Adam with the death of all humankind in Wis 7:1, both compositions assert that some people are more like Adam than others. The righteous of the Wisdom of Solomon, not the wicked, can attain the blissful state of eternal life originally bestowed to Adam.[58] The claim that the *mebin* has stewardship over the garden suggests that the knowledge he can attain through the mystery that is to be represents a restoration of wisdom originally possessed by Adam.[59] This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the addressee can attain the knowledge of good and evil. The fleshly spirit, by contrast, does not possess this knowledge.

Both the Wisdom of Solomon and 4Q*Instruction* oppose those who attain eternal life with a type of humankind that is associated with the physical death of the body. The wicked of the Wisdom of Solomon are much more egregious than the fleshly spirit of 4Q*Instruction*, which is never portrayed as committing heinous acts. Both groups, however, will be ultimately destroyed by God (4Q416 1 12; Wis 5:17-23). The Wisdom of Solomon teaches that the wicked cease to exist after physical death (5:9-14). 4Q*Instruction* is less explicit on this point, but asserts that the "foolish of heart" go to the "eternal pit" (4Q418 69 ii 6). This may suggest that they will endure some sort of postmortem anguish.[60]

The Wisdom of Solomon's portrayal of Adam can help elucidate the interpretation of Gen 1-3 in the Hagu passage of 4Q*Instruction*. As discussed above, the composition minimizes the view that Adam transgressed. There could be something similar at work in the vision of Hagu passage. The fleshly spirit may be associated with the transgression in the garden.[61] 4Q417 1 i 17 can be translated "But no

[58] In *1 Enoch* and other early Jewish texts the final abode of the righteous is modeled after Eden. See E.J.C. Tigchelaar, "Eden and Paradise: The Garden Motif in Some Early Jewish Texts," in *Paradise Interpreted: Representations of Biblical Paradise in Judaism and Christianity* (ed. G.P. Luttikhuizen, TBN 2, Leiden: Brill 1999) 37-57.

[59] G. Macaskill, *Revealed Wisdom and Inaugurated Eschatology in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity* (JSJSup 115, Leiden: Brill 2007) 112-13.

[60] The likelihood of this possibility is increased if its author was familiar with a version of *1 Enoch*, which has a clear affirmation of punishment after death for the wicked. See further Goff, *The Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 197-204.

[61] Elgvin, "An Analysis," 90-91, observes that the verb **יצר** is used in 4Q417 1 i 17 in relation to the spiritual people and the holy ones, and that it is also used in Gen 2:7, which describes the 'creaturely' Adam. He therefore suggests that the two creation stories are conflated into one, with the spiritual people corresponding to Adam before the fall and the fleshly spirit to him after the fall. But, as we have seen above, the account of the elect and the garden in 4Q423 1 never mentions any fall of grace on Adam's part.

more (ועוד לוא) did he give Hagu to the fleshly spirit."[62] This is the translation given in DJD 34.[63] עוד normally has a temporal sense.[64] Thus it may be implied that the fleshly spirit at one point had the "vision of Hagu" but does "no more"—it lost it because it did not distinguish between good and evil (ll. 17-18). The fleshly spirit, as argued above, can be reasonably correlated to Adam in Gen 2-3. There is no claim, however, in 4Q*Instruction* that this revelation was ever possessed by this spirit. Furthermore, if the fleshly spirit had the vision of Hagu it is not clear why it would not know good from evil.[65] Nevertheless "but no more" is a reasonable translation of ועוד לוא. The key for understanding the implications of the phrase ועוד לוא seems to be the sharp distinction between אנוש and the fleshly spirit. Two Adams may be implied in the Hagu passage, but only one is mentioned, and he is allied with the spiritual people, not the fleshly spirit. This is fully consistent with 4Q423 1, in which the elect addressee is likened to Adam. 4Q*Instruction* is vague about why the fleshly spirit does not have the knowledge of good and evil. The text is utterly silent on the topic of the creation of this spirit, whereas this is very much not the case with the spiritual people. 4Q*Instruction* takes pains to separate the figure of Adam from any sense of imperfection or poor judgment. This 'saves' Adam from any sense of wrong-doing recounted in Gen 1-3 and in that sense the Hagu passage is similar to Wis 10:1. The assertion that Hagu was "no more" given to the fleshly spirit may obliquely refer to the fact that Adam is punished in the garden.

LIFE AFTER DEATH WITH THE ANGELS

Like the righteous of the Wisdom of Solomon, the *mebin* of 4Q*Instruction* experiences physical death. 4Q418 103 ii 9 emphasizes that his flesh will expire: "[More]over your wealth is together with your flesh. [When the days of] your life [come to an end], they (also) will come to an end together" (cf. 4Q416 2 iii 7-8; 4Q418 55 11). His inevitable demise is not connected to Adam, in contrast to Wis 7:1. The *mebin* probably expected

[62] I have earlier argued that **ועוד** should be translated "moreover." See *Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 99; Wold, *Women, Men and Angels*, 136. Lange, *Weisheit und Prädestination*, 53, translates "Doch die Erklärung wurde nicht dem Geist des Fleisches gegeben."

[63] DJD 34: 155.

[64] B.K. Waltke and M. O'Connor define עוד as a "constituent adverb" that "qualif[ies] the time extent of the predicate." See their *An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax* (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns 1990) 657. עוד often has no temporal sense when used without a finite verb as in Isa 45:5, "I am the Lord and there is no other (ואין עוד)." The finite verb in 4Q417 1 i 17 is נתן.

[65] Collins, "The Mysteries of God," 302.

to join the angels after death. This is not stated directly but can be plausibly inferred. He is told to act like the angels. They are depicted as model students who never stop searching for truth: "Indeed, would they say: 'We are tired of works of truth, [we] are weary of …' Do [they] not wal[k] in eternal light? … [gl]ory and an abundance of splendor are with them" (4Q418 69 ii 13-14; cf. 4Q418 55 8-11). 4Q417 2 i 10-12 states that through the study of the mystery that is to be the *mebin* can know who will inherit glory and who iniquity. This passage also warns the addressee not to rejoice in his mourning and that "eternal joy" is established for those who mourn. "Joy" is not associated with this side of physical death but afterwards.[66] Eternal joy, or שמחת עולם, is a foil to the שחת עולם, or "eternal pit" (4Q418 69 ii 6; cf. 4Q418 126 ii 6-7).[67] Eternal joy is reasonably understood as a reference to eternal life. This would thus be similar to the *Epistle of Enoch*, which states "you will have great joy like the angels of heaven" (*1 En.* 104:14; cf. *3 En.* 43:1). A core lesson of 4Q*Instruction* is that if the *mebin* acts like the angels in life he will join them after death. In life the addressee must preserve his "holy spirit" through righteous living and proper education (e.g., 4Q416 2 ii 6). After the death of the flesh that part of him that has affinity with the angels simply continues to exist.[68] The elect status of the addressee is formulated in relation to both angels and Adam.

The *mebin* and his affinities with the angels can shed light on the theme of eternal life in the Wisdom of Solomon. Wis 3:7 states with regard to the righteous that "in the time of their visitation they will shine forth, and will run like sparks through the stubble."[69] This is similar to texts such as Dan 12:3, which posits a luminous afterlife for the righteous with the angels, who are associated with the stars. This Jewish tradition informs several of the claims the righteous make, according to the wicked in Wis 2. v. 13 reads: "He professes to have knowledge of

[66] This interpretation is consistent with the poverty and difficult financial circumstances faced by the addressee. For more on this topic, see H.-J. Fabry, "Die Armenfrömmigkeit in den qumranischen Weisheitstexten," in *Weisheit in Israel* (eds. D.J.A. Clines *et al.*, ATM 12, Münster: Lit-Verlag 2003) 145-65; B.G. Wright III, "The Categories of Rich and Poor in the Qumran Sapiential Literature," in *Sapiential Perspectives: Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium of the Orion Center, 20-22 May 2001* (eds. J.J. Collins *et al.*, STDJ 51, Leiden: Brill 2004) 101-23.

[67] These expressions (with עולם in the plural) also contrast one another in the Treatise on the Two Spirits (1QS iv 6-14).

[68] I address the issue of resurrection below.

[69] Notice the parallelism between "holy ones" and "elect" in Wis 3:9. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 128; Gilbert, "Sagesse 3,7-9," 307-23; Grabbe, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 56.

God, and calls himself a child of the Lord (παῖδα κυρίου)."[70] The word παῖς could mean "servant" rather than "child."[71] But according to v. 16 the righteous man "boasts" that God is his father. The wicked propose attacking him to see if God will protect him: "if the righteous man is God's son (υἱὸς θεου), he will help him, and will deliver him from the hand of his adversaries" (2:18). "Son of God" is a common term for angels in the Hebrew Bible and Early Judaism. 4Q*Instruction* asserts that God has placed the addressee in the "lot of the angels" and then claims that he has established the *mebin* "for himself as a first-born son (בכור)" (4Q418 81 4-5). Taken literally, this line counts the addressee among the "sons of God."[72] As explained above, they are similar to the angels during life, being in the their "lot," and this affinity is fully realized after death. In Wis 2:13-18 the wicked claim that the righteous person counts himself, using the present indicative, among the sons of God. The final rewards of the righteous after the death of the body are presented as a continuation or enhancement of their similarity to the angels while they were living. In the eschatological judgment scene of Wis 5, the wicked realize before the final obliteration that the righteous are to join the angels after the judgment: "Why have they been numbered among the sons of God (υἱοῖς θεοῦ) and why is their lot among the holy ones (ἁγίοις)?" (v. 5; cf. 18:13; 4Q418 81 4-5).[73] The righteous' post-mortem union with the angels should not be taken literally in the Wisdom of Solomon. It is better understood as a metaphor that gives expression to the goal of union of the soul with God's eternal being.[74] The Wisdom of Solomon is shaped by the idea of an angelic afterlife, reformulated in terms of the Greek conception of the immortality of the soul. The construal of the reward of eternal life in both the Wisdom of Solomon and 4Q*Instruction* leaves little need for resurrection, either of the spirit or

[70] G.W.E. Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early Christianity* (rev. ed., HTS 56, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2006 [orig. publ. 1972]) 81.

[71] This phrase has been considered an allusion to the fourth Servant Song of Isaiah. See Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 120.

[72] Elgvin, "An Analysis of 4QInstruction," 140; Tigchelaar, *To Increase Learning*, 233.

[73] Wis 2:16c may also refer to the ultimate rewards of the righteous, who purportedly "calls the last end of the righteous happy (μαρακίζει ἔσχατα δικαίων)." If this denotes their eschatological fate, the statement can be compared to the prospect of "eternal joy" expected by the *mebin* of 4Q*Instruction*.

[74] Collins, "The Reinterpretation of Apocalyptic Traditions," 149. Note the association between the angels and the original plan of eternal life for humankind in *1 En.* 69:11: "For humans were not created to be different from the angels, so that they should remain pure and righteous. And death, which ruins everything, would not have laid its hand on them. But through this, their knowledge, they are perishing, and through this power it devours us."

the body. There is no unambiguous assertion of resurrection in either text.[75]

CONCLUSION

The emergence of 4Q*Instruction* provides a fuller picture of the Jewish wisdom tradition during the late Second Temple period. The composition provides a new context for evaluating the extent to which Jewish Diaspora literature attests ideas and tropes found in older Hebrew literature. The Wisdom of Solomon, while extensively reliant upon Greek philosophical traditions, was shaped by Palestinian Jewish traditions.

Both 4Q*Instruction* and the Wisdom of Solomon posit an ideal type of humankind (the spiritual people in the former, the righteous in the latter) that is described with "image of God" language from Gen 1 and given the prospect of life after death. They both distinguish this type of humanity from another that is associated with physical death. Each composition connects the prospect of eternal life with Adam, although they do not envision this ultimate reward in the same way. During his life the addressee of 4Q*Instruction* is to be like Adam and maintain the garden to attain this goal. In the Wisdom of Solomon the afterlife of the righteous represents a restoration of the original condition that Adam possessed. The addressees of 4Q*Instruction* and the Wisdom of Solomon are like Adam in ways others are not. For both works the patriarch has more to do with eternal life more than primordial sin. These similarities suggest that the Wisdom of Solomon's interpretation of Gen 1-3 should not only be attributed to its author's creativity but also to his appropriation of traditions regarding how these chapters were understood. These older interpretative traditions not only influence Philo and his "double creation of man," but, as 4Q*Instruction* demonstrates, they also appear in Hebrew wisdom literature written in

[75] E. Puech discerns a reference to resurrection in Wis 5:1, which states that the righteous will stand before God. See his "The Book of Wisdom and the Dead Sea Scrolls: an overview," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 117-41 (esp. 130-31). See also P. Beauchamp, "Le salut corporel dans le livre de la Sagesse," *Bib* 45 (1964) 491-526; Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse*, 1: 267. Both Elgvin and Puech have argued that 4Q418 69 ii 7 attests a belief in resurrection. I critique this opinion in *Worldly and Heavenly Wisdom*, 176-79. See T. Elgvin, "Early Essene Eschatology: Judgment and Salvation according to Sapiential Work A," in *Current Research and Technological Development on the Dead Sea Scrolls: Conference on the Texts from the Judean Desert, Jerusalem, 30 April 1995* (eds. D.W. Parry and S.D. Ricks, STDJ 20, Leiden: Brill 1996) 126-65 (esp. 143-44); E. Puech, "La Conception de la vie future dans le livre de la Sagesse et les manuscrits de la Mer Morte: Un Aperçu," *RevQ* 21 (2003) 209-32; idem, "Les Fragments eschatologiques de *4QInstruction* (4Q416 i et 4Q418 69 ii, 81-81a, 127)," *RevQ* 22 (2005) 89-119.

Palestine. While this Qumran text should not be understood as a literary source for Pseudo-Solomon's composition, 4Q*Instruction* can be reasonably termed, in the words of John Collins, a "missing link" between the Wisdom of Solomon and older Hebrew wisdom literature.[76] In different ways, 4Q*Instruction* and the Wisdom of Solomon both lay out the possibility that their addressees can, in a sense, return to the garden.

[76] Collins, "The Mysteries of God," 304.

SAPIENTIAL VALUES AND APOCALYPTIC IMAGERY IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON

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The very title of the book in the Septuagint, the Wisdom of Solomon (or the Book of Wisdom), would suggest that it belongs to the sapiential tradition, especially through the attribution to Solomonic authorship as in Proverbs, Song of Songs and Qoheleth. However, it is an extremely late work in comparison to the main sapiential texts of the Bible, stemming from the Greco Roman period in Egypt. Numerous scholars have noted particular affinities in the work to traits of apocalyptic literature.[1] There is a reference to the "mysteries of God" in Wis 2:22. We witness a brief, cosmic judgment of God in Wis 5:15-23 where all lawlessness is to be swept away through a cataclysmic storm. Solomon prays to God in order to receive the special wisdom which sits by the throne of God (Wis 9:10). The presentation of the exodus events throughout the entire final section of the book (Wis 11-19) is conveyed as a cosmic judgment that has already taken place in Israel's deliverance from Egypt and sustenance in the desert.

Apocalyptic works had become increasingly more prevalent primarily in Judea but also in the diaspora of Greece and Egypt from the

[1] David Winston noted apocalyptic influence on the Wisdom of Solomon particularly in the arguments for dating the book, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (AB 43, Garden City: Doubleday 1979) 21-23. John Collins explored apocalyptic influence primarily in the Wisdom author's presentation of eschatology, "Apocalyptic Eschatology in Philosophical Dress in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Shem in the Tents of Japhet: Essays on the Encounter of Judaism and Hellenism* (ed. J. Kugel, JSJSup 74, Leiden: Brill 2002) 93-107. Earlier Collins described the Wisdom of Solomon as perhaps one of the first witnesses where we see an attempt to reconcile traditional biblical wisdom with apocalyptic views, "Cosmos and Salvation: Jewish Wisdom and Apocalypticism in the Hellenistic Age," *HR* 17 (1977) 121-42. Marco Nobile goes so far as to conclude that the Wisdom of Solomon is not really a sapiential book at all but plain and simple, apocalyptic, "La thématique eschatologique dans le Livre de la Sagesse en relation avec l'apocalyptic," in *Treasures of Wisdom: Studies in Ben Sira and The Book of Wisdom* (eds. N. Calduch-Benages and J. Vermeylen, BETL 143, Leuven: Peeters 1999) 303-12.

first century BCE until the first century CE.[2] With their stress on divine revelation through visions and divine judgment throughout the cosmos, apocalyptic texts were particularly suited to situations of crisis and political unrest in Jewish communities. It would be surprising for the author of the Wisdom of Solomon not to employ certain apocalyptic elements in an exhortation to the Jewish community in Alexandria during times of crisis and political upheaval.[3] The work sustains a continuous argument for justice and wisdom in the midst of tension and challenges. What is more surprising is the manner in which the author clings to the values of the sapiential tradition (the inherent beauty and order of creation, the openness of wisdom for all, the primacy of argument to exhort and to convince are among the most important) even as the argument for justice becomes more acute in the final section of the book.

LITERARY GENRES AND WORLDVIEWS

Scholars have not come to a consensus regarding the genre of wisdom literature and its relationship to apocalyptic writing. Both forms of literature owe a great deal of inspiration to prophetic writings. At times we tend to speak of these forms of writing as complete distinct entities in terms of their literary genres, worldview and values. Yet clearly there is considerable overlap between these forms of writing. George Nickelsburg has recently challenged the presumed distinctiveness between wisdom and apocalyptic texts:

> …the entities usually defined as sapiential and apocalyptic often cannot be cleanly separated from one another because both are the products of wisdom circles that are becoming increasingly diverse in the Greco-Roman period. Thus, apocalyptic texts contain elements that are at home in wisdom literature, and wisdom texts reflect growing interest in eschatology.[4]

However, the persistence of a particular worldview associated with these sapiential writings remains, no matter how difficult it may be to articulate their distinctiveness. Note how James Crenshaw describes the diversity yet complementarity of the main sapiential texts in the Bible: Proverbs, Qoheleth, Job, Sirach and the Wisdom of Solomon. "However

[2] G.W.E. Nickelsburg, *Jewish Literature between the Bible and the Mishnah* (2nd ed., Minneapolis: Fortress 2005) 67-89.

[3] See in particular M. Kolarcik, "Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Treasures of Wisdom*, 289-301.

[4] G.W.E. Nickelsburg: "Wisdom and Apocalypticism," in *Conflicted Boundaries in Wisdom and Apocalypticism*, (eds. B.G. Wright and L.M. Wills, SBLSymposium 35, Atlanta: SBL 2005) 20.

much these literary productions differ from one another, they retain a mysterious ingredient that links them together in a special way."[5] This so-called "mysterious ingredient" may very well be associated not with a particular, literary genre, but with the general worldview and cluster of values held to be important behind the text.

If we draw a distinction between literary genres and worldviews, both the distinctiveness and complementarity between diverse literary texts may come into sharper focus. A literary text which belongs to a particular worldview may employ diverse literary forms with various clusters of values. For instance, a prophetic text may include specific genres which normally pertain to the sapiential tradition, such as a proverb. But the mere mention of a proverb does not detract from the authoritative speech of the prophet who delivers an oracle with the authority of God, "thus says the Lord."

THE PROPHETIC WORLDVIEW

The prophetic corpus in the Bible follows a distinctive pattern of oracles. We encounter oracles of judgment against Israel, oracles of judgment against various nations as well as oracles of hope for Israel, and in rare cases even for the nations (Isa 19). Distinctive genres may appear within the narration of oracles such as the prophetic lawsuit which includes oracles of judgment (Isa 5). When we read in Jeremiah, "what has straw in common with wheat?" (Jer 22:28) we may immediately recognize the use of a proverb which normally signifies a link with wisdom literature. But this quotation of a proverb takes places in the context of a prophetic oracle of judgment against false prophets and in the context of presenting the authoritative power of the word of God, "Is not my word like fire, says the LORD, and like a hammer that breaks a rock in pieces?" (Jer 23:29). A distinctively prophetic work may make use of genres which normally find their home in wisdom literature because the proverb is distinctive but not exclusive to a wisdom worldview. A proverb which contains a crystallized piece of human wisdom based on a reflection on human experiences may be incorporated into a prophetic worldview. Even a late work such as Baruch, which appeals to prophetic motifs of oracles and parables of sin, incorporates a voice of personified wisdom (Bar 3:15-4:3) to explain why the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile to Babylon took place.

The prophetic worldview presumes the in-breaking of God into human history and into the life of the prophet (Isa 6, Jer 2, Ezek 1-3) who speaks in the name of the Lord. In prophecy, as a worldview, and not simply as a literary genre, God is the one who establishes a relationship

[5] J. Crenshaw, *Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction* (Atlanta: John Knox 1981) 17.

with Israel and with the world. The Lord is the one with full authority. The theological construct which provides the backdrop for this relationship between God and Israel is the covenant. God is the one who has broken into the history of Israel and established a covenantal relationship with her. From the prophetic viewpoint, God is the one who continuously breaks into the history of the prophet in order to communicate an oracle of judgment against lawlessness and an oracle of hope toward life. Just as God breaks into the history of Israel to liberate slaves from Egypt in order to bring them into a covenantal relationship, so too does God break into the life of the prophet to communicate a word which is to be delivered to Israel and the people. An essential feature of prophetic literature is the primacy of God breaking into human history to deliver a word of judgment against injustice and a word of hope for renewal. The manner in which prophetic speech teaches the will of God is through authoritative oracles. The prophets claim to speak the very words of God, which are often introduced with the phrase, "thus says the Lord."

THE SAPIENTIAL WORLDVIEW

The sapiential corpus of the bible displays a worldview in which wisdom becomes the important interpretative key to human experience and to history. Wisdom texts display an interest in searching for wisdom and in giving guidance for the search of knowledge to others.[6] The proverb is the quintessential example of a sapiential approach. Collections of proverbs are not unique to Israel and in fact all cultures display the tendency to collect pithy proverbial sayings in order to pass on directions in life from one generation to the next. A proverb is the crystallization of human reflection on a typical experience in order to provide guidance for the next generation. It is essentially didactic often with an aesthetic sense of purpose. Proverbs are directed to teach what is essential for human life through entertainment, beauty and the power of thought.

This particular approach to life which gives precedence to searching for wisdom and teaching knowledge finds expression in various literary genres: the proverb, the story of the two ways: the way to life and the

[6] G.W.E. Nickelsburg, "Response to Sarah Tanzer," in *Conflicted Boundaries*, 51. Here Nickelsburg accentuates the twofold movement observable in wisdom texts whereby the sage is one who both seeks wisdom out and in turn imparts knowledge ungrudgingly. On the one hand, the search for wisdom is often fraught with doubt and anxiety which highlights the limits of human knowledge in the pursuit of wisdom (e.g. Job and Qoheleth). On the other hand, the sages expend copious energy with both simple and complex arguments to share acquired wisdom with eager listeners or readers (e.g. Proverbs, Wisdom of Solomon).

way to death, the teaching of a father to a son, the dispute, the didactic story. When sages turn to formulate a backdrop for sapiential thought in Israel, the personification of wisdom offers an explanation for wisdom's relationship to God, to the cosmos and to human beings. All of these specific literary genres presume values related to the power of human thought even as they recognize the limits of human knowledge. John Collins has provided a wide spectrum of sapiential types that range from the proverb to higher wisdom given by God (1. wisdom sayings, 2. theological wisdom, 3. nature wisdom, 4. mantic wisdom, 5. higher wisdom through revelation).[7]

If the prophetic worldview looks to extraordinary events for the in-breaking of God into human history, the sapiential worldview looks to the ordinary experience of everyday life as the locus for discovering the word of God. Whereas the prophetic worldview looks to the covenant as the backdrop for understanding the relationship between Israel and God, the sapiential worldview looks to creation as the backdrop for discovering the will of God for life.[8] The reason for which the wisdom worldview postulates human experience and the cosmos as the locus for discovering the will of God, is the belief that creation itself and human beings in particular have been created and are sustained by the wisdom of God. The theological construct which gave voice to this interdependence of God and the cosmos is the personification of wisdom (Proverbs 8, Sirach 24, Wisdom of Solomon 9; Baruch 3:15-4:4). Wisdom is the manner in which God relates to the cosmos, to history and to human beings, for it is through wisdom that all has been created by God. For this reason, the sapiential worldview takes human experience seriously as the locus for discovering the word of God. It prefers to pass on the wisdom acquired through human reflection or received effortlessly as gift and insight not through authoritative pronouncements but through didactic reflection and arguments.

A wisdom text which shares in this worldview where the cosmos is understood as being imbued with the wisdom and order of God may very well employ motifs or even literary genres from the prophetic corpus. In the book of Job, where the genres of the didactic story and the dispute play prominent roles, suddenly the prophetic motif of theophany takes center stage. The Lord speaks from the worldwind and breaks into the life of Job in the manner of God appearing to a prophet

[7] J.J. Collins, "Wisdom, Apocalypticism, and Generic Compatibility," in *In Search of Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. Gammie* (eds. L.G. Perdue *et al*., Louisville: Westminster John Knox 1993) 168.

[8] For a fine presentation of the place of creation theology within wisdom literature in the Bible, see L.G. Perdue, "Where Shall Wisdom Be Found? Old Testament Theology and Wisdom Literature," in idem, *Wisdom and Creation: the Theology of Wisdom Literature* (Nashville: Abingdon 1994) 19-48.

and especially in the manner of the Lord appearing to Moses and the people at Mount Sinai. But in both cases of prophetic call and theophanic speech, God speaks to give direction (the pronouncement of laws) or judgment (oracles against Israel and the nations, oracles of hope). In the case of theophanic speech in the book of Job, the content of God's words subverts the expected oracles of judgment or laws of direction. Instead, the words of God lead Job and the reader to contemplate one's situation in relation to the ineffable qualities of the cosmos, the mysterious working of wild animals, and the frightful threat of chaos. Through the literary genre of theophanic speech, the wisdom author employs the didactic background of creation theology in order to lay down a path to insight.

The book of Jonah, positioned as it is among the twelve minor prophets, tells the story of a prophet given the task to preach an oracle of destruction to the city of Nineveh. Motifs of prophetic speech and narrative are used in the story to bring about a changed perspective in the reader regarding the universal mercy of God. In effect, the book of Jonah is more a didactic story focusing on the mercy and justice of God than it is a prophetic text concerned with oracles of judgment against Nineveh. Through a playful didactic story about a prophet, the sage both entertains and challenges the reader to view the relationship of God to other nations (the sailors and the captain, the King of Nineveh and all its inhabitants). With inverted irony, it is the prophet Jonah who stands in need of conversion to accept the mercy of God toward others.[9] These examples illustrate the manner in which a sapiential worldview may employ genres or motifs from a different worldview and employ them in a manner consistent with it own cluster of perspectives and values.

THE APOCALYPTIC WORLDVIEW

Gerhard von Rad had postulated an historical context for the development of apocalyptic writings from wisdom literature. "Here too, apocalyptic reveals that its roots are in wisdom. It cannot do enough in

[9] Most interpreters understand the book of Jonah to be concerned with presenting the universal mercy of God. A.J. Hauser, "Jonah: In Pursuit of the Dove," *JBL* 104 (1985) 21-37. For a notable exception see Ph. Guillaume, "The End of Jonah is the Beginning of Wisdom," *Biblica* 87 (2006) 243-50. Guillaume interprets God's last statement "shall I not have pity on Nineveh? " (Jon 4:11) not as a rhetorical question, but as declarative, "though you showed pity over the plant… I will not show pity to Nineveh…" Either as a didactic story highlighting the universal mercy of God, or as a book of theodicy highlighting God's power over history and creation, the book of Jonah engages the reader far more readily as a wisdom text than it does as a prophetic work.

the expounding of the divine mysteries."[10] Though the line of influence is indeed more difficult to determine especially when apocalyptic texts are contemporaneous with sapiential books, there is a point of intelligibility in noticing the historical process. There is an historical progression from prophetic texts to sapiential texts and to apocalyptic texts. Both the sapiential and apocalyptic worldviews share points of contact in motifs and values and are indebted to prophetic works.

Essential to the apocalyptic worldview is the moment of "revelation" which is transmitted to the reader through the elaboration of visions and interpretation of the movements in the cosmos. Nickelsburg distinguishes three terms that are helpful for appreciating the range of interest in the apocalyptic worldview: the literary genre "apocalypse;" the "apocalyptic eschatology" which refers to the parts of texts which attempt to explain the end times; and "apocalypticism," where events in the cosmos and in history are presented in codified fashion for the interpretation of a present reality.[11]

Although apocalyptic texts often share motifs and particular values with wisdom literature, there remains a fundamentally different approach to seeking knowledge and imparting revelation. The apocalyptic worldview leapfrogs backward to prophecy in order to impart knowledge received through revelation. Where wisdom seeks knowledge in the everyday experience of human life and in the events of the cosmos which may include extraordinary divine interventions, apocalyptic seeks knowledge in the extraordinary medium of divine revelation. Where wisdom seeks to impart knowledge through a variety of didactic genres and stories, apocalyptic imparts knowledge through authoritative images of divine revelation and cosmic transformation. Apocalyptic is highly conducive to galvanizing collective positions in times of political tension and upheaval. This explains in part why apocalyptic texts became more dominant in the Greco-Roman period among the Jewish communities living in times of social upheaval.

Where apocalyptic texts display ties with wisdom literature, such as in *1 Enoch*, the question must be asked, 'how is the wisdom motif employed in the work?' Is the overarching theme governed by wisdom perspectives or apocalyptic viewpoints? *1 Enoch* begins with a sapiential reflection on the two ways, but with a distinct introduction of apocalyptic motifs of cosmic judgment. The series of exhortations which call to examine and observe ordinary events in the cosmos could very well read as a wisdom reflection (*1 Enoch* 1-5). But the exhortations to examine ordinary experiences only serve to introduce a final judgment which leads to an extensive and elaborate cosmic scene of the fall of the

[10] G. von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (transl. J.D. Martin London: SCM 1972) .294 n.8.
[11] Nickelsburg, "Wisdom and Apocalypticism," 20.

angels typical of apocalyptic literature. In this work, a wisdom motif of examining the two ways serves to introduce the main tenor of the work, an elaborate cosmic judgment scene. Just as Wisdom texts could employ prophetic genres and motifs with a distinct sapiential purpose, so too may apocalyptic texts employ sapiential motifs within the subsuming apocalyptic worldview. The overall tenor of a work is important to consider for evaluating the function and quality of individual components. In the case of the Wisdom of Solomon, it will be important to assess the function and quality of apocalyptic motifs within the overall frame and perspective of the work.

THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON

Each major section section of the Wisdom of Solomon contains motifs which display affinities with apocalyptic literature. In the first section Wis 1-6 there is a reference to the wicked not knowing the mysteries of God, καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωσαν μυστήρια θεοῦ (Wis 2:22). Moreover, in order to provide an argument for the advantage of virtue, the author displays before the imagination of the reader a final judgment of God whereby the righteous are given a royal reward whereas the wicked are destroyed by God through a cosmic judgment, καὶ ὁπλοποιήσει τὴν κτίσιν εἰς ἄμυναν ἐχθρῶν (Wis 5:17b).

The second section (Wis 6-10) displays the most wisdom like qualities in the entire book. The eulogy of personified wisdom spans her relationship to the cosmos to human beings and to God. The unnamed Solomon is described as receiving intricate knowledge of the functions of the universe. However, in Solomon's actual prayer for wisdom (Wis 9) the wisdom which he ardently seeks and prays for is described as belonging to God, sitting at the God's throne, "…for even one who is perfect among human beings will be regarded as nothing without the wisdom that comes from you" (Wis 9:6). Is it possible to understand this wisdom as a special, hidden wisdom which is revealed to a select few to be imparted to others as in apocalyptic? Or is a particularly sapiential perspective being elaborated in the work's presentation of Solomon's special knowledge?

Finally, the third section which is often described as a midrash on the exodus from Egypt returns to the motif of the two ways from the first section of the book. The plagues are recounted as examples of divine judgment against Egypt with particular emphasis on the forces of the cosmos. The manner in which the elements of the cosmos do battle against the injustice of Egypt illustrates from Israel's past the cosmic judgment of chapter 5 which looked to a future visitation of the Lord.

The use of apocalyptic motifs in the Wisdom of Solomon should not be very surprising given the lateness of the work and also given the

apologetic nature of the author's main argument. What is rather surprising is the manner in which even apocalyptic motifs are employed within a dominant sapiential perspective. The author has chosen not to use the apocalyptic motifs from the perspective of revealing a hidden mystery to an elect few with an encoded presentation of history open to symbolic interpretation. Instead, the dominant feature throughout all three parts of the Wisdom of Solomon is the sapiential value of didactic teaching through arguments, images, comparisons, contrasts, and stories from the past.

WISDOM 1-6, THE MYSTERIES OF GOD, AND THE FUTURE COSMIC JUDGMENT

The dominant motif in the first part of the Wisdom of Solomon is the virtue of justice. According to the author, the practice of justice leads to immortality whereas injustice leads ultimately to death. Wisdom is declared to be associated with those who are just. Wisdom flees from injustice (Wis 1:2-6). The brief remark about the mysteries of God to be associated with the just and not with the wicked points to the author's attempt to invite the reader to reflect beyond appearances of power and might.

> Thus they reasoned, but they were led astray,
> for their wickedness blinded them,
> and they did not know the secret purposes (μυστήρια) of God (Wis 2:22).

The mysteries of God point to the surprised outcome of the just, who, despite appearances to the contrary, are the ones who have the root of virtue and strength. Those who practice the virtue of justice will have wisdom accompany them. They will know the relationship of immortality with the divine. All the examples of the righteous in the central diptychs (Wis 3:1-4:20), the just who suffer death, the barren woman, the eunuch, the childless righteous, the righteous youth who dies young, all of whom appear on the surface to suffer disaster, are the ones who through their commitment to righteousness will receive immortality. The mysteries of God refers not to a special knowledge given to a select few, but rather to the manner in which those who experience weakness in life receive abundant grace through their commitment to justice.

As the clinching argument in support of wisdom and justice as a means to immortality, the author leads the reader to the lofty heights of a future judgment of God (Wis 5:15-23). The motif of judgment whereby God is armed through the weaponry of a hoplite is borrowed from Isaiah 59:17-19. Particularly innovative in the metaphor of the divine warrior in the Wisdom of Solomon is the author's attribution of the

special role of the cosmos. In this judgment the Lord arms creation as well, and the cosmos will join God in battle against lawlessness. This positive role of creation on the side of justice is consistent with the author's earlier declaration of the positive forces of the cosmos "…the generative forces of the cosmos are wholesome" (Wis 1:14). The forces of creation are on the side of the righteous against injustice. This motif will be employed as a key principle in the author's elaboration of the plagues from the exodus narrative (Wis 11-19). This rather brief presentation of the Lord's cosmic judgment points to the author's positive explanation of creation and is a key element in the author's didactic argument for the advantage of righteousness in human life.

WISDOM 9, SOLOMON'S SPECIAL PRAYER FOR GOD'S WISDOM

The entire middle part of the Wisdom of Solomon (Wis 7-10) is the most sapiential part of the entire book. Indeed, it contains one of the three main examples of personified wisdom in the biblical texts along with Proverbs 8 and Sirach 24. Personified wisdom is praised for her expansiveness throughout the cosmos, for the beneficiary qualities she provides to human beings and for her relationship to the divine. It is wisdom who makes holy souls friends of God and prophets (Wis 7:27). In seeking this value of wisdom, Solomon is described as having received extensive knowledge of the cosmos. The author is alluding to the wisdom of the Solomonic tradition described in 1 Kgs 10–11 perhaps built upon the Acts of Solomon referred in 1 Kgs 11:41. However, in Solomon's actual prayer for wisdom, he prays for the wisdom of God which sits by the throne of God.

> Send her forth from the holy heavens,
> and from the throne of your glory send her
> that she may labor at my side,
> and that I may learn what is pleasing to you (Wis 9:10).

Is this wisdom to be understood as a special wisdom given to a select few and barred from others? In light of the previous description of wisdom and her role in the cosmos and in the lives of human beings, such a limited perspective can hardly be the notion of wisdom the author is highlighting. In the case of the Wisdom of Solomon, wisdom accompanies the righteous. Human beings have been formed through the wisdom of God (Wis 9:1), and through righteousness wisdom accompanies human beings to make them friends of God and to lead them to immortality. Solomon has recognized his limitations and his need to have his own limited knowledge completed by the wisdom which comes from God (Wis 7:1-12). The recognition on the part of the

unnamed Solomon of the need to receive the wisdom of God, points to the sapiential starting point of the need to seek wisdom. The special wisdom that is given by God to the righteous brings to completion those very human beings who were formed through wisdom at the very beginning. The wisdom of God which is sought by Solomon is available to every human being who strives for justice. However, Solomon's particular task to rule over and to judge the people requires appropriate knowledge to fit the task. In attributing special knowledge to the unnamed Solomon, the author is building an argument based more on the Solomonic tradition of 1 Kings, than on apocalyptic revelation.

WISDOM 11-19, THE COSMIC JUDGMENT AGAINST EGYPT

The midrashic treatment of the exodus which spans from chapter 11 to the end of the book contains the author's clinching argument as to why it is important for human beings to strive for righteousness (Wis 1-6) and to seek the wisdom of God to help them become righteous (Wis 7-10). The manner in which the author presents the plagues of Egypt as delivering cosmic judgment against the ungodly certainly has parallels to the many scenes of elaborate cosmic judgments in apocalyptic texts. However, whereas cosmic judgments in apocalyptic texts tend to refer to future conflagrations, in the Wisdom of Solomon the cosmic judgment is one associated with Israel's founding deliverance from Egypt.

It is helpful to keep in mind the complex argument the author is weaving together in all three parts of the book. In the first part, the author holds the virtue of justice as the key attribute for guidance in life. Indeed justice is immortal, δικαιοσύνη γὰρ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν (Wis 1:15). Injustice leads to death, but justice leads to immortality. The obstacle to the practice of justice is the fear of weakness and mortality. The wicked speak their own mind and defend their succumbing to the fear of death and grasping at the apparent power of injustice (Wis 2). The author overcomes the fear of weakness and mortality by presenting three diptychs in which the righteous who suffer weakness and even death are said to have the root virtue of righteousness which brings life. In the first part of the book, the clinching element in the argument was provided by the brief, cosmic judgment of God envisioned in the future. With the fear of death overcome through the presentation of the future judgment, the author is free to elaborate the many benefits and beauty of the wisdom of God which accompanies human beings and enables them to practice justice in the paths of life (Wis 7-9). As examples from the past to show how wisdom accompanies the righteous, the author parades before the imagination of the reader the key figures of righteousness from the book of Genesis, moving from Adam right

through to Joseph and ending with Israel and Moses which leads to the midrashic treatment of the exodus (Wis 10).

If the clinching argument in the first part of the book of the future cosmic judgment is not ultimately convincing, because it looks to a hypothetical future, the author elaborates the great example of Israel's deliverance from Egypt as the convincing example from history *par excellence*. The mighty who practiced injustice toward the ancestors had been overcome by the forces of creation which are in the hand of God. Similarly, the weak who suffered every disadvantage but strove for righteousness are brought to life again by the same forces of creation which are in the hand of God. The diptychs in the midrashic treatment of the exodus are placed in parallel fashion to the hypothetical diptychs contrasting the righteous and the wicked in the first part of the book.

The author employs two principles in elaborating the various plagues against Egypt. One principle explains that every particular sin carries with it a correspondingly appropriate punishment (Wis 11:16). Another principle explains that the very elements which God employed to punish the unjust, God employed also to save the righteous (Wis 11:5, 13).[12] No other ancient text elaborates these principles with the details of our author in the Wisdom of Solomon. The important feature to notice is that the author presents the plagues against Egypt not simply as examples of punishment for the ungodly, but as confirming the essential value presented in the opening exhortation to justice. Injustice leads to death whereas righteousness leads to life.

The author playfully elaborates how the elements of the cosmos in the plagues restrain the unrighteous and the same elements are highlighted as coming to help the righteous in their trials. In response to the killing of the infants in the Nile, the ungodly receive undrinkable water (Wis 11:6-14), whereas the righteous find refreshing water in the desert. In response to the ungodly's worship of animals, they encounter animals which suppress the appetite (Wis 16:1-4), whereas the righteous

[12] The principle declared in Wis 11:16, "…so that they might learn that one is punished by the very things by which one sins." is not found extensively in ancient texts, but is found in an apocryphal text, *Testament of Gad* 5:10: "For by whatever capacity anyone transgresses, by that also is he chastised." Similarly, the second principle in Wis 11:5: "For through the very things by which their enemies were punished they themselves received benefit in their need," and in Wis 11:13: "For when they heard that through their own punishments the righteous had received benefit, they perceived it was the Lord's doing," is not widely used in interpretations and elaborations of the Exodus narrative. However, there is a rabbinic source which enunciates a very similar principle in interpreting the plagues of Egypt, "The Holy One blessed be He heals by the same means whereby He smites", *Wayyikra Rabba* 18:5; also in J.Z. Lauterbach, *Mekhilta De-Rabbi Ishmael* (2nd ed., Philadelphia: JPS 2004) 158, "The Holy One, blessed be He, however, is not so, but He heals with the very same thing with which he smites."

find delicious animals to eat, the quails; the oppressors are plagued with animals that kill (Wis 16:5-14), whereas the righteous look to the brazen serpent for the healing of God. In response to their refusal to recognize the true God in heaven, the wicked face a deluge of destructive forces from heaven, rain and hail which like a consuming fire destroys their food sources (Wis 16:15-29), whereas the righteous encounter a transforming cosmos in the gift of manna which resists burning by fire. In response to holding the righteous as slaves, the ungodly are captivated by darkness (Wis 17:1-18:4), whereas the righteous encounter a guiding pillar of fire at night. Finally as a concluding *inclusio*, in response to the killing of the infants in the river, the unrighteous face the death of their first born (Wis 18:5-25) and Pharaoh's army drowns in the sea (Wis 19:1-9), whereas the righteous pass through the Red Sea to safety.[13] This playful presentation of serious repercussions of injustice and the ultimate beneficial fruits of righteousness confirms the author's positive description of the forces of the cosmos in the first and second parts of the book.

Even within the midst of this polemic against the enemies of Israel, we encounter a significant pedagogical concern in the reflection on history which confirms the author's essential sapiential perspectives. The sage is somewhat apprehensive with the possible interpretation of the many plagues which God employs to restrain the ungodly as a possible sign of God's weakness in confronting lawlessness. A major theological reflection ensues (Wis 11:17-12:27) where the author champions the compassion and mercy of God in dealing with the ungodly by giving them time and space to change their ways. In this manner, the plagues themselves are interpreted as a pedagogical device on the part of God which the righteous likewise are to embrace in their dealing with opposition (Wis 12:19-22). This pedagogical example which the author attributes to the manner in which God deals with lawlessness and which the righteous are to incorporate in their own lives confirms the author's own rootedness in the pedagogical value of the sapiential tradition.

The concluding reflection on the transformation of creation for the benefit of the righteous (Wis 19:18-21) is a poetic adaptation of the metaphor of the symphony of sound.

> For the elements changed places with one another,
> as on a harp the notes vary the nature of the rhythm,
> which each note remains the same (Wis 19:13-22).

[13] S. Cheon, *The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon* (JSPSup 23, Sheffield: Academic 1997).

CONCLUSION

Though the midrashic treatment of the plague narratives from the book of Exodus may have parallels to apocalyptic judgments by virtue of the elements of the cosmos being highlighted, by far the most dominant feature in the narrative is the argument to convince the reader of the benefits of virtue and the disastrous results of injustice. In presenting this particular view, the author is firmly rooted in the sapiential worldview of offering convincing arguments often with an aesthetic appeal. One may understand this penchant on the part of the author as exemplifying a philosophizing eschatology as does John Collins, or as an apocalyptic sage as does George Nickelsburg. But the overwhelming tenor of the book, which seeks to convince the reader with arguments based on poetic imagery, imagination and historical review, confirms the author's commitment to the sapiential values of argument and the positive view of the created world.

The tenor of work's sapiential values carries the argument of the author from beginning to the end. Though it is likely that the author made reference to and employed motifs from current apocalyptic literature, such motifs as the mysteries of God, wisdom sitting by the throne of God, and apocalyptic judgments unfolding in the cosmos, these motifs are employed within the context of a convincing and entertaining argument which are characteristic features of the sapiential worldview.

LAW OF NATURE AND LIGHT OF THE LAW IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM (WIS 18:4C)

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1. THE BOOK OF WISDOM AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY: WHAT KIND OF CONNECTION?

The presence of many close connections between the Book of Wisdom and the philosophy of its time, particularly Stoicism and Middle Platonism, is a phenomenon already well-established by scholars. A good point of departure for our study is undoubtedly the *status quaestionis* offered by C. Larcher in his well known *Études sur le livre de la Sagesse*. After a careful examination, Larcher remains convinced that our sage is basically an eclectic who has read a little of everything without, however, having given his allegiance to any specific contemporary current of philosophy.[1] In this connection, we do well to recall the conclusion of the in-depth analysis of J. Reese for whom "the author of Wisdom's use of Hellenism is primarily strategic, serving merely to effect a bridge between received biblical faith and the contemporary situation of the readers."[2]

D. Winston has recently returned to this question in a study presented to the conference at Palermo in 2002 where he takes up again and summarises some of his previous work. According to Winston, "both Philo and the author of Wisdom have refracted their 'ancestral

[1] Cf. C. Larcher, *Etudes sur le livre de la Sagesse* (Paris: Gabalda 1969) 201-236 and M. Gilbert, "Sagesse de Salomon (ou le livre de la Sagesse)," in *DBS* 9: 100. A similar position is to be found in F. Focke, *Die Entstehung der Weisheit Salomos. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der jüdischen Hellenismus* (FRLANT 22, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1913) 90-92. Cf. on the other hand, the opinion of J.J. Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age* (Louisville: WJKPress 1997) 202: "The author of Wis. Sol. was not a philosopher (…). Nevertheless there is enough correspondence with Philo to debunk the idea that he was an idiosyncratic amateur making his own superficial use of philosophical terms."

[2] J.M. Reese, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences* (AnBib 43, Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute 1970) 156.

philosophy' (*Vit. Mos.* 2:216) through the lens of Middle Platonism, though this fact is not meant to imply that they were Middle Platonist *tout court*."[3] However, starting from an analysis of Wis 7:22-26, H. Hübner has reached the conclusion that our sage offers his own personal combination of Stoic and Platonic ideas, neutralising, for example, the Stoic materialism with regard to the divine *pneuma* by means of the introduction of the Platonic idea of transcendence.[4]

Although Winston and Larcher take their stand on positions that are clearly different, both authors accept that our sage would have had a good knowledge of Stoic and Middle-Platonic philosophy such as would have been available to a Jew of Alexandria towards the end of the first century BC. Philo is an excellent example and, at the same time, the best proof of such knowledge within Alexandrian Judaism at a period only a little after ours.

The true problem, already evident from this short introduction, is the need to clarify just what type of relationship exists between our sage and the philosophy of his time. In sum, is it a question of an attempt, before anything else, to convince himself that the tradition of the fathers—that is, the Jewish faith—can still retain all its validity in the presence of the very different philosophical context in which our sage found himself living? Or, is the author of Wisdom, conscious of the total value and truth of his own tradition, trying to express it in categories which are accessible also to Alexandrian Jews who have been steeped in Hellenistic culture, creating thus what M. Gilbert has defined as a genuine work of "inculturation?"[5] Or do we simply find ourselves faced with a no holds barred apology for Judaism, re-presented under the veneer of Greek categories to a cultural environment which accused it of being antisocial and xenophobic, a people ἀπάνθρωπος and μισόξενος as Hecataeus of Abdera wrote?[6]

In the present work we shall begin with the text of Wis 18:4 in which the Law of Moses is presented under the metaphor of light. We shall ask,

[3] Cf. D. Winston, "A Century of Research on the Book of Wisdom," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research. Studies on Tradition, Redaction, Theology* (eds. G. Bellia and A. Passaro, DCLY, Berlin: de Gruyter 2005) 9.

[4] Cf. H. Hübner, "La Sapienza di Salomone e la filosofia antica," in *La Sapienza di Salomone* (ed. idem, Brescia: Paideia 1993) 70-97.

[5] How to speak to the Jews, steeped in Hellenistic culture "using their methods and terminology without in any way denying the religious content received from the fathers?" M. Gilbert, "Le livre de la Sagesse et l'inculturation," in *L'inculturation et la sagesse des nations* (Roma: PUG 1984) 11. Cf. also L. Mazzinghi, "Il libro della Sapienza: elementi culturali," in *Il confronto tra le diverse culture nella Bibbia da Esdra a Paolo* (ed. R. Fabris, *Ricerche Storico Bibliche* 10 [1998]) 179-98.

[6] Cf. Diodorus Siculus 40.3.4. In this regard, M. Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (3 vols., Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 1974-1984) cf. 1: 26-35.

in particular, if there could be a relationship between the presentation of the Law made by our sage in this passage and the concept of the law of nature which was already well known in the cultural atmosphere of the 1st century BC by means of Stoicism.[7] A more general glance at the theme of the Law in the Book of Wisdom could help us to set out this problem.

2. THE THEME OF THE LAW IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM

In fact, in the Book of Wisdom, the theme of the Law does not have a central role. The passages in which the term νόμος appears are not numerous: Wis 2:11, 12; 6:4, 18; 14:16; 16:6; 18:4, 9; only in four of these (Wis 2:12; 16:6 and 18:4, 9) are the references certainly to the Mosaic Law.[8] In these cases, to which ought to be added the references to the Law contained in Wis 9:17 and 16:11, the Law is considered, in a very broad way, in its aspect as at once normative and revelatory. In Wis 18:9, for example, the νόμος is understood more in the sense of "covenant" than of "law."[9] In this context, it is worth recalling that the Book of Wisdom avoids any insistence on typically Jewish regulations such as the practice of circumcision, fasting or the Sabbath.

In at least one case (Wis 6:4), the commentators readily emphasise how, in directing himself to the "kings" and accusing them of having not observed the law or conducted themselves "according to the will of God," our sage has in mind the Stoic concept of "natural law" rather than the Mosaic Law.[10] On this question, as it concerns Wis 6:4, I refer to

[7] We shall assume as a date for the Book of Wisdom the time of the principate of Octavian Augustus, as recently confirmed by M. Gilbert, in "'La vostra sovranità viene dal Signore' (Sap 6,3): ambivalenza del potere politico nella tradizione sapienziale," in *Il potere politico: bisogno e rifiuto dell'autorità* (eds. E. Manicardi and L. Mazzinghi, *Ricerche Storico Bibliche* 18 [2006/1-2]) 117-32.

[8] On the theme of the Law in the Book of Wisdom, I refer to an earlier work of mine: L. Mazzinghi, "La memoria della legge nel libro della Sapienza," in *Torah e Kerygma: dinamiche della tradizione nella Bibbia* (eds. I. Cardellini and E. Manicardi, *Ricerche Storico Bibliche* 1-2 [2004]) 153-76.

[9] Cf. M. Priotto, *La Prima Pasqua in Sap 18,5-25. Rilettura e attualizzazione* (Bologna: EDB 1987) 76 and 77.

[10] Cf. Larcher, *Études*, 203, though without further details; this identification is already present, however, in C.L.W. Grimm, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (Leipzig: Hirzel 1860) 124: "νόμος not the Mosaic Law but the natural foundations of justice." Cf. also D. Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon* (AB 43, New York: Doubleday 1979) 153, who, perhaps a little generally, highlights how the Mosaic Law was regarded in Hellenistic Judaism as an expression of the natural law (*vide infra*). Cf. by the same author, "Hellenistic Jewish Philosophy," in *The Ancestral Philosophy. Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism* (ed. G.E. Sterling, BJS 331, Providence: Brown Judaic Studies 2001) 18-21.

the already mentioned study of M. Gilbert.[11] Refining and improving on Larcher's intuitions, he shows how in Wis 6:4 our sage, rather than founding himself on straightforwardly Stoic concepts, does so on the basis of the Neopythagorean treatises on sovereignty which, in their turn, were influenced by Stoicism. In the "law" of which Wis 6:4 speaks, therefore, we ought to see the expression of positive laws understood as intermediary between the natural law and the king. According to Gilbert, it is rather difficult to suppose that in 6:4 νόμος refers to the Mosaic Law in view of the fact that our sage's invective is clearly aimed at pagan rulers.

It is necessary, however, to make it clear that in fact the addressees of the Book of Wisdom are *Jews*; passages like Wis 1:1 and 6:1 are not aimed directly at the Roman rulers nor does our sage claim to be read or heard by them. The Book of Wisdom is wholly addressed to those within the Jewish community of Alexandria. Therefore, in my opinion, we cannot entirely exclude from Wis 6:4 a further allusion to the Mosaic Law. Gilbert's argument is thus complemented. In accusing the pagan kings of not having observed the law, our sage could already have in mind, right from the beginning of his work, some type of relationship between the positive law, the law of nature and the Mosaic Law, something which Philo would confirm later in a more systematic way (*vide infra*).

These reflections lead us on now to the text of Wis 18:4 where the 'law' that is mentioned is undoubtedly the Mosaic Law.

3. THE INCORRUPTIBLE LIGHT OF THE LAW (WIS 18:4)

Wis 18:4 closes the fifth diptych, that of the darkness (Wis 17:1-18:4), and, in particular, the last strophe of the same diptych (18:1-4) in which, from the description of the plague of darkness which occupies the whole of Chapter 17, the account passes to the description of the light which illumines the whole world (17:20) and Israel (18:1), light which is at the same time the symbol both of wisdom and of the Mosaic Law. This is the passage which concerns us:

> For they deserved to be deprived of light
> and imprisoned in darkness
> those who had kept thy sons imprisoned,
> through whom the imperishable light of the law
> was to be given to the world.

[11] Cf. Gilbert, "La vostra sovranità viene dal Signore," 125-27; A. Squilloni, "Il significato etico-politico dell'immagine re-legge animata. Il νόμος ἔμψυχος nei trattati pitagorici Περὶ βασιλείας," in *Civiltà Classica e cristiana* 11/1 (1990) 75-94.

I will not go back here to repeat the exegesis of a passage to which I have already elsewhere devoted a fairly extensive commentary.[12] I will simply confine myself to some aspects which I hold important with regard to the theme of the law.

First of all, the law to which Wis 18:4 refers is certainly the Mosaic Law, the Law, that is, which the Lord offers to his "sons," evidently the Israelites. The metaphor of light looks back to the theme of guidance: the law is light precisely in that it enlightens man, illuminating and guiding his path; in that sense, the law is in a close relationship with wisdom which is also described in our book as a guide (cf 9:11; 10:17, and, in the same key also, the pillar of cloud of Wis 18:3). Let us remember here, in passing, how in our book "wisdom" is actually presented as superior to the law; without wisdom, in fact, it is impossible to know the will of God expressed in the law which is, therefore, almost the reification of wisdom itself (cf 9:17).[13]

The Law is light not only for "your sons," that is to say, for Israel, but actually for the whole world (τῷ αἰῶνι); that takes place, however, *by means of* the mediation of Israel (δι'ὧν); the law is, therefore, a reality which, although revealed only to Israel, shines by means of Israel over the whole of humanity (cf. already Wis 17:20). Thus, in Wis 18:4, the particularistic aspect of the faith of Israel is joined with a clear approach of universalistic character, something that is certainly not foreign to at least a part of the Greek-speaking Judaism of the time (cf., e.g., *TLevi* 14:3-4; *LAB* 11:1). Nevertheless, it is precisely the Exodus context of the entire fifth diptych which establishes in 18:4 Israel's responsibility with regard to the whole world. This clear juxtaposition of universalism and particularism in the light of the event of the Exodus appears, perhaps, as the most significant characteristic of the metaphor of the Law as light offered to us by Wisdom.

Then it is necessary to remember that the metaphor of light is also bound up with the theme of incorruptibility (ἀφθαρσία); not only is the law an eternal reality, it is also the source of eternal life for the man who observes it (cf. also in this respect Wis 6:18), a life without end which is described precisely with the use of the adjective ἄφθαρτος, a term already employed at 2:23 and which, by reference to the vocabulary of "incorruptibility" deriving from an Epicurean matrix, very probably refers to the theme of bodily resurrection. In other words, exactly as in 6:18, the law is considered as a source of eternal life.

Finally, let us observe that the metaphor of the law as light was certainly not unknown in the Biblical tradition (cf. Prov 6:23LXX; Ps 119

[12] Cf. L. Mazzinghi, *Notte di paura e di luce. Esegesi di Sap 17,1-18,4* (AnBib 134, Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblico 1995) 221-24 and 240-63.

[13] On this, cf. M. Gilbert, "Volonté de Dieu et don de la Sagesse (Sg 9,17s)," *NRTh* 93 (1971) 145-66.

(118):105; Is 2:30). However, our sage goes beyond these texts and also well beyond the traditions of the law as light which are known from Palestinian Judaism.[14] We must ask ourselves, therefore, if it is possible, as in Wis 6:4, to distinguish in the presentation of the law which our sage offers us in 18:4 the presence of influences from the Greek world and in particular the influence of philosophical concepts which had spread through the culture of Alexandria. It is to this world, therefore, that we shall now turn our attention, focusing in particular on the notion of the "law of nature."

4. THE LAW OF NATURE IN STOICISM

In the Greek world, the idea of an unwritten law, divine and eternal, is very ancient (cf. *Antigone*, 450f); but it is only with Stoicism that there spreads a new concept, that of the law of nature (νόμος φύσεως).[15] In the earliest Stoicism, the Greek idea of νόμος changes in a very radical way; in fact, Stoicism places νόμος and κόσμος in a close relationship where the cosmos is obviously understood in a pantheistic sense.

For the Stoics, there exists a divine law, supreme and universal, which surpasses the written laws and which the sage follows without these. Already in early Stoicism, in fact, the individual laws have to be measured against a law that stands above the laws themselves, something which Chrysippus, adopting a celebrated text of Pindar, defines as νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς,[16] that is to say, the law understood

[14] Cf. Mazzinghi, *Notte di paura e di luce*, 246-50.

[15] Until Cicero, the expression "law of nature" is in fact very rare; cf. H. Koester, "νόμος φύσεως. The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought," in *Religions in Antiquity* (ed. J. Neusner, Leiden: Brill 1968) 527-41. According to Koester, Philo would actually be the true coiner of the concept of the "law of nature." On Koester, cf. however, the recent criticisms of J.W. Martens, *One God, one Law. Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Graeco-Roman Law* (Leiden: Brill 2003) xviii, n. 3, and well before that the different position of R.A. Horsley, "The Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero," *HTR* (1978) 35-59. Cf. also for the history of this concept, F. Flückiger, *Geschichte des Naturrechtes I* (Zürich: Zollikon 1954) 1-282; G. Watson, "The Natural Law and Stoicism," in *Problems in Stoicism* (ed. A.A. Long, London: Athlone Press 1971) 216-38; P. Mitsis, "Natural Law and Natural Right in post-Aristotelian Philosophy. The Stoics and their Critic," in *ANRW* II.36.7: 4814-24; G. Striker, "Origins of the Concept of Natural Law," in *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 2 (ed. J.J. Cleary, New York: Brill 1986) 79-94.

[16] SVF III, 77; frg. 314 (cf. R. Radice, *Stoici antichi. Tutti i frammenti raccolti da H. Von Arnim* [Milano: Rusconi 1999] 1122; henceforward cited as Radice); cf. Pindar, frg. 169: νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς θνατῶν τε καὶ ἀθανάτων. The text is much discussed: cf. M. Gigante, *Nomos Basileus* (Napoli: Glaux 1956) 72-102. For the general idea of law in Stoicism, cf. M. Pohlenz, *La Stoa. Storia di un movimento spirituale* (Firenze: La Nuova Italia 1967) 1: 266-84 (= *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1959]); H. Kleinknecht, "νόμος," in *TWNT* 4: 1016-28; L.

as expression of the λόγος.[17] Stoicism tends to posit a certain identity among the λόγος, law and divinity, with a strongly pantheistic emphasis.

Often this universal law is defined by the Stoics as νόμος κοινός and also as ὀρθὸς λόγος. The law is thus identified with universal reason and therefore with God. Already Zeno speaks precisely of ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὀρθὸς λόγος (...) ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διΐ;[18] one is, therefore, the reason of everything, one the law to which everything is subject. The law comes near to being right reason, and, understood as divine and universal law, is certainly one of the more typical concepts of Stoicism.[19] In this connection, Chrysippus uses the expression νόμοι τοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθοῦ λόγου.[20] Stoicism thus overcomes the dichotomy between φύσις and νόμος present in classical Greek thought, binding the law at the same time to the cosmos and to right reason in a way which, even in the time of the Stoics, could seem really paradoxical, a paradox which not even the Stoics resolve in any clear and definite way.

A particular form of this universal law is the νόμος ἔμψυχος, the living law. This concerns a concept which from early Stoicism passes into the Neopythagorean treatises on sovereignty perhaps by means of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (4th century BC).[21] In these treatises, the king is described as the true living law; like the divinity, he governs the world on the basis of a law that is not written but which conforms to nature. Thus, if the king shares in the divine λόγος and governs his subjects with justice, he is the νόμος ἔμψυχος and is, therefore, superior

Monsengwo Pasinya, *La notion de nomos dans le Pentateuque grec* (AnBib 52, Roma: Pontificio Istituto Biblico 1973) 42-46; G. Reale, *Storia della filosofia antica* (Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1989) 3: 419-23; M. Schofeld, *The Stoic Idea of the City* (Cambridge: University Press 1991) 109-11.

[17] Οὐκ ἄλλο τι νόμος ἐστίν ἢ ὁ τοῦ σοφοῦ λόγος; Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* 11 (=SVF III, frg. 175,13; Radice, 1052). "Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt prohibetque contraria," Cicero, *Leg.* 1, 6,18 (= SVF III, frg. 315,3s; Radice, 1124). "Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia (…) Quam ob rem lex vera (…) ratio est recta summi Iovis," *ibid.* 2,8 (= SVF III, frg. 316,12ss; Radice, 1124).

[18] Cf. SVF I,42.43; frg. 162 (Radice, 80 and 82).

[19] Cf., again SVF III,158; frg. 614 (Radice, 1284); III,81; frg. 332 (Radice, 1130); II,295; frg. 1003 (Radice, 866).

[20] SVF III, 128 frg. 323 (Radice, 1128).

[21] For a more extensive consideration and a richer bibliography on these treatises and for the problem of their dating, cf. C. Termini, "Dal Sinai alla creazione: il rapporto tra legge naturale e legge rivelata in Filone di Alessandria," in *La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia* (eds. A.M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi, Villa Verrucchio: Pazzini 2004) esp. 167, n 29; Termini suggests a date for these treatises of around the 3rd or the 2nd century BC. Cf. also A. Squilloni, "Il significato etico-politico."

to the written laws. We have already noticed the importance of this question *à propos* of Wis 6:4.

The universal law, then, is valid for all men and is a source of liberation for the man who grasps it and follows it wholeheartedly: the famous Stoic aphorism, ἄνθρωπος ἐκ φύσεως δοῦλος οὐδείς, "no man is a slave by nature,"[22] involves exactly this question: the sage who follows the law is truly free, the foolish man a slave.[23] The universal λόγος re-establishes fraternity among men; from thence derives the Stoic condemnation of the alleged "egoism" of the Epicureans.[24] The universal law is, therefore, the authentic form of all true wisdom. The Stoics, in fact, "arbitrantur prudentiam esse legem."[25] Right reason, which is identified with wisdom, puts the gods into a relationship with men, but right reason is none other than the law: "quae cum sit lex, lege quoque consociati homines cum diis putandi sumus;" for this reason, the cosmos is indeed a single city: "ut iam universus hic mundus una civitas communis deorum atque hominum existimanda [sit]."[26] We shall discover analogous ideas in Philo.

At the end of the second century BC, therefore, there was abroad in the Hellenistic world a philosophical concept which linked the belief in the existence of a universal law with the idea of the divine λόγος, right reason and the cosmos, thus creating the idea of the existence of a law of nature, an idea to which Philo would contribute an unexpected development. Conceived within the system of Stoic thought, this concept was taken up also in Neopythagoreanism (cf *supra*) and probably in the thought of Antiochus of Ascalon (c. 130-68 BC), whose theory on the law of nature cannot have been very different from that of the Stoics. The *de Legibus* of Cicero probably bears the mark of Antiochus.[27] Of the Middle Platonism attested at Alexandria with Eudorus (c. 64-19 BC) we do not know enough to be able to assert

[22] SVF III, 86; frg. 352 (Radice, 1140).

[23] Cf. SVF III, 85-89; frg. 349-366 *passim* (Radice, 1138-46).

[24] I note that in Wis 11:15-12:27 the digression on divine philanthropy recalls another well-known Stoic idea; Israel performs the duty entrusted to it by God, that of being φιλάνθρωπος (cf. Wis 12,19); φιλανθρωπία is a concept well known to Stoicism, and not only to it. Cf. C. Spicq, *Note di lessicografia neotestamentaria* (Brescia: Paideia 1994) 2: 722-28 (= *Notes de léxicographie Neotestamentaire* [Fribourg: Presses universitaires 1978-1982]); G. Scarpat, *Libro della Sapienza* (Brescia: Paideia 1989) 1: 82-87; M. Gilbert, *La Sapienza di Salomone* (Roma: ADP 1995) 2: 18-21.

[25] Thus Cicero; cf SVF III, 78; frg. 315 (Radice, 1124).

[26] Cicero, *De leg*. I, 7,23; SVF III, frg. 339 (Radice 1134).

[27] "Antiochus' universe is essentially a Stoic one;" cf. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220* (London: Duckworth 1977) 52-106 (esp. 79).

whether within it too the Stoic idea of the law of nature was developed or not.[28] In any case, that happens with Philo to whom we now turn.

5. THE PHILONIC RESTATEMENT OF THE 'LAW OF NATURE'

The idea of an universal law, of divine origin, written in nature and identified with right reason, is accepted and deepened by two non-Greek philosophers each of whom restates it in his own way in two very different cultural contexts between the first century BC and the first century AD: Cicero in Rome and Philo in Alexandria. The closeness of the subjects dealt with by the two authors makes us immediately think of common philosophical sources which could be located in the thought of Posidonius of Apamea, or else in the middle position taken by Antiochus of Ascalon (*vide supra*) between Stoicism and Middle Platonism, even if the question is still far from being resolved.[29] It is in Philo and in Cicero that the expression "law of nature" begins to be employed in a systematic manner. We can concern ourselves here with only the main points of the concept of the law of nature in Philo; serious studies have been devoted to it.[30] I shall confine myself to recalling only some of the basic notions typical of the Alexandrine philosopher which will undoubtedly be useful to us for understanding better the way in which the Book of Wisdom speaks of the Law.

As a general observation, we should note how Philo does not change the Stoic vocabulary; rather, he inserts it within his Jewish faith in the one God, the Creator, which leads him to see the Mosaic Law as the direct revelation of God. Here lies the essential difference between Philo

[28] On Eudorus, see *ibid.*, 115-35. On the possible links of Antiochus and Eudorus with the Book of Wisdom, cf. Larcher, *Etudes*, 224-26, and, more recently, M. Neher, *Wesen und Wirken der Weisheit in der Sapientia Salomonis* (BZAW 333, Berlin: de Gruyter 2004) 203-26 (with extensive bibliography). According to Neher, the Book of Wisdom is absolutely original with respect to these two philosophers.

[29] Cf Horsley, "Law of Nature in Philo and Cicero." According to Horsley, it is the Stoics who are responsible for the identification of the law of nature with universal reason. Nevertheless, the originality of Cicero and Philo of Alexandria remains well established. Middle Platonism is opposed to the pantheistic and materialist monism of early Stoicism, valuing it, however, for its ethical appeal; the Stoic concept of the λόγος φύσεως becomes the Philonian one of the νόμος φύσεως or the Ciceronian one of the *lex naturae.*

[30] Cf the items cited in n. 15 to which may be added: C. Termini, "Dal Sinai alla creazione," with further and extensive bibliography; very useful is the fine work of D. Farias, *Studi sul pensiero sociale di Filone di Alessandria* (Milano: Giuffré 1993) 101-42; cf. again, H. Najman, "The Law of Nature and the Authority of Mosaic Law," *SPhA* 11 (1999) 55-73; eadem, "A written copy of the Law of Nature: an unthinkable paradox?," *SPhA* 15 (2003) 54-63.

and Stoicism; God has in fact created the φύσις.[31] Adopting an idea of Chrysippus, Philo affirms that the world is one big city in which rules the λόγος which is none other than the law of God and, therefore, also the law of nature. We are dealing with a concept well expressed in *Ios*. 29, but taken up again many times by the Alexandrine and already noticed by us with regard to Cicero, thus confirming a common Stoic root for the concept:

> The constitution of various peoples is an extension of nature which is clothed by a universal authority. This world is, in fact, a great city ruled by one sole constitution and by one sole law (ἡ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόπολις ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐστὶ καὶ μίᾳ χρῆται πολιτείᾳ καὶ νόμῳ ἑνί). It is the reason of nature (λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ φύσεως) which commands the actions which must be performed and which must be avoided (…) The laws of the individual states are just extensions of natural right reason (τοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθοῦ λόγου).[32]

Here indeed Philo follows Stoic ideas very closely: the κόσμος is nothing else than the old Greek πόλις enlarged into the entire world, a world brought back into unity thanks to a unique creating principle, God-λόγος, and a single regulating principle, the Law. Nature itself (φύσις) impels man to cosmopolitanism: in this case too, Philo reflects thinking present in Cicero:

> sic apparet a natura ipsa ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus impelli. Ex hoc nascitur, ut etiam communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. Facile intelligitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos.[33]

[31] "Philo finds that the Stoic ideas properly explain God's work in nature, without contradicting Jewish creation accounts, and he believes that the Jewish idea of a transcendent God supplies missing information for the Stoic view of nature," Martens, *One God, one Law*, 86. On the richness of the concept of "nature" in Philo cf. also Farias, *Il pensiero sociale*, 105-07; in some passages of Philo, there is a notable oscillation between nature and God, so much so that one can speak of the theological value of nature; cf. also Termini, "Il rapporto tra legge naturale e legge rivelata," 174 and n. 56.

[32] Cf. SVF III, 79-80; frg. 323 (Radice, 1126-29) and also *Spec*. 2.37; *Ebr*. 80 where mention is made of the ὀρθὸς λόγος; cf. also *Prob*. 46; Plutarch, *De Alex. M. fortuna aut virtute* I,6; cf. Monsengwo Pasinya, *Nomos,* 43.

[33] Cicero, *De finibus*, 3,19, 62s (= SVF III, 83; frg. 340; Radice, 1135). Cf. also *De legibus* I,23, and *De natura deorum*, II, 154. We should remember how in the Middle Stoa, but above all in Cicero, the Stoic notion of universal Law is placed at the service of a precise political agenda (cf. F. Adorno, *Storia della filosofia. II. La filosofia antica* [Milano: Laterza 1965] 48-49). This is true also of Philo who tries to insert the imperial rule into the frame of the ideal state which belongs to the Stoic matrix; with Caligula, Philo's dream would evaporate very quickly. Cf. SVF III, 87; frg. 360 (Radice, 1142-44).

A passage like that of *Prob.* 46[34] shows very well the strong Stoic roots of Philo. He is free who lives in conformity with the law; but the true law is none other than right reason: νόμος δὲ ἀψευδὴς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. It is very interesting to observe the fact that such a law is, for Philo, "incorruptible," written by immortal nature with immortal script in the immortal mind of man: ὑπ'ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἄφθαρτος ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυποθείς. We find here an interesting connection between law and immortality, and even between law and ἀφθαρσία which reminds us, as we shall see, at least of the vocabulary of our passage, Wis 18:4. A corresponding relationship between the law and eternity is present also in Cicero: "sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex est sempiterna et inmutabili" (*Resp.* III,22,33).

A particular aspect of Philo's presentation of the law of nature, at which we can only hint here, is that concerning the unwritten law and the already mentioned νόμος ἔμψυχος, two concepts which Philo applies to the figure of the patriarchs. Now, in the tenth chapter of the Book of Wisdom, which concludes the second part of the book and, at the same time, acts as the prelude to the third, the work of wisdom is described as a universal activity, and only at the end of the section, with the introduction of the figure of Moses in Wis 10:15, does wisdom appear as addressed to Israel. Thus wisdom is at work in Adam and the patriarchs before the Sinai revelation, an event which, moreover, does not seem to have a particular importance in the Book of Wisdom, as also happens in the Enochic literature. From this point of view, the Book of Wisdom appears to be only at the beginning of a process of reflection on the natural law with regard to the patriarchs which Alexandrine Judaism renders explicit only in Philo.[35]

In the thought of Philo, the patriarchs are living examples of that natural law which is later going to find its written expression in the Law of Moses. Philo's treatise *De Abramo* opens with the assertion that the patriarchs are "living and rational laws" and concludes by recalling that the life of Abraham "is this very law and unwritten code."[36] The patriarchs—I am simplifying here a doctrine which is none too clear in Philo—are as though the living incarnation of the universal law, or else are sages and philosophers capable of understanding the structure of the universe ordered by the divine λόγος and of living in conformity with it, according to right reason.[37] It is the whole patriarchal history which, for

[34] Cf. SVF III, 87; frg. 360 (Radice, 1142-44).

[35] On this point cf. Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon,* 211-12; and "A Century of Research," 11-12 and Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 214-15.

[36] Οἵ γὰρ ἔμψυχοι καὶ λογικοὶ νόμοι (*Abr.* 5); the life of Abraham is νόμος αὐτός (…) καὶ θεσμὸς ἄγραφος (*Abr.* 276).

[37] Cf. W. Richardson, "The Philonic Patriarchs as νόμος φύσεως," in *Studia Patristica: Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (eds. K.

Philo, guarantees the perfect correspondence between the written Mosaic Law and rational law, the law of nature, both of them derived from God.

As for Moses, Philo presents him according to the more classical canons of the royal ideal which is expressed in the Neopythagorean treatises on sovereignty. Moses is in fact *par excellence* not only the lawgiver, but also the νόμος ἔμψυχος καὶ λογικὸς (*Mos*. 1.162; but cf. the whole passage, 1.148-162); in *Mos.* 2.4 it is clear that the model according to which Moses is described is that of the king as he is portrayed in the Neopythagorean treatises; cf. also *Praem*. 55; *Migr*. 130.[38]

The Sinaitic Law was put into writing by Moses for those who, unlike the patriarchs, are not capable of living according to this law of nature of which the Mosaic Law is, as it were, a written copy. But the connection between the law of nature and the Mosaic Law is still closer in Philo;[39] the Jews possess, in fact, a perfect copy, the true copy of the law of nature (cf. *Abr*. 3, *Mos*. 2.11.48). We should note that such a position can well be interpreted as a right and proper response to the by now widespread Stoic conception by which they attributed lesser value to written laws by contrast with the universal unwritten law. For his part, Philo does not distinguish any contrast between the law of nature and the written Law of Moses:

> This origin (of the law) is wonderful because it contains the creation of the cosmos (κοσμοποιίαν), because the cosmos is in harmony with the law and the law with the cosmos and because the man who observes the law is constituted thereby a citizen of the world, regulating his doings by the purpose and will of nature which guides the whole universe (cf. *Opif*. 3).

Here we find expressed another idea typical of Philo: the unity between creation and lawgiving (cf. also *Mos*. II,48). Philo's aim is that of making it understood—utilising language and concepts typical of Stoicism—that the Mosaic Law, in so far as it is a true and authentic copy of the law of nature, is superior to all other laws, which are certainly not so. In doing this, Philo shows his total originality, not without leaving a certain amount of paradox: "Philo creates his unity of law, first by relating all

Aland and F.L. Cross, Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1957) 1: 515-25; Martens, *One God, one Law*, 86-95; Termini, "Dal Sinai alla creazione," 154-91.

[38] On this matter, cf. R. Barraclough, "Philo's Politics. Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism," in ANRW II.21.1, 520-21 and F. Calabi, *The Language and the Law of God: Interpretation and Politics in Philo of Alexandria* (SFSHJ, Atlanta: Scholars Press 1998) 7-10.

[39] On the argument, cf. Martens, *One Law, one God*, 95-99; A. Myre, "Les caractéristiques de la loi mosaïque selon Philon d'Alexandrie," *Science et Esprit* 25 (1973) 37 and 67; idem, "La Loi de la Nature et la loi mosaïque selon Philon d'Alexandrie," *Science et Esprit* 28/2 (1976) 163-81.

forms of higher law to one another, and second by connecting the Law of Moses closely to the law of nature."[40] Philo shows himself unique in the context of his time in obtaining the effect of reinforcing the value of the Mosaic Law by anchoring it to the idea of the law of nature propounded by Stoicism. Philo thus obtains a further result—like Cicero in Rome too—that of deepening the idea and at the same time in developing it. So Philo responds to the double challenge, at once philosophical and political, which he had set himself, at an undoubtedly highly critical time for the Jewish community of Alexandria. It will be remembered, moreover, that already in Stoicism the idea of a law that is eternal and universal is born *also* from political factors (the collapse of the *polis*) and not only philosophical ones (the ontology of the imminent *logos*).

In sum, Philo seeks a balance between creation and Sinai, an attempt already present *in nuce* in Ben Sira by means of the bringing together of wisdom and the Mosaic Law (cf. Sir 24).[41] In Philo, rather more than in Ben Sira, the Mosaic Law, filtered through the Stoic concept of the law of nature, is taken within the Biblical-Judaic framework of creation. If Cicero in Rome translates the Stoic λόγος φύσεως in juridico-religious terms more congenial to the Roman spirit, the same expression evokes in

[40] Martens, *One Law, one God*, 101. Cf. also J.W. Martens, "Philo and the 'Higher' Law," *SBLSP* (1991) 317: "Philo could not admit that the Mosaic law was only a shadowy sketch of true law. God gave the law to Moses; God also created the world and with it the law of nature. The law of Moses, divinely given, could in no way contradict the law of nature, divinely implanted in the world of creation." On this Philonic paradox cf. Najman, "Written Copy of Law of Nature:" "The paradox is that Philo regards the Law of Moses as a written copy of the law of nature, but the law of nature is unwritten and so cannot be reduced to a code of rules that could be written down. (…) I do not think that this paradox can be entirely removed" (62). This is because Philo has in front of him a written text, the Law of Moses, which is something more than a written law; it is the very revelation of God.

[41] On the relationship between law and wisdom in Ben Sira, cf. the exhaustive study of G.L. Prato, "Sapienza e Torah in Ben Sira: meccanismi comparativi culturali e conseguenze ideologico-religiose," in *Il confronto tra le diverse culture*, 129-51, with extensive bibliography. Prato, discussing the opposed positions of J. Marböck (*Weisheit im Wandel. Untersuchungen zur Weisheitstheologie bei Ben Sira* [BBB 37, Bonn: Hanstein 1971] 39-46) and J.E. Schnabel (*Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul. A Tradition Historical Enquiry into the Relation of Law, Wisdom and Ethics* [WUNT 2.16, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1985] esp. 69-77), sees in the connection which Ben Sira establishes between wisdom and law a new interpretation in view of a reformulation of a more precise cultural identity. In this perspective, the possible connection of Ben Sira with Stoic philosophy seems secondary. More interesting and more fruitful, in the case of Ben Sira, is the study of the relationship with the Isis aretalogies. "More than a cultural ethos to which he refers, more interesting is the fact that the link achieved by Ben Sira suggests a different hermeneutic for the elements brought together, creating from them, so to speak, a third which is the simple sum of both," Prato, "Sapienza e Torah," 135.

Philo the divine perfection of the Torah. Precisely the indefinite content of the λόγος φύσεως allows Philo to fill it with all the significance of the *Tôrah* of Israel and thus to contribute in creating a truly original idea with regard to the λόγος φύσεως.[42] The Alexandrine, intending thus "to give credibility and universal value to the Mosaic Law in a competitive way with respect to the political and cultural world in which he lives, uses shrewdly the conceptual and terminological tool of Greco-Roman philosophy."[43] The fruitfulness and novelty of this *interpretatio judaica* of the Mosaic law in the light of the concept of the law of nature are today ever more evident.

As an appendix to what we have said on Philo, it is necessary at least to take note of a text perhaps contemporary of Philo, that is, the *Fourth Book of the Maccabees*.[44] One gets the impression that the author of this work wishes to distinguish himself deliberately from the position of the Alexandrine; the "law" which stands at the centre of the book is, in fact, not the unwritten, universal and eternal law to which—as happens in Philo—the patriarchs are subject; it is the Law of Moses that alone allows one to live κατὰ φύσιν (cf *4 Macc* 5:25). Law and nature, law and reason are thus in perfect agreement.

Precisely such a passage as *4 Macc* 5:25 attests on the one hand a full awareness of the Stoic idea of a law that is divine and eternal, written in nature, and on the other hand the presence of an open polemic against such a position. In the face of Greek philosophy, *4 Maccabees* reclaims the whole validity of the Law of Moses. In fact, right from the beginning of the book (*4 Macc* 1:1), there is affirmed the worth of "pious reason," that εὐσεβὴς λογισμός which in reality coincides with observance of the Law (cf. e.g. *4 Macc* 2:9-10; 5:34-35). The absolute centrality of the *Torah* shows how there is no true rationality except in the observance of the *Torah* itself within which, therefore, is taken up the very idea of the "law of nature" of which, significantly, by contrast with Philo, the author of *4 Maccabees* never speaks but shows himself aware, precisely by means of adopting these polemical positions.

[42] Cf. Farias, *Studi sul pensiero sociale,* 106.

[43] Termini, "Il rapporto tra legge naturale e legge rivelata," 191.

[44] The precise date of *4 Macc* is still discussed; cf. C. Marucci, "La rilevanza sapienziale della Torah nel Quarto libro dei Maccabei e negli scritti di Flavio Giuseppe," in *Sapienza e Torah,* 83-90 and D.A. DeSilva, *4 Maccabees* (Sheffield: Academic Press 1998) 12-18; it goes from the first years of the 1st century AD to the end of the same century: before 38 AD: H. Anderson, "4 Maccabees," in *OTP*, 2: 334. Between 18 and 55: E. Bickermann, "The Date of 4 Maccabees," in idem, *Studies in Jewish and Christian History* (Leiden: Brill 1976) 275-81. Around 90-100 AD: see the recent edition in Italian with introduction, translation and commentary by G. Scarpat, *Quarto Libro dei Maccabei* (Brescia: Paideia 2006) 65, see also 66-69, 81-84, and 201; and P.L. Reddit, "The Conception of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees," *CBQ* 45 (1983) 249-70.

6. THE ANTECEDENTS OF PHILO IN GREEK-SPEAKING JUDAISM

In no other author of Alexandrian Judaism do we find so rich an account of the subject of the law of nature as in Philo. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine the existence of a current of thought which, influenced by Stoicism, perhaps known through the, already Middle Platonic, mediation of Antiochus of Ascalon and then of Eudorus and Posidonius (cf *supra*), developed within Alexandrian Judaism, in particular with regard to the Jewish ethic.[45] Philo, therefore, had predecessors who had opened up the way for him. Among these was the author of the Book of Wisdom.

Already in the course of the second century BC, it is possible to identify some background ideas which will be taken up again by Philo. Witnesses to these are the fragments of Aristobulus and, especially, the *Letter of Aristeas*. Aristobulus attests the existence of a Jewish-Alexandrine philosophical tradition influenced notably by Stoicism and perhaps also by the *De Mundo*. Three aspects in Aristobulus in particular reveal the existence of common ground with Philo: the deanthropomorphisation of the divine attributes; the recourse to Greek philosophy; and the taking up of that philosophy within the Jewish faith.[46] It is much more difficult, however, to show in any detail just what conception Aristobulus had of the Mosaic Law in relation to the Stoic concept of the universal law, given the scarcity of fragments which have reached us.

Well known, though, is the fragment in which Aristobulus asserts: "it is clear that Plato has followed our legislation, at every stage;" and a little further on: "the whole complex of our laws is governed by piety, justice, continence and the other true goods."[47] From this point of view, Aristobulus is very close to the *Letter of Aristeas*: according to Aristobulus, the Mosaic Law is in full accord with Greek philosophy; better still, in the Law of Moses are expressed the highest ethical demands of the Greek philosophers. In any case we find ourselves in the field of ethics.

Our knowledge of Aristobulus is really too limited for us to be able to draw certain conclusions. What we do know of him is, however,

[45] Cf. G.E. Sterling, "Universalizing the Particular: Natural Law in Second Temple Jewish Ethics," *SPhA* 15 (2003) 64-80.

[46] On Aristobulus, cf. A. Paul "La Torah sapienziale a confronto con il mondo culturale ellenistico," in *Sapienza e Torah. Atti della XXIX Settimana Biblica* (Bologna: EDB 1987) 50-55, with further bibliography; M. Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism. Studies in their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period* (Philadephia: Fortress 1974) 1: 163-69; for the connections between Aristobulus and the Book of Wisdom, cf. Larcher, *Etudes*, 136-37; for his links with Philo, cf. R. Radice, *Platonismo e creazionismo in Filone di Alessandria* (Milano: Vita e Pensiero 1989) 186-201.

[47] Cf. Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.*, XIII,12,1-16.

sufficient to prove that in Alexandrian Judaism the encounter with the Greek philosophy of the time is a real one and not just casual. Aristobulus' position is certainly apologetic: the Law of Moses is the true philosophy and does not stand in contrast with a reason that has been philosophically educated. Aristobulus thus "must be understood as a positive effort to adapt the traditional conceptions of the Jewish tradition to the spiritual demands of a new age."[48]

The first time that we find expressed with sufficient clarity in the sphere of Alexandrian Judaism the idea that the Mosaic Law corresponds to the dictates of right reason is in the *Letter of Aristeas*, evidence of what we could describe as "Judaism in dialogue."[49] In connection with the laws relating to the purity of animals contained in the Mosaic Law, we read in *Arist.* 161 that "it has not been laid down by chance, or by something which has poured into the soul, but through truth and the expression of right teaching." The bringing together of law and ὀρθὸς λόγος is already an indication of the existence of a link with concepts haling from a Stoic ambience. A little further on, we read again that the Mosaic Law was conceived as the expression of a universal norm of justice ("everything has been disposed with a view to justice," cf *Arist*. 168-69); thus there is no dichotomy between the demands of the Law of Moses and the ethical requirements of contemporary Greek philosophy. Aristeas does not speak again explicitly of the law of nature, nor does he openly use Stoic vocabulary, but, in the *Letter*, the influence of the Stoic-Pythagorean concept of the universal law is undoubtedly apparent. We recall the words of Demetrius at the beginning of the *Letter* where he speaks of the Law of Israel as legislation that is "philosophical, pure and divine" (*Arist*. 31). The Law of Moses acquires thus in Aristeas a truly universal value which, to that extent, brings it close to the "right reason" and "common law" propounded in Stoicism. By this means, however, recognition is given within Judaism to the Greek *paideia* as something of value.

Among the predecessors of Philo, as far as our topic is concerned, the *Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* are of great importance.[50] Although the dating of this highly individual work is much debated, it is possible to accept a date of composition about the beginning of the first century AD, therefore at a time almost contemporary with Philo and the Book of Wisdom, but certainly prior to the clashes caused by Caligula. Although

[48] Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism*, 168.

[49] Cf. Paul, "La Torah sapienziale," 55-63, with further bibliography. On the notion of "giudaismo dialogico/Judaism in dialogue" in Aristeas, cf. G. Boccaccini, *Middle Judaism. Jewish Thought, 300 B.C.E. to 200 C.E.* (Minneapolis: Fortress 1991) 161-85.

[50] Cf. P.W. van der Horst, *The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides* (Leiden: Brill 1978); Paul, "La Torah sapienziale," 62-66; Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 158-77.

not certain, the Alexandrine origin of the Sentences remains the most probable option.[51]

The ethics of Pseudo-Phocylides are based on an evident faith in the existence of a natural law rather than on the Mosaic *Torah* as such, although a good part of the content of his work can be related to the Decalogue. For example, when speaking of marriage, Pseudo-Phocylides asserts that to get married signifies "giving something to nature," giving to nature what is owed to it (l. 176); that is in full accord with the Stoic idea that to get married is κατὰ φύσιν.[52] Thus Pseudo-Phocylides bases his own ethic on the typically Stoic idea of the universal law; the analogies between marriage and the animal world (ll. 201-204) are, for example, typical of the Stoic ones relating to the law of nature; similarly, Pseudo-Phocylides avoids basing marriage directly on the divine command contained in Scripture.

Although the aim with which Pseudo-Phocylides composed his work is still the object of discussion, we may think that his real interest was not in Judaism in itself. He does not cite Scripture explicitly and his work lacks any manifestly Jewish statements: "His purpose, the only purpose we can safely impute to him, was to impart to his readers, whether Jews or Gentiles, his understanding of the moral life."[53]

The position of Pseudo-Phocylides, motivated by arguments drawn from the natural law, is further evidence that, in the Jewish world of Alexandria, the coming together of the Mosaic Law and the universal law, the one law of reason and of the cosmos, as it had been conceived in Stoicism and in the contemporary philosophy which had been influenced by Stoicism, was, despite obvious nuances, a well-established tendency. Thus, the Greek-speaking Jews (and, in fact, not only they) were fully capable of performing that hermeneutical twist which brought them to reconcile the Law of Moses with the law of nature.[54] In this way, Judaism showed itself able to respond to the accusations of being "misanthropic" and particularist, and also succeeded in conferring on the Law of Moses a universal significance.

So then, it is against this unitary, but certainly not univocal, background that the Book of Wisdom is placed, even in terms of chronology, and it is to this book that we now turn our attention.

[51] Cf. Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 158-59.

[52] Van der Horst, *The Sentences*, 226, with citation of Stoic parallels; cf. also G. Striker, "Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics," *Oxford Society for Ancient Philosophy* 9 (1991) 1-73.

[53] Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 177.

[54] "The equation of Mosaic legislation and natural law took place on a routine or semi-routine basis in Second Temple Jewish circles (…). Jewish moralists used it when they thought appropriate but did not work out a full-scale or systematic analysis," Sterling, "Natural Law," 79.

7. WIS 8:4: THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LAW OF MOSES

We have already recalled how, in Wis 6:4, our sage speaks of the law, bringing together in a certain measure the positive laws—both human laws and, probably, also the Law of Moses—with the idea of a universal law as happens in the Neopythagorean treatises on sovereignty which, in their turn, take up Stoic concepts. The presentation of the patriarchs in Wis 10, moreover, is not far from the way in which Philo describes them, that is, as men who observed that unwritten law which is the universal law of nature, the "living law" which Philo identified with the Law of Moses.

Nevertheless, it should be observed that in none of the passages in which our sage speaks of the law does he use any of the expressions which could make us pinpoint a direct philosophical influence. In fact, expressions such as ὀρθὸς λόγος, νόμος φύσεως, νόμος κοινός, νόμος ἔμψυχος… are wholly absent from the Book of Wisdom. It is clear how distant we are from Philo's thought. The very term φύσις is present only in Wis 7:20, 13:1 and 19:20, never, however in connection with νόμος and never used in a philosophical sense in relation to the "nature" of the cosmos.[55] However, there are some clues which help us to put the idea of the law expressed in 18:4 into some relationship with the Stoic concept of universal law, that law of nature so well noted by Philo.

Let us observe first of all how in Wis 18:4 (but cf. already 17:20), our sage thinks of an evidently universal destination for the Mosaic Law, thus distinguishing himself, as has been said, from the traditions about the Law as light in Palestinian Judaism, traditions which point rather towards particularism and to the destination of the light of the law as Israel alone. The universalism of the Book of Wisdom can certainly find its origin in some Biblical texts as we have already noted. But the position of our sage who, in Wis 17:20 and 18:4 inserts the idea of a universal destination of the Law within a context that is at once Exodic and eschatological, is certainly original. It is possible that a strong impulse towards such universalistic overtures could have been suggested to our author precisely by a consideration of the Stoic idea of universal law, an idea that was certainly not foreign to Alexandrian Judaism. The light of the Law offered "to your sons" does not just illuminate them, the Israelites, but though them the whole cosmos to which it was also addressed. The cosmos is, therefore, one big reality, animated by one law which is identified with the divine will, an idea certainly not far from the Stoic concepts which we have outlined.

To follow the Law means to obtain that ἀφθαρσία which characterises the Law itself which is an ἄφθαρτος φῶς. As we have seen,

[55] In 19:20 φύσις is probably synonymous with δύναμις.

this connection is also found in Philo (cf *supra* with regard to *Prob*. 46) and is not absent from the Stoic perspective on the universal law; whoever follows the universal law of nature finds a life without end. Wis 18:4, however, does not speak of the law of nature understood as identical with right reason, as Philo does in the text mentioned above, but talks only of the Law of Israel. Moreover, the idea of ἀφθαρσία has a much more Semitic meaning in the Book of Wisdom, given that our sage, although employing a philosophical vocabulary borrowed from the Greeks, is thinking very probably, as in 2:23, of the resurrection of the body.

The typically Stoic connection between the universal law (the νόμος κοινὸς) and right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος) is not, however, totally absent from the Book of Wisdom. In fact, our sage gives great importance to reason. His whole book, for example, is characterised by a continual rational reinterpretation of the ancient sapiential categories. The miracles described in Wis 11-19 may be those of a distant past but, for the addressees of the book, they reveal the deep sense of the structure of the cosmos.[56]

The divine gift of wisdom is not so much opposed to reason; on the contrary, it includes it. Solomon is a wise man according to the canons of Greek culture *also* (cf., for example, Wis 7:17-21). In this connection, the text of Wis 18:4 is situated precisely at the end of the fifth diptych, at the centre of which we find the definition of fear (17:12-13), defined exactly as "surrender" (προδοσία) of the aids that come from λογισμός. Our sage thus takes up again in his definition of fear ideas which were already circulating in Platonic spheres and then within the Stoic philosophy. Fear is linked with the decrease of reason.[57] The darkness which characterises the whole of the fifth diptych is undoubtedly a very rich symbol, but it also represents the situation in which the ungodly who have not known how to make use of their reason come to find themselves. They are exactly like the ungodly described back in Wis 2:1: λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς (cf also 2:21; already in 1:3 the σκολιοὶ λογισμοὶ of the ungodly are censured).

[56] Cf. M. Sweet, "The theory of miracles in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Miracles* (ed. C.F.D. Moule, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965) 115-26. We should observe, however, that, according to Sweet the aim of Wisdom is merely propogandist and, therefore, little more than polemic; cf., on the other hand, A. Passaro, "L'argomento cosmologico di Sap 19,18 e la concezione della creazione nel libro della Sapienza," in *In Charitate Pax. Studi in onore del Card. Salvatore De Giorgi* (eds. F. Armetta and M. Naro, Palermo: Salvatore Sciascia 1999) 47-61. Starting from Wis 19:18, Passaro shows how the use of Greek philosophy in a context of miracles (in 19,18 the renewal of creation) is much more than a work of propaganda.

[57] Cf. Mazzinghi, *Notte di paura e di luce,* 122-27.

So then, the presentation of the Law as light in Wis 18:4 occurs within a context in which reason has considerable importance. Even if there does not appear in the Book of Wisdom any direct alignment between νόμος and λόγος,[58] the Law does not in fact seem opposed to the λογισμός mentioned in Wis 17:12. In any case, to follow reason does not exclude one from following the Law.

At this point, we can draw a first conclusion: the Law which is spoken of in Wis 18:4, certainly the Mosaic Law, is not introduced by our sage in directly philosophical categories, but such a presentation does not contradict, and certainly does not exclude, the Stoic concept of a universal law, in conformity with reason, eternal, written in nature. Rather than talking of direct Stoic influences, it is preferable, therefore, to speak of a description of the Mosaic law which is not opposed to the Stoic idea of νόμος, but recalls at least two fundamental elements of it: its universality and its conformity with reason.

From this point of view, the Book of Wisdom can certainly be considered as one of the antecedents of Philo, to be situated within that trajectory in Alexandrian Judaism which begins with Aristobulus and the *Letter of Aristeas*. Within this complex panorama, our sage reveals himself, certainly not as "Greek" as Philo, but nor as opposed and adverse to the Hellenistic world as will be the author of *4 Maccabees*.

The sage-author of Wisdom shows certainly that he is not aware of (or at least does not wish to accept) all the Philonic speculation about the law of nature, and his intention is different from that of Philo. The Alexandrian, in fact, intends to offer to his readers a thoroughgoing *interpretatio judaica* of the Stoic notion of the universal law, succeeding thus in developing the idea of the law of nature in a new direction. The Book of Wisdom, on the other hand, makes use of some ideas in circulation in its time—for the most part exactly the same as a little later would be taken up by Philo—to express in a way adapted to the needs of its readers, the correct teaching as far as the *Torah* of Israel was concerned. At all events, our sage seems much less interested in this than Philo, given that the emphasis of his work falls rather on the figure of wisdom. In Wis 18:4, the alternative to falling into the darkness comes only from that light which, before being the light of the Law, is the light of wisdom, as appears clear from 17:20 seen as a flashback to Wis 7:29-30. In 18:3, the image of the pillar of cloud as "guide" of Israel recalls again the theme of wisdom which is also described as a guide in Wis 9:11 and set alongside the pillar of cloud itself at 10:7.

[58] Cf., however, Wis 16:12, where the λόγος is placed in connection with the law which has been mentioned in vv. 6 and 11, and Wis 18:15; but in both cases the background is principally Biblical. On λόγος in the Book of Wisdom, cf. M. Priotto, *La Prima Pasqua in Sap 18,5-25. Rilettura e attualizzazione* (Bologna: EDB 1987) 125-36.

In this way, by means of the encounter with the Hellenistic cultural world, the Book of Wisdom allows the faith of Israel to advance, achieving a successful balance between its particularistic aspects (the Law of Moses given to "sons") and universalistic ones (light for the world). It is my contention that it is precisely reflection on the Stoic concept of the law of nature which offers our sage the possibility of rereading the Mosaic Law in a universal key. The literary and theological figure of personified wisdom likewise becomes the hermeneutic base for this encounter.[59]

8. THE ORIGINALITY OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE LAW IN WIS 18:4 AND IN THE WHOLE OF THE BOOK OF WISDOM

The author of the Book of Wisdom and Philo have undoubtedly a common interest, that of binding together creation and Sinai, and so cosmos and Mosaic Law, cosmos and revelation. Philo creates this link by developing the Stoic idea of the law of nature and rereading and revaluing the Mosaic Law in this perspective. Along a line which is developed from Aristobulus and Aristeas and above all in Pseudo-Phocylides, the Mosaic Law is repropounded in Alexandrian Judaism as the bearer of a series of ethical principles which can be shared by all, Jews and Greeks, because they conform to the universal law of nature. The Philonic allegory serves this aim exactly.

In the Book of Wisdom, on the other hand, there is no allegory,[60] and at the theological heart of the book there is rather the *relecture* of the events of the Exodus carried out through the filter of the sapiential theology of creation and, at the same time, within a perspective that has a clear eschatological stamp. The third part of the book (Wis 11-19) is illuminated by the first (Wis 1-6) and illuminates it in its turn; the figure of wisdom (Wis 7-10) unites both these sections of the book.[61] The context in which the text of Wis 18:4 is situated is in this respect significant: the law which will be offered to the world through the

[59] Cf. Prato, "Sapienza e Torah," 147-48.

[60] On the use of allegory in Philo, cf. J. Laporte, "Philo in the Tradition of Biblical Wisdom Literature," in *Aspects of Wisdom in Judaism and Early Christianity* (ed. R.L. Wilken, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press 1975) 103-43; J. Cazeaux, "Philon: l'allégorie et l'obsession de la totalité," in *Etudes sur le judaïsme hellénistique* (eds. R. Kuntzmann and J. Schlosser, Paris: Cerf 1984) 267-320. On the differences with the Book of Wisdom, cf. C. Larcher, *Etudes sur le livre de la Sagesse* (Paris: Gabalda 1969) 151-78.

[61] Cf. M. Gilbert, "The last pages of the Wisdom of Solomon," *Proceedings of the Irish Biblical Association* (Dublin: The Irish Biblical Association 1997) 48-61; M. McGlynn, *Divine Judgment and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom* (WUNT II/139, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2001) 170-219. Cf. also L. Mazzinghi, "Il libro della Sapienza: elementi culturali," *Il confronto tra le diverse culture*, 181.

mediation of Israel is inserted in a framework that is clearly Exodic but which does not lack references to the creation or even an apparent eschatological background.

Similarly, by emphasising the themes of creation and history, our sage is able to retain the particularity of the Jewish faith. Exodus and creation become exemplary events. By contrast with Aristeas and Pseudo-Phocylides, our sage avoids dwelling on a series of moral precepts common to all men because in conformity with a universal law of nature. The viewpoint which our sage adopts is thus a lot more Biblical than philosophical. The ethical aspect is not obscured. The metaphor of light in Wis 18:4 also refers to the idea of the law as a moral guide for man. On the other hand, however, the ethical dimension of the law does not prevail over the salvation-history perspective which characterises the Book of Wisdom as a whole.

The adoption of philosophical categories is not, therefore, as explicit in the Book of Wisdom as in Aristobulus, Aristeas, Pseudo-Phocylides and, above all, Philo. The Biblical and Jewish particularity of our texts always remains very strong. For our author, the existence of a law of nature which is identified *tout court* with the Law of Moses seems to be unthinkable. Rather, the latter, the objectivisation of the wisdom which pervades the whole creation (cf. Wis 8:1) can be better understood precisely in the light of the widespread Hellenistic concept of the universal law.

It is true that for Philo, as for the Book of Wisdom, the Mosaic Law is before everything *revelation* rather than merely a corpus of written norms (cf. what has been written with regard to the patriarchs). For the Book of Wisdom this idea is even stronger: the Mosaic Law refers to wisdom which, in its turn, is the symbol of the presence of God in the world and in man, that is to say, a mediatory figure. For our sage it is wisdom—not so much the law—that is at work in the world before the Sinaitic revelation (cf the whole of Chapter 10). Perhaps precisely for this reason the Mosaic Law is never identified with reason or nature.

To return to the questions with which we began: the question of the relationship between the Mosaic Law and the law of nature helps us to clarify the connection between the Book of Wisdom and Greek philosophy. This connection has to be seen within the theological perspective of the book: in Wisdom, Exodus and creation are not simply restated but reinterpreted in the double light of the tradition of the fathers and the historical situation of the community of Alexandria. The *midrashic* background of the Book of Wisdom is well known;[62] our sage

[62] Cf. M. Gilbert, "Sagesse de Salomon (ou livre de la Sagesse)," in *DBS* 9: 77-87; J.R. Busto Saiz, "La intención del midrash del libro de la Sabiduría sobre el Exodo," in *Salvación en la Palabra; en memoria del profesor A. Diez-Macho* (ed. D. Muñoz León, Madrid: Cristiandad 1988) 63-78.

does not shrink from utilising the cultural tools of his time to actualise the Biblical text for these particular listeners. This is what happens with the Stoic idea of the natural law; the Book of Wisdom never makes full use of it as Philo will do, nor is it confined, on the other hand, to solutions of an apologetic or propagandist character. Rather, Wisdom uses some philosophical concepts well known to Alexandrian Judaism in order to *rewrite* Scripture[63] and render it still more effective for its hearers. In other words, it is a question of a work in the service of the faith, a position of fine balance, the sign of a real wish to enter into dialogue with a world that, at first sight, is totally foreign.

And finally: rather than a possible appeal for obedience to a universal law of nature which is to bind all men in the name of a reason that is divine and universal and which is incarnate in the Mosaic Law, it is the conviction of our sage that the Mosaic Law does not contradict those universal values on which Hellenistic culture is based. It is precisely in this context that it becomes possible to accept it. Moreover, before even the law, there is wisdom, a real means of mediation which refers at the same time to the presence of God in creation and in history. The paradox which characterises the position of Philo is thus avoided; the Law of Moses is *not* identified with the law of nature, but nor is there a radical exclusion of a mutual relationship between the two. Precisely the dimension of mediation typical of sapiential theology enables the Book of Wisdom to accept the universalism typical of the Stoic concept of the law of nature within a perspective absolutely typical of Israel: the Law of Moses, revelation of God to men.

[63] On the idea of "rewritten Scripture," cf. H. Najman, *Seconding Sinai. The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism* (JSJSup 77, Leiden: Brill 2003) 7-8, nn. 13-14; 16-17, n. 33; P.S. Alexander, "Retelling the Old Testament," in *It is Written: Scripture citing Scripture, Essays in Honour of B. Lindars* (eds. D.A. Carson and H.G.M Williamson, Cambridge: University Press 1988) 99-121.

SOLOMON, WISDOM AND THE PHILOSOPHER-KINGS*

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Wisdom of Solomon contains three full chapters (7-9) which have, lying behind them, the events of 1 Kings chapters 1-10 and the almost parallel account in 2 Chronicles 1-9: i.e. the succession of Solomon (1 Kings 1:1-2:12); the request for wisdom (1 Kings 3:1-15); the building of the Temple and its dedication (1 Kings 5:1-8:66); Solomon's knowledge of the world and considerable wealth (1 Kings 9:15-10:29); and the visit of the Queen of Sheba (1 Kings 10:1-13) who came to test his wisdom. These are the basic strands out of which the author of Wisdom has woven his own composition. His Solomon, pre-eminently, makes a request for the divine gift of wisdom. In the Wisdom of Solomon this gift does not come alone: it brings with it riches and happiness, but it does so because wisdom also subsumes reason, the possession of the virtues, long pursuit of education, and an inclination for the good. These latter qualities of kingship have emerged as a consequence of Plato's political thought that the best kingship required a philosophical education. Middle Platonism was a strong emphasis of the Greco-Roman thought world in which Wisdom's author moved.[1] Requirements for kingship had become a practical matter. The relative security and intimacy of the polis, for which Plato had written, was long gone, replaced by the Hellenistic kingdoms in the years after Alexander's death, and later by Roman imperial ambition. Real power lay with the rulers, and the succession of kingship tracts which emanated from the Hellenistic courts were often no more than

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[1] M. McGlynn, *Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom* (WUNT 2/139, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2001) 13-15. This does not contradict Angelo Passaro's carefully detailed paper in this volume. It has long been agreed by scholars that Middle Platonism was a fusion of Platonist and Stoic ideas. See J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: a Study of Platonism -80 BC to AD 220* (London: Duckworth 1977) 118.

propaganda for the reigning monarch, and not a real dialogue on freedoms and government.[2] Nevertheless they existed, and as such provided a marker by which qualities of kingship, political decisions and military and economic progress could be measured.

There is little doubt that for the author of Wisdom, the reign of Solomon epitomised the ideal of kingship. The textual tradition which provided the basis for this interpretation of Solomon is most likely to have been LXX, already to some extent adapted to new cultural circumstances.[3] Even the Hebrew text of 1 Kings has been extensively edited to present a particular theological narrative, that of covenant kingship imposed upon an earlier royal ideology.[4] In reading the account of 2 Chronicles, a new emphasis is revealed. For the Chronicler, it is the Davidic dynasty which is significant, and especially for the achievement of the Temple's construction. Times of adversity in the reigns of both David and Solomon are omitted from Chronicles, and the chief concentration of David's reign is to enable Solomon to build the Temple.[5] David, as well as Solomon, has lost some of his more vivid characterisation and the range of Solomon's activities as portrayed in 1 Kings has been curtailed. Importantly, the idealisation of David and Solomon which occurs in Chronicles is linked to hopes of messianic rule. However, it is apparent that we are contending with a process of re-visiting and re-interpreting the Davidic and Solomonic traditions, depending upon the theological perspectives of author and editor. The LXX must, to some extent, be a continuation of this process.

The historical books were translated into Greek more than a century before the time of Wisdom's author,[6] and the LXX version of 1 Kings also reflects a degree of hellenisation, most notably in the religious and philosophical understanding of wisdom, Solomon's gift. The words

[2] J.G. Gammie, "The Sage in the Hellenistic Royal Courts," in *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near-East* (eds. J.G. Gammie and L.G. Perdue, Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns 1990) 148. Gammie has noted that no mark left by the great civilisations on the Hellenistic kingdoms can be compared to the effect on these kingdoms of "accumulated Hellenic institutional experience." Persaeus of Citium, a pupil of Zeno, founder of the Stoics, accepted a post at the court of Macedonia and wrote a treatise "On Kingship." Philosophers were frequently invited to take up court posts in the new kingdoms. See note 30 below.

[3] P. Torijano, *Solomon the Esoteric King: From King to Magus: Development of a Tradition* (Leiden: Brill 2002) 15. Torijano takes for granted the fact that omissions and interpolations in 1 Kings (LXX) are evidence of editorial activity and enculturation.

[4] Torijano, *Solomon*, 15.

[5] 1 Chron 22:1 indicates where the Temple will be sited, and the succeeding verses deal with materials for the Temple construction.

[6] Translation of the prophetic books was obviously complete, and most of the "Writings" by the visit of Ben Sira's grandson to Egypt in 132 BC. See R.T. Beckwith, *The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church* (London: SPCK 1985) 4.

used of Solomon's wisdom, *phronesis* and *sophia,* have a range of meanings, one of which, in the case of s*ophia,* is knowledge of divine entities, and *phronesis* is associated with kingship in Plato. [7] Significant too, is the idea embedded in Hellenistic philosophy that the king identified personally with justice. Solomon's request in 1 Kings in the Greek version is to be able to judge the people "*with justice*," a phrase which is missing from the Hebrew version of the request.[8]

Time and the existence of different recensions may have brought about a certain conformity in differing textual traditions. Nonetheless, the creation of Wisdom of Solomon from the backdrop of 1 Kings gives us an extraordinary, literary composition. It remains extraordinary even though we accept the fact of continuous revision of the David/Solomon histories under the impact of the Hellenistic world.

It is this revision process that reveals the key questions of this paper. The Solomon of Wisdom of Solomon differs markedly from his counterpart in 1 Kings of the LXX, already a partial revision of the Hebrew text. Undoubtedly, these changes reflect the changing nature of kingship within the Greco-Roman world, but it is also significant that wisdom, Solomon's divine gift, has also become subject to re-appraisal. We need to consider what circumstances prompted the re-appraisal, and how the original material available to Wisdom's author was adapted to suit a different purpose. We will also need to be aware of the constraints, literary, theological, and traditional, which might have been hidden factors in the reinterpretation of Solomon's kingship. Finally we ask the question whether there was, in reality, more than one Solomon, each inconsistent with the others, or can we discover a common thread which links the different portrayals?

[7] Plato *Politicus* 294a. where he refers to "the kingly man who possesses wisdom," see also Torijano, *Solomon*, 30.

[8] There has been considerable scholarly debate about how LXX is to be used in biblical research, with some scholars arguing that what we have in LXX may be an older textual tradition, and others claiming that the variant readings in LXX constitute a midrash on the text. In 1 Kings (3 Reigns) there are two principle interpolations, or miscellanies, concerning Solomon, at 2:35a-o and 2:46a-l, and there are other sections where the ordering of the text differs from the MT. Whilst these are not questions specifically related to the topic of this paper, it is well to be alerted to the idea that the text of 1 Kings (3 Reigns) which Wisdom's author had available may not be precisely the same, in order or content, as the versions available today. See S. DeVries, *I Kings* (WBC 12, Texas: Word Books 1985) 48.

2. THE PORTRAIT OF SOLOMON IN 1 KINGS 1-10 (LXX)[9]

1 Kings 1-2 begins with the account of the struggle for the succession as David grows old, the presumption of Adonias (Adonijah) that he will be king, and the successful conspiracy by Nathan and Bersabee (Bathsheba) and other officials of David's court to have Solomon acknowledged as co-regent. No reason is given for the preference of one brother over another other than an oath, unrecorded and supposedly sworn by David many years earlier, that Solomon would reign after him. In the narrative Solomon is passive. While his brother makes a feast and gathers his supporters, he does nothing. The court prophet and Bersabee confront David reminding him of the oath, and the King suddenly becomes decisive and instructs the appointment of Solomon. Solomon is mounted on the King's mule, anointed and declared King. It is as though he has the kingship forced upon him.

Once the regency is established, an active Solomon emerges. To David's grievances, he adds his own, with the killing of Joab (2:34), conveniently a supporter of Adonias' claim; Semei, the Benjaminite (3:46); the removal from office of Abiathar, the high priest (2:26-27), also a Adonias supporter; and the execution of Adonias himself after David's death (2:25). "You are a wise man" David said to him in 2:9, "you will know what to do," although whether David recognised the inevitability of Adonias' death for Solomon's security is left unanswered. With this series of executions and one dismissal, Solomon has rooted out all potential dissent.

The narrative continues with descriptions of Solomon's wealth and the prosperity of his people, his public administration, the extent and safety of his kingdom, his chariot horses and stables.[10] Additionally, he had understanding and wisdom and "enlargement of heart" (4:29-34) and out of this knowledge he created 3000 proverbs and 5000 songs (1005 MT), he could speak of the natural world, both plants and animal life, and he was sent ambassadors from "all the kings of the earth" so that his wisdom could be heard.

Solomon's wisdom is first pointed out by David before his death (2:6, 2:9), but there it seems to relate to political acumen. The dream sequence

[9] Since Wisdom's author wrote in Greek and the provenance of Wisdom is regarded by the majority of scholars as Alexandria, we cannot assume knowledge of the Hebrew text. The Hebrew text of 1 Kings was the product of several compositional layers and some redaction. See J.T. Walsh, *Berit Olam: Studies in Hebrew Narrative and Poetry; I Kings* (Minnesota: Liturgical Press 1996) xi. The Greek Books of Kings include 1 and 2 Samuel, so 1 Kings equates in LXX to 3 Reigns. The books bear traces of two different translators and also give readings from various recensions. DeVries, *I Kings*, liii.

[10] MT 4:20-34.

at Gabaon (Gibeon 1 Kings 3:3-14) is where we are first introduced to the idea that Solomon asked the Lord for a listening heart to be just, and the ability to discern between good and evil. Solomon, in the early years of his kingship, was a lover of God and walked according to his statutes (1 Kings 3:3). Accordingly, the King went to Gabaon, to offer sacrifices there and to spend the night near the shrine in the hope of a dream revelation. In some ways this is a standard legitimation narrative,[11] however, Kenik has noted that the language does not reflect a request for patronage, as in near-eastern tradition, but a direct appeal to the covenant God of Israel.[12]

> You have dealt mercifully with your servant David my father, as he walked before you in truth, in righteousness, and in uprightness of heart, and you have kept for him this great mercy, to set his son upon his throne. (1 Kings 3:6)

Solomon recognises that his kingship will be measured according to his faithfulness to the covenant. He describes himself as a child, one that does not know the rules of kingship, and he requests the gifts of discernment and the ability to judge so that his people may have justice. In the dream, Yahweh commends him because he has asked nothing for himself, neither long life, nor wealth, nor the destruction of his opponents, and he is granted an "understanding and wise heart." And because of the Lord's pleasure in the request, he is also promised the things for which he did not ask, for wealth, glory and long life. The story which immediately follows, of the two harlots quarrelling over the living baby (1 Kings 3:16-28), is designed to demonstrate the gifts of wisdom and discernment, and to show that, possessing them, Solomon is able to exercise judgement even for the lowest of his subjects.

Solomon's journey to Gabaon, to set the divine seal upon his kingship, is also designed to highlight the absence of a central shrine. It is made clear that Solomon has visited this 'high place' on more than one occasion (1 Kings 3:3) to offer incense and sacrifices, and that the people go there for that purpose (1 Kings 3:2).[13] This moment of worship, however, anticipates the central task of Solomon's reign, i.e. the construction of the Temple in Jerusalem and its dedication.

[11] DeVries, *I Kings*, 48.

[12] H.A. Kenik, *Design for Kingship: The Deuteronomistic Narrative Technique in I Kings 3.4-15* (SBLDS 69, Chico: Scholars Press 1983) 71-88.

[13] The "High Place" is usually identified with Nebi Samwil about 11 km NW of Jerusalem and just south of Gibeon. After the fall of Shiloh (1 Sam 4) Gibeon seems to have become the chief sanctuary and it was to Gibeon that the Ark was taken after it was released by the Philistines (1 Sam 7:1-2). See G. Rice, *Nations Under God: A Commentary on the Book of I Kings* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1990) 31-32.

The building of the Temple occupies about a third of the Solomon narrative, and includes the conscription system used to provide indigenous workers,[14] the negotiations with King Chiram of Tyre (Hiram) for materials and additional labour, descriptions of the foundational and outer work in stone (1 Kings 6:2-8), the ceiling and partition work in cedar and fir (1 Kings 6:11), the artistry of Chiram's bronze craftsmen (1 Kings 7:13-40), and the work of Solomon's goldsmiths (1 Kings 7:46-50). Each of these elements adds to Solomon's consequence (as, indeed, do his other building projects) as a wise king.[15] But it is his dedication speech and prayer that reveals the internal wisdom which upholds his kingdom and allows it to prosper.

The speech and prayer really form a continuous piece and both are heavily redacted to show covenantal piety and continuity with the fulfilment of the Exodus. Solomon acknowledges that Yahweh's dwelling is in heaven, but asks for concessions to be made towards "this house" because the name of God is honoured there (1 Kings 8:27-29). In building the Temple, Solomon has created a focus for national life and has underpinned a system by which the nation can flourish. The petitions of the people can be offered by day and night (1 Kings 8:29) and disputes among them have a place of settlement. Any unlawful act against a neighbour can be recompensed, and the wicked condemned while the righteous are justified (1 Kings 8:31-32). Prayers against adversity, whether man-made or natural, can be directed to repentance and restoration (1 Kings 8:33-34). It is a place of confession (1 Kings 8:37), and equally, it is a place where the believing stranger, "who is not of your people," may be heard (1 Kings 8:41). The Temple, as a central shrine, has continuity with the Israel of the Exodus and wilderness, and with David, who brought the Ark of the Covenant to Jerusalem. The Ark, containing the tablets of the Law, is centrally positioned. Seven times during his speech, Solomon reminds the people of the promise made to David (1 Kings 8:14; 8:16; 8:18; 8:20; 8:24; 8:25; 8:26).The repeated underscoring reinforces David's piety and the consequent stability of the dynasty, and also the choice of Jerusalem, the dynastic capital, as the place where God's name is housed with his people. The Temple is the visible sign that the political state and the nation's cultic

[14] Scholars have implied that this extended only to Israel and that Judah was exempt from conscription and taxation, factors which lead to the secession of the Northern Kingdom after Solomon's death. See Walsh, *Berit Olam*, 100. 1 Kings 5:13 refers to "all Israel," but usually means by that Israel, and not Judah.

[15] In the famous incident of the Queen of Sheba's visit (1 Kings 10:1-10) it is not simply the questions (riddles) that convince her of Solomon's wisdom, but also the grandeur of the palace and the number of servants i.e. the consequences of his wisdom.

life have become inseparably intertwined—and this moment is the zenith of Solomon's reign.

1 Kings (but not 2 Chronicles) continues the narrative to include the fall of Solomon: the rise of external enemies and the succession of the Northern Kingdom (1 Kings 11:14-24), and the final address by Yahweh (1 Kings 11:1-8) in which the charges against Solomon are reduced to one charge, that of building sanctuaries to rival gods for his foreign wives. In spite of Yahweh's anger, the kingdom is not taken from Solomon, but the separation of Judah and Israel is deemed inevitable (1 Kings 11:11). Jerusalem remains the Lord's chosen city, and for David's sake, Roboam, (Rehoboam) Solomon's son, is left on the throne of Judah at Solomon's death (1 Kings 11:41-43).

Walsh[16] has suggested that Solomon was "either ignorant of or cavalier toward serious external danger," dangers of having his heart turned by his foreign wives and their forms of worship, as well as the enemies in Edom, Moab, and ferment in Israel. But Solomon's particular failures of kingship can be found in a separate narrative in Deuteronomy 17:14-20 where the limitations of royal authority are laid out: the king must not be a foreigner; he must not gather many horses or return the people to Egypt for horses (presumably an exchange of mercenaries for horses);[17] he must not acquire many wives or great wealth; he must read the Law all the days of his life. That this list is compiled on the basis of Solomon's failure must remain a strong suspicion. Many years ago Von Rad[18] noted that there continues to be a tension between the blessings and curses of Deuteronomy, which has a need of covenantal failure to explain the division of the kingdom, and an enduring faith in the promise of kingship which Yahweh declared to David. This tension is not present in the account of 2 Chronicles, nor is it transferred to later revisions of Solomon, and those promises become the basis of subsequent interpretations including that of Wisdom.

[16] Walsh, *Berit Olam*, 141.

[17] See G. Herrick, "Conceptions of the Davidic Hope in the Greek Psalter and Apocrypha. A Star will come out of Jacob: Early Regal Images in Numbers 24:15-19. Regal/Messianic Hope in Deuteronomy, I, II Samuel and I, II Kings," www.Bible.org, Accessed 9/02/2007.

[18] G. von Rad, "The Deuteronomistic Theology of History in 1 and 2 Kings," in *The Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays* (London: Oliver and Boyd 1966) 219-21, where it is argued that with the release of Jehoiachin the line of David has not come to an end.

3. REAPPRAISAL: SOLOMON IN THE HELLENISTIC WORLD

The author of Wisdom of Solomon, writing during the years of the Roman occupation of Egypt,[19] is not concerned to present a history of Solomon's reign but an account of how wisdom, the divine agent of God, operates within the world. Wisdom is the way in which God's love for the creation is expressed, and her relationship with Solomon, or indeed with any other of the leaders of Israel, is uniquely to show God's *philanthropia* to the world (Wisdom 1:6). Wisdom creates the environment in which righteousness or its opposites, wickedness and folly, may be chosen. Solomon the King is secondary to the designs of God enacted by wisdom, and he is never named.

We encounter Solomon in *Wisdom* in two autobiographical speeches, from 7:1-9:18 (although it could be assumed that Solomon is the narrator of the continuing story of salvation history). The King's narrative, however, begins prior to that, in chapter 6, where the "kings and judges of the earth" are exhorted in traditional proverbial phrases to "learn wisdom" and "you will be instructed"(Wisdom 6:1-11). The context for this narrative is the drama of the first five chapters where the kings and judges are swept away because they have mocked the divine demand for just kingship. And it is clear from this beginning that Solomon is being positioned in contrast to these rulers.[20]

Solomon's first speech opens with a statement about the shared human condition.

He is mortal, like everyone else, a descendant of "the first-formed" child of earth, Adam (7:1). When he was born, he breathed the same air and fell upon the dust, from which we came and to which we return (7:3). His first cry was as any other child, and he emphasises that no king has any other beginning. There is one entrance for life and one exit (7:5-6).

Solomon's recognition of his mortal state alerts us to two things. He betrays none of the hubris that characterises the conspiracy of kings in chapters 1-5, he is as a creature before the one who creates. Additionally, the limitations of human mortality act in his case as a spur towards wisdom:

> The beginning of wisdom is the most sincere desire for instruction;
> And the care of instruction is love;

[19] G. Scarpat, *Libro della Sapienza: Texto, Traduzione, Intoductione & Commento* (3 vols, Brescia: Paideia 1989); McGlynn, *Divine Judgement*, 12.

[20] The context of the conspiracy of the kings against "the Lord and his anointed" occurs in Psalm 2:1-2 and has the setting of an enthronement. Kenik comments that an enthronement ritual would be the traditional place to ask for wisdom. See Kenik, *Design for Kingship*, 122-46.

> And love is the keeping of her laws;
> And giving heed to her laws is the assurance of immortality;
> And immortality makes us near to God,
> So the desire for wisdom leads to a kingdom (Wisdom 6:17-20).

The next part of Solomon's speech is the request for wisdom, "I called on God and the spirit of wisdom came to me" (7:7) and for him she outshines the artefacts of kingship, the gold, silver and jewels of wealth, the gifts of health and beauty. Wisdom is the prize Solomon seeks, valuing her above all these other prizes, and unknown to him she brings all these gifts as well. Wisdom is an "unfailing treasury for mortals" (7:14).

We are meant to assume, as the locus of the first speech, the dream sequence from Gabaon, where Solomon went to spend the night, and having asked for "an understanding heart" to judge the people he receives, at Yahweh's hand, wisdom and wealth, health and honour. In the hymn of Wisdom 7:15-30 Solomon praises wisdom for teaching him cosmology, astronomy, physics, biology, botany as well as other knowledge.[21] Wisdom also teaches the virtues of temperance, prudence, justice and courage, providing the means by which the ruler becomes as like to the good (God) as is possible and introducing into daily life the disciplines that govern the universe (Wisdom 8:7-8). But significantly, in the hymn Solomon praises wisdom herself, for her beauty, transparency, mobility, for being the image of God's goodness, and he goes on to tell of how he had looked for her even in youth, always desiring her company.

Solomon specifically states that he had received a soul which inclines towards the good (Wisdom 8:19), yet he perceives that this is only a beginning and wisdom must be requested from God who alone can bestow such a gift (Wisdom 8:20). In receiving her, Solomon receives everything: his kingship; his wealth; and his famed knowledge of the natural world and the planets—the legendary wisdom upon which his reputation is grounded.

Is this gift of wisdom the same as the gift received by Solomon in 1 Kings? This is not an easy question to answer, despite the fact that we can see differences. The wisdom of 1 Kings is the gift a king receives upon his accession, as in near-eastern tradition. Solomon's victory in the succession struggle ensures that he will ask for wisdom as a legitimating seal upon his kingship. In Wisdom of Solomon, wisdom comes to meet those who will want her (Wisdom 6:13) and to desire her "leads to a kingdom" (Wisdom 6:20). The implication is that Solomon's victory in the succession struggle was pre-ordained by his love of wisdom. Yet the post-dated seal of approval in 1 Kings may imply that wisdom was

[21] D. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (AB 43, New York: Doubleday 1979) 172.

involved in the succession. Proverbs 8:16-17 declares of wisdom, "by me kings reign and the powerful decree justice, I love those who love me, and those who seek me diligently find me."

The range of knowledge wisdom brings in the Wisdom of Solomon undoubtedly reflects topics under discussion in the Hellenistic world. Knowledge has been hellenised to include what Winston calls "the full range of human science and philosophy."[22] Yet Solomon in 1 Kings 4:29, is given "all the wisdom of the ancients, all the wise men of Egypt—and wiser than all other men" (4:29). This too would seem to be the full extent of human knowledge. Yet in both texts wisdom is more than human knowledge. It is also the wisdom of God, giving knowledge of God's purposes in creation, translating those purposes into the realities of existence.

For the redactor of 1 Kings, the Law was the embodiment of the mind of God. By what other means could Solomon be made wise, and rule over a people made wise? In this respect, the United Kingdoms of Israel and Judah could be seen as a paradigm of community with its well-being rooted in Torah. For Wisdom's author, this was equally true, and his hymn to wisdom at 7:15-30 includes the properties of the divine *pneuma*, the world soul.[23] In this guise, it is wisdom "who holds all things together" (Wisdom 1:7) and actively seeks the good of the creation by encouraging paradigms of goodness in contrast to the folly of those who do not know her. Solomon is contrasted with the unjust rulers because wisdom's paradigms can deliver justice and preserve his people from adversity, and the kingdom is in the vanguard of God's purpose for creation by providing a paradigm of justice and well-being. For all the differences of expression and metaphor, wisdom remains recognisable in both accounts.

Do wisdom's paradigms offer us more than an exemplary kingdom on earth? I have argued elsewhere that, in the Wisdom of Solomon, the creation of Israel by divine wisdom, expressing the total *philanthropia* of God, provides humankind with an earthly model of a righteous community. But the worship of this community and its piety also creates a righteous nation where the people are as like God as is possible, and that these factors are signposts towards the immortality which was God's redemptive design.[24]

The story of Solomon in 1 Kings is part of a larger story, one that looks back to the reign of David, Yahweh's chosen King, and forward to the time when the kingdom will be divided and when David's

[22] Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, 172.

[23] J.J. Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age* (OTL, Louisville: WJKPress 1997) 196-97.

[24] McGlynn, *Divine Judgement*, 123-31. See Wisdom 3:1-4 "the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God—yet their hope is full of immortality."

successors will continue to rule over Judah and Jerusalem. Solomon's punishment for his apostasy is mitigated because Yahweh remains faithful to the promise made to David in 2 Samuel 7:8-16. The keynote of the promise is not merely that the issue of David will succeed him in a dynastic sense, but that his descendant will reign forever. Three times in these eight verses Yahweh stresses that David's descendant will have an everlasting rule (once in 2 Samuel 7:13, and twice in 2 Samuel 7:16. MT *'ad 'olam*, LXX *eis ton aiona*). Assuming that we accept traditional datings,[25] the Davidic dynasty ruled the Southern Kingdom for half a millennium, sufficiently long to acquire the description of 'eternal' in popular imagination. Psalm 89:36-37 has Yahweh speak of David,

> His line shall continue forever,
> And his throne endure before me like the sun,
> It shall be established forever like the moon,
> An enduring witness in the skies.

However we may interpret the promise historically, it is clear that Wisdom's author understood this in terms of an immortal and eternal reign.

The high point of Solomon's reign in 1 Kings, is the construction of the Temple. In the second of Wisdom's Solomonic speeches (Wisdom 9:1-18), which runs parallel with the dedication prayer of 1 Kings, there is a second request for wisdom. In 1 Kings the request is exclusively attached to the dream sequence at Gabaon, and the change of setting in Wisdom has the effect of giving a concrete and rooted element to Solomon's plea, the existence of the Temple provides a visible manifestation of his wisdom and also associates the divine affirmation of his kingship with the Temple itself. The language is appropriately liturgical, with an additional element in that wisdom's role in the created order is acknowledged (Wisdom 9:2), as is her part in the creation of holiness and righteousness (Wisdom 9:3). The wisdom that is requested here is the *paredros*, the throne-partner of God (Wisdom 9:4), as Dike is the throne-partner of Zeus, and wisdom's role here is identical to that of Dike. She is to distinguish between what pleases and what offends God (Wisdom 9:10). As a consequence of this gift of discernment, Dike is regarded in mythology as the personification of justice. Solomon's prayer highlights this aspect of the gift of wisdom,

[25] Archaeological evidence for the existence of the United Kingdom remains inconclusive. For the current state of research see W. Dever, "Histories and Non-Histories of Ancient Israel: The Question of the United Monarchy," in *In Search of Pre-exilic Israel: Proceedings of the Oxford Old Testament Seminar* (JSOTSup 406, ed. J. Day, London: T&T Clark 2004) 65-95, and others in the same volume.

> And I shall judge your people justly
> And shall be worthy of the throne of my father (Wisdom 9:12).

Solomon's prayer touches on several aspects of Davidic and sacred history. He refers to himself as "a servant, the son of your serving girl." Is this, perhaps, a reminder that Solomon was the only surviving son of Bathsheba and David and that Solomon lived because the Lord loved him (2 Samuel 12:24-25)? Solomon was named "beloved of God" (2 Samuel 12:25) and there is a use of "sonship" language by Yahweh relating to David's successor in the promise to David, and also in Psalms associated with the enthronement of Solomon (Psalm 2:7, Psalm 89:26). Solomon undoubtedly ascribes his own succession to the particular favour of God, and importantly, a favour that singles him out among David's sons because of his love of wisdom (Wisdom 9:6-7). He protests that he is weak and has no understanding of 'judgement and of laws' (Wisdom 9:5). He refers to Israel, over which he must preside as judge, in terms which recall the covenant, "your sons and your daughters" (Wisdom 9:7). The construction of the Temple is presented as God's initiative, a command, and the Temple itself is to be an imitation (*mimesis*) of the Tent of the Presence, by which God was present in the midst of the people (Wisdom 9:8). Zion, the place of God's habitation with Israel, is also Jerusalem, David's city, and the chosen location for the Temple. By the gift of wisdom, Solomon discerns that this work will be acceptable, yet there is a sense that wisdom's choice of Solomon has made this dynastic consolidation, prolongation, his destiny.

It is to be presumed that Wisdom's author knew of the 1 Kings dedication prayer and its contents, yet he makes no attempt to replicate the prayer or its main concerns.

The Temple seems secondary here to the importance of the relationship with wisdom, but that is not to say that it is unimportant. It is the insight wisdom brings which allows Solomon to recognise the significance of the Temple as a place of true worship for the nation. The Temple of Solomon's prayer is a concrete symbol of the historical and continuing relationship between God and his people. It has become an instantiation of God's idea of a holy nation, made possible by the activity of divine wisdom as the possession of Israel's king.

4. PLATO AND THE PHILOSOPHER-KINGS

To understand this fully, we need to refer to Plato. Plato's *Republic* was a formative book for Wisdom's author and leads to many of the questions posed in Wisdom. [26] The important factors in the creation of a

[26] E.g. the fate of the just man of chapters 1-5. See Collins, *Jewish Wisdom*, 195-202.

philosopher-king are that the subject owns a psyche which possesses all the virtues, and which has a ruling desire for education or philosophy. The well-being of the state, its constitution and health is embodied in the character of the ruler. The ruler, consequently, must not be seen to grasp power, but must be able to create a state which mirrors the virtues. The virtues of psyche and polis must be the same, as *poleis* determine the character of their members. Equally, only such a properly-ruled state, striving for the best constitution, can produce a philosopher-king because it is shaped by a ruling desire which allows full potential for growth. The best political constitution, i.e. the best in itself, is a divine constitution, which only those who by nature and education can see beyond the property to the thing in itself, are capable of bringing into being. The education received by the philosopher-kings enables them, in terms of practical politics, to introduce the institutions that will modify the natures of the members of the polis and their own.

> We were compelled by the truth to say that no city state or constitution, and no man like them, will ever become complete (*teleos*) until some chance event constrains those few philosophers—to take charge of a polis, whether they want to or not, and the polis is compelled to obey them, or until a true passion for true philosophy flows by divine inspiration into the present rulers and kings or their offspring (*Rep* 6.499b1-c2).

Wisdom's author creates this educational path for Solomon, re-emphasising elements of the 1 Kings narrative and making implications from the silences in that narrative.

The Solomon of 1 Kings is not involved in the succession struggle. Plot and counter-plot occur with his character off-stage until the time comes for the anointing and declaration of kingship. The narrative expresses neither reluctance on Solomon's part nor any desire for power. In Wisdom 9:3, Solomon stresses his inability to "execute judgement" if he does not possess the gift of wisdom. Plato held that only those engaged in the good and wise life were able to rule.

> Men who aren't lovers of ruling are precisely the ones who must do it, for if not, those who do love it will fight over it (*Rep* 7.521b1).

Similarly, we have noted that it was important in the Kallipolis that a ruler has the correct psyche, "gold or silver in their natures" (3.415c3-5). The ruling desire of any individual is what indicates their ability to receive and profit by further instruction and become rulers. Reeve has also noted that in Plato rulers are instructed,

> All of you in the city are brothers (*Rep* 3. 415a).

Solomon's first speech in Wisdom, begins with a confession of his mortal frailty and is without the arrogance of the unjust rulers of the earlier chapters. This is an adaptation of the narrative in 1 Kings, where Solomon speaks of himself as a servant, and a child (1 Kings 3:7). The humility of his petition and his awareness of his own deficiencies, "I know not my going out and my coming in," allows a presentation of Solomon in Wisdom in which his mortality and common humanity is to the forefront of his request.

Solomon's request for wisdom at the shrine of Gabaon is emphasised in Wisdom to portray Solomon as one who has consistently looked for wisdom since childhood, a wisdom-lover, one who, "readily and willingly tries all kinds of learning—is rightly called a philosopher" (*Rep* 5.475c). Wisdom, as Solomon's ruling desire, is indicative of his capacity for learning and for ruling.

Strong emphasis is placed, in Plato, on the importance of an adequate philosophy which desires the whole of wisdom. Plato has already suggested that a manner of thought which cannot see beyond beautiful things, to the nature of the beautiful itself, cannot provide either public or private happiness in the city (*Rep* 5.473d). Philosopher-Kings must legislate for the greatest good of binding the city together to make it one (*Rep* 5.462a-e). Wisdom's Solomon not only binds the people together in worship in the Temple, but recognises that having a wise populace is a saving, healing element in the world, and a wise king is essential to uphold his people (Wisdom 4:24). Solomon's hymn of praise to wisdom, makes it clear that he understands the beauty of wisdom, in all its depth and range, as an emanation from God, "more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars" (Wisdom 7:29). In other words, Solomon sees beauty in the created order but recognises in that something deeper, something beyond beauty, the good itself, or God, and by his rule conveys that knowledge to his people and the world beyond his realm.

Is anything more than practical government at the heart of Plato's *Republic*? The answer is clearly, yes. Firstly, Plato's aspirations for the Kallipolis, his imaginary state, are tied into making the best possible form of government, the best citizens, towards the end of philosophy itself—namely, knowledge of the good. The topics which make up the education of the philosopher-kings include geometry and astronomy, subjects which provide analogies for knowledge beyond the physical realm of the study (*Rep* 7.510c-e). The whole process of education is likened to a turning of the whole body towards, "the brightest thing that is, namely, the one we call the good" (*Rep* 7.518 c-d). The ideal ruler of the Kallipolis is, thus, one whose nature, and consequently whose laws, is attuned to God's eternal ideas.

For the redactor of 1 Kings that dream of ideal government is embodied in covenantal kingship. The eternal reign promised to

Solomon as David's successor is related to, though ultimately not contingent upon, his ability to fulfil the demands of a just king according to the Law. The piety which the covenant inspires recognises in the Temple the appropriate place of worship for the people who were chosen for salvation, and its construction forms part of the salvation history of that people.

In Wisdom, the account of Solomon's reign is resting on his experience of a personified, divine wisdom, who alone knows God's purpose. Like 1 Kings, the enduring promise of Solomon's reign is rooted in his ability to govern as part of a redemptive plan, in continuity with the other major events of Israel's history. But Solomon's experience of wisdom brings answers to the questions of mortal humanity about the purposes and goals of God. One of these purposes is the election of a chosen people as a paradigm community reflecting the form of the good.[27] With wisdom, Israel can achieve the piety which enables her people to become a nation raised to immortal potential by her heaven-sent laws and institutions.

> And your counsel who has known, except you give wisdom and send your Holy Spirit from above? For so the ways of those who lived on earth were reformed, and men were taught the things that were pleasing to you, and were saved through wisdom (Wisdom 9:17-18).

It is on this question of immortality, which is a gift which comes with wisdom, that the most radical changes have taken place in the revision of Solomon. In 1 Kings, Solomon's wisdom brings gifts of the here and now. David and Solomon die, but through their descendants, i.e. the eternal dynasty, their names and the glories of each reign live on creating a typological kingship.[28] However the phrase of 2 Sam 7:16 is to be understood: "And your house and your kingdom shall endure before me forever, your throne shall be established forever," it was not understood in terms of a developed teaching on immortality, rather that the typological traditions created an eternal memorial. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory—given the continuous development of the character of Solomon within Jewish literature—but the narrative of 1 Kings lends no support to this development beyond the idea of an enduring dynasty.

Plato, however, did have a developed teaching on immortality which is related to the forms—or the ideas of God. That which is alterable,

[27] McGlynn, *Divine Judgement*, 219.

[28] A. Le Donne, in his unpublished PhD thesis, Durham. I am deeply indebted to Anthony Le Donne for allowing me to see two chapters of his PhD thesis. Le Donne views these typological traditions as "a powerful mnemonic tool and a highly influential interpretive cipher," p. 87.

perishable, such as the body, which is alterable by illness, can never fully instantiate a form. Alterable things are, thus, mortal. Immortal things, like the psyche, are "always being" (*aeion einai*). Reeve has pointed out that this teaching is more complex than the simple equation of changeability and mortality. The substance/essence (*ousia*) that fills perishable things is likewise perishable—as food for the body—whereas the substance that fills the empty states of the soul is truth, knowledge, wisdom, virtue. The making of a psyche/soul is filled with substance which is itself immortal and "always being," like the forms. The closer our instantiation of a form, the closer we are to its eternal properties.[29]

Two developments converged to enable Wisdom's author to claim for Solomon the desire for the immortality of the Platonist thought world. The first of these was the existence of the Hellenistic kingship tracts. These tracts are for the most part lost, what we know of them is related to their existence rather than their content.[30] However, we are aware that they disseminated the idea that the kingly ideal could not exist apart from the virtues. At the same time, the virtues were being inseparably linked with notions of immortality in Middle-Platonism, which had reintroduced the idea of transcendence, i.e. in a single causal principle, God or a supreme being, and thereby created the need for an intermediate realm which was the sphere of some other entity. In Wisdom, divine wisdom is the agent by which existing things come into being and are sustained. It is, consequently, wisdom who gives immortality as a gift to those who have shown themselves desirous of being as like God as is possible. Thus, not only Solomon, but his gift of wisdom has been reinterpreted. Wisdom is now the monad, acting upon the dyad in an intermediate world that lies between the transcendent God of ideas/forms and life within the inhabited world, bringing the forms into daily existence.[31]

Wisdom's author sees in Solomon's desire for wisdom a longing for the immortal and divine. Solomon's acquisition of the virtues, through his relationship with wisdom, assures his people that they will be ruled with justice as close to the form of justice as possible. Further, as we

[29] See Plato *Republic* 585b12-c5, 610-611. See also C.D.C. Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings; The Argument of Plato's Republic* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1997) 110-15.

[30] For a discussion on the influence of philosophy on the Hellenistic courts, see Gammie, "The Sage," 149-50 and also J.O. Murray, "Aristeas and Ptolemaic Kingship," *JTS* 18 (1967) 337-71, esp. 337-38 on the rights and duties of kings in the *Letter of Aristeas*. Zeno, founder of the Stoics, was invited to the court of Antigonas II Gonatas, he refused but sent two of his pupils, one of whom Persaeus of Citium wrote a treatise on kingship for Gonatas. Another Stoic philosopher, Sphaerus presented a tract on kingship at the Ptolemiac court sometime in 220 BC.

[31] T. Tobin, "Interpretations of the Creation in the World of Philo of Alexandria," in *Creation in the Biblical Traditions* (eds. R. Clifford and J.J. Collins, CBQMS 24, Washington: CBA 1996) 112, see also Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, 118-21.

have seen, the Temple has become an instantiation of the form of worship, and the nation that worships within it an instantiation of the form of a nation, a holy nation, whose empty states are filled with immutable things: truth; knowledge; wisdom and virtue.

> For to know you is complete righteousness
> And to know your power is the root of immortality (Wisdom 15:3).

Solomon's gift of wisdom has not only brought benefit to him, but raises both him and the nation he governs to potential immortality. In acquiring the gifts brought by wisdom, Solomon is able to institute a just ordering of the affairs of state, which not only mirrors wisdom's ordering of the cosmos, but is bound into the redemption plans of God. When Solomon asked for wisdom, he was asking for the necessary tools not merely of practical kingship, but for the eschatological king. It is this point which is most crucial for understanding our last section, and the eschatological gifts which surround Solomon as the Son of David.[32]

5. THE "SON OF DAVID" AND OTHER SOLOMONIC TRADITIONS

The final section of this paper will deal briefly with some of the other roles attributable to Solomon. Before we analyse these roles, however, we need to clarify the essential characteristics of Solomon the King, and how they relate to one another. Solomon was a wise king and he built the Temple. He was also, literally and physically, the son of David but became, through the promise of an everlasting covenant, the "Son of David," i.e. the king who presides over an enduring kingdom and, thus, the centre of messianic expectation.

If, as we have argued, Solomon's construction of the Temple is a manifestation of his wisdom, and roots the divine ideal, the mind or wisdom of God, within the nation, then those essential characteristics are in fact one characteristic. It is equally possible, in fact probable, that Solomon is wise and able to build the Temple because he is the "Son of David" and the eschatological king. In other words it is impossible to separate Solomon's roles, one from another. Solomon symbolically and theologically spans the temporal frame from the Tent of the Presence in the accounts of the Pentateuch, to the new locus of the presence of God, dwelling in the centre of his people and guiding them towards the kingdom of the future.

This construct of the "Son of David," though not always used as a title, is consequently charged with a wealth of meaning, meaning which

[32] Winston notes the view of Middle Platonism that mortal beings exist to make the universe perfect, or perhaps not imperfect or incomplete. Winston, *The Book of Wisdom*, 27.

may act as an effective constraint on other new interpretations of Solomon by later authors such as Wisdom's author. Wisdom's author's modification of Solomon's gift to include Hellenistic concepts such as the virtues still enables Solomon to rule the nation justly, thus adhering to the text of 1 Kings and providing a bridge into the hellenised thought world. But Solomon not only possesses the virtues, he also possesses all knowledge, and it is from this springboard that his more esoteric roles begin.

In his book, *Solomon, the Esoteric King*,[33] Torijano has given a comprehensive account of the other roles attached to Solomon: exorcist; hermetic sage; horseman; astrologer; magician. Additionally, he has examined the significance of the title "Son of David" and its changing relationship to these other roles. These roles could form, and have formed, studies in their own right, but that is not their interest here. The principle question they raise can be expressed as, is there a necessary relationship between the interpretation of Solomon as the philosopher-king par excellence, as occurs in Wisdom, and Solomon as the eschatological Son of David, magician, sage, astrologer, or do these belong to very different traditions?

The body of evidence for Solomon in his other roles is varied. Literary evidence occurs in the canonical and extra-canonical works that are attributed to Solomon, in the *Testament of Solomon*;[34] the *Hygromanteia of Solomon*, which is a mixture of magical and astrological instruction from Solomon to his son, Rehoboam;[35] some fragments of apocryphal Psalms from Qumran (11QPsAp, dated late 1st century BC or early 1st century AD) which contains fragments which would seem to be for the purpose of exorcising demons; one astrological text from Nag Hammadi;[36] in *Sepher ha-Razim*, the Book of the Mysteries;[37] in Josephus, where he describes the knowledge Solomon has over demons for benefit

[33] Torijano, *Solomon*.

[34] This text is a pseudepigraphic catalogue of demons summoned by King Solomon, and how they can be countered by invoking angels and other magical techniques. It is one of the oldest magical texts attributed to King Solomon, dating 1st to 3rd century AD. There is a translation by F.C. Conybeare, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, October 1898. See also the translation of D.C. Duling, *OTP*, 1: 935ff.

[35] A full translation plus Greek synopsis is given in Torijano, *Solomon*, Appendix One and Two. Dating is uncertain as it is referred to in no source earlier than the 15th century manuscript Ms. Monacensis 70.

[36] "On the Origin of the World," in *Nag Hammadi Library in English* (4th rev. ed., ed. J. Robinson, Leiden: Brill 1996).

[37] *Sepher ha-Razim*, attributed to Solomon in the introduction. A kind of magical handbook dating from around the fourth century. Its importance is that it showed the popularity of magic texts in Semitic speaking communities as well as Greek-speaking, Hellenistic communities.

and healing, and the incantations and forms of exorcism used;[38] and in the synoptic Gospels, where Jesus is given the title "Son of David" in connection with his ministry of exorcisms and healing. The Qumran document already noted, 11QPsAp, gives us a recension of Psalm 91, which is described in rabbinic literature variously as a song for the stricken, about evil spirits, or for demons (j*Sab* 6.8b, b*Shebu* 15b, j*Erub* 10.26c) Archaeological evidence occurs in Jewish and Christian amulets where Solomon is depicted slaying a demon,[39] and in incantation and magic bowls, where Solomon is one of the names which have power over the djinn.[40]

This evidence represents a range of perspectives: Jewish/Semitic; Hellenistic; Gnostic; Jewish-Christian; Essene; and possibly Byzantine (the *Hygromanteia*). The material also spans several centuries and in some cases, shows evidence of adaptation to suit a new set of circumstances (e.g. later amulets of Solomon the Horseman, originally with Jewish iconography, have been replaced by a more specifically Christian iconography).[41] However, there is also a considerable degree of overlap.

The amulets frequently contain charms or spells to protect the wearer from demons. Josephus recorded an exorcist who used the name of Solomon and chanted Solomon's incantations in order to perform an exorcism. The Jewish exorcist also possessed a ring with a root, prescribed by Solomon, under the seal of the ring.[42] Much of the astrological material, as in *Hygromanteia*, is for the purpose of gaining control over the demons and angels who come to ascendancy on certain days of the week under their signs of the zodiac. In Rabbinic literature, as in the synoptic tradition, Solomon, the Son of David is associated with healing and/or exorcisms, but illness and injury was frequently perceived as the result of demonic activity. Even the magical text, *Sepher ha-Razim* depicts a Solomon who can utilise magic for control over demons, although other powers, unrelated to exorcism, are also listed. Nonetheless, the common factor in each of these roles ascribed to Solomon is the ability to control demons, whether in performing exorcisms or in a wider context of healing. Whatever other powers are attributed to Solomon, this dominion over demons, Solomon in his eschatological role as the Son of David, remains the touchstone.

[38] *Jewish Antiquities* 8:4-50.

[39] Torijano, *Solomon*, 129-30.

[40] D.C. Duling, "Solomon, Exorcism, and the Son of David," *HTR* 68 (1975) 235-52.

[41] See Torijano, *Solomon*, 130-31. The earliest haematite amulets are probably mid third century.

[42] *Jewish Antiquities* 8:46-48.

The consensus of scholarship indicates that Solomon, Son of David, was an evolutionary characterisation,[43] and that it is possible to trace a trajectory of a developing tradition.

Torijano has produced the most detailed trajectory which he claims begins in the O.T. only in post-exilic writings, where the title, Son of David, is used (Proverbs) or implied (Ecclesiastes) to enhance the characterisation of Solomon as David's legitimate heir. Development of the title occurs in the Second Temple period through the Psalms of Solomon, especially Psalm 17, which has echoes of the canonical Psalm 72 (also entitled a Psalm of Solomon) and which gives the title a specific messianic context. The Psalmist asks for king who is called "Son of David," who is taught by God, has the attributes of wisdom and justice and will usher in a reign of peace. There is a similarity here to the presentation of Solomon as it is given in Chronicles, where Solomon becomes a prototype of the messiah. [44] Eupolemus' history, 2nd century BC, "*Concerning the Judaean Kings*" depicts Solomon as the "king of kings," hinted at in Psalm 72, and the translation of LXX represents him as a Hellenistic ruler. Torijano's trajectory continues into the 1st century BC / 1st century AD where expectations of the messiah have acquired a thaumaturgical and exorcistic element. This tradition is also known at Qumran and occurs in 11QPsAp. By the 3rd to the 4th centuries AD, the amulets and incantation bowls make an appearance, where Solomon is a magician but is no longer associated with Jewish messianism. At the far point of the trajectory is the kind of astrological knowledge which occurs in the *Hygromanteia.*

In le Donne's recent study, he has examined the possibility that there is a broader range of meaning attached to the title "Son of David." Solomon is the son of David, but he also has a unique relationship with the God of Israel, a relationship which is represented in father/son language, and in his gift of wisdom he receives the spirit of God. He is the temple-builder, and he receives tribute from foreign kings. He is also a judge of exceptional wisdom and a bringer of peace. The gift of God's spirit protects Solomon from evil spirits. There is also a tradition which associates the soothing of Saul by David, when the evil spirit entered Saul's heart, with gifts of exorcism. Solomon's mastery of the world of demons, because he bears the Spirit of God, is also rooted in his descent from David. Le Donne asks whether these attributes are transmitted with the title into later texts concerning the eschatological "Son of David" and discovers that different categories appear in different combinations—held in check by the key text of 2 Sam 7.[45] The development, then, of royal/messianic expectation had certain

[43] Duling, "Solomon;" Torijano, *Solomon*; and Le Donne, unpublished PhD.
[44] Torijano, *Solomon*, 109-11, 225-28.
[45] Le Donne, unpublished PhD, 2006: 95.

identifiable characteristics, all of which were strongly associated with Solomon or with David/Solomon. From this, we can conclude that there is only one tradition of Solomon, a developing one admittedly, in which each portrayal is linked to the others by mastery of demons, sometimes allied with healing power, as particular gifts of the eschatological king.

5. CONCLUSION

What kind of position, if any, does Solomon as the philosopher-king occupy along the trajectory of a developing literary tradition? We can see how the range of knowledge attributable to Solomon in 1 Kings has expanded in Wisdom to include the knowledge expected of an idealised philosopher-king. Solomon, as we have seen, was taught cosmology, astronomy, physics, biology, botany, as well as other knowledge through wisdom, and he praises her accordingly. However that knowledge is also the route to immortality, both for Solomon as the eschatological king and for the idealised nation he governs through the virtues and true justice.

Solomon's knowledge is divinely given (Wisdom 7:21), and is therefore the kind of knowledge which makes him invulnerable to the forces which affect other lives, such as illness or injury. In Wisdom 7:17-21, the author details the areas into which this knowledge strays, not scientific subject matter, but knowledge of the dark forces at work in the world. Solomon knows about plants and roots. He understands the positions of the stars and how the universe is structured. He has knowledge of the force of spirits. In this catalogue of divine revelation, we can see pointers to Solomon the magician, the exorcist, and the astrologer.

At the very least, the merging of the Solomon of legendary wisdom, the biblical king, with Platonist and later Hellenistic aspirations of kingship, gave a philosophical context to Jewish history and expectations. It made that history recognisable in a different social environment. More significantly, it anchored the Davidic promises and messianic hopes in an intellectual theory of kingship which had as its end product the philosophical construct of being "likened to the good" and the attainment of immortality. In other words, Wisdom's contribution to the trajectory intellectualised the "enduring covenant" and gave it a locus in the philosophical milieu of the Greco-Roman world.

But we are left with a question—did Wisdom's account accelerate the picture of Solomon in his more esoteric roles, or were these so deeply embedded in the characterisation of the Son of David that our author must find ways to include them in the education of his idealised ruler?

"FOOD OF ANGELS" (WIS 16:20)*

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In the third, probably central part of its *Relecture* of the Exodus events[1] the Book of Wisdom confronts the hailstone plague (Exod 9:13-35; Wis 16:16-19) with the Manna miracle (Exod 16:11-36; Wis 16:20-23).[2] Hereby the Book of Wisdom creatively develops the Exodus narratives (and connected Old Testament traditions).[3] One of the most interesting motifs of this chapter is the idea that God fed his people in the desert with a "food of angels"[4] (Wis 16:20).

In his concise and at the same time important commentary on the book of Wisdom, Helmut Engel comments on this motif as follows:

* I dedicate this contribution to the remembrance of the late Armin Schmitt († 2007) who during his life worked extensively on the Book of Wisdom. See e.g. A. Schmitt, *Das Buch der Weisheit: Ein Kommentar* (Würzburg: Echter 1980); *Weisheit* (NEB.AT 23, Würzburg: Echter 1989). Moreover, Schmitt has written a multitude of articles on early Jewish sapiential traditions—some of which can be found in the volume A. Schmitt, *Der Gegenwart verpflichtet: Studien zur biblischen Literatur des Frühjudentms* (BZAW 292, Berlin: de Gruyter 2000).

1 J. Vílchez and E. Eynikel, "Wisdom of Solomon," in *The International Bible Commentary: An Ecumenical Commentary For the Twenty-First Century* (ed. W.R. Farmer, Collegeville: Liturgical Press 1998) 969-86, esp. 983, speak about a "*haggadic midrash.*"

2 On the reason for the confrontation of hail and manna H. Hübner, *Die Weisheit Salomons: Liber Sapientiae Salomonis* (ATDAp 4, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999) 197 states: "Das Tertium Comparationis ist, daß beides vom Himmel kam und beides weiß aussieht."

3 On the reworking of the book of Exodus in the Book of Wisdom see also S. Cheon, *The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon: A Study in Biblical Interpretation* (JSPSup 23, Sheffield: Academic Press 1997). More generally on the development of Old Testament themes in the Book of Wisdom see A. Schmitt, "Alttestamentliche Traditionen in der Sicht einer neuen Zeit: Dargestellt am Buch der Weisheit," in idem, *Der Gegenwart verpflichtet*, 185-203, and D. Georgi, "Interpretation of Scriptures in Wisdom of Solomon," in *Jüdische Schriften in ihrem antik-jüdischen und urchristlichen Kontext* (eds. H. Lichtenberger and G.S. Oegema, JSHRZ-Studien 1, Gütersloh: Gütersloher 2002) 304-32.

4 C. Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse ou La Sagesse de Salomon* (vol. 3, EtBib NS 5, Paris: Gabalda 1985), 924, gives significance to the fact that the text does not call the manna as "the" food of angels but as "a" food of angels.

> Damit ist nicht die Vorstellung verbunden, daß Engel Nahrung zu sich nähmen… Vielmehr wird so der Herrschaftsbereich des Manna bezeichnet, das nicht unserer alltäglichen Erfahrungswelt angehört.[5]

However, is the fact that the Mannah "does not belong to the world of our everyday lives" not already stated in Wis 16:20b? Does the expression "food of angels" not point to something more than the words "bread sent down from heaven"(16:20b) do?

A second question can be added: What ideas of a "food of angels" does the text itself contain and how can they be imbedded in their receptive historical context?

In fact, early Judaism knows of several texts and traditions which state quite clearly that angels—as heavenly creatures—do not take human food.[6] The origins of this idea are established by several Old Testament texts, which directly or indirectly address this theme.[7]

1. NARRATIVES IN THE BOOK OF JUDGES AND THEIR EARLY JEWISH REWRITINGS

1.1. *Gideon's Call (Judges 6:11-24)*

According to Judg 6:11-24 the angel of the Lord appears to Gideon under an oak tree near Ophrah (Judg 6:11) and addresses him with the words "the Lord is with you, you mighty warrior"(6:12b; NRSV). Gideon complains about Israel's fate, and the Lord sends him—sometimes the text has the "Angel of the Lord," sometimes the "Lord"—to free Israel from Midian (6:15,16). Gideon requests a sign to make sure that it is the Lord himself who commissions him. He withdraws and prepares a meal, a he-goat and unsalted bread, which he offers to the angel (respectively to the Lord; 6:19). The angel does not eat from it, but instead touches the meat and the bread. Flames light up, burn up both (6:20-21), and the angel of the Lord disappears.

Two details of this story are of interest with regard to our question: (1) The angel does not eat the food offered to him, but turns it miraculously into a sacrifice. (2) Obviously, Gideon did not really realise that the angel of the Lord had appeared to him, as Judg 6:22 shows, but also the fact that he did not react fearfully upon the angel's appearance.

[5] H. Engel, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (SKK, Stuttgart: Bibelwerk 1998) 252.

[6] Space does not allow to describe developments in the Rabbinic literature, too. But see D. Goodman, "Do Angels Eat?," *JJS* 37 (1986) 160-75.

[7] See in this respect also Goodman, "Do Angels Eat?"

In this context two early Jewish versions of the Gideon-narrative are of interest:

According to chapter 35 of Ps-Philo's *Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum*[8] Gideon asks the angel of the Lord for a sign, which would prove that he was really sent by the Lord (35:6). *LAB* omits the whole passage we read in Judges about the preparation of the meal. Instead of this, Gideon is instructed to fetch water and plegde it on a rock. On Gideon's demand the angel turns the water partly into fire, partly into blood.

Unlike Ps-Philo, Josephus, in his version of the Gideon narrative in his *Antiquitates Judaicae* (AJ V vi), completely omits the motif of Gideon's demand for a sign. Both texts, however, have one thing in common. None of them speaks even about an attempt to feed the angel. *Is the image of Gideon offering a meal to the angel of the Lord already seen as problematic?*

1.2. *The announcement of Simson's birth (Judg 13)*

Even clearer than Judg 6:21-22, which at least leaves the possibility open that the angel could have eaten something, is the account of the announcement of Simson's birth (Judg 13). Here, the angel of the Lord appears twice to Simson's mother. The second time she fetches her husband Manoach, and the angel informs him about the boy's special fate. Upon this Manoach wants to invite the angel to share a meal and prepare him a young he-goat (Judg 13:15) whereupon the angel of the Lord replies: *Even when you invite me, I will not eat your food*, and he suggests to offer the goat to the Lord. Judg 13:16b makes clear that Manoach only offers the food because he does not know that he is really talking to an angel. Only after Manoach makes the offering and the angel ascends to heaven in a flame, Manoach and his wife realise what had happened (Judg 13:20b-23). Judg 13 thus works in a way similar to Judg 6—but it is more unambiguous than Gideon's calling. Manoach had only offered food to the angel because he was unaware of who was standing in front of him, and the angel explicitly refused the food offered to him.

Again both early Jewish rewritings mentioned above clearly change their *Vorlage.*

[8] For the date of this text see, e.g., J. Hadot, "Livre des Antiquités Bibliques," in *La Bible: Écrits Intertestamentaires* (eds. A. Dupont-Sommer and M. Philonenko, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Paris: Gallimard 1987) 1225-392, esp. 1227, who speaks about the first century BC, while C. Dietzfelbinger, *Pseudo-Philo: Antiquitates Biblicae* (JSHRZ II/2, Gütersloh: Gütersloher 1975) 91, considers the time between the great Jewish wars against the Romans in Palestine, i.e., the years between 73 and 132 AD as a probable date.

1.2.1 Ps-Philo narrates the announcement of Simson's birth in *LAB*, chapter 42. After the angel reconfirms his prophecy to Manoach (42:7), the latter expresses his invitation—though here more indirectly than according to the original version of the book of Judges.

> If I can, let me persuade you to enter my house and eat bread with me; and know that, when you go, I will give you gifts that you may take along with you to offer as a sacrifice to the Lord your God (*LAB* 42:8a)[9].

The following differences between this and the text of Judges are remarkable: Manoach does not invite the angel directly, he does not offer a he-goat (i.e. meat), but bread, and extends his hospitality by promising presents at the guest's departure. The purpose of the gifts is interesting: The guest ought to bring them as a sacrifice to his Lord.

The text seems to be inconsistent here, because these closing sentences would only make sense if Manoach was aware of the fact that he speaks to an angel. The angel answers as follows:[10]

> I will not enter your house with you, nor eat your bread, nor take your gifts. For if you offer sacrifice from what is not yours, I cannot show favor to you (*LAB* 42:8b).

When Manoach hereupon builds an altar, offers sacrifices and burnt offerings, surprisingly the sign occurs something that is left out in *LAB*'s Gideon narrative. The angel touches the altar with the end of his sceptre:

> And fire came forth from the rock and it devoured the holocausts and sacrifices; and the angel of the Lord went up from there with the flame of fire (*LAB* 42:9b).

1.2.2. Josephus' version of the story (compare *AJ* V viii 3) is different. Manoach wants to know with whom he speaks in order to be able to give him a present upon the birth of his son. When the angel refuses to accept it, Manoach wants to invite him to be his guest. Upon his perseverance the angel stays – but even then he does not eat from the he-goat Manoach's wife has prepared. Instead, he works a miracle like the one told in Judg 6.

[9] Translations: D.J. Harrington, "Pseudo-Philo," in *OTP* 2: 297-377, esp. 356. For a German translation see Dietzfelbinger, *Pseudo-Philo*, 217.

[10] This again shows a significant shift compared to the narrative in the book of Judges. The text does not only focus on the food, but on bread and presents. Another new aspect can be seen in the motif of the "strangeness" of the things that are sacrificed. The idea that God cannot accept "strange," i.e. "impure" offerings is expressed very clearly in *LAB* 26:2. On this see also Dietzfelbinger, *Pseudo-Philo*, 217.

2. RAPHAEL'S SELF-DISCLOSURE (TOB 12:19)

In this light also Raphael's self-disclosure according to Tob 12:19 is interesting. Raphael, accompanies Tobias on his dangerous journey and conquers the demon that murdered Sara's husbands. Finally he heals Tobit's blindness, but he refuses the payments Tobias offers him for his services. Instead, he calls for a praise of the Lord and reveals himself as "Raphael," one of the seven angels which stand next to God's throne and have access to the Glory of the Lord (Tob 12:15 G^{II}).[11]

As Tobit and Tobias are frightened and fall facedown before Raphael, he once again urges them to praise the Lord, who is the only one who can be thanked for the angel's appearance. Then Raphael points to another point which shows that he is an angel. The various versions of Tob 12:19 differ from each other in detail:[12]

4Q 196 17 i2: לוא אשתית *I do [n]ot drink…*

G^{I} πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας ὠπτανόμην ὑμῖν *καὶ οὐκ ἔφαγον οὐδὲ ἔπιον* ἀλλὰ ὅρασιν ὑμεῖς ἐθεωρεῖτε.

G^{II} καὶ θεωρεῖτέ με ὅτι οὐκ ἔφαγον οὐθέν ἀλλὰ ὅρασις ὑμῖν ἐθεωρεῖτο.

G^{III} καὶ οὐκ ἔφαγον οὐδὲ ἔπιον, ἀλλὰ ὅρασεις ἐθεωρείτε.

L^{1} (Codex Rhegius 3564; Vetus Latina): *et uidebatis me*

L^{2} (Alcalà Bible; Vetus Latina): *…nam cum putabatis me manducare uobiscum ita uidebatur uisui uestro ego autem non manducabam.*

L^{4} (Codex Amiatinus; Hieronymus): *uidebar quidem manducare uobiscum et bibere sed ego cibo et potu inuisibili qui ab hominibus uideri non potest utor.*

Surprisingly the long version G^{II} has a rather short text here: Tobit and Tobias had seen that Raphael did not eat anything, but had only had a vision, a "manifestation" (ὅρασις). G^{I} adds the motif of drinking,[13] as G^{III} does. Both Old Latin versions proceed differently. While L^{1} omits the motif, L^{2} interprets the event. Each time Tobit and Tobias believed that the angel was eating with them, this was only seemingly so—in reality, he did not eat. The Vulgate goes even further. As is well known, Hieronymus is inclined to interpret his Tobit text quite freely.[14] His version of Tob 12:19 is another example of this tendency: Even though the angel seems to be eating and drinking along with the humans, he

[11] A new German translation of G^{II} is prepared by H. Engel.

[12] The texts mentioned here are cited according to *The Book of Tobit: Texts from the Principal Ancient and Medieval Traditions* (eds. S. Weeks, *et al.*, FoSub 3, Berlin: de Gruyter 2004) 298.

[13] Interestingly Tob 6:6 G^{I} says that Tobias *and* Raphael-Azariah actually ate the fish from the river Tigris (see also L^{3}) while according to G^{II} only Tobias eats.

[14] On the Vulgate of Tobit see the excellent study of V.T.M. Skemp, *The Vulgate of Tobit Compared with Other Ancient Witnesses* (SBLDS 180, Atlanta: Scholars 2000).

eats and enjoys a beverage that cannot be seen by humans. Already the G^{II} version of Tob 12:19 points at least in a very indirect manner to the angel's transcendence.[15] With small variations this idea is repeated throughout the textual history of the book. (with the exception of L^{1}, where it is omitted). The Vulgate, finally, states that Raphael a) only seemingly eats and drinks while on earth, which b) is even more thoroughly confirmed by the statement that Raphael lives on a mysterious "food (of angels)."

The texts mentioned above do not explain completely, why angels do not eat, or, in other words, of what they live. Other Old Testament and early Jewish texts are more helpful in this respect:[16]

3. THE GLORY OF THE LORD AS FOOD

3.1. *Traditions around Moses*

Of interest in this regard are texts that assume that Moses did not eat or drink during the 40 days he spent with the Lord on the mountain. The following passages should be mentioned (but compare the traditions in Exod 24:11b):

> When I went up the mountain to receive the stone tablets, the tablets of the covenant that the LORD made with you, *I remained on the mountain forty days and forty nights; I neither ate bread nor drank water* (Deut 9:9 [NRSV]).

> Then I lay prostrate before the LORD as before, *forty days and forty nights; I neither ate bread nor drank water,* because of all the sin you had committed, provoking the LORD by doing what was evil in his sight (Deut 9:18 [NRSV]).

This can also be found in Exod 34:28-39, a text which is helpful as far as it connects Moses' stay, his conversation with the Lord, and the inherent fact that Moses does not eat and drink to his changed appearance. He is radiant with light—a reflection of God's glory. This, again, is related to Prov 16:15, saying that "in the light of a king's face there is life." If the "king" in Proverbs is understood to be "God the Lord," then one may conclude that those who stand in front of God feed themselves from the sight of his glory.

[15] See also J.A. Fitzmyer, *Tobit* (CEJL, Berlin: de Gruyter 2003) 298.
[16] Cf. again the overview by Goodman, "Do Angels Eat?," 162.

3.2. *The Apocalypse of Abraham*

The *Apocalypse of Abraham* (1st or 2nd century AD)[17] points to this idea even more explicitly. According to *ApAbr* 12:1-2 Abraham, accompanied by an angel, ascends to the Lord for forty days and nights:

> And I ate no bread and drank no water, because (my) food was to see the angel who was with me, and his discourse with me was my drink.

The sight of the angel, mentioned in chapter 11, which is at the same time a reflection of God's glory is seemingly enough nourishment for Abraham.[18]

4. THE ANGEL'S MEAL AT ABRAHAM'S (GEN 18:8) AND LOT'S (GEN 19:3)

The Old Testament is by no means unambiguous about answering the question whether angels share meals with humans. The most important scene, which contradicts the line of reasoning mentioned above and which therefore caused problems to many early Jewish interpreters, is Gen 18:8. This passage states clearly that the three men who visit Abraham—amongst them the Lord himself—enter Abraham's home and eat.[19] The same thing is repeated in Gen 19:3. Two angels stop at Lot's, he prepares them a meal from unleavened bread "and they ate" (19:3c).

4.1. Many early Jewish interpreters of these passages obviously have a problem with this, which they try to solve in various ways. While the equivalent scenes lack in *LAB* and in the *Book of Jubilees*, Philo of Alexandria discusses them repeatedly. In his *Quaestiones in Genesim* 4:9 he states that the angels that visited Abraham did only symbolically eat and drink.[20] He discusses the scene again in his *De Abrahamo*. Of special interest is *De Abr.* 118 (see also 110), where Philo argues that the three

[17] For a date of the text in the 1st or 2nd century AD see R. Rubinkiewicz, "Apocalypse of Abraham," in *OTP* 1: 681-705, esp. 683. A.-M. Denis, *Introduction à la littérature religieuse judéo-hellénistique* (2 vols., Turnhout: Brepols 2000) 1: 212, more precisely speaks about the end of the 1st, respectively the first decennia of the 2nd century.

[18] *ApAbr* 13 should be mentioned, too: The text speaks of the fact that "on the heavenly heights there is neither food nor drink, not does human food occur." Moreover, the motif of angels nourishing themselves only with heavenly glory is also found in *GenR* 2:2.

[19] Neh 9:6 is also of interest. The text describes God as giving life "to all"—i.e., also to the heavenly legions mentioned in the context.

[20] *Evidens est illud, manducaverant, symbolice, minime vero cibium proprium; non enim comedunt cibum, neque bibunt rubeum vinum felices illae naturae, sed annuendi benignitati fidenter rogantis indicio est*. (Text: C. Mercier, *Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim I et II* [Les Oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie 34 A, Paris: Cerf 1979] 170 and 172).

angels *seemed* to eat and drink, while they were not really eating and drinking.[21] Closely connected to this is the following idea: according to Philo it had been particularly miraculous that the otherwise bodiless angels (ἀσωμάτους ὄντας) appeared in the form of a human body.

4.2. Josephus works in a comparable way: in the eleventh chapter of the first book of his *Antiquities* he retells the story of Abraham's meal (*AJ* I xi 2) with a small but important change: he interprets Gen 18:8 as if the angels were only *pretending* to eat. Additionally, he shortens Gen 19:3 to an absolute minimum: *AJ* 1,11,3 speaks of Lot's hospitality, but not of an actual meal which was offered to the angels and which they were eating.[22]

4.3. In this context both versions of the *Testament of Abraham* are of interest, too. In their fourth chapter they mention the motif of Abraham's great hospitality. Especially the longer recension [A] is not without irony. According to this text Abraham's enormous hospitability even embarrasses the angel Michael, who is actually sent to announce that Abraham's death is drawing near.[23] Michael, who is Abraham's guest, leaves him under the pretence of needing to urinate, but instead ascends to heaven and asks God for advice on his darned complicated situation.[24]

> *TestAbr [A]* 4:6 "Lord, Lord, may your sovereignty know that I am unable to proclaim the notice of death to that just man. For I have not seen a man like him on the earth—merciful and hospitable, just, truthful, God-Fearing, abstaining from every evil deed. An now know, Lord, that I am unable to proclaim the notice of death." 4:7 The Lord said, "Go, Michael Commander-in-chief, to my friend Abraham, and whatever he says to you, this indeed do, and whatever he eats, you indeed eat along with him. ... 4:9 And the Commander-in-chief said: "Lord, all the heavenly spirits are incorporeal, and they neither drink nor eat; and he has set a table with an abundance of good things that are earthly and corruptible. And now, Lord, what shall I do? How shall I remain undiscovered while sitting with him at one table with these

[21] Τεράστιον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πίνοντας πινόντων καὶ το μὴ ἐσθίοντας ἐσθιόντων παρέχειν φαντασίαν. (Text: J. Gorez, *De Abrahamo* [Les Oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie 20, Paris: Cerf 1966] 70).

[22] Traces of this exegetical tradition can be found later in early Christian and Rabbinical literature. See D.C. Allison, *Testament of Abraham* (CEJL, Berlin: de Gruyter 2006), 143, who offers a long list of texts: Justin, *Dial.* 57; Ps. Athanasius, *Confutatio quarundarum propositionum* (PG 28.1377A-80B); Theodoret of Cyrus, *Quaest. Gen*. 69; Macarius Magnes, *Apocrit.* 4.27. For Jewish texts see, e.g., Targum Neofiti 1 and Pseudo Jonathan of Gen 18:8; b*BMes* 86b; *GenR* 48:11,14.

[23] The short recension, however, only says that the Lord commands Michael to eat whatever Abraham eats and to sleep wherever Abraham sleeps (4:15).

[24] Text: F. Schmidt, F. Schmidt, *Le Testament grec d'Abraham: Introduction, edition critique des deux recensions grecques, traduction* (TSAJ 11, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1986), 104-10. English Translation: Allison, *Testament of Abraham*, 125-26.

> things?" 4:10 The Lord said: "Go down to him, and do not worry about this; for while you are sitting with him I shall send upon you an all-devouring spirit, and it will consume from your hands and through your mouth all that is on your table, and you may freely rejoice together with him."

The following aspects of this text are most interesting: Michael calls angels "heavenly spirits" (ἐπουράνια πνεύματα), i.e. they are something else than earthly creatures. The further argumentation reminds us of Philo (see above): Heavenly creatures are in fact incorporeal (ἀσώματα) and therefore do not eat or drink. By contrast Abraham's food is earthly (ἐπιγεῖος) and therefore transient.

This way a rather ancient line of texts can be constructed, which are very reserved about a "food of angels." Nevertheless the texts mentioned ought not to be grouped in the same corner too quickly. Only a few of them explicitly state that angels basically do not eat *anything*, others only state that they do not eat any *human* food. That is also the case with the book of Wisdom, which also does not say that the "food of angels" is a kind of usual "human food." Moreover, another line of thought can be established, which speaks of a—miraculous—"food of angels."

5. THE "FOOD OF ANGELS" ACCORDING TO THE BOOK OF WISDOM

The way food of angels is dealt with in the book of Wisdom (Wis 16:20) should not be too easily linked with the traditions addressed above. The key to this, namely that the book of Wisdom calls manna the "food of angels," is well-known for a long time now. The background surely can be found in Ps 78:24-25 and its Greek translation.[25] In its *relecture* of Israel's history this text reminds us of the miraculous feeding of the people in the desert. Ps 78:24 assigns the manna as "bread from heaven" (Ps 77:24 LXX: "bread of heaven," ἄρτον οὐρανοῦ). Even more interesting is Ps 78:25. The Hebrew text says לֶחֶם אַבִּירִים, which can be translated as "food of the noble ones" or "food of the strong ones." The LXX renders it as ἄρτον ἀγγέλων (Ps 77:25), "food of angels."[26] The Book of Wisdom thus follows here an interpretation of the manna narratives like the one presented in Ps 77:24-25 LXX. How much Wis 16:20 and Ps 77:24-25 LXX

[25] Cf. also Hübner, *Weisheit*, 197.

[26] M. Mach, *Entwicklungsstufen des jüdischen Engelglaubens in vorrabbinischer Zeit* (TSAJ 34, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1992) 97, writes: „Die אבירים sind 'Vornehme' oder auch 'Starke,' in keinem Fall aber ein anderer Name für Engel." However, the translation can possibly be justified by an exegesis of Ps 78:25 in connection with Ps 103:20, where angels are called "strong heroes" (cf. Larcher, *Livre de la Sagesse*, 3: 923). Although this translation had been discussed up to the Rabbinic era, it finally has been regretted. See for example the discussion between R Aqiva and R. Ishmael according to b*Yoma* 75a.

are linked with each other can be seen with the help of Wis 16:20b. This passage speaks of ἄρτον οὐρανοῦ, while Ps 77:24 LXX has ἄρτον ἀπ᾽ οὐρανοῦ (hebr.: דגן־שמים: "corn of heaven;" cf. also Ps 104:40 LXX ἄρτον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ and Neh 9:15 LXX: ἄρτον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ).[27] A further connection might be found in the words "bread ready to eat" (Wis 16:20b [NRSV]) which clearly resembles Ps 77:19-20 LXX. Wis 16:20-23 does not only use Ps 77:24-25 LXX, but also reworks other biblical traditions about the manna—and this way exemplifies the image of the "food of angels."

5.1. According to Wis 16:20b God "without effort" (ἀκοπιάτως)[28] offers to his people "bread ready to eat" from heaven. While the statement of "bread ready to eat" contradicts the ways of preparation mentioned in Exod 16:13-15 and Num 11:8, Exod 16:13-15 does not speak explicitly about the origin of the bread. The statement in the book of Wisdom—"from heaven"—might of course be due to developments as in Ps 77:24 LXX. The small change from ἄρτον οὐρανοῦ to ἄρτον ἀπ᾽ οὐρανοῦ can possibly be derived from the consideration that the food of heavenly creatures must be in heaven and therefore needs to be given from heaven.[29]

5.2. A second development, which can only indirectly be derived from the manna traditions in the books of Exod and Num, is still more important. Wis 16:20c states that the manna "suited to every taste" (NRSV).[30] This, of course, completely contradicts Num 11:4-6, according to which the Israelites complain that the manna was not varied enough for them.[31] The background of Wis 16:20c is usually considered to lie in the fact that the Old Testament provides several descriptions of the manna (see, for example, Exod 16:4,14,31 LXX and Num 11:7 LXX).[32]

[27] Further correlations might be seen in the idea of "bread ready to eat" (Wis 16:20 b), which possibly develops Ps 77:19-20 LXX, and particularly Wis 16,29, which can be related to Ps 77:22 LXX. Cf. also Engel, *Weisheit*, 252, and Larcher, *Livre de la Sagesse*, 3: 924.

[28] The adverb ἀκοπιάτως also could be understood as "tirelessly." For the above decision, see, however, Schmitt, *Weisheit* (1980), 126, and Larcher, *Livre de la Sagesse*, 3: 924-25. See also the parallel in Philo, *VitMos* 2:267.

[29] Hübner, *Weisheit*, 197-98, writes: "Die Speise der Engel ist die im Himmel für sie bereitete Speise; damit sie für die Menschen da ist, muß sie ‚vom Himmel herab' fallen."

[30] The Book of Wisdom here shows the oldest comprehensible example of the tradition of interpretation that the manna can adopt diverse tastes. Further on this cf. e.g. Engel, *Weisheit*, 253, who points to *ExodR* on Exod 16:4. On the difference between the variants ἰσχύοντα and ἔχοντα cf. P. Dumoulin, *Entre la Manne et l'eucharistie: Étude de Sg 16,15-17,1a* (AnBib 132, Roma: Pontifical Biblical Institute 1994) 70.

[31] Schmitt, *Weisheit* (1980), 128, in this context speaks about an "Überhöhungstendenz der Auslegungstradition."

[32] See also Engel, *Weisheit*, 253. Cf. also A. Passaro, "The Serpent and the Manna or the Saving Word. Exegesis of Wis 16," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology* (eds. idem and G. Bellia, DCLY 2005,

This is surely true, but might need some specification: I consider it probable that this idea can be derived from Num 11:8 LXX (see also Exod 16:23):[33]

> [8] καὶ διεπορεύετο ὁ λαὸς καὶ συνέλεγον καὶ ἤληθον αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ μύλῳ καὶ ἔτριβον ἐν τῇ θυίᾳ καὶ ἤψουν αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ χύτρᾳ καὶ ἐποίουν αὐτὸ ἐγκρυφίας καὶ ἦν ἡ ἡδονὴ αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ γεῦμα ἐγκρὶς ἐξ ἐλαίου.

This text namely speaks of several possible methods to prepare the manna: It is true that the grinding in the mill and the beating in a mortar are parallel events to the actual preparation. What is cooked in a pan, however, is of course something different from the ἐγκρυφίας, the baked cakes hidden (ἐγκρύπτω!) in the ashes. Even the closing sentence is important. Its Greek version does not necessarily mean that all manna tastes like cakes baked with oil, but that it smells that way. It is striking that Num 11:8 uses the same key terms ἡδονή and γεῦμα, which we also came across in Wis 16:20c. Therefore, it might, of course, be possible that this statement (perhaps in combination with Exod 16:31b LXX) forms the background for the tradition of interpretation used in Wis 16:20c.[34]

5.3. Verse 22 is also closely connected with the well-known descriptions of manna. The expressions that "snow and ice resisted the fire and did not melt" can be understood against the background of Exod 16:14 HB/LXX (like "hoarfrost") and particularly Num 11:7 LXX

Berlin: de Gruyter 2005) 179-93, esp. 187, who writes that in this respect one should also take the rabbinic traditions into account. Are these, however, not better seen as developments, or (in any case) parallels to what we find in the book of Wisdom? A complete different derivation has been proposed by U. Offerhaus, *Komposition und Intention der Sapientia Salomonis* (Bonn: Universitätsverlag 1981) 158 n. 184, who does not see any clue to the statement of Wis 16:20c in Exod or Num, but who derives this from the idea about the adaptability of nature expressed in Wis 16:24-25. The connection between both statements is surely rightly observed. However, it seems to me quite probable that the idea mentioned in Wis 16:24-25 led to an interpretation of Num 11:8 LXX as we have it in Wis 16:20.

[33] U. Schwenk-Bressler, *Die Sapientia Salomonis als ein Beispiel frühjüdischer Textauslegung* (BEATAJ 32, Frankfurt: Peter Lang 1993) 205, also tends to also go into this direction.

[34] The interpretation of Wis 16:21a is not relevant to the question here. Does 21a describe the *Dulcedo Dei*, the sweetness of God, a concept, which later has played such an important role in Christian mysticism, as Schmitt, *Weisheit* (1980), 128, writes? Hübner, *Weisheit*, 198, writes hereupon: "Gott erschließt sich, also *sein Wesen*, als Süßigkeit. Und auch dieses Wort muß in der… theologischen Intention des Autors verstanden warden… Gott ist in seinem Wesen der, der uns seine schenkende Liebe zuteil werden läßt."

("looking like ice").[35] What the texts mentioned above still understand as a comparison to describe how the manna looked like, is now seen as a statement on its substance[36] and is developed further. Wisdom's "ice and snow" (16:22) is developed from "looking like ice" (probably) by using Ps 148:8 LXX (χιών κρύσταλλος)[37] and possibly Exod 16:21. The miracle of the manna, described by Wis 16:22 and 16:27, therefore consists of the fact that the same substance of "ice and snow" which perishes through the heat of the sun, can be used for cooking and baking according to Exod 16:23 and Num 11:8. Wis 16:23-24 mentions the reason for this. In order to feed the righteous, the manna loses its strength. God's creation serves its creator to discipline the unjust, but to support the just.[38]

5.4. Of great additional interest is another passage: At the very end of the book, Wis 19:21 again speaks about the manna. Here the elements already mentioned are repeated, namely that the manna was "crystalline" (κρυσταλλοειδές) and "easily melting" (εὔτεκτος). Finally the manna is called ἀμβρόσιος, what means "immortal,"[39] but also "heavenly" and only in second instance "sweet, delicate."[40] But above all, this attribute is the "classical designation of the food used by the gods," as J.M. Reese writes.[41] "Immortality" as nourishment of the Gods is a theme of many texts of classical and post-classical Greece.[42] In specific and rare occasions it can be handed to humans, for example when they become the table-companions of the Gods like Tantalus (Pindar, *Ol.* 1.95). Whoever digests this nourishment, reaches immortality and will not grow older (Hesiod *fr.* 23a21; Homer, *Il.* 5,342, *Od.* 5,135; Pindar, *Pyth.* 9,104-106; Ovid, *Met.* 4,249-251 and others). The diverse texts apply different miraculous characteristics to it. It even has the ability to stop

[35] Cf. e.g., M. Gilbert, "The Origins According to the Wisdom of Solomon," in *History and Identity: How Israel's Later Authors Viewed Its Earlier History* (eds. N. Caldurch-Benages and J. Liesen, DCLY 2006, Berlin: de Gruyter 2006) 171-85, esp. 181.

[36] See also Schwenk-Bressler, *Sapientia Salomonis*, 208.

[37] See also J.M. Reese, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and Its Consequences* (AnBib 41, Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute 1970) 69 n. 169.

[38] Here the book of Wisdom again differs clearly from the texts in Exod and Num, where Israel again and again is described as acting against God's demands.

[39] For the translation "immortal" cf. Gilbert, "Origins," 182: "The adjective ‚ambrosial' has probably to be taken in its strong etymological meaning as a food which ensures immortality."

[40] Cf. e.g., Larcher, *Livre de la Sagesse*, 3: 1092.

[41] Reese, *Hellenistic Influence*, 70. Reese goes even further and states: "…by comparing the biblical manna to ambrosia he [the author of Wisd; TN] presents it as a type of the divine gift that alone enables just men to enjoy his reward in the Lord, who is 'eternal light' (7.26)."

[42] For more information see F. Graf, Art. "Ambrosia," in *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike* (Stuttgart: Calwer 1996) 1: 581-82; and more extensively K. Wernicke, Art. "Ambrosia," in *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: Calwer 1894) 1: 1809-11 [with many examples].

the decomposition of a corpse like in Patroklos' case (Homer, *Il.* 19,38-39). Only in later texts nectar and ambrosia were differentiated from each other as beverage and food to the Gods, whereby both can alternatively be ascribed to be either beverage or food. It is also interesting to realize that this food of the Gods originally could be described in quite diversive manners—according to the context it could be a balm, a food of horses, a kind of bread, but also honey.[43] Has this also been of influence to the idea that the manna as food of angels suits to every taste (Wis 16:20c)?[44] This, however, cannot be proven with certainty.

6. RELATED MANNA-TRADITIONS

What can be said about ancient Jewish and early Christian parallels of the manna traditions as found in Wis 16:20-23?[45]

6.1. *LAB, 5 Ezra, Revelation*

LAB 19:5a mentions the motif briefly in Moses' farewell speech: *But know that you have eaten the bread of angels* (*panem angelorum*) *for forty years.* Another witness to the idea is 5 Ezra (2nd century AD)[46] in a passage where God complains about Israel's scandalous deeds, even though he has provided them with so many mercies:[47]

> Where are the benefits which I bestowed on you? When you were hungry and thirsty in the wilderness, did you not cry out to me saying: Why hast you led us into this wilderness to kill us? It would have been better for us to serve

[43] For examples of this development cf. Wernicke, "Ambrosia," 1811.

[44] For reflections on the connection between Wis 19:21 and traditions of "immortality" as food of the Gods see P. Beauchamp, "La salut corporal des justes et la conclusion du livre de la Sagesse," *Bib* 45 (1964) 491-526, esp. 509 n. 2, considers the possibility that the manna's multivalence as mentioned in Wis 16,20c can be understood against the background of ancient medical ideas (the manna as a kind of miraculous or magical medicine).

[45] As far as I see, texts like *T.Levi* 8:5, where Levi seems to be fed by angels, do not belong to the same category, because the text does not make clear whether it is not entirely regular bread which is handed to the speaker.

[46] *5 Ezra* is a 2nd century AD Christian apocalypse, which in old versions of the Vulgate is connected to the (Jewish) book of *4 Ezra* as its first and second chapter. For an introduction see: H. Duensing and A. de Santos Otero, "Das fünfte und sechste Buch Esra," in *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen II: Apostolisches, Apokalypsen und Verwandtes* (6th ed., ed. W. Schneemelcher, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1997) 581-90, esp. 581-82.

[47] Translation: B.M. Metzger, "The Fourth Book of Ezra. With the Four Additional Chapters," in *OTP* 1: 517-59, esp. 524. For a German translation see: Duensing and de Santos Otero, "Das fünfte und sechste Buch Esra," 583.

> the Egyptians than to die in this wilderness. I pitied your groanings and gave you manna for food, you ate the bread of angels (*5 Ezra* 1:17-19).

The Latin version of the *Vita Adae et Evae* (*VitAd*),[48] which in their original form might go back to the first century AD, describes that Adam and Eve searched for food after they had been expelled from paradise. For nine days they do not find anything similar to the food they used to eat in paradise, and Adam complains: *The Lord appointed this (i.e. meat of animals) for animals and beasts to eat, but for us there used to be the food of angels* (*VitAd* 4,2).[49] The text does not say explicitly that manna is meant by this food of angels, but interestingly connects it to paradise, outside of which it is nowhere to be found.

A comparable idea is presupposed by the Revelation of John. At the closing of the letter to the community of Pergamon the following is promised: *To everyone who conquers I will give some of the hidden manna…* (Rev 2:17b).

While *5 Ezra* only repeats the motif of the "bread of angels" once again, Rev 2:17b seems to take the subject even further. Here the manna is seen as a kind of food, which is digested in heaven. Actually, the "hidden manna,"[50] which is promised here, might be the Eucharist, which will be given as food[51] to the one "who conquers," i.e. who begets the eschatological "crown"[52]—probably in heavenly Jerusalem. In other terms: The manna is developed from a food of angels, which also nourished Israel in the desert, to the eschatological food for the righteous among God's people, a people, which has its roots in Israel.

6.2. *Joseph and Aseneth*

The early Jewish "novel" *Joseph and Asenet* (*JosAs*) probably originated from a very similar environment as the book of Wisdom, namely Egypt

[48] This text must not be mixed up with the Greek version, which is also known as the *Apocalypse of Moses*.

[49] Translation: M.D. Johnson, "Life of Adam and Eve," in *OTP* 2: 249-95, esp. 258. Here (252) also a date (between 100 BC and 200 AD) can be found. Johnson himself tends "toward the end of the first Christian century" (252).

[50] For the idea of a hidden manna, see also the parallel in Targum Pseudo-Jonathan on Exod 16:15, where Moses says that from the very beginning the manna had been hidden for Israel in heavens.

[51] For "manna" as Eucharist cf. P. Prigent, C*ommentary on the Apocalypse of St. John* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2004) 177, with cross-references to 1 Cor 10:3ff; John 6 and later ancient Christian authors.

[52] Another idea, which, however, cannot be connected to the idea of the "food of angels," can be found in *2 Bar* 29:8 and *SibOr* 7:149: Both texts say that at the end of times manna will once again fall out of heaven and will nourish the just.

around the beginning of the Common Era.[53] The text elaborates on the Old Testament motif of Joseph taking the daughter of an Egyptian priest as his wife (Gen 41:45,50, 46:20).[54] Here a long scene can be found which describes the visit of the Prince of the angels to Aseneth (*JosAs* 14:1-17:6). After Joseph has, during a first encounter, rejected the greeting of the Egyptian woman, who of course is a Gentile, Aseneth retreats to her chamber, fasts and prays for a week, dresses herself in black and repents her former devotion to idolatry. Then, on the morning of the eighth day "a human" descends from heaven (*JosAs* 14:3).[55] He enters Aseneth's (locked) chamber and reveals himself as the ruler of the Lord's house and his commander-in-chief (*JosAs* 14:8). The Prince of the angels demands that Aseneth puts off her fasting cloth. After Aseneth has done accordingly, the angel announces to her that her name is written in the Book of the Living and that she will be given to Joseph as a bride. Finally, the angel calls her name "city of refuge" (*JosAs* 15:6). When Aseneth asks the Prince of the angels for his name, he declines to respond, but allows her to entertain him to a meal (*JosAs* 15:13 and 17:4a).[56]

The Egyptian woman prepares bread and wine (JosAs 15:14 and 16:1a). The angel accepts, but asks for one additional dish:

> καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος· φέρε δή μοι καὶ κηρίον μελίσσης. "And the man said to her: Fetch me also a honeycomb" (*JosAs* 16:1b).

Aseneth is sorry, because she does not have a honeycomb in her storage room and proposes to send for one from the estate of her inheritance. The angel replies that she ought to look into her storage room. There she will find one on the table. This one she should fetch (*JosAs* 16:2-5). At first Aneseth does not believe him, but after a second demand she obeys and actually finds the comb.

> καὶ ἦν τὸ κηρίον μέγα καὶ λευκὸν ὡσεὶ χιὼν καὶ πλήρης μέλιτος. καὶ ἦν τὸ μέλι ἐκεῖνο ὡς δρόσος τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἡ πνοὴ αὐτοῦ ὡς πνοὴ ζωῆς. "And the comb

[53] Probably *JosAs* is somewhat later than the Book of Wisdom. D. Sänger, "Erwägungen zur historischen Einordnung und zur Datierung von 'Joseph und Aseneth,'" *ZNW* 76 (1985) 86-106, dates the text very precisely to the period before the pogroms under Flacchus in 38 AD.

[54] For an introduction, see e.g., E.J. Humphrey, *Joseph and Aseneth* (Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Sheffield: Academic Press 2000).

[55] The naming of the angel as ἄνθρωπος is somewhat strange because it corresponds to a description, which characterizes the ascended figure unambiguously as an angel, who even later on appears in angelic form (cf. *JosAs* 14:9). The reason for this, however, might be found in the comparison with the figure of Joseph.

[56] On the text of *Joseph and Aseneth* cf. the critical edition of C. Burchard (together with C. Burfeind and U.B. Fink), *Joseph und Aseneth* (PVTG 5, Leiden: Brill 2003).

> was large and white as snow and filled with honey. And this honey was like dew from heaven and its smell was like the smell of life" (*JosAs* 16:8b).

Two elements of this description catch the eye immediately. The comb is "white like snow" and the honey within it is "like dew from heaven"—the text seems at least indirectly want to say that manna is concerned here (or respectively that the comb is from the substance of manna).[57] The connection between manna and honey may be due to Exod 16:31b LXX, but could well be influenced by the frequently found portrayal of ambrosia as honey (see above). Aseneth is surprised to notice that the honey's smell is the same as the smell from the angel's mouth (*JosAs* 16:9). She recognizes that the comb in a miraculous way stems from the angel's mouth (*JosAs* 16:11). After this, the Prince of angels blesses her, promises eternal youth to her and reveals the secret of the honeycomb.

> ... τοῦτο τὸ κηρίον ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ζωῆς. καὶ τοῦτο ποποιήκασιν αἱ μέλισσαι τοῦ παραδείσου τῆς τρυφῆς ἐκ τῆς δρόσου τῶν ῥοδων τῆς ζωῆς τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐσθίουσι καὶ πάντες οἱ ἐκλεκτοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πάντες οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ ὑψίστου ὅτι κηρίον ζωῆς ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἂν φάγῃ ἐξ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα χρόνον. "This comb is spirit of life. And it is made by the bees of blissful paradise of bliss[58] from the dew of the roses of life, which is growing in God's paradise. And all of God's angels eat from it and all those chosen by God and all the sons of the highest, because this is a comb of life and each one, who eats from it, will not die for eternity" (*JosAs* 16:14b).

This text thus provides us with a whole amount of interesting motifs. The comb—and with it the manna—is called "spirit of life." Not only the text's description of the comb's construction is interesting. Its description as nourishment to God's angels and his chosen ones (see also Rev 2:17)[59] respectively as a kind of food, which makes anyone who eats of it immortal, is also important. It is exactly this last detail which reminds us once again strongly of the Greek Gods' nectar and ambrosia. Finally, the angel's statement, after Aseneth ate a piece of the comb, shows the (potential) multiformity of what is specifically described as "honeycomb:"

[57] Cf. also C. Burchard, *Joseph und Aseneth* (JSHRZ II/4, Gütersloh: Gütersloher 1983) 679 n. 8c.

[58] Corresponding to the LXX translation of "Garden Eden" (e.g. in Gen 3:23). Cf. also M. Philonenko, *Joseph et Aséneth: Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes* (SPB 13, Leiden: Brill 1968) 168.

[59] It is not entirely clear what is meant with the words "sons of the highest:" does this point to angels or just persons which are already situated in heaven?

> ἰδοὺ δὴ ἔφαγες ἄρτον ζωῆς καὶ ἔπιες ποτήριον ἀθανασίας καὶ κέχρισαι χρίσματι ἀφθαρσίας. "See, you have eaten bread of life and drank from the grale of immortality and balmed yourself with the balm of everlastingness" (*JosAs* 16:16).

This will, like the angel prophesies, lead to the situation that Aseneth will receive heavenly beauty and will never grow old (*JosAs* 16:16).[60] The comb is miraculously re-established, and the bees of paradise occur out of it. They surround Aseneth's face and build another comb on her mouth. The angel interprets this miracle as a sign that he spoke the truth and makes the comb disappear.[61] Compared to the book of Wisdom and its descriptions *JosAs* thus clearly develops the miraculous qualities of the "food of angels," which is here only indirectly connected to the manna. The basic ideas, however, are in many respects similar. Both texts relate manna and the "food of angels" more or less explicitly to each other, and both texts refer more or less explicitly to immortality. While according to JosAs this miraculous food is prepared in paradise, whose location is not specified any further. According to Wis it comes "from heaven." The manna's changeability in taste mentioned in Wis has no part in *JosAs*. Yet another observation might be of interest: The digestion of the heavenly honeycomb gives Aseneth characteristics of heavenly beings (or persons already in paradise)—the effects of the nourishment remind us of the effects of ambrosia. It makes immortal, gives supernal beauty, prevents aging and even makes the body imperishable.

7. CONCLUSION

Early Judaism obviously allowed several different ideas about the "food of angels" which do not completely correspond to each other. Several texts contradict quite clearly the idea that angels would nourish themselves and point to the difference between humans and angels. One of the reasons of this is surely the "holiness" of angels who stand in front of God's glory (for example *ApAbr*, Tob).[62] Moreover, *TestAbr* 4 [A] 4:9 and Philo point to the incorporeality of *heavenly* angels, who therefore cannot (or need not) eat *earthly* food.[63] Texts like Ps 77:24-25 LXX and others, however, developed the image of the angels actually

[60] By this, of course, the angel's prophecy of *JosAs* 15:5 is fulfilled.

[61] The wording reminds of the miracle at Gideon's calling (Judg 6:21).

[62] Cf. Mach, *Entwicklungsstadien*, 98.

[63] On later Christian discussion (mainly in Syria!) about the substance of angels see R.M.M. Tuschling, *Angels and Orthodoxy: A Study in their Development in Syria and Palestine from the Qumran Texts to Ephrem the Syrian* (STAC 40, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007) 156-63.

eating a kind of heavenly food. At least *one* of these heavenly dishes is the manna, which also was allotted to Israel during their wandering through the desert.[64] At least some texts express the hope that it will again be the food for the righteous in eschatological times. According to the book of Wisdom (Wis 19:21), but also according to *JosAs* 16, one of the qualities of this food is to grant immortality. In this context the Book of Wisdom uses the term ἀμβρόσιος—and very probably shows the influence of the old Greek concepts of the Gods eating "immortality." This shows again how early Judaism had the ability to critically and selectively adapt influences from its Hellenistic environment, to integrate them into its own world of thought and make them understandable to a new age and time.[65]

[64] Mach, *Entwicklungsstadien*, 98, even goes further: According to him the idea that in the desert Israel participated in the bread of angels wants to express that Israel also participated in the status of angels.

[65] More generally on this phenomenon in early Jewish sapiential literature, cf. O. Kaiser, "Anknüpfung und Widerspruch: Die Antwort der jüdischen Weisheit auf die Herausforderung durch den Hellenismus," in idem, *Gottes und der Menschen Weisheit: Gesammelte Aufsätze* (BZAW 261, Berlin: de Gruyter 1998) 201-16.

COSMOLOGY AND MUSIC. WIS 19:18 AND THE CONCEPT OF CREATION IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM

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1. INTRODUCTION[1]

Verses 10-21 of Chapter 19 form the conclusion of the Book of Wisdom. In it the author states the principles which have previously been exemplified in 10:1-19:9. Here the history of salvation is read typologically as "the history of Wisdom in action." While this conclusion describes, in philosophical language, the nature of the ἐπισκοπήν of God for his people in the events of the Exodus, it also accounts for what makes it possible: the omnipotence of God, the Creator, who refashions the creation (cf. 19:6). The use of the verb διετυποῦν in 19:6 brings to mind a revolution in the order of things: creation, which has been placed in a constant state of obedience towards the Creator (cf. 16:24), shows new possibilities, a new way of being regulated by the divine activity, which changes the properties of created things. These end up exhibiting exceptional capacities, which, on occasions, are contrary to their normal powers.

Within this very clear-cut frame of reference, 19:18, with its appropriate musical analogy, is an attempt to present to an audience, already familiar with a way of thought, that draws, perhaps in the first place, on the Greek world, the miracle of the Crossing of the Red Sea. This is understood, interpreted and presented as an act of "continuous creation:" the elements become interchangeable, an astonishing act, which remodels nature, offering the just the possibility of a safe passage. What we are presented with is a change of rhythm that is the result of a new relationship between the elements. These would normally have a different range, but they are changed, reciprocally, to achieve different results.

[1] I would like to thank Dr. Michael Tait, who translated the text into English.

Wis 19:18, therefore, conveys an idea that is particularly important in Wisdom, a kind of *leitmotiv* that runs throughout the book (cf. 5:17b-20; 16:17, 22, 23b) and that belongs to the Old Testament tradition. The idea is that of God who puts the κόσμος at the service of his people, but it does this by resorting to cosmological and musical concepts typical of Hellenistic culture. This is achieved without being disloyal to the existing Scriptural tradition, above all that of Gen 1, of which it presents an exegetically appropriate reading.

In this contribution, therefore, I intend to examine the *arrière-plan* to which the author of Wisdom makes reference in his cosmological argument. Then, after having briefly analysed the syntactic structure of 19:18 and taking account also of 11:17, I would like to try to describe the conception of creation held by our author. Present in the book in a very straightforward and coherent manner, it is a concept that does not allow the book to be understood as an apocalyptic work. In fact, in 11:17 there is a clear affirmation of creation ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης. However, this has always been interpreted with a sort of inexplicable, neo-apologetic prudery, because it seems to break the line of evolution of faith in creation *ex nihilo*, which is "virtually" present in the oldest Old Testament traditions and which comes to clear definition in the text of 2 Mac 7:18. This would henceforward become classic.[2] J. Reider puts it like this:

> Amorphos hyle is a Greek philosophical term which is entirely foreign to Jewish thought and conception. The Jews believed in creation out of nothing; the Greeks believed in creation out of formless matter which was eternal. On the one hand religious monism (God alone is eternal); on the other philosophic dualism (God and matter are eternal). It is difficult to assume that the author of Wisdom, who was far more Jewish than Philo, would adhere to the Greek view of creation. Undoubtedly the allusion is *casual* and not dogmatic.[3]

In his commentary, J. Vílchez Líndez, in a tone that is brusquely apologetic, recognises a purely linguistic datum in the expression ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης. It is, in fact,

> the attempt to explain the unchanging phenomenon of creation by means of earthly, human concepts to render the great mystery of the origin of all things a little more accessible. In the context, the expression does not have the

[2] Cf. E. Vallauri, "1 e 2 Maccabei," in *Introduzione alla Bibbia, III: gli ultimi storici, Salmi e Sapienziali* (Bologna: EDB 1978) 180.

[3] J. Reider, *The Book of Wisdom* (New York: Harper & Brothers 1957) 145.

> significance which has been bestowed on it: it is merely secondary, inspired by the Neoplatonic philosophy of the time.[4]

A casual allusion, then, the linguistic transposition of an idea with a pedagogic aim,

> an attempt to hold together the biblical doctrine of Creation—God's constant physical and moral control of the world which he called into being out of nothing—and the assumption of Greek philosophy, that the world was shaped by God out of pre-existing matter and runs according to the immutable laws then implanted.[5]

It is legitimate, therefore, to ask if the author of Wisdom, someone who, although a Jew, was perfectly at home in the cultural and intellectual environment of Alexandria,[6] had in mind the notion of *creatio ex nihilo* or that of unformed matter. Alternatively, if in fact he had the former in mind, was he putting forward the latter to make the former more intelligible to his readers!

I believe, then, that a brief *excursus* on the cosmological ideas of how the world began that were prevalent at the time of the composition of Wisdom could be useful in understanding not only the cultural milieu in which the concept of creation propounded in the Book of Wisdom took its place but also the coherence of the structure of thematic moves which the author progressively develops.

2. SOME PHILOLOGICAL AND SYNTACTICAL POINTS IN WIS 19:18

From the syntactic point of view, this verse has some difficulties arising from the fact that it contains a participial phrase without a personal verb.[7] Goodrick has highlighted the fact that in the overall structure of the verse the third stich is expressed in a way that is too short.[8]

But the initial γάρ, connecting with vv. 10-12, refers to the extraordinary phenomena of the Exodus and, at the same time, introduces a new summary (vv. 19-21).[9] The principal phrase would be μένοντα ἦχω, to be

[4] J. Vílchez Líndez, *Sapienza* (Roma: Borla 1990) 373.

[5] J.P.M. Sweet, "The Theory of Miracles in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Miracles* (ed. C.F.D. Moule, London: Mowbrays 1965) 116.

[6] Cf. M. Conti, *Sapienza* (Rome: Paoline 1975) 9.

[7] Cf. C. Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse ou la Sagesse de Salomon* (Paris: Gabalda 1985), 3:1082-89; G. Ziener, *Die Theologische Begriffssprache im Buche der Weisheit* (Bonn: Peter Hanstein 1956) 155-57; U. Offerhaus, *Komposition und Intention der Sapientia Salomonis* (Bonn: Univesität Bonn 1981) 185-89.

[8] Cf. A.T.S. Goodrick, *The Book of Wisdom* (New York: Macmillan 1913) 373-74.

[9] Cf. Larcher, *Le Livre* 1082.

completed with ἐστίν as main verb.[10] Μένοντα is connected grammatically with στοιχεῖα, but the idea points directly to the musical comparison which comes before.[11]

In the LXX, στοιχεῖον occurs only in Wis 7:17; 19:18; 4 Macc 12:13. The occurrence in 7:17 (21) is interesting. Here, in full accord with Jewish thought, it is stated that God is the source of knowledge by means of his wisdom (εἰδέναι σύστασιν κόσμου καὶ ἐνέργειαν στοιχειῶν). Δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν normally means "by means of; through," and so underlines the sense of reciprocity.[12] Significant is the use of μεθαρμόζειν, which, however, does not have the sense of changing the arrangement or the disposition of something or even of improving it.[13] Finally, it is clear that the subject of διαλλάσσουσιν is φθόγγοι, even if στοιχεῖα can perform the same function without changing the sense of the first two stichs.[14] In 19:18, ῥυθμός, from ῥέω, does not mean "melody," but it designates a duration of sound (tone), long or short, and, together with τὸ ὄνομα, must be understood as a kind of rhythm.[15] Φθόγγοι stands for the sounds or the notes. The plural refers to the different sounds and alludes to the distinction between high and low pitch.[16]

[10] Cf. P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (Münster: Aschendorff 1912), 341; Ziener, *Die Theologische* 155; Larcher, *Le Livre* 1086-87; C.L.W. Grimm, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (Leipzig: Hirzel 1860) 298.

[11] Cf. Larcher, *Le Livre* 1086.

[12] Cf. Larcher, *Le Livre* 1083; Offerhaus, *Komposition* 185-86.

[13] Cf. R. Pistone, "The Lyre and the creation. Music Theory and Persuasive Strategy in Wis 19," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research. Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology* (eds. A. Passaro and G. Bellia, DCLY 2005, Berlin: de Gruyter 2005) 195-217 in contrast with G. Scarpat, *Libro della Sapienza* (Brescia: Paideia 1999), 3: 305-08.

[14] These two members of the comparison are closely linked to each other. Cf. Heinisch, *Das Buch*, 341; Offerhaus, *Komposition* 185-89; J. Holtzmann, *Die Peschitta zum Buche der Weisheit* (Freiburg: Herder 1903) 142-43.

[15] Cf. Heinisch, *Das Buch* 341-43; Ziener, *Die Theologische* 157, writes: "ῥυθμός kommt von ῥέω und besagt in seiner Grundbedeutung eine regelmassig wiederkehrende Bewegung. Auch die Musik angewand, ist damit die Aufeinanderfolge von langen und kurzen Tonen in bestimmter Ordnung gemeint. Diese Bedeutung hat ῥυθμός auch bei Plato (*Symposion* 187 b-c)." For D. Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory of Cosmogony," *HR* 11 (1971) 200-02, the use of this term poses a certain difficulty of interpretation, so he substitutes "Key" (τόνος or τρόπος). D. Georgi, *Weisheit Salomos*, in *Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn 1980) 391-478, suggests changing the word order: "Wahrscheinlich ist τοῦ ῥυθμου τὸ ὄνομα aus τὸ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ὄνομα verlesen, weil ein Abschreiber den in jedem Falle schwierigen Vergleich nicht verstand" (p. 470). Cf. also Scarpat, *Libro della Sapienza*, 305-08. He distances himself from Heinisch and suggests ways of interpretation that are new, interesting and learned.

[16] Cf. Larcher, *Le Livre* 1084.

3. THE CULTURAL *MILIEU* OF THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

The terminology employed in 19:18 is immediate testimony that the rationalising explanation that the author of Wisdom gives of the miracle of the crossing of the Red Sea is suitable for readers who have a Hellenistic idea of physics.[17] Moreover, its position in the book clearly reflects the tendency derived from Stoic philosophy to discern in the events of history the illustration of the workings of the universe.[18] In fact, with the definition of λογός as πρόνοια, the Stoics conferred a character of intrinsic necessity on the whole of reality.

The reference to the philosophical theories of the harmony of the universe is clearly noticeable from the use of two technical terms that are not found in the Old Testament: στοιχεῖον and μεθαρμόζειν.

The theory that the elements can be interchanged in a harmonious manner is attributed to Pythagoras[19] who, according to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, claimed some elements μεταβάλλειν καὶ δὲ τρέπεσθαι δι᾽ ὅλον. In his *De Natura*, Diogenes of Apollonia gives a careful clarification of the principle underlying this theory. For him, the different properties change and are exchanged by means of the identical, the unique substance from which all things originate and to which they return through a process of differentiation and dissolution.[20]

In his consideration of becoming, Heraclitus would afterwards introduce, as a cosmological category, the principle of λόγος the truest nature of which is to be the law of "harmony reciprocally tuned."[21] To reciprocal exclusion, he opposes reciprocal integration through the contradiction of opposites. This does not mean to reconcile the opposites because their harmony consists in their tension, in a "harmonious discord." The identity of being is, then, configured as a reality structured by opposing forms. The λόγος, which is eternal fire, norm of reason and the universe's material principal of becoming, in varying according to the measure of its own intensity, exercises a function that is cohesive and regulatory, distinguishing and opposing.

The reality of the cosmos is, therefore, determined by the plurality of pairs of opposites, by the opposing tension that determines a harmony

[17] Cf. G. von Rad, *La Sapienza in Israele* (Torino: Marietti 1975) 385.

[18] Cf. J.J. Collins, "Cosmos and Salvation: Jewish Wisdom and Apocalyptic in the Hellenistic Age," *HR* 17 (1977-78) 126-27.

[19] Cf. J.M. Reese, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences* (AnBib 41, Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute 1970) 199.

[20] "But all these things arise by alteration out of the same thing, become different at different times, and return back to same thing." Citation by Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory," 193.

[21] The musical image of fragment 51 of Heraclitus (παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης) recalls Wis 19:18. Cf. E. Pfleiderer, *Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus* (Berlin: Reimer 1886) 326.

that is unitary and necessary, which is the divine law of moderation and justice.[22] The entire life of φύσις is thus reduced to a double process of transformation, from fire into air and from air into water and from water into earth and, in the return process, from earth into water, then to air and back to fire.

The encounter between the cosmological-metaphysical conception of Heraclitus and that of Anaxagores will leave its mark on Platonic and Aristotelian cosmology issuing in Stoic philosophy, which is the philosophic system to which the author of Wisdom makes most reference.

The Platonic recognition that the conditions of the being of the physical world are the formal-exemplary cause (ἰδέα), the efficient cause (δημιουργός) and the material cause (ὕλη) is the attempt at a response to the riddle of being and becoming typical of naturalistic thought. It is, however, a response that is not completely clear. Platonic matter, in fact, cannot be thought of except as non-being (μὴ ὄν), while on the other hand it is supposed to be the co-principle for the being of the world. It would be Aristotle's task to recover what Plato had scattered in various concepts in the idea of μορφή and of δύναμις. Matter, which Plato is not able to understand except as μὴ ὄν (non-being), is the power of being, potential being, the necessary foundation (ὑποκείμενον) of every change, having the absolute potential to be that substance on which form confers the determination. Thus the demand of the Pythagorean harmony, of the determining principle, arrives at its logical and natural conclusion.

For the most part, Hellenistic philosophy would abandon the results of the Aristotelian treatment and prefer to draw on pre-Socratic themes. From the one it would retain the duality of principles to explain the nature of bodies: the extensive principle (τὸ πάσχον) and the dynamic principle (τὸ ποιοῦν). The other would be needed to save the demand of form and also of the Aristotelian Mind, but it universalised the former and made the latter imminent, identifying the κόσμος with being, making the λόγος a rational principle analogous to the Heraclitan principle.

Posidonius, the chief exponent of the Middle Stoa and point of departure for the attempt to conciliate the various lines of metaphysical-religious thought of the Hellenistic world, is perhaps the most shining example of eclecticism current in cosmology at the time of the author of Wisdom. He takes up the Stoic theory of the coincidence between κόσμος and being and recognises in it the possibility of the accomplishment of all the multiple modes of being because of the intrinsic harmony between the various parts of the whole. Thus, his immanentist cosmo-theological monism leads him to conceive of reality

[22] Cf. Wis 11:20d.

as a living organism, arranged hierarchically by the four traditional elements of earthly reality. Reality is generated by Fire,[23] by means of which it is differentiated and into which it is cyclically reabsorbed according to the Stoic-Heraclitan concept of the universal conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις). Typical of this approach to the cosmological question is the idea that the "material" (στοιχεῖα) with which the world is made is the ἄποιος ὕλη, which is the originating and primordial principle together with God, the condition of the possibility of the mutual interchangeability of the elements.[24]

Two fragments of Zeno clearly exemplify this idea:

> The universe has two principles: one passive, the unformed substance; the other active, the mind, God. This second principle penetrates matter, produces the four elements and creates all things.[25]

But:

> […] essence (οὐσία) and matter are to be distinguished. Copper, gold, iron are the matter of the objects which are made from these metals, but they are not the essence which is that which gives to the said things and to everything else their *raison d'être*. Essence is, therefore, the primordial matter and the foundation of everything (οὐσία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἀρχαιότατον ὑποκείμενον τῶν ὅλων). Universal matter and essence is one thing, the matter and essence of individual beings is another; the former is not patient of augmentation or diminution while the matter of individual beings increases or diminishes. Through the essence passes reason, that is God, inseparable from it and penetrating it like the seed in the genitals.[26]

Again for Cleanthes:

> The principles are: God and matter […] Earth is turned into water, water into air, and air into fire […] the air is drawn (upwards) and the fire subsides

[23] According to the Stoic conception, Fire is the determination of the cosmic πνεῦμα, which is the vital principle. It runs through (διήκει) the world, makes it live and guarantees its unity. It governs it by its providence (πρόνοια, διοίκησις) because it is thinking breath, intelligent and artistic fire (πῦρ τηκνικόν), equipped with a tension (τόνος), which, pervading the body of the world in all its parts, expands or contracts its matter, differentiates it in the singularity of beings, joins it in the unity of an organism. Cf. L. Robin, *Storia del pensiero greco* (Milano: Mondadori 1978) 324.

[24] Cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi graeci* (Berlin: de Gruyter 1965) 308.

[25] *I Frammenti degli Stoici antichi*, I, *Zenone* (ed. N. Festa, Bari: Laterza 1932) 80.

[26] *Ibid*., 81. It is of some interest that the doxographic form of the passage is found again in Philo, *De providentia*, I, 22.

> around the earth […] and the soul penetrates the whole universe and, in so far as we share in it, we are animated by this.[27]

The four traditional elements, then, are not permanent or irreducible, but can be transmuted one into the other because they are endowed with a τόνος which is maintained or diminished. This explains the intrinsic dynamism of reality. If it is true that the tension of the universal substance never ceases, it is also true that

> like elements of parts, meeting with the seed, they blend together and then separate again in forming these parts, as if all things are hidden in a sole seed and all are founded on one, unfolding the cycle in a regular and harmonious manner.[28]

As could easily be argued, and as Festugière has noted with regard to Philo,[29] the author of Wisdom is situated in a period in which there is a sort of jumble of cosmological ideas. It is a time of great eclecticism in which an attempt at the synthesis of previous systems is in process. It is clear that the author of Wisdom is indebted to this attempt, at least as regards the theory of the division of the world into elements and the cosmic cycle of becoming. Despite the fact that he is not bound to any particular current or system,[30] the ideas of Heraclitus and Plato are the heritage of thought most easily noticeable in his work. They have been transmitted and popularised by Stoicism, beginning with the speculations of Posidonius.

On the other hand, as P. Beauchamp has already emphasized, the idea of the interchangeable elements, and its literary expression in the musical analogy, is present in works contemporary with or just posterior to the Book of Wisdom.[31] In fact, in the treatise Περὶ κόσμου,[32] dated around the first half of the second century CE, in which the thought of Posidonius can be recognised, a series of cosmological data very close to the Book of Wisdom is in the fifth chapter. To the question why, if the

[27] *I Frammenti degli Stoici antichi*, II (ed. N. Festa, Bari: Laterza 1932), 115-16. According to the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, for Plato also the principles (ἀρχαί) are two: God and matter (θεός καὶ ὕλη); the matter is ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ ἄπειρος, ἀτάκτως κινουμέμη. Cf. W. Foerster, "κτίζω," *Grande Lessico del Nuovo Testamento* (Brescia: Paideia 1965), 5: 1245.

[28] The text is attributed to Cleanthes. Cf. *I Frammenti degli Stoici antichi* 117.

[29] A.-J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris: Libraire Lecroffe 1954).

[30] Cf. C. Larcher, *Études sur le Livre de la Sagesse* (Paris: Gabalda 1969) 179-236.

[31] Cf. P. Beauchamp, "Le salut corporel des justes et la conclusion du livre de la Sagesse," *Bib* 45 (1964) 512-20.

[32] Cited by Festugière, *La revelation*; J. Fichtner, "Die Stellung der Sapientia Salomonis in der Literatur und Geistesgeschichte ihrer Zeit," *ZNW* 36 (1937) 117, holds probable a connection with the author of Wisdom.

κόσμος is made up of opposing principles, it has not been destroyed and reduced to nothing already, the author replies that "nature has a tendency for opposites" (396b 8),[33] as is shown by music: "it is in placing together notes that are high and low, long and short, that music produces from different sounds a unique harmony" (396b 16-17). Thus "fire softens ice, and ice lessens the force of fire" (397b 36-37). Therefore the world is not destroyed. In fact, it is in this paradox that its σωτηρία lies.[34]

Also in Philo's works, and more explicitly in the youthful *De Incorruptibilitate Mundi*, we find the concept of the world's being founded on the harmony of the elements in which is recognised a principle of order and justice,

> just as the four seasons of the year follow one another in cyclical manner, one giving way to the other […], so the elements of the world in their reciprocal exchange—paradoxical fact (παράδοξον)—are immortalized when they seem to die, and they take again the same path upwards and downwards […] earth is dissolved and becomes water; water evaporates and becomes air; the more subtle air becomes fire. The return path begins up above […] down to the earth.[35]

Even medicine, which forms part of the universal culture of the period, makes use of the theory of opposing elements, above all of the pair "water-fire," to explain the phenomenon of death and life:

> Quippe ubi temperiem sumpsere
> humorque calorque
> concipiunt, et ab his oriuntur cuncta
> duobus
> cumque sit ignis aquae pugnax,
> vapor humidus omnes
> res creat, et discors concordia
> fetibus apta est.[36]

Indeed, when heat and moisture have reached the proper balance,

[33] Cf. Festugière, *La révélation*, 2: 468-70. His own translation reads: "la nature a du penchant pour les contraires."

[34] Cf. the use of σωτήριοι in Wis 1:14.

[35] Philo, *De incorruptibilitate mundi*, XXI, 108-09.

[36] Ovid, *Metamorfosi*, I, 430 (ed. F. Bernini, Bologna: Zanichelli 1943). Beauchamp, "Le salut" 517-19, adduces other texts to show how the theory of opposing elements, expressed by means of the musical analogy, would have had ancient roots and, by the time of the composition of the Book of Wisdom, would have become popularised.

> they bring forth life, and all things are born from these two elements.
> Although fire and water are always opposites,
> nonetheless moist heat is the source of everything,
> and this discordant harmony is suited to creation.[37]

Unquestionably medical theories contributed to the formation of pictures of the universe, especially the Stoic cosmology.

The theory of opposing elements and its formulation according to the musical analogy is, therefore, "a common *topos* of Greek literature,"[38] and expresses the belief that nothing is produced from that which does not exist but that all things only unite and separate and are transformed.

The author of Wisdom is situated within this line of thought and, although not elaborating a cosmological theory, he has recourse to the concepts of his time in order to explain the crossing of the Red Sea. Indeed the Stoics too rely on the theory of opposing elements, which assumes matter as the originating principle, in order to explain how divine interventions in the cosmos do not violate the laws of nature:

> …you (Stoics) assert that matter, which forms and contains everything, is wholly flexible and subject to change so that there is nothing that cannot be modulated and transmuted by it unexpectedly […] The modulator of this universal substance is divine providence.[39]

Certainly one cannot say that for the Stoics God can act arbitrarily. They insist on the fact that so-called miracles do not exist but have a naturalistic explanation.

Following the example of Stoicism and like the author of Wisdom, Philo clarifies and explains some of the Biblical miracles by means of the physical principle of the interchangeability or "metabolism" of the elements.[40] Thus, in the miracle of the manna, in which the birth of the universe is set forth analogically, each element changed its own power.[41] Beauchamp can rightly conclude, therefore, that "the miracles of the Exodus described as the play of opposites, must have constituted a common topos in Judaism."[42]

[37] Ovid, *Metamorphoses* (London: Penguin 2002).

[38] Beauchamp, "Le salut" 513.

[39] The text is attributed to Chrysippus. Cf. H. F. Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner 1968) 2: 1107.

[40] Cf. D. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (AB 43; New York: Doubleday 1979) 330-31.

[41] Cf. Philo, *De vita Mosis*, XXVIII, 156.

[42] Beauchamp, "Le salut" 521.

4. CREATION OF UNFORMED MATTER AND DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE

This is a rapid glance at the general background against which is situated the theory of the "metabolism" of the elements. It is this to which 19:18 clearly makes reference, presenting it in the traditional way with the musical analogy. This appears to us exclude the presence, even if only implicit, of creation *ex nihilo* in the outlook of the author of Wisdom. On the contrary, the theory to which he refers requires for its logical functioning the concept of the ὕλη πρώτη underlying all the elements.

Certainly, the author of Wisdom's adhesion to the theory of opposing elements is not dogmatic nor adopted in an uncritical way. In fact, he remains clearly indebted to the whole previous Old Testament tradition, which revealed a personal God who acts in history. The currents of thought contemporary with him sought to understand creation as a personal act of the divine, without, however, being able to give an image of it. The νοῦς of Anaxagores, the Platonic δημιουργός, the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover, the cosmological πνεῦμα of the Stoics are all attempts that end up with the impersonal. In the impersonal divine principle, the author of Wisdom understands the God of the tradition of the fathers who is almighty, personal, who acts in history; the material cause of the becoming of the cosmos in matter, following the example of a Stoicism impregnated with Plato; Wisdom, in the πνεῦμα of the Stoics, which, though remaining itself qualitatively and quantitively, renews all things in its capacity as τεχνίτις (7:27).

In Wis 19:18, then, the author, presents the miracle of the crossing of the Red Sea as a parable for the future. In so doing, he conjures up a picture of the metamorphosis of that which is permanent—the fire remains fire, the water remains water, the air remains air, the earth remains earth—but in a momentous metamorphosis, they change their properties, their effects. These changes of function without any change of nature do not destroy harmony but change it.[43] In this way, although he employs the Stoics' method of explanation, the author of Wisdom does not reduce the miracle to a merely natural phenomenon and can assert a continuous and total dependence of nature on God (cf. 16:24ff).

The concept of the creation from unformed matter makes possible the reading of the deeds of the Exodus as "continuous creation" and the presentation of it as a type of the future. The Exodus becomes the image of a new harmony, which is always possible, not irrepeatable. There is, therefore, no annihilation or substitution of the original creation but a continuous action, which is creative, regulatory and conserving on the part of God. By means of Wisdom, he fulfils the potentiality of change,

[43] Cf. Ziener, *Die Theologische*, 157.

which is at times paradoxical but which is proper to the matter which underlies all created things.

Moreover, in the light of Wis 19:18 and of the *arrière-plan* to which it refers, the affirmation of 11:17 becomes unequivocally clear and coherent:

> οὐ γὰρ ἠπόρει ἡ παντοδύναμός σου χεὶρ
> καὶ κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης

The expression ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης is certainly derived from the Stoic-Platonic philosophical system. In fact, ἀμόρφος is employed by Plato in the *Timaeus* in the context of a new and more developed line of reasoning concerning the universe (cf. 48e), but without the term ὕλη.[44] It is probable, then, that the author of Wisdom would have had as his source the commentary on the *Timaeus* edited by Posidonius,[45] in which ὕλη is joined with ἀμόρφος and ἄποιος, to which Philo also refers in a literal way.[46]

Now, if reference is made exclusively to the expression ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης, the impression is given that the author is introducing a concept foreign to the biblical idea of creation. But if the expression is interpreted as taking account of the context, immediate (the verse), proximate and remote, the concept is revealed to be a moment of evolution in the faith of the Old Testament with regard to creation.

In effect, the verse insists on the omnipotence of God as can be deduced from the reading καὶ κτίσασα.[47] The interest of the author is to highlight the power of the creator as a hermeneutic device to understand his position with regard to history. In this, the author is firmly in the bedrock of the Jewish and Old Testament tradition. In this, above all in the post-Exilic period, there is expressed the necessary relationship that runs between the omnipotence, that manifests itself in history and that manifested in the act of creation: to give history its form is a creative activity. Therefore, the terms used to express the creative act (עשה, יצר, פעל, and, above all, ברא, which indicates an act of creation that does not have analogies in the human sphere) are terms to indicate the action of God in history.[48] Moreover, the use that the author makes of κτίζω shows his desire to indicate the aspect of decision, the will to create on

[44] Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* (ed. A. Rivaud, Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres" 1963).

[45] Cf. Larcher, *Études*, 217.

[46] Cf. Philo, *De specialibus legibus*, I, 328.

[47] The variant καὶ ἡ κτίσασα would have made immediate reference to the creation.

[48] Cf. Foerster, "κτίζω," 1256.

the part of God.[49] In the Hellenistic period, the verb indicates the activity of the one who has the power, the exercise of absolute dominion by him who by his word arranges and founds all things.[50] It is a term, which, at least implicitly, seems to refer to the use of the word in the creative act. The use of κτίζω thus places the author in a line of continuity with the ancient tradition and absolves him from understanding the creative act as demiurgic activity, which is only regulatory.[51] Certainly the reference to χεὶρ, if it is intended to be anthropomorphic, could give the opposite impression, because it is the means by which the δημιουργός acts. But, in the more ancient historical traditions, χεὶρ is the element which indicates the action of God in history, precisely the term which announces or designates the plagues that Yahweh sends against Egypt (Ex 7:5; 9:13-15 LXX). Moreover, in some prophetic traditions, creation itself is presented as the work of the *hand* of Yahweh (Isa 45:11-12; 48:13; Hos 13:4 LXX).

In this frame of reference, which is also linguistic, ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης does not express the attempt to reduce the creative activity of God to purely demiurgic activity. On the contrary, the use of the term παντοδύναμος shows how the author of Wisdom does not wish to exclude the unformed matter from the divine work of creation, thus placing himself in a coherent line of continuity with what has been affirmed in 1:14.[52]

Situating himself, therefore, in the bedrock of tradition, the author carries out a kind of exegesis of Gen 1:1-2, understanding the תהו ובהו of Gen 1:2 as ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης.[53] Making use of the Stoic theories, which characterise unformed matter as the underlying stratum of the elements, the common base of all beings, he affirms the "how" of creation, of the origin of the world, without removing matter from causal creation, something that would have produced a kind of metaphysical dualism, which was unknown to him. He does not affirm, therefore, that it is uncreated.[54]

Now, it is true that in the elaboration of a theology of creation in the post-Exilic period, in which the redaction of Gen 1:1-2:4 is to be placed,

[49] It is interesting to note that in the second part of the book (Chapters 6-9), the author seems to state that the will to create belongs to God, but the realisation of it to Wisdom.

[50] Cf. Foerster, "κτίζω," 1303.

[51] In fact, the verb διημουργέω, occurs only in 15:13, in the context of the firm criticism that the author makes against the idolatrous religions, *à propos* of the potter who, playing at making the demiurge, forgets the frailty of his own existence and denies the power of God who gives life by his breath.

[52] Cf. M. Gilbert, *La philanthropie de Dieu* (Rome: PIB 1976) 9.

[53] This line of interpretation is supported by the Vetus Latina which translates ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης with *ex materia invisa*. Cf. Gilbert, *La philanthropie* 9.

[54] Larcher, *Études* 217, comments: "Il suppose seulement, à la base des quatres éléments, un substrat commun, qui doit être la 'matière informe'."

the way is cleared for the idea of a divine operation, exclusive and universal, which cannot be reconciled with the existence of a pre-existent element, and that the idea of creation by means of the word has its necessary complement in the *creatio ex nihilo*; but it is true at the same time that "this theory is not formulated in Gen 1:1f which, by contrast, presents the earthly chaos as the point of departure for the account. Gen 1:1 does not speak of the creation of this chaos."[55] On the other hand, as far as traditionalism and, therefore, immemorial custom are concerned, the situation is just as contradictory: in Judaism there is not always clarity with regard to the idea of creation, to the extent that Winston can assert: "The majority view was probably the doctrine of creation of primordial matter."[56]

So what about the very well known text of 2 Macc 7:28: οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεος καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος οὕτω γίνεται. From the time of Origen on, this has been understood as an unequivocal affirmation of the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, but it retains a measure of ambiguity in its formulation:[57] αὐτὰ could in fact refer to the visible world, to the particular world, while οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων seems to recall, according to the testimony of Aristotle,[58] the Platonic τὸ μὴ ὄν with which matter is indicated. The verse could then intend to say that God has created not from reality that has been already formed but from primordial unformed matter.

In the text of *Bereshit Rabba* 1:9[59] a philosopher states that the God of the Jews is certainly an artist but in the creation was assisted by five materials (חשׁ, תהו ובהו, תהומות, מים, רוח) arousing the reaction of R. Gamaliel who shows that the creation (בריאה) of each of these is recorded in Scripture. This expresses the violent reaction of rabbinism to the Gnostic theories, which attributed a dynamic cosmogonic function to the primordial elements and championed the multiplicity of creative powers.[60]

Certainly other texts of rabbinic Judaism show the rejection of the idea of a pre-existence of matter,[61] but the impression that is gained is

[55] Foerster, "κτίζω," 1266.

[56] Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory," 186.

[57] Cf. J.A. Goldstein, *II Maccabees* (AB 41A, New York: Doubleday 1983), 307-11; Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory," 186-87. Also the *Bible de Jerusalem* points out how some manuscripts and the Syriac read "from things which are not," an expression that in Philo indicates the creation of unformed matter.

[58] Cf. Aristotle, *Physique*, Text established and translated by H. Carteron (Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres" 1961).

[59] *Bereshit Rabba*, edited by A. Ravenna and T. Federici (Turin: UTET 1978).

[60] Cf. Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory," 187-91.

[61] Cf. Foerster, "κτίζω," 1282.

that of a situation of less clarity. This is equally true of Philo[62] in his elaboration of the doctrine of creation.

The position of Reider seems fair: "In Rabbinic Judaism opinion oscillated for some time between accepting and rejecting the notion of primordial matter or elements,"[63] and, therefore, the formulation of the *creatio ex nihilo* could not have belonged to a native Jew, much less to a Jew who found himself confronted with Hellenistic philosophy.

The clear and explicit formulation of *creatio ex nihilo* would appear only in the second century CE when the way would be made for the idea that the doctrine of creation from a primordial element would have served to limit the creative action and, therefore, the divine omnipotence. It was only under the influence of Christianity that it penetrated into the Jewish world.[64]

5. HISTORICAL AND ESCHATOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE: WISDOM AND ESCHATOLOGICAL PROPHECY

Already, by means of internal criteria, Grimm had shown how there could not be any doubts as to the concept of creation from unformed matter in the Book of Wisdom.[65] It constitutes the base for the doctrine of the "metabolism" of the elements to which the author of Wisdom has recourse in explaining the miraculous events of the Exodus. There is, then, an intimate connection and a total coherence between 19:18 and 11:17, between the cosmological argument and the concept of the creation from unformed matter.

The author of Wisdom is the child of a cultural period marked, as has been said, by much eclecticism and, therefore, by the ambiguity that characterises every period in which there is the attempt to synthesise different systems of thought.

But he is in the position of mediator between the religious tradition of the fathers and the categories of Hellenistic thought. This enables him to make a novel contribution.

[62] Cf. note 56. According to a passage of *De opificio mundi*, XXVI, 82, "For it is clear that it is easier without calling in the husbandman's art to supply in abundance the yield of growths already existing than to bring into being things that were non-existent," the creative activity of God could be understood as a *creatio ex nihilo*. But the expression "the things that were non-existent" could also be understood, according to a line of thought that goes back to Plato, as "the things that are not in perfect mode," but nevertheless always have a certain grade of being. Cf. Philo, *On the Account of the World's Creation given by Moses* (eds. F.H. Colson and G.H. Whittaker, LCL 226, Cambridge: HUP 1929) 67.

[63] Reider, *The Book of Wisdom*, 150.

[64] Cf. Winston, "The Book of Wisdom's Theory," 199.

[65] Cf. Grimm, *Das Buch*, 213.

That he does not consider unformed matter as eternal and uncreated puts him outside the metaphysical dualism and immanent pantheism that characterise Stoic philosophy. His concept of creation enables him to present the facts of the Exodus, the events of history, as renewed creation, the newness of which does not imply substitution, still less, annihilation of what has gone before, something which would have signified a negative judgment on it. This is not a new act of creation, therefore, as in the *Heptameron*, but the activity of divine omnipotence, which continues to preserve and put in place what has been created by its salvific plan, recreating it, reharmonising it without being put outside the intrinsic laws of nature, without violating the natural laws.

In the unfolding of his salvific work, *God has no need do a new creation*. An examination of the whole of Chapter 19 confirms in fact that it is a question of a "mutation" of nature, a turning around of its laws, which is made known in the new and extraordinary way in which things appear.[66] Not only is this the meaning of 19:18 but also that of the expression νέα γένεσις of 19:11 in which is emphasized the unexpected, unaccustomed, singular way by which birds come to life.[67] This is the sense of the musical comparison of 19:18: the natural elements remain stable, but their properties change. Their function changes without their nature changing.[68] In fact, the text does not offer any support for thinking that the author would have wished to indicate the return of creation to its condition of primitive harmlessness, because this would have fitted badly with the sufferings that it is inflicting on the Egyptians.[69]

We have here, then, a rearrangement of the harmony of creation, in which the elements become interchangeable, determined by the power of Him who has made the universe with wisdom and maintains control of it. It is clear, moreover, that this reorganisation of the universe is not to be understood in the strict sense as a "new creation."[70] It is a question

[66] Cf. A. Sisti, *Il Libro della Sapienza* (Cittadella: Assisi 1992) 410-11.

[67] Cf. H.G. Liddel and R. Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996). The author of Wisdom reproduces Num 11:31 to the letter: ורוח נסע יהוה ויגז שלוים מן־הים.

[68] Cf. L. Alonso Schökel *et al.*, *Sabiduría* (Madrid: Ediciones Cristiandad 1974) 206.

[69] Cf. Larcher, *Le Livre de la Sagesse*, 1056.

[70] Cf. however, the studies of P. Enns, *Exodus Retold: Ancient Exegesis of the Departure from Egypt in Wis 10:15-21 and 19:1-9* (Atlanta: Scholars Press 1997) 72, and S. Cheon, *The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon. A Study in the Biblical Interpretation* (JSPSup 23, Sheffield: Academic Press 1997) 123, who use the expression "new creation" with regard to Wis 19. I believe that recourse to this expression, which, above all, in the study of Cheon badly accords with the tenor of the conclusions to Chapter 4 of his work (cf. pp. 122-24), is due to the scant importance that both of these scholars attribute to the contacts and connection of Wisdom with Hellenistic philosophy and with the Greek world in general. On this last question, one should

of a recomposition through transmutation of the elements, of a remodelling, of a new harmony of the elements, which witnesses to a precise divine purpose: the physical integrity of the elect, the salvation of the just (19:6c: ἵνα οἱ σοὶ παῖδες φυλαχθῶσιν ἀβλαβεῖς).[71] The cosmos is "transformed and renewed in order to restore justice for the Israelites and to destroy the chaos of the enemies."[72] More precisely, then, it is necessary to speak of "continuous creation."

Also the ending of the book (19:22), with the emphasis placed on the expression κατὰ πάντα and ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ καὶ τόπῳ, concludes a theme in which the unleashing of the forces of nature against the ungodly, announced in 5:17, 20 and confirmed in 16:24 on behalf of the just, is presented as something that has already happened in the past, in the events of the Exodus, and in the end is finally placed in history as it is on-going. On the other hand, to speak of a newness in the strictest sense, something which implies substitution, would mean creating tension with the affirmation of 1:14b, καὶ σωτήριοι αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου, in which the author of Wisdom, recalling Gen 2:4a (אלה תולדות השמים והארץ), refers both to the origins and to their salvific value and also to the generations that ensure the survival of life and, therefore, of the original blessing.[73] For the author of Wisdom, what has been put at the beginning to persevere in being, as a witness to the divine benevolence, is not replaced. It does not lose the structure of its constitutive elements, because what underlies the change remains. Therefore, it is always ready to be remodelled, to serve the bounty (16:25: δωρεᾶ) of the Creator. This remodelling of the cosmos has already taken place in the facts of the Exodus. It is the Exodus read as renewed creation in the light of Genesis, not as a prediction but as a parable. The author does not wish to affirm that in the future the same phenomena will recur; he says only that, as in the past, so in the future, the intervention of God will be cosmic. As in the Exodus, the ἐπισκοπή

consult the different approaches of L. Mazzinghi, "Il libro della Sapienza: elementi culturali," *RStB* 1-2 (1998) 179-97; J.M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark 1996) 181-91; cf. also *Jews in a Graeco-Roman World* (ed. M. Goodman, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998); L.I. Levine, *Judaism and Hellenism in Antiquity. Conflict or Confluence?* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press 1998).

[71] According to Beauchamp, "Le salut," 498, ἀβλαβεῖς indicates the physical integrity of the elect. It is one of the elements that impel him to affirm for the just, after their death, the idea of a holistic salvation, corporal, that is, as well as spiritual. Cf. also *Idem*, "Sagesse de Salomon. De l'argumentation médicale à la resurrection," in *La sagesse biblique de l'Ancien au Nouveau Testament* (ed. J. Trublet, LDiv 160, Paris: Cerf 1995) 174-86.

[72] Collins, "Cosmos and Salvation," 131.

[73] Cf. M.V. Fabbri, *Creazione e salvezza nel libro della Sapienza. Esegesi di Sap 1,13-15* (Rome: Armando 1998) 111-28.

of God will have a miraculous character because it will involve the whole of creation and make use of it. The author puts the emphasis on both the past and the present. As far as the future is concerned, he offers only the framework, which, without any ambiguity, can become the object of hope. The spatial and temporal coordinates of the relationship between the action of the universe on behalf of the just against the ungodly and the renewed creation belong to history, whether the created world punishes the ungodly or looks after the elect or, as in the Exodus from Egypt, renews itself.[74] Moreover, the links between the Exodus and Genesis 1, which the author also does not hesitate to present, as has been said, in terms of νέα γένεσις, reveal that the renewed creation of the continuous divine action is situated and happens at the time of the central events of the history of Israel. It is not located exclusively in the future.[75] Thus the theme of creation becomes a hermeneutical criterion to show how the action of God, although eschatological in its power and significance, is unfolded in history, not outside it or in opposition to it. Therefore, thanks to the gift of Wisdom, the history of salvation, which is guided by it, is already a sign of the victory of the just. In the same way, thanks to Wisdom, the defeat of the just in confrontation with the ungodly is to be judged provisional and superficial.

The eschatological perspective and the historical meet together: the third part of the book, in the light of the second, is a solid reply to the first. The history of the past is a guarantee for the present and the future, for this latter is found in the sands of time, in the pages of the past.

This way of conceiving the connection between the creation and history puts the author of Wisdom in a dialectical situation with regard to the prophetic eschatology in which his apocalyptic opening is situated.

In fact, by contrast with the Book of Wisdom, the prophetic hope is placed solely in the future, and the new creative action of God does not concern the natural world but the historical one. Unquestionably, however, as in Wisdom, the remembrance of the creative action of the past becomes the guarantee that the hope of God's intervention, the expectation of an historical upheaval—which for Isaiah takes on an imminent character (cf. 46:13; 51:5)—will not be disappointed.

Also the texts in which Isaiah juxtaposes the "new things" with the "old things" (42:8-9; 43:18-19; 44:6-8; 46:8-11; 48:3-7) is placed in a context in which the superiority of Yahweh is exalted in comparison with the pagans and their idols, "and this argument is based on

[74] Cf. A. Dell'Omo, "Creazione, storia della salvezza e destino dell'uomo," *RivB* 37 (1989) 319.

[75] Cf. M. Gilbert, "Nouvelle création et expérience historique," in *Idem*, *Il a parlé par les prophètes. Thèmes et figures bibliques* (Bruxelles: Lessius 1998) 229.

history."[76] In effect, the "new things," which do not refer, even allusively, to the initial creation, but are "created" (48:7: עתה נִבראו) by Yahweh, the only Lord of history, are events tied up with the return from the Exile. Now, these events do not have a dimension that is eschatological, properly speaking, because their occurrence is bound up with "this" history.[77] However, in the parallelism that Deutero-Isaiah sets between the new and the old, there is the surpassing of the old, the concrete surpassing of the old Exodus by a "new" Exodus (cf. 43:16-19a). The heart of the profession of faith of Israel must no longer be called to mind.[78] In fact, a period has finally arrived in which a new era has opened which looks qualitatively superior because the salvific act of Yahweh is superior. The prophet announces a breach between the old and new that interrupts all show of continuity. On the other hand, however, the future intervention of Yahweh happens in a manner analogous to the salvific acts already performed, yet without there being an attenuation of the deep fracture between the old and the new.

As in the Book of Wisdom, then, the new salvific act appears as a creation, characterised by newness. It takes place in history, but, by contrast with the perspective of the author of Wisdom, the past, the historical past, is not a paradigm, a parable of the future, rather it is surpassed, forgotten. With the removal of the basis of salvation from past tradition to the future intervention of Yahweh, we are at the threshold of the doctrine, typical of apocalyptic eschatology,[79] of the epochs of the world. Traces of this begin to appear in Trito-Isaiah.[80]

In Isa 65:17 and 66:22, the expression שמים חדשים וארץ חדשה is set in the context of an oracle of salvation (caphters 65-66, pronounced by the Lord in response to a long intercession [63:7-64:11]). This highlights the contrast between the marvellous situation of the Exodus and the destruction of the Temple and also unites the confession of sins with the request for salvation.

[76] *Ibid*., 221.

[77] Cf. *ibid*., 222. For the opposite opinion, cf. G. Fohrer, "Die Struktur der alttestamentlichen Eschatologie," *ThLZ* 85 (1960) 401-20; D.H. Odenhall, *The Eschatological Expectations of Is 40-66 with Special Reference to Israel and Nations* (New York: Westminster Theological Seminary 1970).

[78] G. von Rad, *Teologia dell'Antico Testamento* (Brescia: Paideia 1972) 2: 290.

[79] I shall adopt the terminology of P.D. Hanson, *The Dawn of Apocalyptic* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1983), who distinguishes among apocalypses, eschatological apocalyptic and apocalyptic. For a brief but up to date *status quaestionis* on the terminology, cf. the Introduction to the Italian edition of the work of D.S. Russel, *L'apocalittica giudaica (200 a.C. – 100 d.C.)* (Brescia: Paideia 1991). It would also be useful to consult P. Sacchi, *L'apocalittica giudaica e la sua storia* (Brescia: Paideia 1990) 9-26.

[80] Cf. P. Harner, "Creation Faith in Deutero-Isaiah" *VT* 17 (1967) 303-04.

Trito-Isaiah grasps salvation as a total and radical change of the existing state of affairs in a renewal so pronounced that the contrast with the preceding situation will be very evident. The "new heavens and new earth" are not solely the simple re-enacting or restoration of a previous situation but indicate a substitution as a conclusive act of judgment. They are the positive result of a terrible and definitive judgement: Yahweh not only purifies human history but also creates new heavens and a new earth.

On the other hand, for Trito-Isaiah too, this new creation is not a beginning like the origins. Its characterisation indicates, moreover, that it has its plane of reality in history—in this world, not in another one. "At bottom, it is incarnated in real history."[81] The proclamation of this absolutely new order remains anchored to the horizon of the promise. In effect, the use of the participle בורא in 65:17 makes one think of an action which is beginning to be. However, its fulfilment, referred to the future, as the ensuing *yiqtol*'s testify, is not situated outside history. In fact, if 66:22 is read in connection with 65:17, the "new creation" described in 65:17 will be realised with the gathering of the גוים, of the nations.

There is, then, a line of continuity between Deutero- and Trito-Isaiah as far as their rooting of the divine plan in history is concerned. In Trito-Isaiah, however, it is undeniable that there is an emphasizing of the viewpoint of the surpassing of the past and of the existent, which opens the way to the doctrine of epochs of the world, of dualism in history and creation, which is typical of apocalyptic.[82] In apocalyptic, indeed, history and creation are marked with a radical dualism: new heavens and new earth are the symbols of the denigration of the old order of the cosmos and the emergence of the new. At the root of this perspective, there is an "ontological equation:"[83] the past and the present are the sphere of evil, the future that of good. The former are marked with the character of corruption, which also permeates the sphere of nature, so that the evil of history also takes on a cosmic force. Apocalyptic will, therefore, express complete disillusionment with the realizing of an ideal of salvation in the present world. Only a dramatic and imminent act of God will remove the evil that marks history and the cosmos. Fulfilment lies in the divine intervention that will destroy the old order of things.

In apocalyptic, the prophetic hope, which remains anchored in history, is dissolved in a future, which, although near, remains vague

[81] M. Gilbert, "Nouvelle création et expérience historique," 225.

[82] Cf. Hanson, *The Dawn of Apocalyptic*, 134-161; *Visionaries and their Apocalypses* (ed. P.D. Hanson, Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1983) 49. Gilbert, "Nouvelle création et expérience historique," 227, is of a different opinion: "Ce projet du Seigneur qu'il s'apprête à mettre en œuvre n'a plus ici aucune note apocalyptique."

[83] Hanson, *The Dawn of Apocalyptic*, 158.

and indefinite, in an eschatology that no longer makes reference to the real events of the history of Israel.

6. CONCLUSION

In the construction and thematic development of the Book of Wisdom, the theme of creation renewed is "evidently" one of the most important. Understood as the background and key to the reading of history, it brings the perspective of the author of Wisdom nearer to the ancient prophetic tradition than to the apocalyptic one.

The author of Wisdom remains, in fact, anchored in history. In it he locates the sphere of the salvific activity of God and presents it as a parable of the continuous "visitation" of God on behalf of his people. It is a visitation that will be renewed in the future, but always in line with the whole of the *historia salutis* and with the events that constitute it. It is not a past to be forgotten; it is not a breach to be signalled between past and future, because the whole of the history of salvation is a continuous creation, a work of the divine omnipotence. So then only the consideration of things that have happened will open up a hope that does not fade. The conclusion of the book, with the sequence of verbs in the past (ἐμεγάλυνας; ἐδόξασας; ὑπερεῖδες: 19:22) shows clearly how the hoped for salvation is already there in past events.

The paradoxical way in which salvation will be manifested does not signify a denial of the past, because the intervention of God on behalf of his people has taken on marks that are paradoxical, marvellous, miraculous, without this signifying the emergence of new elements constitutive of the cosmos.

Undoubtedly Wis 19 concludes with a situation of judgment. However, that imminent characterization, which does not leave room for mercy, is completely absent,[84] because history, by contrast with what is understood in apocalyptic, is not the sphere of evil but the sphere in which God can exercise a judgment of salvation even though engaging hostile ways of life.

Moreover, in the perspective of the author of Wisdom there is no dualism in creation. In this, the eschatology of Wisdom is of a different order from that of Trito-Isaiah who opens the gates to dualism and the

[84] Cf. M. Gilbert, "Les raisons de la modération divine (Sg 11,21-12,2)," in *Mélanges bibliques et orientaux en l'honneur de M. Henri Cazelles* (eds. A. Caquot and M. Delcor, AOAT 212, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener 1981) 149-62. S. Manfredi, "A proposito di misericordia: è ipotizzabile un rapporto tra Sapienza e i profeti?," in *Treasures of Wisdom. Studies in Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom* (eds. N. Calduch Benages and J. Vermeylen, BETL 143, Leuven: Peeters 1999) 265-77.

division of history, thus becoming the bed in which apocalyptic will be rooted and developed.[85]

It is impossible to deny the correspondences between Wisdom and some apocalypses.[86] Within these correspondences, however, there remain very marked elements of differentiation, as our analysis of the theme of "creation renewed" shows.[87] Indeed, salvation, as Wis 19 testifies, does not require annihilation aimed at a new order because

[85] On prophetic eschatology as possibly the decisive factor in the birth of apocalyptic, cf. O. Plöger, *Theocracy and Eschatology* (Richmond: John Knox Press 1968); P.D. Hanson, "Jewish Apocalyptic Against its Near Eastern Environment," *RB* 78 (1971) 31-58; *Idem*, "Old Testament Apocalyptic Re-examined," *Interp* 25 (1971) 454-79; S.L. Cook, *Prophecy and Apocalypticism: The Postexilic Social Setting* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press 1995) 123-65. Also J.J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination. An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature* (2nd ed., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1998) 25, although welcoming the methodological suggestions of P. Sacchi, *L'apocalittica giudaica e la sua storia* ("However, if we wish to examine the matrix in which the configuration of the genre emerged, we must surely begin with the earliest actual apocalypses, rather than with their partial antecedents") holds that "Postexilic prophecy undoubtedly supplied some of the codes and raw materials utilized by the later apocalypses." Disputed and hardly viable is the thesis that apocalyptic is rooted "exclusively" in the sapiential tradition, and that this latter constitutes the "sole" source which can be taken into consideration. Cf. von Rad, *Teologia dell'Antico Testamento*, 319. On the difficulties raised by von Rad's thesis, Carmignac's reflections retain their relevance. Cf. J. Carmignac, "Description du phénomène de l'Apocalyptique," in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Apocalypticism, Uppsala, August 12-17, 1979* (ed. D. Hellholm, 2nd ed., Tübingen: Mohr 1989), 161-70, especially p. 166 ("[...] malgré G. von Rad, on maintiendra une nette distinction entre l'Apocalyptique et la littérature sapientielle"); M. Knibb, "Apocalyptic and Wisdom in 4 Ezra," *JSJ* 13 (1982) 56-74; K. Koch, *Difficoltà dell'apocalittica* (Brescia: Paideia 1977) 51-58; Collins, "Cosmos and Salvation," 138-42.

[86] Cf. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination*, 20-21, who emphasises the fact that the discussion on the origin of apocalyptic ("genetic approach") and, in this context, the position of von Rad, has served, in an indirect manner, to determine "the character of the phenomenon," that is to say, to pick out from the apocalypses characteristic elements that are found in the sapiential tradition. From this point of view, "it is significant that the biblical wisdom book that shows most correspondence with the apocalypses is the Hellenistic (deuterocanonical) Wisdom of Salomon." Cf. also by the same author, *Seers, Sybil, and Sages in Hellenistic-Roman Judaism* (JSJSup 54, Leiden: Brill 1997) 317-38.

[87] It seems problematic to me to define Wisdom as a book which is "apocalyptique tout court." Thus M. Nobile, "La thématique eschatologique dans le livre de la Sagesse en relation avec l'apocalyptique," in *Treasures of Wisdom*, 312. In fact, the author's argument seems to me to absolutize some elements of likeness, which still need deeper study, and to disregard elements of difference which are of no less significance.

creation, being the sphere of operation of Wisdom is not in a state of lawlessness,[88] as it is for apocalyptic.

To return to the analogy of 19:18, God does not need a new musical system; it is sufficient that, although sounding the same notes, he changes the rhythm in order to have a new harmony.

When, in hope, God's future, the eschatological future is invoked, it is not necessary to deny the past or to divide history into periods on which to exercise a judgment. In fact, salvation already lies in the layers of the past, because all of history led by God, rooted in the creative act and understood as creation renewed, is already the history of salvation.

[88] With regard to the elements of difference, cf. J.J. Collins, "Cosmos and Salvation" 138–41. To summarize: "Wisdom and Apocalyptic most obviously differ in their modes of presentation: Wisdom found salvation within the processes of nature and affirmed the principle of order in old creation, while Apocalyptic rejected the present world order" (141-42).

PHILOSOPHISCHE LEHRE UND DEREN WIRKUNG AUS DER SICHT EINES WEISHEITSLEHRERS. UNTERSUCHUNG VON WEISH 1:1-15

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Die nachfolgende Untersuchung beschäftigt sich der Intention von Weish 1:1-15. Neben grundsätzlichen Fragen werden die literarische Gestalt und die Stilmittel usw. analysiert (1-4). Dann folgt die Detailanalyse (5) bevor eine Zusammenfassung (6) die Untersuchung abschließt.

1. Die Rolle des ersten Abschnittes des Weisheitsbuches

Ein Abschnitt am Anfang eines Werkes bietet nicht eo ipso eine grundlegende Einführung in das Gesamtwerk. Welche Funktion eine Einheit innerhalb des literarischen Kontextes besitzt, zeigt erst die Analyse, wie das Zusammenspiel der Einzelteile mit dem gesamten Werk zu beschreiben ist. Um diese zu erheben, bedarf es einer aufmerksamen Beobachtung der Struktur und der Stilmittel.

Im Buch der Weisheit scheint die Fragestellung schon entschieden. „Im Proömium (Kap. 1) klingen wie in einer Overtüre schon manche Themen des Buches an“[1] liest man über den Beginn des Weisheitsbuches. Wenn dies zutrifft, ist die Analyse des Proömiums ein fruchtbarer Weg, um einen erhellenden Schlüssel für das Verständnis des Buches in die Hand zu bekommen. Es gibt mehrere Vorschläge, was das Ziel des Prologes ist. Er gilt u.a. als bedeutsam, weil er Dimensionen des grundlegend verkehrten Lebens aufdeckt[2] und sich mit dem Gericht über die Frevler[3] beschäftigt. Einen bildungspolitischen Akzent streicht

[1] S. Schroer, „Das Buch der Weisheit,“ in *Einleitung in das Alte Testament* (ed. E. Zenger, 7. Aufl., Kohlhammer Studienbücher Theologie 1/1, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 2008) 396-407, 398; vgl. A. Schmitt, *Das Buch der Weisheit. Ein Kommentar* (Würzburg: Echter 1986) 36: „Dieses Textstück eröffnet das Buch der Weisheit (introduktorische Funktion — Proömium)“.

[2] Vgl. die Grundtendenz der Auslegung von H. Hübner, *Die Weisheit Salomons. Liber Sapientiae Salomonis* (ATDAp 4, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1999) 32f.

[3] Vgl. so A. Schmitt, *Weisheit* (NEB.AT 23, Würzburg: Echter 1989) 19.

Engel hervor und „die programmatische Breite der Ausführungen über die Macht und die Konsequenzen von Gedanken und Worten (seien) in der Erziehungsliteratur verständlich."[4]

Es stellt sich die Frage, ob es um schulmäßige und abstrakte Diskussionen in einem „Gelehrtenzirkel" geht oder ob hinter den Überlegungen handfeste gesellschaftliche Auseinandersetzungen stehen? Welche Kriterien sind anzugeben, um die Absicht des „verdichteten" Abschnittes zu finden? Wir gehen den Weg der poetisch-literarischen Analyse und möchten sehr genau das Bezugsgeflecht im untersuchten Abschnitt eruieren. Die Beschreibung der Intention soll aus dem Text erhoben und die Argumente innerhalb des Textes *ent-deckt* werden, das meint, insofern aufgedeckt werden, als sie ohnedies in poetischer Verpackung schon vorliegen, aber nicht sogleich greifbar sind. Dass einem heutigen Leser die Anspielungen nicht in gleicher Weise wie damals auffallen, ist auf die zeitliche Distanz zurückzuführen. Weder sind uns die damalige gesellschaftliche Stimmungslage noch des Verfassers Verwurzelung in der griechischen oder der alttestamentlich-hebräischen Welt anders zugänglich als durch die Analyse des vorliegenden Textes.

Zu berücksichtigen ist vor allem der hellenistische Kontext:[5] Damalige Sprecher und Hörer[6] haben die griechische Sprache von Kindesbeinen an gelernt. Der Autor des Weisheitsbuches war wie damals viele[7] (in unterschiedlichen Philosophenschulen) ausgebildet worden. Da just „Rede" thematisiert wird, ist davon auszugehen, dass jedes verwendete Wort, wie jede Wortverbindung und wahrscheinlich auch die Abfolge der Argumentation mit Bedacht formuliert worden sind. Die poetische Präsentation ist also eine Interpretationshilfe.

[4] H. Engel, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (NSK.AT 16, Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk 1998) 46.

[5] Vgl. zum zeitlichen Hintergrund und zur Gestalt des Autors M. Kolarcik, „The Sage Behind the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Sages, Scribes, and Seers. The Sage in the Mediterranean World* (ed. L.G. Perdue, FRLANT 219, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2008) 245-57.

[6] Vgl. G. Bellia, „Historical and Anthropological Reading of Book of Wisdom," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research. Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology* (eds. A. Passaro and G. Bellia, DCLY 2005, Berlin: de Gruyter 2005) 83-115.

[7] Vgl. L. Heinemann, „Die griechische Quelle der 'Weisheit Salomos'," in *Poseidonios' Metaphysische Schriften I* (Breslau 1921, repr. Hildesheim: Ohlms 1968) 136-53; H. Hübner, „Die Sapientia Salomonis und die antike Philosophie," in *Die Weisheit Salomos im Horizont Biblischer Theologie* (ed. H. Hübner, BThSt 22, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag 1993) 55-81; M. Kepper, *Hellenistische Bildung im Buch der Weisheit* (BZAW 280, Berlin: de Gruyter 1999).

2. DIE LITERARISCHE EINHEIT

Als Kriterium für die Fixierung der literarischen Einheit gibt die größere Anzahl der Exegeten das Stichwort δικαιοσύνη einerseits von 1:1a und andererseits von 1:15 an.[8] Nach einer Minorität bilden 1:1-11 eine Einheit. Die Verse 12-15 sind dann als eine weitere Perikope zu qualifizieren,[9] welche auf den folgenden Abschnitt hingeordnet ist. Hübner, der sich für 1:1-11 als Einheit entscheidet, formuliert seine Unentschlossenheit in der Abgrenzung. Wird 1:11

> als Einheit und 12 als Beginn eines neuen Abschnittes, nämlich des zweiten Teil des Proömiums, gesehen, so ist das ein Ermessensurteil. Denn die Imperative von 11 könnte man schon als Beginn der zweiten Einzeit sehen, die dann, parallel zur ersten, mit Aufforderungen begänne.[10]

Danach bietet sich als weitere Möglichkeit 1:1-10 als Einheit an. Als Formalkriterium werden Sätze angegeben, in denen Imperative stehen.

Die Verwendung von Imperativen ist zwar ein Signal, das Aufmerksamkeit erregt, aber sie genügt nicht ohne weitere differenzierende Untersuchungen und formale wie inhaltliche Argumente für eine Entscheidung. Nach einer detaillierten Überprüfung der Argumente und der Untersuchung der inneren Querbezüge[11] kann man zumindest hypothetisch davon auszugehen, dass die Verse 1:1-15 eine literarische Einheit bilden. Begründende Argumente dafür werden im Folgenden vorgestellt.

3. DIE POETISCHE STRUKTUR DES GESAMTEN BUCHES

Während es nicht an Äußerungen fehlt, das Buch der Weisheit bestehe aus einer wirren Ansammlung unverbundener Abschnitte, belegen andere Analysen das Gegenteil. Um die inneren Querverbindungen zu

[8] Vgl. unter anderem Engel, *Buch*, 46; Engel verweist zusätzlich auf „Erde" in 1:1a und 1:14d; vgl. zur Sache F.V. Reiterer, „Theologie im Proömium des Weisheitsbuches? Die poetische Struktur und Gestaltung als Mittel der Verkündigung in Weish 1,1-15," in *Schätze der Schrift, FS. H. Fuhs* (ed. A. Moenikes, Paderborner Theologische Studien 47, Paderborn: 2007) 43-68, 46f.50.

[9] Vgl. unter anderem W. Werner, „'Denn Gerechtigkeit ist unsterblich.' Schöpfung, Tod und Unvergänglichkeit nach Weish 1,11-15 und 2,21-24," in *Lehrerin der Gerechtigkeit. Studien zum Buch der Weisheit* (eds. G. Hentschel and E. Zenger, EThS 19, Leipzig: Benno 1991) 26-61, 30-32.

[10] Hübner, *Weisheit*, 30.

[11] Vgl. Reiterer, „Theologie," 53-60.

belegen, sind Wortzählungen etc. vorgenommen worden. Das Ergebnis bestätigt jene, die das Buch für gehobene Literatur halten.[12]

3.1. *Poetische Gestaltung als Leitfaden der Auslegung*

Die eigene Untersuchung bestätigt die poetische Gestaltung als ein Mittel, um die *Intention* des Autors in vollendeter Form zu präsentieren. Mit verschiedenen Stilmitteln wird der Inhalt geformt und so auch die Spur für die Auslegung angedeutet. Daher ist es geraten, diesen Markierungspunkten zu folgen.

3.2. *Allgemeine Beobachtungen zur Funktion der Poesie:*

Die konkret gewählten Mittel für die kunstvolle Gestaltung sind trotz der typischen und „zeitlosen" Stilfiguren einerseits in gewisser Weise zeitbedingt, weisen daher auf das Milieu der Entstehung und andererseits auf die Zuhörer hin. In der griechischen Philosophie spielt die Poetik eine besonders wichtige Rolle. In allen großen Philosophenschulen wurden Rhetorikbücher[13] geschrieben. In der akademischen Ausbildung wurde damals methodisch untersucht, was man mit der Rhetorik und der Gestaltung eines Textes erreichen kann. Je nach Ziel und Zweck der Philosophenschulen und Intention, die ein Redner anvisiert, werden auch unterschiedliche Regeln formuliert und gelehrt.

Der Autor des Buches der Weisheit kennt offensichtlich die argumentativen wie stilistischen Regeln der verschiedenen Schulen. Er entwickelt eine durchaus eigenständige Art der Dichtung, wobei er viele Anleihen aus der damaligen griechischen Technik der Dichtung übernimmt[14]. Er bedient sich jedoch nicht ohne Überlegung. Die individuelle Art des Schreibens des weisheitlichen Autors hängt damit zusammen, dass er neben der griechischen Bildung fest in seiner eigenen

[12] Vgl. Schmitt, *Buch*, 9: „Hinsichtlich des Sprachidioms begegnet man einem eleganten Griechisch, das auf Ursprünglichkeit (Verfassergriechisch) schließen lässt. ... Gesamtzahl der Vokabeln 6952 — verschiedene Vokabeln 1734, von denen nicht weniger als 1303 nur einmal vorkommen".

[13] Vgl. A. Weische, "Rhetorik," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 8* (eds. J. Ritter and K. Gründer, Darmastadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1992) 1014-25, 1018f.

[14] Vgl. allgemein D. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 43, New York: Doubleday 1979) 16-20; D. Georgi, *Weisheit Salomos* (JSHRZ III/4, Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn 1980) passim; Engel, *Buch*, 120-23; zum Enkomion in Form hellenistischer Rhetoriker mit Beispielsreihen, ebd. 167f; zur „Gattung der Protreptik" vgl. M.V. Blischke, *Die Eschatologie in der Sapientia Salomonis* (FAT II/26, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007) 43.

alttestamentlichen Tradition[15] verwurzelt ist. Er benutzt vor allem verschiedene Formen des Parallelismus, die schon als Hebraismus[16] bezeichnet worden sind.

3.3. *Wortbedeutungen — neue Akzentsetzungen*

Die Eigenart, wie sich der Schreiber ausdrückt,[17] wird in der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion vor allem im Vergleich mit anderen literarischen Bereichen, sei es das „Alte Testament," sei es die „griechische Literatur" beschrieben und es ist gewiss, das jede dieser Traditionen ihren Einfluss ausübt. Doch darüber hinaus sollen jetzt bisher kaum diskutierte, bedeutsame Erscheinungen herausgestrichen werden, nämlich der Umgang und die Variationen mit den Wortbedeutungen. Der Autor wechselt immer wieder und mit Absicht zwischen verschieden Bedeutungen eines Wortes. Das Faktum, dass es mit den Bedeutungen etwas auf sich hat, ist Forschern, die sich sehr eingehend mit dem Text selbst beschäftigten, wohl intuitiv bewusst, leider nicht thematisch und systematisch hinterfragt worden. Es wurde schon festgehalten, dass „'Gerechtigkeit' und 'Frömmigkeit' … wie 'Macht,' 'Weisheit,' 'heiliger Geist,' 'Geist des Herrn' synonym gebraucht" sind, was voraussetzt, dass ungewöhnliche Schwerpunktsetzungen in den Wortbedeutungen vorliegen müssten.[18] Wenngleich die Gleichsetzung zu weit geht, wie am Beispiel „Geist" gezeigt werden wird,[19] werden zurecht Besonderheiten registriert, die am zitierten Wort „Macht / δύναμις" näher beleuchtet werden sollen.

Im Weisheitsbuch trifft man 12 Mal auf δύναμις. Im „klassischen" Griechischen[20] und in der LXX formuliert δύναμις — etwas vereinfachend und schematisierend dargestellt — die „politische und militärische Macht, den gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Einfluss." In „profanen" Kontexten unterscheidet sich der weisheitliche Autor nicht vom allgemeinen Wortgebrauch. Dem steht nun die theologische Dimension gegenüber. Die Hälfte der Belege steht in engem Kontext mit Gott, sodass sich schon von dieser Zuordnung her andeutet, dass δύναμις

[15] Vgl. U. Schwenk-Bressler, *Sapientia Salomonis als ein Beispiel frühjüdischer Textauslegung* (BEATAJ 32, Frankfurt: Lang 1993).

[16] Vgl. Winston, *Wisdom* 15, mit Beispielen in Fußnote 2.

[17] Diese Frage beschäftigt die Exegeten schon lange; vgl. E. Gärtner, *Komposition und Wortwahl des Buches der Weisheit* (Berlin: Mayer & Müller 1912).

[18] Schmitt, *Weisheit* 19.

[19] Eigenartiger Weise berücksichtigt der so sensibel die Worte und Kontruktionen beobachtende Forscher das zwischen „heiliger Geist"(1:5a) und „Geist des Herrn" (1:7a) stehende „menschenfreundlicher Geist / φιλάνθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα" (1:6a) nicht.

[20] Vgl. G. Gemoll *et al., Griechisch-Deutsches Schul- und Handwörterbuch* (München and Wien: Freytag 1954) 228.

auch als theologischer terminus technicus fungiert. In vier Belegen (Weish 7:25; 11:20; 12:15.17) wird mit δύναμις nur die Gott eigene, in der Schöpfung und in der Geschichte wirksame Kraft[21] zur Sprache gebracht bzw. auf Gott selbst bezogen. Δύναμις wird so ein „anderes" Wort für Gott, da das Epitheton zum Realdeiktykon wird, also Gott selbst meint:[22] das Substantiv ist demnach zum schöpfungs- und geschichtstheologischen Fachausdruck geworden. Die göttliche Kraft spiegelt sich auch in den Geschöpfen und diese legen Zeugnis für sie ab (13:4). Der Autor gebraucht das Wort in einem teilweise neu geprägten Sinne und, verglichen mit dem traditionellen Usus, bewusst mehrdeutig.[23] Mit „Gerechtigkeit" und vor allem „Frömmigkeit" kann man diese Wortverwendung, wie oben von Schmitt angenommen, nicht gleich setzen.

Diese Eigenart des Autors kann durch das ganze Buch hindurch belegt werden: mehr oder weniger alle ihm wichtigen Worte begegnen in „mehrdeutigem" Gebrauch. Der Ansatz für diese Entfaltung ist in der hebräischen Sprache zu suchen. Bekannt ist, dass vor allem die hebräischen *Substantiva* im Regelfall ein breiteres Bedeutungsspektrum besitzen, als dies in indogermanischen Sprachen der Fall ist.

In der späten Weisheitsliteratur findet sich eine variantenreiche Breite bei der gezielt mehrdeutigen Verwendung von Worten bzw. auch Phrasen. Der Verfasser des Buches Ben Sira,[24] dessen Enkel — ist der Übersetzer ins Griechische — und der Autor des Buches der Weisheit setzen die Bedeutungsbreiten und die dadurch mögliche Mehrdeutigkeiten im weit über das früher beobachtbare Maß hinausgehend ein. Zudem entwickeln sie einen neuen Typ, indem sie geradezu spielerisch und beabsichtigt mehrere Verständnismöglichkeiten anklingen lassen oder das gleiche Wort in unterschiedlichen Bedeutungsschwerpunkten gebrauchen: verfehlt erscheint es, wenn man als heutiger Interpret nur *eine* Bedeutung in Betracht zieht. Geschieht dies, ergeben sich allenthalben Spannungen zu andern Belegen innerhalb des Werkes, die sogar den Eindruck hinterlassen, die Autoren

[21] Vgl. 7:25: τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως (der Kraft Gottes); 11:20: ὑπὸ πνεύματος δυνάμεώς σου (vom Hauch deiner [= Gottes] Kraft); 12:15 τῆς σῆς δυνάμεως (mit deiner Kraft) und 12:17 ἐπὶ δυνάμεως τελειότητι (die umfassende Macht).

[22] Diese Funktion von δύναμις ist der hellenistischen Welt keineswegs fremd, gehört doch δύναμις zu den bevorzugten Elementen, denen Enkomia gewidmet werden; vgl. Engel, „Wem nimmt unrechtes Denken," 87. Eine Gleichsetzung ist schon deswegen ausgeschlossen, weil der hellenistische Polytheismus einerseits und die biblische Schöpfungsvorstellung andererseits einen großen Unterschied darstellen.

[23] Ein schönes Beispiel für Mehrdeutigkeit findet sich auch in Weish 8:7 für δικαιοσύνη, allerdings als Gegenüberstellung der traditionell alttestamentlichen und stoischen Verwendungsbereiche; vgl. Engel, *Buch*, 142f.

[24] Vgl. F.V. Reiterer, „Jesus Sirach / Jesus Sirachbuch / Ben Sira / Ecclesiasticus," in WILAT, Stuttgart 2006, http://www.wilat.de.

argumentierten sprunghaft und die Argumente seien widersprüchlich. Die oben notierten Beobachtungen zeigen, dass auch der übliche Methodenraster[25] in einigen Punkten adaptiert werden muss.

4. DIE STRUKTUR VON 1:1-15

Das eben angeführte Problem der Methodik kann gleich bei der Behandlung der Struktur[26] von 1:1-15 weiterverfolgt werden. Auf den ersten Blick erkennt man in 1:1-15 keine systematische Ordnung, wohl aber fällt das Wort δικαιοσύνη auf (1:1a.15).

Engel sieht in 1:1-6:1 eine Ringkomposition, die von den *Mahnungen* in 1:1-15 (A) und 6:1-21 (A′) gerahmt wird, die Reden in 2:1-24 und 5:1-23 (B : B′) umgeben die Gegenüberstellung von 3:1-4:20. „Jeweils am Schluß eines Abschnitts (1:11-15; 2:21-24; 4:20; 5:23) werden die Themen angekündigt, die der folgende Abschnitt behandelt."[27] Damit ist die Frage, ob nicht mit 1:11 eine weitere Einheit beginnt, so beantwortet, dass zwar die poetische Einheit in 1:15 endet, inhaltlich jedoch ab 1:11 schon der folgende Teil in den Blick genommen wird. Diese Position gilt es zu überprüfen.

Wer den ganzen Text von 1:1-15 liest, registriert verhältnismäßig häufige Imperative, ähnliche Gedanken, die paarweise — zumeist nicht nach strengem Ordnungsmuster von gleichen Hebungen[28] — auf den ersten Blick hin locker aufeinander hingeordnet sind. Es finden sich Assonanzen. Weiters trifft man — ausgenommen in der ersten Strophe — auffällig häufig auf das Wortfeld „*Rede*."

4.1. *Die rahmenden Elemente in ihrem Kontext*

Im Folgenden wird der Text geradezu kleinlich beschrieben, um eine möglichst klar definierbare Textbasis für die nachfolgenden Untersuchungen zu haben. In der Literatur wird durchwegs das Stichwort δικαιοσύνη in 1:1a und 1:15 registriert. Der gewichtige Ausdruck wird als stabiles Kriterium für die Abgrenzung nach vorne und hinten angesehen

[25] Vgl. einige einschlägige Hinweise bei F.V. Reiterer, „Gott und Opfer," in *Ben Sira's God. Proceedings of the International Ben Sira Conference Durham — Ushaw College 2001* (ed. R. Egger-Wenzel, BZAW 321, Berlin: de Gruyter 2002) 136-79, 137f.

[26] Vgl. J.M. Reese, „Plan and Structure in the Book of Wisdom," *CBQ* 27 (1965) 391-99; F. Perrenchio, „Struttura e analisi letteraria di Sapienza 1,1-15, nel quadro des suo contesto letterario immediato," *Sal* 37 (1975) 289-325.

[27] Engel, *Buch*, 46.

[28] Diese Beobachtung weist darauf hin, dass die paarweise Gestaltung neben der hebräisch-poetischen Eigenart der Parallelsetzung vor allem auf die griechischen Regeln für die Rhetorik zurückgehen; vgl. Weische, „Rhetorik," 1015: „möglichst parallel gebaute Satzglieder und kurze Sätze."

und für die Auslegung bedeutsam gehalten. Es ergeben sich also zwei Aspekte: wie steht es mit dem Anfang (a) und wie mit dem Ende (b) der Einheit.

(a) Die Verse 1:1a und 1:1b beginnen jeweils mit einem Imperativ (ἀγαπήσατε / φρονήσατε). Das erscheint vielen als Hinweis auf gewollte Parallelisierung. Es erhebt sich die Frage, ob damit alle entscheidenden Elemente registriert und richtig beurteilt worden sind. Wir wenden uns daher der Frage zu, wie flüssig und stilistisch überzeugend die Kola 1:1a und 1:1b untereinander und mit dem nachfolgenden Kontext inhaltlich verknüpft werden:

1a ἀγαπήσατε δικαιοσύνην οἱ κρίνοντες τὴν γῆν ◎
1b (a) φρονήσατε (b) περὶ τοῦ κυρίου (c) ἐν ἀγαθότητι
1c καὶ (c′) ἐν ἁπλότητι καρδίας (a′) ζητήσατε (b′) αὐτόν

Folgende Gesichtspunkte sind zu bedenken:

(1) Die Kola 1b // 1c bilden einen klassischen Parallelismus. Alle Elemente entsprechen sich inhaltlich und formal: a - a′, b - b′ wie c - c′. Innerhalb der chiastisch angeordneten Kola gibt es weitere Gestaltungselemente (die Folge: a : b : c – c′ : a′ : b′), wie sie in wohlgeformter hebräischer Poesie vorkommen.
(2) „Gerechtigkeit" in 1:1a erscheint als ein Wert für Personen, die mit κρίνοντες bezeichnet werden, also entweder eine Tätigkeit als Regent oder als Richter ausüben: es handelt sich um typisch menschliche Tätigkeiten. Klar wird nicht, ob die „Gerechtigkeit" als eine persönliche Eigenschaft des Regenten/Richters oder als eine Qualität der Tätigkeit anzusehen ist. Inhaltlich fällt auf, dass sich die Fortführung von 1:1a („Denkt nach über den Herrn in Gutheit") nicht flüssig ergibt.
(3) Warum soll die „Gerechtigkeit" dazu anregen, in Güte über Gott nachzusinnen? 1b und 1c stehen in Parallele, wodurch 1a isoliert erscheint. Der Übergang von 1a zu 1b.c ergibt sich nicht eo ipso.

(b) Nun wenden wir uns dem Abschluss der Einheit zu:

(1) Zwischen 1:15, wo das Signalwort δικαιοσύνη steht, und dem vorangehenden Kontext bis 1:14b gibt es keinen flüssigen Zusammenhang. Es steht, Gott habe den Tod nicht geschaffen (1:13), die Schöpfung führe zum Guten und der Hades habe nach Gottes Schöpfungsordnung keinen Herrschaftsbereich auf der Erde (1:14).

Wie sind die Aussagen mit (1:15: „Die ‚Gerechtigkeit' ist nämlich unsterblich[29]") zu verbinden?

(2) Weitere Probleme ergeben sich, wenn man 1:1a und 1:15 aufeinander bezieht: ἀγαπήσατε δικαιοσύνην οἱ κρίνοντες τὴν γῆν (1:1a) ↔ δικαιοσύνη γὰρ ἀθάνατός ἐστιν (1:15). Dass die Richter deshalb die δικαιοσύνη lieben sollten, weil (γὰρ) sie unsterblich ist, ist kein leicht nachvollziehbarer Rückschluss? Der Gedankensprung ist unübersehbar.

(3) Wegen der bisher beobachtbaren Probleme spreche ich bei 1:1a und 1:15 *nicht* von einer Inklusion, sondern von einem Rahmungselement. Die Übereinstimmung besteht nur in einem einzigen wichtigen Schlüsselbegriff. „Gerechtigkeit" / δικαιοσύνη ist mehrdeutig.[30]

(4) Die bisherigen Beobachtungen könnten darauf hinweisen, dass die rahmenden Elemente erst nach dem dazwischen liegenden Mittelstück formuliert wurden. Das Thema „Gerechtigkeit" war für damalige Hörer im sozialen und politischen Bereich wichtig, vor allem spielt es auch in der sich entwickelnden messianischen Erwartung eine hervorragende Rolle:[31] Wer oder was bringt einen Ausweg aus den allgegenwärtigen Schwierigkeiten und den Machtmissbräuchen? Die Suche nach einer Antwort war zentral.

4.2. *Die Verwendung von ὅτι als Text strukturierendes Signal*

Da nun geklärt scheint, dass für die vorliegende Untersuchung *vorerst* 1:1a und 1:15 nicht weiter zu berücksichtigen sind, konzentrieren wir uns auf die poetische Gestaltung von 1:1b-14d. Das erste auffällige Element sind der Gebrauch und die Position von ὅτι.[32]

(a) Wenn man das erste Vorkommen von ὅτι in 1:2a als Ausgang zur Bestimmung der Funktion nimmt, zeigt sich, dass vor dem ὅτι-Satz zwei im Parallelismus verbundene Sätze stehen (1:1b und 1:1c) und das Objekt κύριος von 1b in Form des Pronomens αὐτός in 1:1c.2a.2b weitergeführt wird. Demnach wird ὅτι von vorangehenden und nachfolgenden Sätzen umrahmt, wobei die nachfolgenden bei- und

[29] Vgl. A. Dupont-Sommer, „De l'immortalité astrale dans la Sagesse de Salomon," *REG* 62 (1949) 80-87; P. Grelot, *De la mort à la vie éternelle. Études de théologie biblique* (LeDiv 67, Paris: Cerf 1971) 187-99.

[30] Vgl. zur inhaltlichen Analyse: Reiterer, „Gerechtigkeit," 128-36, 138-58.

[31] Vgl. Reiterer, „Gerechtigkeit," 143-47.

[32] Blischke, *Eschatologie*, 51, Anm. 9, notierte, dass ὅτι 8mal vorkommt. Da sie jedoch die Funktion als Stilmittel nicht näher hinterfragt hat, sind ihr die Implikationen nicht aufgefallen. Ein kurzer Vergleich hätte ergeben, dass ὅτι in 1:16 als gebräuchliche Einleitung eines begründenden Nebensatzes steht und sich so von den vorangehenden sieben Verwendungen unterscheidet.

nicht untergeordnet werden. Ὅτι nimmt demnach nur formal die klassische Position in einem Satzgefüge ein: Der Autor stellt eine These auf und entwickelt aus dieser mittels der ὅτι-Sätze weiterführende Argumentationszusammenhänge. Neben 1:2a (1:1b-1:2b) hat ὅτι diese Funktion auch in 1:4a (1:3a-1:4b), 1:6c (1:5a-1:6e), 1:10a (1:9a-1:10b), 1:11c (1:11a-d) und 1:13a (1:12a-1:14d).

(b) In 1:1b-14d trifft man also auf ein interessantes Beispiel einer Anapher.[33]

(c) Genau in der Mitte dieser Sechsergruppe wird das System unterbrochen und das mit ὅτι bedeutungsgleiche διὰ τοῦτο wird in 1:8a als mit ὅτι funktionsgleiches Wort verwendet: So ergibt sich eine auffallende Reihe:

3mal ὅτι, 1mal διὰ τοῦτο, 3mal ὅτι.

(d) Mit dem Stilmittel des Wechsels (von ὅτι zu διὰ τοῦτο) begnügt sich der Autor nicht, sondern leitet die Strophe 1:7a-1:8b selbst mittels ὅτι ein:

7a ὅτι πνεῦμα κυρίου πεπλήρωκεν τὴν οἰκουμένην
7b …
8a διὰ τοῦτο φθεγγόμενος ἄδικα οὐδεὶς μὴ λάθῃ …

Wie soll man das interpretieren?

(1) Als erstes mag man die Frage stellen, ob nicht auch in 1:7a wie in den anderen Fällen ὅτι die Weiterentwicklung für das 1:7a Geschriebene darstellt. Das ist aber aus inhaltlichen Gründen nicht möglich. Daher ist es klar, dass ὅτι eine andere Rolle ausfüllt als in übrigen sechs Verwendungen.
(2) Zur Klärung hat man den Kontext bei zu ziehen. Die in 1:5a, 1:6a und 1:7a beginnenden Argumente konzentrieren sich auf das Stichwort πνεῦμα (ἅγιον γὰρ πνεῦμα / φιλάνθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα / πνεῦμα κυρίου). Die πνεῦμα-Thematik wird auf zwei Strophen ungleicher Länge (8 Kola und 4 Kola) verteilt.[34] In der πνεῦμα-Reihe nimmt 1:7a als letzte Nennung eine besondere Position ein, welche der Autor mit ὅτι betont. Der Gebrauch von ὅτι als ein Hervorhebungssignal ist

[33] Zur Beliebtheit der Anaphern im Enkomion vgl. H. Engel, „Wem nimmt unrechtes Denken und Reden das Leben? Zur Deutung von Weish 1,11d," in *Lehrerin der Gerechtigkeit*, 62-66, 62.

[34] Die Verse 5a-6b besitzen in 6c-e eine mit ὅτι eingeführte Weiterführung. Das Thema πνεῦμα κυρίου steht auf thematisch gleicher Höhe wie ἅγιον γὰρ πνεῦμα in 5a und φιλάνθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα in 6a. Es liegt also eine Dreierreihe mit dem Thema πνεῦμα vor: ἅγιον γὰρ πνεῦμα — φιλάνθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα — ὅτι πνεῦμα κυρίου.

innerhalb des Griechischen nicht gebräuchlich, hat aber in der Septuaginta Vorbilder, da ὅτι als Übersetzung von כי allenthalben diese Funktion besitzt. Der Autor verwendet demnach ein hebräisches Stilmittel zur Akzentsetzung.

Ὅτι — inhaltlich und funktional unterschiedlich gebraucht — fungiert als ein Signal für die Textstruktur, die sich folgend darstellt:

(1)		1:1c-d	:	ὅτι	1:2a-b
(2)		1:3a-b	:	ὅτι	1:4a-b
(3)		1:5a-c.6a-b	:	ὅτι	1:6c-e
(4)	ὅτι	1:7a-b	:	διὰ τοῦτο	1:8a-b
(5)		1:9a-b	:	ὅτι	1:10a-b
(6)		1:11a-b	:	ὅτι	1:11c-d
(7)		1:12a-b	:	ὅτι	1:13a-b.14a-d

Der Abschnitt besteht aus sieben Untergliederungen, sprich Strophen. Die Abfolge der Argumentation ist straff, wobei die stilistischen Variationen nicht zu übersehen sind. Der Autor hat in diesem Abschnitt einen auffallenden Akzent gesetzt. Die Stellung und die Gestaltung deuten darauf hin, dass im sieben Strophen umfassenden Abschnitt 1:1b-1:14d insbesondere der mittleren Strophe (1:7a-8b) — sowohl durch die Gestaltung wie durch die Stellung betont — eine herausgehobene Aufgabe zufällt.

4.3. *Die Strophengliederung*

Man mag die Frage stellen, ob der Autor eine Ansammlung von sieben Strophen, von denen jede für sich steht, anbieten will oder ob er einzelne Teile zusammenzieht. Stichworte und Leitgedanken wie mannigfache Bezüge innerhalb des Textes zeigen, dass der Autor mehrere einzelne Strophen zu Großstrophen zusammenführt.

4.3.1. *Der mittlere Teil: 1:5-8*

In 1:5a-8b liegt eine dreiteilige Abhandlung des Bereiches πνεῦμα vor:[35] Dieser Abschnitt besteht aus 12 Kola. Nicht mit jedem Vorkommen von πνεῦμα beginnt auch eine neue Strophe. Wenn man πνεῦμα als Leitwort in 1:5a-8b akzeptiert, ergeben diese beiden Strophen eine zusammengehörende Großstrophe. Man kann überprüfen, ob die Passagen vorher

[35] Erstaunlich ist, dass Schmitt, der sprachliche Eigenheiten in pedantischer Weise (vgl. *Buch*, 10) sammelte, dieses Sinn und Poesie strukturierende Element nicht registriert. Bei Nichtberücksichtigung solcher Markierungselemente ignoriert man auch entscheidende Hinweise für die Interpretation.

(1:1b-4b) und nachher 1:9a-14d auch Großstrophen bilden. Tatsächlich unterstützt die kolometrische Gestaltung eine derartige Anfrage, denn 1:1b-4b wird aus 8 Kola und 1:9a-14d aus 16 Kola gebildet.

4.3.2. *Der erste Teil: 1:1-4*

1:1b-2b kreist um das Thema „*Herr* / κύριος," gemeint ist natürlich „Gott." Auf ihn weisen jeweils Pronomina (αὐτόν / αὐτῷ) in 1c.2a.b hin. Wer über zentrale Gegebenheiten nachsinnt, hat *vor allem anderen* über ihn — und nichts anderes nachzudenken. Die Anspielung an philosophische Spekulationen (φρονεῖν) wird sofort in die „richtigen" theologischen Bahnen gelenkt, da κύριος als terminus technicus zur Wiedergabe des Gottesnamens יהוה und nicht das allgemeine θεός (1:3a) verwendet wird. Das führt zur Erkenntnis, dass bei der Auslegung der biblische Gebrauch einzubeziehen ist.

Der Aufforderung, sich dem Herrn zu nähern, stehen die Gründe für die Trennung von Gott gegenüber (1:3a): es sind die λογισμοί, eine Vokabel, welche die Wortwurzel λόγος[36] beinhaltet; vgl. unten 1:9b. Wir befinden uns also im Kontext des Redens. Zum zuvor einleitend erwähnten Nachsinnen (vgl. φρονεῖν), eine zentrale Verhaltensweise im philosophischen Kontext, gesellt sich die philosophische Rede. Diese trennt von Gott, wenn sie σκολιός, „krumm" ist. Zu beachten ist, dass ab 1:3a von θεός und nicht von κύριος die Rede ist. Für die Einzelauslegung ist auf die chiastisch angeordneten Verba hinzuweisen: φρονήσατε und ἐλέγχει (1:1b // 1:3b) wie ζητήσατε und χωρίζουσιν (1:1c // 1:3a). Diese zwei Strophen bilden eine Großstrophe. Sie besteht aus 8 Kola.

4.3.3. *Der dritte Teil: 1:9-14*

Mit Überlegungen (διαβουλία; 1:9a) und den damit verbundenen Äußerungen (λόγοι; 1:9b) beginnt die nächste Strophe. Inhaltlich unscharf, aber nicht wirklich missverständlich wird die zu beurteilende Instanz in schrittweiser Abfolge eingeführt. Die Diskussionen sind nicht an sich schlecht. Sie sind es aber dann, wenn sie von Menschen ohne Achtung, von Pietätlosen (ἀσεβής), vorgenommen werden.

Gott selbst ist die Schiedsinstanz (1:9b), welche die Entscheidung fällt. Wenn Gott selbst in Aktion tritt, ist davon auszugehen, dass es sich um sehr zentrale Inhalte handelt. Gott hält fest, dass die inkriminierten Spekulationen und deren Verbreitung zum Tode führen. Aber Gottes Wille ist nicht die Vernichtung des Geschaffenen. So ergibt sich, dass die Kola 9a-14d eine in sich geschlossene, aus drei Strophen bestehende Argumentationskette bilden. Die gesamte Großstrophe umfasst 16 Kola.

[36] Vgl. die weiteren Vorkommen von λόγος in Weish 1:16; 2:2,17,20; 6:9,11; 7:16; 8:8,18; 9:1; 12:9; 16:12; 18:15,22.

4.3.4. *Schematischer Überblick über die Gliederung*

Nach den bisherigen Beobachtung zeigt sich ein kunstvoller Aufbau der Passage 1:1a-1:15:

	1:1a	Erster Teil der Rahmung	
1. Megastanza	1:1b-4b	2 Strophen mit 8 Kola	4 Kola : 4 Kola
2. Megastanza	1:5a-8b	2 Strophen mit 12 Kola	8 Kola : 4 Kola
3. Megastanza	1:9a-14d	3 Strophen mit 16 Kola	4 Kola : 4 Kola : 8 Kola
	1:15	Zweiter Teil der Rahmung	

4.4. *Alpha privativum und Negationen als Stilmittel*

Auffallend häufig verwendet der Autor Worte mit einem Alpha privativum: 1:2b ἀπιστοῦσιν; 1:3b ἄφρονας; 1:5b ἀσυνέτων; 1:5c ἀδικίας; 1:6b ἀθῳώσει; 1:6d ἀληθής; 1:8a ἄδικα; 1:9a ἀσεβοῦς; 1:9b ἀνομημάτων; 1:11a ἀνωφελῆ; 1:15 ἀθάνατός. Notierenswert ist bei diesen Vorkommen, dass sowohl das je verwendete Ausgangswort wie das durch das α-privativum ins Gegenteil gewendete im Kontext bedeutungsvoll sind.

In den Versen 12a-13b.14cd stehen 6 Negationen (12a: μή; 12b: μηδέ; 13a: οὐκ; 13b: οὐδέ; 14c: οὐκ; 14d: οὔτε). Daher fallen die dazwischen stehenden nicht negierten Kola 14a.b besonders auf. Was wird negiert? Es sind dies in 12a: θάνατος; in 12b: ὄλεθρον; in 13a: θάνατος; in 13b: ἀπωλεία; in 14c: φάρμακον ὀλέθρου; in 14d: ᾅδου βασίλειον. Obzwar diese Passage das hier zur Untersuchung anstehende Gebiet der Rede nicht mehr behandelt, ist die Beobachtung für die Analyse des letzten Parts bedeutungsvoll.

4.5. *Querverweise*

Dass Querverweise eine stilistische Eigenheit des Weisheitsbuches sind, hat u.a. Reese nachgewiesen.[37] Insgesamt benennt er 44 Fallbeispiele. *Neun* von diesen betreffen 1:1-15, was gemessen am ganzen Werk eine relativ große Anzahl darstellt:[38] 11:5 → 1:5; 11:20 → 1:8; 14:4-6 → 1:13-15; 14:30 → 1:1; 15:3 → 1:15; 15:4-5 → 1:3-4; 15:8 → 1:4; 18:24-25 → 1:13-14 und 19:3 → 1:12. Weiters erbrachte Wright den Nachweis, dass das ganze Weisheitsbuch nach einem numerischen Raster gestaltet worden

[37] Vgl. den Hinweis auf die Querverbindungen zwischen 1:1-5 und Kap 9 bei P. Bizzeti, *Il Libro della Sapienza. Struttura e genere letterario* (RivBibS 11, Brescia: Paideia 1984) 74.

[38] Die Beispiele stehen bei J.M. Reese, *Hellenistic Influence on the Book of Wisdom and its Consequences* (AnBib 41, Rom: Pontificio Instituto Biblico 1970) 127-39.

ist.[39] Leider untermauert er seine Argumente nur mit Zahlen, nicht mit Textbeispielen, so dass man seine Ergebnisse schwer nachvollziehen kann. Trotz aller offenen Fragen weist Wrights sehr formalistische Methode eine erstaunliche innere Ordnung nach. Schmitt beschäftigt sich in seinem Kommentar ausführlich mit der Gräzität und belegt überzeugend die perfekte Beherrschung des *klassischen* Griechisch,[40] womit der Autor des Weisheitsbuches dartut, dass er auch die vorhellenistische Bildung flüssig zu verwenden versteht. Mittels der Untersuchung der Wortwahl zeigt Schmitt, dass sich der Autor innerhalb der LXX durch einen gehobenen Sprachgebrauch auszeichnet. Dieser weist auf eine autorenspezifische Ausprägung, die auch für die Verfasserschaft nutzbar gemacht werden kann: „Die Lieblingsvokabeln, die das Gesamtwerk durchziehen und prägen, sprechen… für die Einheitlichkeit des Werkes als von einem Autor stammend (personale Identität)."[41]

Auch innerhalb von 1:1-15 — vgl. die schon notierten Hinweise zu ὅτι, die Bezüge zu κύριος in 1b-2c und die Rolle von πνεῦμα in 1:5-8 — gibt es viele Querbezüge.[42]

Uns interessieren vor allem jene direkten terminologischen Verbindungen, die sich mit mündlichen Äußerungen beschäftigen. Zweimal werden verwendet: λογισμός in 1:3a and 1:5b; γογγυσμός in 1:10b und 1:11a; und die Wurzel φθεγγ*: φθεγγέσθαι in 1:8a und φθέγμα 1:11c. Es sind also alle Großstrophen betroffen, das heißt dass alle Teile einbezogen werden.

4.6. *Das Wortfeld „Rede/n"*

Die bisherigen Beobachtungen führen uns zu jenem Wortfeld, das neben dem gedanklichen Sinnieren für die Entwicklung philosophischer Argumentationen unerlässlich ist: das *Wort*, die *Rede*.[43] Im Konnex von Reden und Rede bietet der Autor die meisten Beispiele und eine große Vielfalt: λογισμός (3a.5b), χεῖλος (6b), φθεγγέσθαι (8a), γλώσσα (6c.11b), φωνή (7b), διαβούλιον (9a), λόγος (9b), γογγυσμός (10b.11a), καταλαλιά (11b),

[39] Vgl. A.G. Wright, „Numerical Patterns in the Book of Wisdom," *CBQ* 29 (1967) 524-38.

[40] Schmitt, *Buch*, 9f.

[41] Schmitt, *Buch*, 12.

[42] Vgl. Reiterer, „Theologie," 53-58.

[43] Vgl. „Zunächst braucht er (der Mensch)… die Fähigkeit (wenn wir sie organisch anordnen) zu sehen und zu hören, dann die zu sprechen und zu denken. Die Wahrnehmungen werden zu Worten, und nur mittels der Worte kann der Mensch denken;" O. Kaiser, *Des Menschen Glück und Gottes Gerechtigkeit. Studien zur biblischen Überlieferung im Context hellenistischer Philosophie* (Tria Corda 1, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2007) 39f.

φθέγμα (11c) und στόμα (11d). Von der Vernehmbarkeit her gesehen, gehören hierher auch ἀκουστής (6e), ἀκοή (b) und ἀκροάομαι (10a).

(a) Es geht 1:1-15 nicht darum, was durch ein Wort *mittelbar* bewirkt und erreicht werden kann, wie Verletzung, Lob, Trost, Hass, Versöhnung oder Freude usw. Es geht nicht darum, ob durch Worte eine Wohltat oder ein Vergehen bewirkt wird. Es geht grundlegend um das „Wort" an sich: es äußert und vermittelt Einstellungen und zentrale Gewichtungen, welche in einer zweiten Phase etwas auslösen können.

(b) Das, was mit Worten vermittelt wird, bzw. die Reden an sich stehen im Zentrum des Interesses des Autors: die in Worten formulierten Weltbilder. Das einschlägige Wortfeld ist — wenn auch nicht gleich dicht — über den gesamten einleitenden Abschnitt des Werkes verteilt. Der Autor bewegt sich im Grenzgebiet zwischen helleninistisch-philosophischer und alttestamentlich-hellenistischer Weltauffassung. Aus diesem Grund ergeben sich zwei Bereiche, aus denen heraus die Thematik erörtert werden kann. Sofort fällt auf, dass der Herr-κύριος / Gott-θεός innerhalb von 1:1-15 *nie* in *positiver* Weise mit irgendeinem der vielen Termini für „Rede" verknüpft wird. Das ist ein deutlicher Hinweis darauf, das ER allen Dimensionen des mit den verschiedenen Ausdrücken für „Rede / Wort" Bezeichneten distanziert gegenübersteht.

5. WELCHE PROBLEME VERSTECKEN SICH HINTER DER *REDE*?

Worum geht es dem biblischen Autor bei der Behandlung des Bereichs „Rede," wenn er mündlich Geäußertes Gott gegenüber stellt. Und weiters ist von Interesse, inwieweit diese Fragestellung im Gesamt des weisheitlichen Buches von Bedeutung ist.[44]

In der für die stoisch-hellenistische Rhetorik typischen Art der Antithesen wie der Art positiver wie negativer Beweisführung[45] werden die Argumente Schritt für Schritt weiter entfaltet, wobei er auch ein Lernziel — wieder charakteristisch für griechisch-rhetorische Argumentation — anvisiert: Dieses wird gegen Ende in 1:14 angeführt. Infolge dieser Gestaltung zeigt sich, dass er sich stärker diesen Kriterien verpflichtet fühlt als den typisch alttestamentlichen, wenn er auch jene — wie sich an 1:1b.1c zeigen lässt — formvollendet beherrscht.

[44] Vgl. F. Raurell, „Righteousness' Gift of Immortality (Wisd 1,1-15)," *Laur* 40 (1999) 417-36.

[45] Vgl. Weische, „Rhetorik," 1015.1018. Anzumerken ist, dass in ausgearbeiteten Reden diese Teile länger und breiter ausgeführt werden; im Buch der Weisheit liegt eine Reduktion auf die in der Rhetorik benutzten Stilelemente in einem straff organisierten Gedicht vor.

5.1. *Spekulationen ohne Gott (1:1b-4b)*

1. Strophe

1b[46] Denkt[47] über den Herrn in Gutheit[48] nach /
1c und in der Einfalt des Herzens sucht ihn!
2a ὅτι/*Denn* er lässt sich von [solchen, die] ihn nicht provozieren,[49] finden,[50] /
2b er zeigt sich[51] aber denen, die ihm nicht misstrauen.

2. Strophe

3a Falsche[52] Überlegungen trennen nämlich von Gott, /
3b Die Macht jedoch stellt nach der Überprüfung[53] die Uneinsichtigen bloß.[54]
4a ὅτι/*Denn* die Weisheit wird nicht in einen übeltätigen[55] Menschen[56] eingehen, /

[46] Ein so ausgefeiltes literarisches Werk müsste möglichst „wortgetreu" wiedergegeben werden. Das feinsinnige Ausloten semantischer wie grammatischer und stilistischer Möglichkeiten funktioniert auf der Ebene der griechischen Sprache, doch wird eine Übersetzung, die Wortstellung, verwendete Formen usw. beibehalten will, selbst für jemand mit deutscher Muttersprache schwer verständlich. Zudem kommt man nicht umhin, auch Einfügungen zu tätigen, die dann in eckiger Klammer: damit werden Ergänzungen angezeigt, die nicht im griechischen Text stehen.

[47] Das Verb φρονήσατε inkludiert spekulatives, vertieftes Nachsinnen.

[48] Das Substantiv ἀγαθότης wird in der LXX nur in Sir (45:23) und Weish (neben 1:1 noch 7:26; 12:22) verwendet und spielt im Profangriechischen keine Rolle.

[49] Dem Verb πειράζειν inhäriert grundsätzlich das Element des Probierens, im vorliegenden Sinne aber nicht das des bewährenden Testens (wie z.B. in Gen 22:1: θεὸς ἐπείραζεν τὸν Αβρααμ), sondern des misstrauischen Nachprüfens, womit Gott herausgefordert wird. Später wird man mehrfach lesen, dass er seiner Gegner Worte usw. beobachtet und bewertet.

[50] Die Grundbedeutung von εὑρίσκειν ist „finden." Hier geht es um das *Auffinden* im Sinne vom „Ent-decken" Gottes, der ja ohnedies schon da war, nicht gesehen wurde, jedoch unter Benutzung richtiger Hilfsmittel aufzuspüren ist. Doch kann man dies mit menschlichen Mitteln nur *bedingt* bewerkstelligen, ist das Ergebnis doch von der richtigen Einstellung zu Gott abhängig, sodass deutlich wird, dass Gott sich auch entziehen kann. Daher wird εὑρίσκεται reflexiv-medial zu verstehen sein.

[51] Wie schon im vorangehenden Kolon verwendet der Autor ἐμφανίζεται mit reflexiv-medialen Implikationen.

[52] Das Adjektiv σκολιός bedeutet dinglich „krumm," übertragen wertend „verkehrt, schlecht, gottlos." Impliziert wird eine grundlegende Wertung. Ethische Fragestellungen gehören zu den typischen Anliegen der Stoa und — ganz allgemein — der hellenistischen Philosophie.

[53] Das Partizipium δοκιμαζομένη bezieht sich auf δύναμις, aber nicht in dem Sinne, dass δύναμις selbst überprüft wird, sondern dass diese die Spekulationen (λογισμοί) nachprüft und dann ein entsprechendes Urteil fällt.

[54] Das Verb ἐλέγχειν beschreibt einen „Testvorgang," der meistens mit einem Urteil über das „Überprüfte" verbunden ist: *überprüfen, beurteilen, bewerten*. Die Vokabel spielt vor allem als Fachausdruck in philosophischen Disputationen und den Bewertungen von Argumenten eine Rolle. Es ist nicht leicht, diese verschiedenen Aspekte in *ein* Wort zu fassen, da zugleich auch noch eine pejorative Note eingeschlossen ist.

4b noch in einem Leib wohnen, der in Verfehlungen verstrickt ist.[57]

Die Argumentation wird folgend analysiert: (1.) Welche Rolle nimmt Gott in 1:1b-4b ein? (2.) Mit welcher Einstellung nähert man sich Gott? (3.) Wie lassen sich die angesprochen „Gesprächspartner" näher beschreiben?

5.1.1. *Welche Rolle nimmt Gott in 1:1b-2:4b ein?*

Wer sich heutzutage mit philosophischen Fragestellungen beschäftigt, beginnt gewöhnlich nicht mit Ausführungen über „Gott." Der Autor stellt aber den *Herrn* / κύριος in das Zentrum. Für Gott wählt er einen Terminus, der damals im gesellschaftlichen und politischen Raum vor allem zur Bezeichnung des Königs eine bedeutsame Rolle spielte. Für die in der jüdischen Offenbarungstradition Stehenden ist κύριος — vgl. 1:7a und 1:9a — deshalb so gehaltvoll, weil der klassische Gottesname יהוה damit wiedergegeben wird. Viermal wird in der ersten Strophe (1:1b-2b) auf ihn verwiesen, in 1c.2a.b mittels des Pronomens αὐτός;. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass die Zuhörer verstanden haben, wovon der Autor spricht, wenn er den Gottesnamen κύριος verwendet. Also wussten sie mit κύριος als Gottesbezeichnung umzugehen.

In 1:3a verwendet der Autor das allgemeine θεός, zu dem in 1:3b δύναμις das parallele Subjekt bildet. Die *Macht* ist fähig, die in 1:3a genannten Spekulationen zu bewerten (δοκιμάζειν) und — wie in philosophischen Diskussionen üblich — darauf hin ein Urteil zu fällen (ἐλέγχειν), das zugleich jene qualifiziert, welche sich mit den

[55] Das Adjektiv κακότεχνος wird in der LXX nur im Buch der Weisheit (neben 1:4 noch 15:4) verwendet. Der Autor versteht es geschickt, zwei recht unterschiedliche Aspekte, nämlich κακός [schlecht, böse] und τεχνή [Vermögen, Kunst] zu vereinen. Κακός bringt etwas „Übles, schlechtes" zur Sprache. In der Sprache der Gebildeten bezeichnet τεχνή etwas durchaus Positives, sind doch alle Fertigkeiten, welche man sich aneignet, insbesondere auch z.B. die Redefertigkeit (τέχνη ῥητορική) unter diesem Fachausdruck zusammenzufassen. Zugestanden wird den Kontrahenten, dass sie ihr „Handwerk," d.h. ihre Aktivitäten beherrschen, woraus sich ergibt, dass sich die Gegenpositionen auf einem hohen Niveau gegenüber stehen.

[56] Das Substantiv ψυχή ist, wie Blischke, *Eschatologie*, 60-67, richtig ausführt, ein „Ausdruck eines ganzheitlichen Menschenbildes" (60) und ist nicht im platonischen Sinne (vgl. 268) zu verstehen.

[57] Das zugrunde liegende Kompositum κατα-χράω verstärkt — falls nicht die in der Koine verfolgbare Vorliebe für Komposita vorliegt — durch κατά die Aussage von χράω dahin, dass das Subjekt sich des angeführten Objektes, hier ἁμαρτία, nachdrücklich bedient. Da nun χράω ohnedies schon „gebrauchen, sich Nutzen schaffen durch etwas" bedeutet, wird das „Ausnutzen, das sich zu Diensten-Machen" im pejorativen Sinne verstärkt. Der Autor hält den Angesprochenen nicht vor, selbst die Vergehen verübt zu haben, vielmehr nutzen sie ihre Fertigkeiten, andere dazu zu bringen.

inkriminierten Überlegungen herumgetragen haben. Sowohl von der Position wie vom Inhalt her ergibt sich, dass *Macht* / δύναμις eine Bezeichnung für *Gott* darstellt: es wird eine Beschaffenheit Gottes[58] bzw. eine Wirkweise Gottes zur Bezeichnung erhoben. Da wir uns u.a. im Umfeld griechisch-hellenistischer Vorstellungen befinden, ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass die Macht- und Kraftausweise in der griechischen Göttervorstellung besonders gewichtig waren: nur jene Gottheit ist entscheidend, welche sich auch mit Macht, zumeist auch mit Demütigungen der Gegner verbunden, durchsetzt. Das ist wohl auch der Grund, dass just das Epitheton δύναμις zum Namen erhoben wurde: sie beschreibt selbstbewusste *Autorität* und sie vermittelt *Kraft* und *Macht*. Über das Gottesbild lässt sich also sagen: Der *Herr* / κύριος ist *Gott* / θεός ist die *Macht* / δύναμις. Damit ist Klarheit geschaffen. Gott ist nicht verfügbar. Es gibt keinen rationalen Weg, ihm mit philosophischen Mitteln aufzuspüren. Vielmehr lässt er sich finden (εὑρίσκεται) und, wenn er will, erscheint er (ἐμφανίζεται) jenem, der ihn mit der richtigen Einstellung sucht.

5.1.2. *Mit welcher Einstellung nähert man sich Gott?*

Beschreibungsebene. Für die beiden ersten Qualifikationen wählt der Autor Substantiva und nicht Verba. Er zeigt damit Grundlegendes auf der Beschreibungs- und nicht auf der Handlungsebene: ἀγαθότης und ἁπλότης καρδίας. Bei ἁπλότης καρδίας geht es um eine vom Inneren (καρδία) her bestimmte, schnörkellose und positive Einstellung des Menschen. Auch da gibt es jetzt zwei grundlegend unterschiedliche Verständnisebenen, da καρδία auf dem hebräischen Hintergrund den *Menschen* (לֵב) mit all seinen Fähigkeiten bezeichnet, während die griechische Vorstellung vor allem auf die rationale Seite weist. Schwieriger ist die Analyse von ἀγαθότης. Nach vielen Vorschlägen — auch unter Hinweis auf ἁπλότης καρδίας — bewegen wir uns auf der Ebene guter Haltungen. Man liest „lauterer Sinn" (Luth), „Frömmigkeit,"[59] „in Geradheit,"[60] „‚in Güte' … d.h. (man) denkt gut, wohlwollend und richtig über Gott, nämlich, dass er gut ist und Gutes will."[61] Zur Vorsicht rät die die Abstraktbildung von ἀγαθός, die „sich in der klassischen Gräzität noch nicht"[62] findet und offensichtlich im Kreis

[58] Vgl. z.B. Ps 21/20:2,14; Ps 45/46:2; Ps 53/54:3; Ps 58/59:12,17 usw.

[59] Diese in der EÜ gebotene, fragliche Übersetzung lässt Schmitt (*Buch*, 36 und *Weisheit*, 19) ohne weitere Überprüfung stehen.

[60] So Werner, „Gerechtigkeit," 30, ohne dass er erklärt, was man unter dieser im Deutschen ungewöhnlichen Formulierung als persönliche Qualifizierung zu verstehen habe bzw. was man tut und wie man sich verhält, damit man dieser Beschreibung entspricht.

[61] Engel, *Buch*, 49.

[62] Hübner, *Weisheit*, 30.

hoch gebildeter jüdischer Kreise geprägt wurde. Die Abstraktion bringt eine distanziert-objektive Note ins Spiel. Für das Verständnis vergleiche man das ältere — und zugleich einzige — Vorkommen beim Enkel Ben Siras, der im vollen Bewusstsein der Grenzen von „Übersetzungen" (vgl. Prol) die griechische in Alexandria erstellte. Dort wird mit ἀγαθότης jene unbestechliche und unbeugsame „Güte" als Festigkeit der Überzeugung des Pinhas beschrieben, der selbst trotz des Falles des ganzen Volkes nicht von Gott losließ, sondern sich ohne Ansehen seiner Person für ihn einsetzte. Danach ist ἀγαθότης eine objektive Beschreibungsebene, eine Art objektives Urteil. Die Qualität des so Bezeichneten entspricht dem Inhalt von „Gutheit" — auch im Deutschen eine unübliche Abstraktbildung — als grundlegende Haltung und nicht nur individuell wohlwollende Einstellung.

Weish 1:1b.c bewegen sich auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen: 1b beschäftigt sich mit der abstrakt-objektiven, 1c mit der individuell-personalen Ebene jener, die jetzt aufgefordert werden, sich mit Gott und seinem „Welthandeln" einzulassen.

Handlungsebene: Mittels der Negationen in 1:2a-4b wird vor allem die Gegenseite charakterisiert. Ausnahmen sind die zwei Imperative φρονήσατε und ζητήσατε, die jeweils *den Herrn* zum Objekt haben, wobei festzuhalten ist, dass die Phrase φρονεῖν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου in der LXX nur hier belegt ist. Das relativ selten gebrauchte Verb φρονέω beschreibt die mentale Beschäftigung mit grundlegenden und besonders wichtigen Zusammenhängen.[63] In der LXX zählt dieses Verb nicht zu den prägenden, um weisheitliches „Nachsinnen" zu beschreiben. Da es nun an erster Stelle steht und als Imperativ uneingeschränkt auffordert, hat es für den Autor offensichtlich besonderes Gewicht: *Er will sehr wohl, dass man „nachdenkt, bedenkt und überlegt."* Er schätzt das Nachdenken,[64] wobei ihm beim Fehlen alttestamentlicher Verweisstellen vor allem griechisch-philosophische Fertigkeiten vorschweben. Es ist nahe liegend, dass sich der Verfasser des Weisheitsbuches unter solchen Menschen bewegt, die philosophisch nachzudenken geübt waren. Auch das Verb „Suchen" ist im gleichen Umfeld anzusiedeln, obwohl für ζητεῖν κύριον eine breite biblische Belegung gegeben wäre, vgl. בקשׁ / דרשׁ יהוה, womit aber keine rationale Tätigkeit angesprochen ist.

5.1.3. *Wie lassen sich die „Gesprächspartner" näher beschreiben?*

Das *Denken an sich* bürgt noch nicht für Qualität und Richtigkeit, weshalb folgendes zu überlegen ist:

[63] Vgl. u.a. Dtn 32:28; Weish 14:30.

[64] Die Aufforderung „nachzudenken" entspricht gutem spätalttestamentlich-weisheitlichem Brauch: „Mach nichts ohne vorhergehende Überlegung" (vgl. Sir 32:19).

Beschreibungsebene: Die Angesprochenen pflegen λογισμοί, Überlegungen bzw. Spekulationen. Die Gesprächspartner geraten nicht wegen des Nachdenkens an sich in Misskredit, sondern wegen dessen Qualität. Wenn die Argumentationsketten *verschlungen* und *falsch* sind, dann sind sie abzulehnen. Da derartige Gedanken von θεός trennen, erweisen sie sich faktisch als *gottwidrig*.

Die Fertigkeit, zu denken und Einfälle zu haben, schätzt der Autor. Umso spitzer ist der Vorwurf gegen jenen, dem er diese Fertigkeit abspricht: er ist ἄ-φρων (1:3b), uneinsichtig, weil er sich Argumenten gegenüber unzugänglich erweist. In der klassisch gewordenen griechischen Dichotomie wird der Mensch auf Seele (ψυχή) und Leib (σῶμα) aufgespalten (1:4a.b).

Handlungs- und Wertungsebene: Ineffizient wird philosophisches Bemühen, wenn man dem religiös fundierten „Spekulieren" kein Gewicht beimisst und so de facto in Gott kein Vertrauen setzt (ἀ-πιστοῦσιν; 1:2b). Noch verkehrter wird die Lage, wenn man Gott „ausprobiert," was nach dem Kontext darauf hinausläuft, dass ein Mensch Gott herausfordert und ihn damit provoziert (1:2a). Es wird Gottes Göttlichkeit in Frage gestellt. Beide Beispiele setzten voraus, dass Gott eine personale Größe und kein abstraktes Konstrukt ist.

Σοφία ist neben δύναμις das einzige Subjekt, von dem positiv-verbale Aktionen ausgehen: damit ist sie in den Augen des Autors etwas Besonderes. Die Weisheit (1:4a), das *Zentrum der griechischen Philosophie*, aber auch in der biblischen Tradition von Gewicht, wird hier nicht als abstrakt und geistig,[65] sondern personal beschrieben, *geht* sie doch auf den Menschen *zu* oder *verweigert* sich ihm. Letzteres ist dann der Fall, wenn zwei negative Gegebenheiten zutreffen:

Erstens: Wenn ein Mensch (ψυχή; 1:4a) als κακότεχνος zu bewerten ist, ist für ihn die Weisheit unzugänglich. Zum Verständnis ist genau auf die Wortwahl zu achten: ψυχή spielt in der stoischen Philosophie eine herausragende Rolle als ein den ganzen Kosmos glühend durchwaltendes Prinzip. In 1:4a ist ψυχή in alttestamentlicher Manier auf den Menschen reduziert und im Gegenüber zu σῶμα auf seine geistigen Fertigkeiten festgelegt. Zum guten Verständnis trägt nun κακότεχνος bei, eine Vokabel, die in der LXX nur im Buch der Weisheit belegbar ist, und mit der jemand beschrieben wird, der „mit bösen Künsten" umgeht und „arglistig" ist.[66] Der hintersinnig argumentierende Autor spielt aber wohl auf einen zentralen Verwendungsbereich von τεχνή an, nämlich auf das hellenistische, vermutlich vornehmlich stoische Ausbildungswesen. Dort wird τεχνή vermittelt und eingeübt. Zugleich impliziert das Wort

[65] Nach A. Dihle, *Die Vorstellung vom Willen in der Antike* (Sammlung Vandhoeck, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1985) 68, ist σοφία die „theoretische… Intelligenz…"

[66] Gemoll, *Schul- und Handwörterbuch*, 402.

τεχνή „Meisterhaftes", sodass impliziert wird, dass die Angesprochenen „meisterhaft Schlechtes" bzw. „Schlechtes meisterhaft" hervorbringen. Weiters ist zu berücksichtigen, dass τεχνή an sich auf Konkretisierung und Praxis hindrängt.

Zweitens: Die inhaltliche Weiterführung in 1:4b ergibt sich fast unausweichlich, wo man dann auf ἁμαρτία, Verfehlung bzw. Sünde, trifft. Auffällig ist der Plural: es gibt also vieles, was Fehlerhaft ist. Eigenartig ist auch κατάχρεος, das Adjektiv zu σῶμα. Der Mensch als σῶμα, also als körperliche Erscheinung, bedient sich der „Sünde." Man kann nach dem vorliegenden Textbefund nicht davon sprechen, dass die Kontrahenten selbst Sünder sind, vielmehr benutzen sie die „Sünde". Wie man im weiteren Buch sehen wird, handelt es sich — neuzeitlich ausgedrückt — neben Mobbing, geistigen und physischen Repressionen sogar um direkte Lebensbedrohung. Besonders ärgert den Autor, dass die Beklagten ihr Vorgehen so gut verbrämen, dass sie selbst gar nicht zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden können. Daher ist der letzte Vorwurf zugleich der schwerste, gleichsam der Höhepunt des Inkriminierten: ἁμαρτίαι.

5.1.4. *Zwischensumme zu 1:1b-4b*

Der Autor wendet sich an Hörer, die zumindest zum Teil im alttestamentlichen Kontext „beheimatet" sind, jedoch nicht sofort und ausschließlich auf diesen Traditionen ihr Urteil aufruhen lassen, sondern selbst darüber nachdenken. Vorauszusetzen ist nun auch, dass sie gelernt haben, etwas (philosophisch) argumentativ zu bedenken bzw. zu behandeln.

Im ersten Argumentationsgang (1:1b-4b) rückt der Autor einerseits den Herrn in den Mittelpunkt und behandelt andererseits Einstellungen, Haltungen gegenüber Gott und die Gegenpositionen dazu. Weiters geht es um Unfähigkeit zur Einsicht im Gegensatz zur Weisheit, die ihrerseits nicht näher definiert wird; vgl. unten 5.2.1. Es geht aber nicht um Reden und Argumentieren, wenngleich solcherlei vorbereitet wird.[67] Die erste Stufe ist also die persönliche, geistige und innerliche Auseinandersetzung, wobei herausgestrichen wird, dass es Haltungen und Überlegungen/Spekulationen gibt, die mit Gott scharf kontrastieren. Der Autor rückt Aspekte in das Zentrum, welche sich direkt auf die

[67] In einem weiteren Sinne kann und soll man daher λογισμός zum Wortfeld von „Rede" rechnen (vgl. Reiterer, „Theologie," 58), steckt doch — und mit subtilen Anspielungen arbeitet der Autor in meisterhafter Manier — die Wortwurzel λόγος im Wort. Λόγος — ursprünglich Berechnung (vgl. G. Verbeke, „Logos," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie 5* [eds. J. Ritter and K. Gründer, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1980] 491-99, 491) setzt die Verfügbarkeit und Beherrschbarkeit durch den Menschen voraus.

Angesprochenen auswirken: es geht nur am Rande darum, welche Wirkung sie auf andere ausüben.

5.2. *Geist und Offenheit der Rede (1:5a-8b)*

3. Strophe

5a Der heilige Geist der Bildung[68] wird nämlich die Hinterlist meiden[69] /
5b und Abstand nehmen von uneinsichtigen Überlegungen[70] /
5c und würde sich selbst bloß stellen,[71] wenn[72] Un*recht* [zu ihm] hinzukommt.[73]

6a Ein menschenfreundlicher Geist nämlich [führt[74] zur] Weisheit, /
6b und er wird den nicht straflos lassen, der mit[75] seinen Lippen lästert.[76] /

[68] Bei παιδεία geht es um Ausbildung und um deren Ergebnis, die einerseits in der Erziehung — u.a. als „Zucht" übersetzt (Hübner, *Weisheit*, 29) —, andererseits in der „Kultur" begegnen; vgl. Sir Prol 0:3.

[69] Das Verb φεύγειν mit direktem Objekt (τινά) ist häufig im Sinne von „meiden", „aus dem Wege gehen" belegt.

[70] Der Autor spielt geschickt bei der Verwendung von λογισμῶν ἀσυνέτων mit der Grundaussage der Worte und formuliert damit markante Positionen: Das Substantiv λογισμός gehört zu den Schlüselworten griechischer Philosophie. In σύνεσις leuchtet „die Verständigkeit, die Einsichtsfähigkeit" auf, wird allerdings durch das Alpha privativum aprupt und nachdrücklich negiert.

[71] Das Verb ἐλέγχειν (vgl. oben zu 1:3b) bezeichnet das prüfend-argumentative Beurteilen, das mit einer Bewertung verbunden wird, ja zu diesem Zwecke durchgeführt wird. Das Passiv ist nicht leicht zu deuten: Wer soll überprüft werden? Den heiligen Geist kann man nicht mit Schlechtigkeit in Verbindung bringen. ἐλεγχθήσεται spielt mit der offensichtlich als bizzar angesehenen Vorstellung, das könnte trotzdem eintreten. In diesem Fall wäre das ist ein Widerspruch in sich und eine Blamage schlechthin. Daher verstehe ich ἐλεγχθήσεται als „*sich selbst bloß stellen*". Das Futurum sehe ich als eine Anlehnung an die Präfixkonjugation — ein hebraisierendes Element — und nehme an, dass es konjunktivisch zu interpretieren ist.

[72] Es ist nicht leicht die beabsichtigte syntaktische Verbindung zwischen dem Verb und dem Genetivobjekt zu deuten. Da in 5a in passiver Form notiert wird, dass ἅγιον πνεῦμα negiert wird, wird im dem Objekt begleitenden Partizipium die Veranlassung gesehen. Deshalb wird das Partizipium als konsekutiv-kausale Angabe gedeutet.

[73] Das Verb ἐπέρχεσθαι beschreibt eine Bewegung, wo etwas ankommt oder hinzukommt, *das vorher nicht da war*, hier ἀδικίας. Das aus der Physik und der Raumfahrtssprache stammende Verb „andocken" vermag diesen Vorgang recht gut verständlich zu machen.

[74] Das Kolon besteht aus nominalen Elementen, sodass jedes finite Verb eine deutende Hinzufügung darstellt. Das Faktum, dass 1:6a aus einem Nominalsatz besteht, sagt nicht, dass πνεῦμα und σοφία zu identifizieren sind.

[75] Die Präposition ἀπό inkludiert den Ausgangspunkt: es geht um gesprochene Worte, wofür das „Instrument", die Zunge, genannt wird. Da ἀπό aber auch instrumentale Funktion haben kann, wird man die gewählte Übersetzung verstehen.

[76] Das Substantiv βλάσφημος wird aufgrund der inhaltlichen Funktion analog der syntaktischen Auflösung eines Partizipiums in einen Nebensatz verwandelt.

6c ὅτι/*Denn* Gott [ist[77]] Zeuge [über[78]] dessen [innersten] Gedanken[79] /
6d und [er ist[80]] untrüglicher[81] Inspekteur[82] [von] dessen Herz /
6e und [ist] der Zunge Hörer.[83]

4. Strophe

7a ὅτι/*Tatsächlich*[84] der Geist des Herrn erfüllt den Erdkreis,[85]
7b und der das All[86] zusammenhält, hat Kenntnis von der Stimme.
8a διὰ τοῦτο/*Denn*[87] keiner wird verborgen bleiben, der Un*recht*es schwätzt,
8b noch wird ihn das bloß stellende Ge*richt* übergehen.[88]

[77] Wiederum liegt ein Nominalsatz vor, dem in der Übersetzung ein finites Verb beigefügt wurde.

[78] Mit der Präposition wird versucht die Beziehung, die mit dem Genetiv angedeutet wird, herauszustellen. Anzumerken ist, dass das Vorziehen des Genetivs im griechischen Text ungewöhnlich erscheint und eine Begründung für die Satzstellung herausfordert: man findet sie in dem im Hebräischen üblichen Stilmittel, das für den Autor Wichtigste auch an früher Stelle im Satz zu bieten.

[79] Das Wort νεφρός bedeutet im naturalistischen Sinn „Nieren" und steht übertragen, wie zuvor die „Zunge", für jenen Körperteil, wo man die Denk- und Argumentationsfähigkeit lokalisierte.

[80] In 6d ist kein Element, das das Subjekt repräsentiert. Gezeigt wird mit der Ergänzung, dass θεός aus 6c als Subjekt des dann vollständigen Nominalsatzes weiterwirkt.

[81] Mit der deutschen Wortwahl will die Wortbildung von ἀ-ληθής, die mit einem Alpaha privativum arbeitet, nachgeahmt werden „ohne verheimlichendes Täuschen;" Gemoll, *Schul- und Handwörterbuch*, 32.

[82] An sich geht es bei ἐπίσκοπος um jemanden, der „(von oben) drauf sieht," der „beobachtet," doch ergibt der Kontext, dass keine neutrale Funktion beschrieben wird, sondern eine begutachtende und zugleich bewertende Tätigkeit. Daher könnte man aus sachlichen Gründen „Kontrolleur" sagen.

[83] Man mag die Frage stellen, ob es wegen der Kürze richtig ist, 1:8e als allein stehendes Kolon einzustufen. Aber 8e bringt einen selbstständigen Gedanken und in der Aufzählung ein drittes Glied nach 8c und 8d. Weiters entspricht es dem Stil, wenn die Argumentation mit Supprimierung weitergeführt wird; vgl. 1:4a.→b (σοφία) oder 5a.→b.c (ἅγιον πνεῦμα).

[84] An sich ist hier ὅτι ein Funktionswort, das zur Hervorhebung dient und daher nicht übersetzt werden müsste. Da im Deutschen kein gleiches Element zur Verfügung steht, wird mit „Tatsächlich" darauf hingewiesen

[85] Unnachahmlich ist in οἰκουμένη die Verbindung des *Umfassenden* mit der häuslichen *Geborgenheit* (vgl. οἶκος).

[86] Man kann die Frage stellen, ob τὰ πάντα eine Weiterführung von οἰκουμένη sein will und ganz allgemein „alles" meint, was auf der „Erde" zu finden ist, oder ob eine „räumliche" Ausdehnung beabsichtigt ist, wofür 14a, dort in Parallele zu Kosmos (14b), spricht.

[87] Die Übersetzung mit „denn" wird deshalb gewählt, weil so die funktionale Entsprechung zum sechsmaligen ὅτι in 2a.4a.6c.10a.11c.13a erkennbar wird.

[88] Das Verb παροδεύειν (παρά-ὁδός) bringt zum Ausdruck, dass etwas außerhalb der gewohnten und daher offen daliegenden und bekannten Wege, also abseits liegt. Im Kontext geht es darum, das die Kontrahenten zwar versuchen, durch List und Tricks

Weit konzentrierter als in der vorigen Einheit greift der Autor zentrale Vorstellungen der in gebildeten Kreisen vertretenen und diskutierten Weltvorstellung auf. Folgende Bereiche spielen eine zentrale Rolle: (1.) das dreimalige und durch Epitheta näher akzentuierte πνεῦμα, (2.) die öffentliche Austragung und Entscheidung des latenten Konfliktes, (3.) die schrittweise Einführung des (philosophischen bzw. gebildeten) Redens und (4.) deren Wirkung bzw. Bewertung.

5.2.1. *Das dreimalige πνεῦμα*

Das stilistische wie inhaltliche Leitwort in 1:5-8 ist πνεῦμα, welches der Autor durch seine Epitheta näherhin festlegt. An sich ist πνεῦμα eines der großen Worte in der griechischen Philosophie und dient der profanen wie religiösen Weltdeutung.

Dieses aus der Naturbeobachtung als „Wind, Hauch, Odem" bekannte Phänomen wird übertragen und/oder abstrakt in anthropologischem wie theologischem Kontext bipolar verwendet.

> Vom Aspekt seiner reduzierten, fast nicht registrierbaren Stofflichkeit her ermöglicht es die Metaphorik der Nichtigkeit, Hinfälligkeit und der zu bezweifelnden Existenz, deren Realitätsgrad kaum festzustellen ist (Soph. Frg. 12 [FTG 133]: ἄνθρωπός ἐστι πνεῦμα). … Durch die Prononcierung des Teilaspektes seiner Wirkung des Belebens kann πνεῦμα mit diesem Effekt identifiziert werden und die Bedeutung von „Leben" oder „lebendem Wesen" annehmen. … Damit einher gehen — psychologisch betrachtet — Ansatz und Möglichkeit der Identifikation von πνεῦμα und ψυχή. … Anthropologisch steht das πνεῦμα wie die ψυχή dem menschlichen Körper gegenüber, den es als letzter Hauch verlässt.[89]

Vor allem in der mythischen, aber auch der appolinischen Inspirationsauffassung spielt πνεῦμα eine besondere Rolle. Die mantische Ergriffenheit erreichte sogar Stadien der Ekstase und äußerte sich in Ausschweifungen, gegen die sich vor allem die Kyniker und Philo v. Alexandria wandten.[90] „Die Manifestation des göttlichen Pneuma übersteigt dabei u.U. die rein verbale Verlautbarung bis zu Gemurmel, Stöhnen…"[91] Weil πνεῦμα in keiner Phase als verfügbar erscheint, wird es

ihre Argumente zu vertreten, gleichzeitig aber die eigentliche Intention im Verborgenen bleibt. Aber gerade die trügerische Intention stellt der Autor bloß und bekräftigt, dass es kein „neben dem Weg-Gehen" gibt, vielmehr erzwingt Gott durch seine Argumentation eine offene und direkte Auseinandersetzung.

[89] H. Saake, „Pneuma," in *Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Neue Bearbeitung begonnen von Georg Wissowa. Fortgeführt von Willhelm Kroll und Karl Mittelhaus* (München: Alfred Druckenmüller 1974) 387-412. 388-89.

[90] Vgl. Saake, „Pneuma," 390.

[91] Saake, „Pneuma," 390.

auch als „etwas Göttliches erfahren u. dementsprechend auch in anderen Bereichen direkt als θεῖον bzw. θεῶν oder θεοῦ πνεῦμα prädiziert…“[92]

- *Qualifizierung des Geistes*: In 1:5-7 trifft man auf folgende Vorkommen von πνεῦμα: ἅγιον πνεῦμα (1:5a), φιλάνθρωπον πνεῦμα (1:6a) und πνεῦμα κυρίου (1:7a).
- Ein ausdrücklicher Gottesbezug fehlt in 1:5a, doch ordnet man automatisch „heilig“ der Sphäre Gottes zu. Während „göttlicher Geist“ in der griechischen Welt eine bedeutsame Rolle spielt, „ist der Begriff eines πνεῦμα ἅγιον in der reinen Profan-Gräzität… nicht belegt.“[93] Durch das folgende Genetivobjekt παιδείας wird der „heilige Geist“ näherhin bestimmt. Da παιδεία den Vorgang wie das Ergebnis von Erziehung einschließt, sind sowohl die körperlich-geistige (vgl. ψυχή und σῶμα in 4a.b) Persönlichkeitsentwicklung[94] wie das allgemeine und umfassende Ergebnis im Hinblick auf die hellenistische Umwelt (vgl. οἰκουμένη in 1:7a) eingeschlossen. Ich versuche παιδεία mit „Kultur“ zu erfassen.
- Wegen der Parallelität in der Konstruktion (Subjekt und konjugiertes Verb) wird 1:7a als Nächstes behandelt: πνεῦμα κυρίου, dem in 7b mit τὸ συνέχον ein Parallelausdruck zugeordnet ist. Im Hinblick auf 1:1b erscheint es gesichert, dass κύριος JHWH, den sich in Israel offenbarenden Gott, meint. Die Frage ist nun, wie der Parallelausdruck τὸ συνέχον zu definieren ist. Es könnte einen neuen Inhalt einführen, in dem der benannt wird, der alles/das All zusammenhält, das heißt, dass *Gott* umschrieben wird. Das ist aber wegen des Neutrum unwahrscheinlich, warum sollte man von θεός oder κύριος im Neutrum sprechen? Ganz flüssig und natürlich ergibt sich das Neutrum, wenn πνεῦμα das Bezugssubjekt ist. Er ist es, der einerseits den Mikrokosmos, οἰκουμένη, durchwirkt, wie den Makrokosmos, τὰ πάντα, umfängt. In dieser dritten Serie der πνεῦμα-Vorkommen angesiedelt, ist hier wohl auch ein Schwerpunkt gegeben. Und der beschäftigt sich mit φωνή, instrumental für *Rede*.

[92] H. Kleinknecht, „πνεῦμα, πνευματικός. A. πνεῦμα im Griechischen,“ in *TWNT* 6 (1990 [1959]) 333-57. 336.

[93] Kleinknecht, „πνεῦμα,“ 336.

[94] Engel, *Buch*, 52, konzentriert sich auch auf zwei Aspekte, da παιδεία „einen griechischen Idealbegriff (aufnimmt), der die Vervollkommnung von Körper, Geist, individuellem und politischem Ethos umfasst… Er war auch schon in der Septuaginta zur Übertragung eines wichtigen biblischen Begriffs *mûsár* ‚Züchtigung, Zucht‘… (gebraucht worden), mit der Eltern, Lehrer und Gott selbst einen Menschen prägen, damit er in Ehrfurcht und Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber Gott sein Leben verantwortungsvoll gestalten kann;“ vgl. auch Blischke, *Eschatologie*, 56.

- Umfangen von den eben behandelten Stellen steht φιλάνθρωπον πνεῦμα: Das Adjektiv φιλάνθρωπος stand zeitgenössisch in jener Tradition hoch im Kurs, in der man sich als Kosmopolit und — häufig gegen die Fakten — besonders offen gegenüber Nichthellenen verstand.[95] In der LXX begegnen sowohl φιλάνθρωπος[96] als auch φιλανθρωπία[97] ausschließlich in solchen Belegen, die keine hebräische Vorlage haben. Wenngleich das damit gemeinte Verhalten auch terminologisch schon — in historischer Unschärfe — den persischen Königen zugeschrieben wird, zeigt das Material, dass es um eine Haltung und ein Verhalten geht,[98] das hellenistische Könige oder deren Befehle durchführende Beamte beanspruchen. Auf seleukidisch-königliche Zugeständnisse weist 2 Makk 4:11 (Antiochus IV. Epiphanes [φιλάνθρωπα βασιλικά]) und 2 Makk 14:9 (Demetrius [φιλανθρωπίαν]). Besonders Antiochus IV. machte sich mit seinen ausgiebigen und kostspieligen Euergesien, die er geschickt zur Erweiterung einerseits des Ansehens und andererseits zur Ausdehnung des politischen Einflusses[99] „philanthrop" einzusetzen wusste, politisch vor allem bei umworbenen Völkerschaften beliebt. Es gilt jedoch grundsätzlich, dass sich hellenistische Könige als menschenfreundlich verstanden, wobei diese Bezeichnung neben einem berechtigten Gebrauch teilweise — euphemistisch — Gegensätze überspielte, teilweise zur höfischen Phrase erstarrt war. Klar war aber jedem Hörer, wo der gebräuchliche „Sitz im Leben" anzusiedeln war.[100]

Im Buch der Weisheit wird φιλάνθρωπος anthropologisch (12:19: δεῖ τὸν δίκαιον εἶναι φιλάνθρωπον) und theologisch (7:23) verwendet und belegt damit die hervorragende Bedeutung. Es ergibt sich, dass φιλάνθρωπον πνεῦμα eine „königliche" Haltung und deren konkrete Realisation darstellt, welche zur Weisheit führt, jener Fähigkeit und Tugend, die

[95] Vgl. F.V. Reiterer, „Mehr als Gastfreundschaft — nämlich Liebe. Entwicklungslinien des Umganges mit Fremden im Alten Testament," in *Gastfreundschaft* (eds. F.V. Reiterer and K. Zapotoczky, Intercultural Theology and Study of Religions 4, Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi 2009) unter 3.1, Lit. in Fn 39 (im Druck).

[96] Siehe 1 Esdr 8:10; 2 Makk 4:11; Weish 1:6; 7:23; 12:19; vgl. 4 Makk 5:12.

[97] Siehe Est 8:12; 2 Makk 6:22; vgl. 14:9; 3 Makk 3:15,18.

[98] Vgl. καὶ τὰ φιλάνθρωπα ἐγὼ κρίνας προσέταξα τοὺς βουλομένους („Über die menschenfreundlichen Aktionen entscheide ich [Artaxerxes] und ordne als königliche Verfügungen an …) (1Esdr 8:10).

[99] Vgl. P.F. Mittag, *Antiochos IV. Epiphanes. Eine politische Biographie* (Klio NF 11, Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2006) 89-91.103-18.

[100] Vgl. Reiterer, „Gerechtigkeit," 156-58.

sowohl im biblischen wie im alexandrinisch-hellenistischen Kontext hohe Wertschätzung genießt.[101]

Dem πνεῦμα wird mit σοφία syntaktisch ein nominales Element als (Satz-)Aussage zugeordnet. Bedeutet das, wie man lesen kann, eine Identifikation?[102] „Die bereits in 1:3-5 erkennbare Verbindung Gott-Weisheit-Geist wird nunmehr zur deutlichen Gleichsetzung. Geist-Weisheit meint Gott selbst, insofern er sich den Menschen mitteilt."[103] Folgende Beobachtungen lassen nun Zweifel an dieser Deutung aufkommen:

Sowohl in 5a wie in 7a wirkt der Geist aktiv und strebt ein Ziel an. Warum sollte das in 6a nicht auch der Fall sein? Dieses *Ziel* liegt in 5a und 7a auf der menschlichen Ebene (Umgehung der Hinterlist, Erfüllung der ganzen belebten Welt). *Ziel* von Pneuma ist demnach Weisheit. Es gibt keinen Hinweis, dass in 6a anderes als die unter Menschen aktualisierte urteilsfähige Weisheit gemeint sein kann, ist sie doch offensichtlich Instrument, um nach 6b die Lästerer zu überführen. Diese Überlegungen führen zu einer inhaltlichen Erfassung der Weisheit, wogegen sich im Regelfall die Kommentatoren mit sehr allgemeinen Hinweisen begnügen müssen.

Unterstützt wird diese Interpretation durch 1:4a, wonach negativ festgehalten wird, wo sich die Weisheit nicht findet, nämlich „in einem übeltätigen Menschen." Weisheit kann aber erreicht bzw. vermittelt werden, so 1:6a, allerdings nur durch Positives, den „menschenfreundlichen Geist."

5.2.2. *Tätigkeiten des Geistes*

Die letzten Argumente bildeten schon den fließenden Übergang vom systematisch Grundlegenden zum konkreten Vorgang. Da treten die Verba in den Mittelpunkt, mit denen πνεῦμα verbunden wird: In 5:a.b.c sind es deren drei (φεύξεται, ἀπαναστήσεται, ἐλεγχθήσεται), in 6a und 7a je eines (ἀθῳώσει und πεπλήρωκεν).

Als erstes erfährt man, dass der *heilige Geist* der Hinterlist aus dem Wege geht, er flieht sie. Der Autor will zum Ausdruck bringen, dass es sich um etwas derartig Abzulehnendes handelt, dass der Geist nicht

[101] Vgl. die allgemeine Interpretation bei S. George, „Philanthropie im Buche der Weisheit," *BiLe* 11 (1970) 189-98; O. Hiltbrunner, „Humanitas (φιλανθρωπία)," in *RAC* 16 (1994) 711-52.

[102] „Weisheit und heiliger Geist werden demnach identifiziert," Hübner, *Weisheit*, 32.

[103] Engel, *Buch*, 54. Zu diesem Schluss verleitet auch seine Abgrenzung, da für ihn „1:1-5 in sich eine kleine Ringkomposition (A-B-C-B'-A') (bilden): Die je drei Verszeilen von 1:1 und 1:5 (A und A') entsprechen einander in chiastischer Folge (1a-b-c / 5c'-b'-a') und erläutern sich positiv und negativ gegenseitig;" (ebd. 48). Die Überprüfung der Argumente erweist sie weder formal noch inhaltlich überzeugend.

einmal daran streifen will. Der Autor fährt fort, dass der *Geist* Abstand nimmt von „uneinsichtigen Überlegungen" (λογισμοί). Während in 1:3a die Spekulationen ethisch disqualifiziert wurden (σκολιοί; 1:3a) konzentriert er sich hier auf das Zentrum philosophischer Beschäftigung: es geht beim philosophischen Bemühen darum, vertiefte Einsicht zu gewinnen. Genau diese spricht er der Gegenseite ab. Es handelt sich um „un- vernünftige / ἀ-σύνετος," vernunftswidrige Überlegungen. Die verworfenen Spekulationen (λογισμοί; 1:3a) stellen das Gegenteil von Bildung (παιδεία; 1:5a) dar.

Der Autor rechnet jedoch damit, dass seine Zuhörer sich trotzdem damit abgeben: Wenn das beim Geist auch der Fall wäre, würde er sich selbst disqualifizieren (ἐλεγχθήσεται; 1:5c). Mit ἐλέγχειν greift der Autor ein Verb mit breitem Bedeutungsspektrum auf, das auch in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie eine bedeutsame Rolle spielte. Die Bedeutung reicht von *beschimpfen*, *tadeln*, *beschämen*, *widerlegen*, zu *untersuchen* und *prüfen*, und ἔλεγχος wird dann zur *Prüfung*, zum *Beweis*(*mittel*) bzw. zur *Widerlegung* und zum *Gegenbeweis*;[104] vergleiche dazu oben 1:3b, auch schon mit dem Hinweis, dass sie „Menschen ohne Einsicht" sind. Wer sich mit den inkriminierten Spekulationen abgibt,[105] gerät unversehens und sicher auf die falsche Ebene, zumindest in den Bereich des Un-*rechtes*. Man beachte wiederum die Wortwahl, ist doch δίκη ein gesellschaftlich unverzichtbarer Grundwert des Zusammenlebens und hat sich in der griechischen Vorstellung sogar zur Göttlichkeit[106] verdichtet. Wiederum fällt die knappe und zugleich überzeugende Negierung auf: ἀ(Alpha privativum)-δικία. Es wird also eine sich ausschließende Opposition zwischen ἅγιον πνεῦμα und ἀδικία hergestellt. Mit Leichtigkeit hätte der griechische Autor ein anderes Wort für etwas Schlechtes, z.B. κακός/κακά, wählen können, doch er schreibt ἀδικία. Es geht ihm offensichtlich um die negierte δίκη. Die schrecklichen Folgen falscher, ja verdorbener Einstellung und des daraus entspringenden Verhaltens wird man bald zu lesen bekommen, wieder unter Verwendung eines Substantivs, das δίκη enthält, nämlich δικαιοσύνη und δίκαιος:

> Lasst uns dem Gerechten (τὸν δίκαιον) auflauern! Er ist uns unbequem und steht unserem Tun im Weg. Er wirft uns Vergehen gegen das Gesetz (ἁμαρτήματα[107] νόμου) vor und beschuldigt uns des Verrats an unserer

[104] Vgl. Gemoll, *Schul- und Handwörterbuch*, 263.

[105] Vgl. den Versuch, den philosophischen Kontext näher zu beschreiben bei A. Dupont-Sommer, „Les 'impies' du Livre de la Sagesse sont-ils des Épicuriens?," *RHR* 111 (1935) 90-112.

[106] Die Göttin Dike ist Tochter des Zeus und zuständig für Ordnung und Recht.

[107] Man spürt noch die ursprüngliche Bedeutung von „Verfehlung" bzw. von „Nicht das eigentliche Ziel-Treffen."

> Bildung/Erziehung (ἁμαρτήματα παιδείας). Unsere Stärke (ἰσχύς) sei Gesetz/Norm ([ἔστω] νόμος) für die Gerechtigkeit (τῆς δικαιοσύνης); denn das Schwache erweist sich als unnütz (ἄχρηστον[108]) (Weish 2:12.11).

Das φιλάνθρωπον πνεῦμα weist die Schuld, nachdem die *Rede* ins Spiel gebracht wird, öffentlich nach. Die zuvor aufgezeigten Querverbindungen zeigen, dass es bei den Überlegungen nicht um einfaches „Denktraining" oder „harmlose Gedankenspielereien" geht, sondern um Schuld- und Unschuldsfragen, die andere betreffen. Diese werden nicht nur im Inneren gedanklich gewälzt, sondern ausgesprochen, und zwar als Lästerung. Ein βλάσφημος ist nach heutigem Sprachgebrauch jemand, der gottesverachtend spricht. Dieser religiöse Bezug scheint weder im allgemeinen Gebrauch noch in Weish 1:6b prägend zu sein: die verwerfliche Rede bezieht sich aufgrund von handgreiflichen Vergehen (ἁμαρτία; 1:4b) und Unrecht (ἀδικία; 1:5c) auf die sozialen und die rechtlichen Ebenen. Der menschenfreundliche Geist tut, wie er ist, er stellt jene, die so reden, als Schuldige bloß.[109] Wieweit Reden ohne tätliche Eingriffe Menschen zerstörend sein können, zeigen z.B. verschiedene, ohne physische Gewalt durchgeführte Formen von Gehirnwäsche.[110]

Das Verb in 1:7a (πεπλήρωκεν τὴν οἰκουμένην) weist darauf hin, dass die gesamte von Menschen bewohnte Welt vom *Geist des Herrn* umfangen wird. Damit kommt einerseits der Universalismus zum Ausdruck, andererseits drängt sich eine prüfend bewertende, ja richterliche Rolle immer stärker nach vorne, dies vor allem im Gefolge von 1:6c-e. Im Rückblick auf 1:3b, wo Gott als δύναμις dargestellt wird, ist wohl auch Macht eingeschlossen.

5.2.3. *Gott und Rede*

Es fällt auf, dass in 1:6b neben dem eo ipso als Sprechender vorgestellten Lästerer (vgl. βλάβος [Verderben] und φημί [sprechen]) nochmals die Lippe (χεῖλος) mit Rückbezug auf den Lästerer (αὐτοῦ) thematisiert wird: die breite Formulierung mag auf poetische Vollmundigkeit zurückzuführen sein, doch erreicht sie den Effekt, dass das *Reden* kräftig betont wird. Der Autor scheint davon auszugehen, dass die Äußerungen der Gegenseite schuldhaft, vielleicht auch schuldbeladen sind. Wo kommt dieses Urteil her?

[108] Man bedenke, dass im Normbuch klassischer Bildung, der Ilias, χρηστός zu sein, einen bedeutenden Wert darstellte.

[109] Die Umkehrung der grammatischen Bezüge ist schwer nachvollziehbar, wenn Blischke, *Eschatologie*, 56, schreibt, dass die „Menschenfreundlichkeit der Weisheit… sich dadurch aus(zeichnet), dass sie die Lästerer nicht ungestraft lässt."

[110] Es wird immer wieder diskutiert, ob Werbe- und Betreuungsmethoden bei den Scientologen auch in diese Kategorie zu rechnen sind.

In einer erklärenden dreigliedrigen Ausfaltung wird nun Gott (ὁ θεός; 6:1c) bemüht.

- Er ist Zeuge (μάρτυς), ist also wie vor einem ordentlichen Gericht tätig. Das was ab jetzt geschieht, vollzieht sich in der Öffentlichkeit, was durch ἀληθής, also „nicht verborgen," unterstützt wird. Er verhandelt und urteilt nicht hinterrücks.
- Gott fungiert als Inspekteur (ἐπίσκοπος). Er übernimmt die Rolle des recherchierenden Kontrolleurs.
- Zuletzt ist er ἀκουστής, also Hörer. Wiederum wird herausgehoben, dass es etwas zu hören gibt.

Deutlich wird aus dieser Dreierreihe, dass Gott als ein — modern gesprochen — Staatsanwalt auftritt. Er wartet nicht, bis man den Fall an ihn heranbringt, sondern er wird aufgrund seiner Position selbst erhebend und beurteilend tätig.

- Welche Bereiche sind es jetzt, wo Gott Erhebungen vornimmt: Es handelt sich um die Nieren (νεφρός; 1:6c) als Sitz der Einstellungen, um das Herz als Lebenszentrum, wo die verschiedenen menschlichen Fertigkeiten (Triebe, künstlerische und emotionale Anlagen usw.), vor allem auch die denkerischen Anlagen situiert werden, und als Abschluss die „Zunge," pars pro toto für die Sprechfähigkeit, eingeschlossen all das, was auch gesprochen wird.
- Das inkriminierte Sprechen beschäftigt, fast möchte man sagen „belastet," den Autor. Ins Unversale (τὰ πάντα; 1:7b) ausgreifend hält er fest, dass die drohende Gefahr des Zerfallens zwar zu bestehen scheint, jedoch an dem, der alles zusammenhält, seine Grenze findet. Wieder tritt das Reden, diesmal als Stimme (φωνῆ; 1:7a) dargestellt, in das Zentrum. Und Gott ist nicht unwissend und uneinsichtig, wie es den Kontrahenten vorgeworfen wird: er hat vielmehr Kenntnis (γνῶσιν ἔχει) von allem Gesprochenen. Man spürt direkt die sich steigernde Erregung des Verfassers. Mit dem wie ein Blechinstrument „tönen" (φθέγγομαι; 1:8a) — im Gegensatz z.B. von ᾄδειν bzw. ψάλλειν — abwertenden Verb beschreibt der Autor die Äußerung von „Schlechtem, Unrechtem, Bösem" (ἄδικα; 1:8a). Aber, und damit schließt dieser Teil, es wird zum gerechten Gericht (δίκη; 1:8b) kommen und dort erfolgt die korrekte Beurteilung (ἐλέγχειν).

5.2.4. *Zwischensumme über 1:5a-8b*

Mit sich steigernder Schärfe wendet sich der Autor gegen philosophische Überlegungen und vor allem gegen Reden. Diese vermitteln Schlechtes und führen zum Verderben. Wer zu den Anhängern dieser Philosophie gehört, wird nicht schuldlos bleiben: Sie

sind Lästerer (1:6b). In den Augen des Autors richten sich die philosophischen Spekulationen vor allem gegen Gott. Doch Gott selbst kontrolliert und urteilt über diese Denkweise. Er beurteilt die persönlichen Gedanken (1:6c) und kontrolliert die Überzeugung (1:6d). In öffentlicher Auseinandersetzung wird der Irrweg bloß gestellt.

Wie schon in 1:4a wird in 1:6a klar, dass das Verhalten der anderen Seite das Gegenteil von Weisheit (σοφία) ist. Das Thema, dass Gott jegliche Stimme, sprich Äußerung, hört, wird in 1:7b weiterentwickelt. Das argumentative Ambiente verändert sich aber grundlegend: Nicht nur die in Ägypten geprägte hellenistische Kultur, sondern die von Menschen bewohnte Welt (οἰκουμένη) und jener, sprich Gott, der sie zusammenhält, sind das Umfeld. Die kommende Auseinandersetzung hat universale Auswirkungen.

5.3. *Testergebnis der Rede: Tod und Leben (1:9a-14d)*

5. Strophe

9a Über die Diskussionen[111] des Pietätlosen[112] wird nämlich eine Untersuchung abgehalten,[113] /

9b [114] die Kunde von seinen Worten wird aber zum Herrn gelangen, damit er dessen Ungesetzlich-keiten[115] bloß stellt.[116]

[111] Bei διαβούλιον handelt es sich im hellenistischen Kontext um einen Fachausdruck der politischen Auseinandersetzung, welchen der Autor auf die hier beschriebene Situation überträgt, oder, was noch wahrscheinlicher ist, er spielt auf politisch relevante, wahrscheinlich öffentliche Debatten an.

[112] Das zugrunde liegende Verb σέβειν bedeutet „sich scheuen, verehren, hoch achten," durch das Alpha privativum wird nun das Gegenteil gesagt. Da es im Deutschen keine gute Entsprechung zu ἀσεβής gibt, wird mit dem etwas antiquierten Substantiv „Pietät" das Element der *Achtung* zu erhalten versucht. Im religiösen Kontext sind es *Gottesverächter*.

[113] Die verbale Umschreibung für ἐξέτασις wird gewählt, um den amtlichen Charakter, den das „Gottesgericht" hat, zu betonen.

[114] Das Kolon 9b ist überlang. Da in der ganzen Einheit zusammengehörende Themen innerhalb *eines* Kolons stehen, meistens sogar eigene Sätze bilden, scheint es nicht angeraten zu sein, zwei Kola zu machen, da „zur Widerlegung seiner Ungesetzlichkeiten" als allein stehendes Kolon keinen Sinn ergibt. Dies erkannten richtig die Übersetzer, Hamp in der EÜ „und bestraft seine Vergehen" und Hübner, *Weisheit*, 29, „um so seiner Gesetzlosigkeit überführt zu werden," und haben den Part zu einem ganzen Satz ergänzt, wodurch wiederum neue Bezüge hergestellt werden und formen eine neuen Kolaeinteilung.

[115] Es geht um Gesetzmäßigkeit, die ins Gegenteil verkehrt wird, wie die Wortwohl ἀ-νόμημα zeigt. Wiederum agiert der Autor mit dem Alpha privativum.

[116] Da die nominale Wiedergabe von ἔλεγχον schwer verständlich ist, wurde eine verbale Umschreibung gewählt. Es geht um eine öffentliche Debatte bzw. Untersuchung, die Zusammenhänge aufdecken soll. An sich beschreibt der Vorgang auch neutrale Untersuchungsvorgänge bei philosophischen oder politischen Debatten.

[10a] ὅτι/*Denn* ein Ohr [voll] Eifer[117] hört alles, /
[10b] und die gemurmelte Tuschelei[118] bleibt nicht verborgen.

6. Strophe

[11a] Hütet euch also vor nichtsnutzigem Gemurmel, /
[11b] und vor dem Niederreden haltet die Zunge zurück!
[11c] ὅτι/*Denn* [selbst][119] heimliches Getön wird nicht wirkungslos dahingehen, /
[11d] ein verleumdender Mund aber nimmt Leben weg.

7. Strophe

[12a] Eifert nicht nach dem Tod infolge der Irrungen[120] eures Lebens, /
[12b] noch verführt[121] die Vernichtung durch [die] Werke eurer [eigenen] Hände!
[13a] ὅτι/*Denn* Gott hat den Tod nicht gemacht /
[13b] noch freut er sich über den Untergang der Lebenden.

[14a] Geschaffen hat er nämlich das All[122] zum Dasein,[123] /
[14b] und heilsam[124] sind die Geschöpfe[125] der Welt,[126]

Im Kontext wird jedoch vorausgesetzt, dass die angegriffenen Kontrahenten listige Untergriffe beabsichtigen, welche nun durch das Gottesgericht nicht nur untersucht, sondern auch öffentlich aufgedeckt und damit bloßgestellt werden.

[117] Wörtlich: „Ohr des Eifers (ζηλώσεως)." Wenngleich ζήλωσις auch Eifersucht und Neid bedeuten kann, belegt der Kontext, dass der anklagende Part seinen ganzen Eifer daran setzt, die im Heimlichen besprochenen Positionen der Gegner zu erfahren. Dann kann man die verheimlichten Absichten der Kontrahenten an die Öffentlichkeit zerren.

[118] Wörtlich „die Tuschelei (θροῦς) der Gemurmel (γογγυσμῶν)." Die in der LXX seltene Vokabel θροῦς bezeichnet verschiedene Lautstärken von undifferenziertem „Lärm." Da dieser infolge des Verbes „verborgen sein" nur so laut sein kann, dass man ihn gar nicht bemerken würde, wurde das verwendete Substantiv gewählt. Der Plural des Genetivobjektes γογγυσμῶν ist im Deutschen nicht nachahmbar.

[119] „Selbst" ist interpretierend in dem Sinne dazugefügt, dass dem Autor an der Hervorhebung liegt, dass auch — oder vielleicht sogar: „vor allem" — heimlich verbreitetes Gerede Wirkungen hervorbringt, selbst wenn die sprechende Person nicht damit gerechnet hat.

[120] Im Griechischen steht der Singular, doch verlangt die deutsche Phraseologie den Plural.

[121] Der Autor teilt mit dem Verb ἐπισπάομαι „verlocken, verführen" mit, dass Verderben und Untergang keine unbeeinflussbar hereinbrechenden Gegebenheiten, gleichsam Naturkatastrophen, sind. Spöttisch und ironisch beschreibt er den Weg, wie man den Tod aktiviert. Durch das konkrete Handeln, sehr nachdrücklich als Ergebnis der eigenen Tätigkeit beschrieben, lädt man das Unglück ein, man provoziert es.

[122] So wie in 7b geht es um eine umfassende Schöpfungsaussage, wobei man überlegen kann, ob man mit der modernen Vorstellung vom „All" wirklich die qualitative Dimension richtig trifft.

[123] Wörtlich εἰς τὸ εἶναι.

[124] Mit der Übersetzung „heilbringend" (EÜ; Engel, LXX-D) projiziert man Inhalte, die erst spätere Theologie geprägt hat, in die Entstehungszeit des Textes zurück. Im

[14c] und es gibt in ihnen kein Mittel[127] des Verderbens /
[14d] noch des Hades Königsherrschaft[128] auf der Erde.

Die dritte Megastanza entwickelt sich in drei Schritten: Gleichsam summierend wird in der ersten Strophe die inkriminierte Fragestellung mit neuen Worten nochmals herausgearbeitet (1:9a-10b). Daraufhin wird das Ziel der Argumentationskette als zusammenfassende Warnung (1:11a-d) vorgeführt. Der Autor stellt antithetisch den eigentlichen Schöpfungsplan als positive Alternative in der dritten Strophe (1:12a-14d) an das Ende und rundet so seine Thematik ab. Schon allein die Länge zeigt, dass hier eine der Kernbotschaften des Autors liegt, sodass sich von diesem Teil aus 1:1b-11d als kontrastierende Diskussionsfolie darstellt.

5.3.1. *Die Funktion der Rede*

Nur noch mit dem einleitenden, gleichsam überleitenden διαβουλίοις, einem Fachausdruck für philosophische Disputationen, knüpft der Autor in der fünften Strophe an die Frage philosophisch-diskutierter Fragestellungen an. Die Diskutanten bewertet er als ἀσεβής (1:9a), d.h. sie haben keine Achtung mehr vor anderen, es ist ihnen das Gefühl für Werte verloren gegangen, was dem Ausbildungsziel der hellenistischen, insbesondere stoischen Lehren[129] widerspricht. Das Ergebnis sind Regel-, Gesetz- und Ordnungswidrigkeit: ἀνομήματα (11:9b). In der griechischen Philosophie wäre an sich die Entsprechung mit νόμος die eigentliche Säule der Argumentation und der philosophischen Vorstellungen.[130]

Kontext von „Mittel" (14c) wird in praktischer Weise festgehalten, dass es sich um das Gegenteil von „Vernichtung" und „Untergang" handelt.

[125] V. 14b: *die Geschöpfe*; wörtl.: „die Hervorbringungen, Erzeugnisse; das, was entsteht."

[126] Gemeint ist mit κόσμος die belebte Welt. Hinzuweisen ist auf den von großen Teilen der LXX abweichenden Gebrauch: „Weish (verwendet) das Wort κόσμος im Sinn von ‚Weltall.' Die übersetzten Schriften der Septuaginta verwenden es dagegen stets in der Bedeutung von ‚Schmuck;'" Werner, „Gerechtigkeit," 27, unter Hinweis auf Reese, *Hellenistic Influence*, 4f.

[127] Während man neuzeitlich mit φάρμακον (vgl. *Pharmazie* usw.) vornehmlich positive Inhalte verbindet, ist die frühere Verwendung um vieles breiter: „1. Zaubermittel, schädliches Mittel, bes. Gift. 2. Heilmittel, (zunächst Gegengift)… 3. Färbemittel;" Gemoll, *Schul- und Handwörterbuch*, 779.

[128] Es ist nicht klar, ob mit βασίλειον ein örtlich umschreibbares Gebiet oder eine Funktion gemeint ist.

[129] Vgl. Weische, „Rhetorik," 1016-17.

[130] Vgl. O. Kaiser, „Gott als Lenker des menschlichen Schicksals in Platons ‚Nomoi'," in *Rethinking the Foundations. Historiography in the Ancient World and in the Bible. Essays in Honour of John Van Seters* (eds. S.L. MacKenzie det al., BZAW 294,

Wenngleich manche dieser fragwürdigen Positionen nur im „stillen Kämmerlein" ausgesprochen werden (1:10b), sind sie nicht zu verbergen. Als Reden (λόγοι; 1:9b) werden die Überlegungen (διαβούλιοι; 1:9b) verbreitet und gelangen auch zum *Herrn* — es wird wieder der Bezug zum Gott der Offenbarung aufgenommen —, woraufhin er eine Untersuchung durchführt.

Die Präsentation der Rede in der sechsten Strophe: Für die Äußerungen der Kontrahenten verwendet der Autor nur noch abwertende Bezeichnungen, welche zum Teil die Wertigkeit, zum Teil die Wirkung beschreiben: Es handelt sich also einerseits um zu nichts nütziges Gemurmel (γογγυσμὸς ἀνωφελής; 1:11a) und um verlogene Worte (στόμα καταψευδόμενον; 1:11d) und sind statt mit wohlklingenden Tönen vergleichbar mit unangenehmem Geräusch (φθέγμα; 1:11c). Die Wirkung ist andererseits negativ. Die Gesprächspartner werden nieder gemacht (καταλαλιά; 1:11b), ja sogar das Leben vernichtet (ἀναίρειν ψυχήν; 1:11d).[131] Mit Nachdruck kann der Autor nur davor warnen: „Hütet euch" (φυλάξασθε; 1:11a) vor dieser Art von Rednereien! Damit beendet der biblische Schriftsteller seine Stellungnahme zu den „Reden," jedoch nicht seine Ausführungen.

5.3.2. *Gottes Wille — Leben versus Tod*

Weish 1:11b hatte mit der Warnung geendet, dass das „Leben weggenommen wird." Nun beschreibt der Autor warnend, worauf sich das Leben der Gegner hinentwickelt. Man möge endlich einsehen, dass es sich um einen Irrweg handelt, wobei es besonders peinlich ist, dass das eigene Verhalten (1:12b) in den Abgrund führt. Man schaufelt sich selbst das Grab.

Die Botschaft, welche Gott mitteilen will, ist kontradiktorisch. Gott hat den Tod[132] nicht geschaffen, er will das Leben seiner Geschöpfe, denn dazu hat er sie in Dasein gebracht. Das Verderben in Form von faktischer Selbstzerstörung ist kein unentrinnbares „Schicksal," ja an sich hat die Unterwelt keinen Platz in der auf das Leben hin

Berlin: de Gruyter 2000) 91-113 = id., *Zwischen Athen und Jerusalem. Studien zur griechischen und biblischen Theologie, ihrer Eigenart und ihrem Verhältnis* (BZAW 320, Berlin: de Gruyter 2003) 81-103.

[131] Vgl. Engel, „Wem nimmt unrechtes Denken," 65f.

[132] Vgl. H. Bückers, *Die Unsterblichkeitslehre des Weisheitsbuches. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung* (Münster: Aschendorff 1938); P. Beauchamp, „Le salut corporel des justes et la conclusion du livre de la Sagesse," *Bib* 45 (1964) 491-526; Y. Amir, „The Figure of Death in the Book of Wisdom," *JJS* 30 (1979) 154-78; id., „Die Gestalt des Thanatos in der 'Weisheit Salomos'," in *Studien zum Antiken Judentum* (ed. Y. Amir, BEATAJ 2, Frankfurt: Lang 1985) 51-82; M. Kolarcik, *The Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1-6. A Study of Literary Structure and Interpretation* (AnBib 127, Rom: Pontificio Instituto Biblico 1991).

ausgerichteten Schöpfung: Gott hat nämlich das All für das Dasein (1:14a) und nicht für das Verderben geschaffen.[133]

5.3.3. *Zwischensumme über 1:9a-14d*

Die philosophische Bildung macht die Studenten stolz. Der Autor des Weisheitsbuches wertet die Bemühungen als eigenbrödlerische Geheimnistuerei ab. Er fährt schweres Geschütz auf gegen die zentralen Bereiche der philosophischen Ausbildung und greift mit Schärfe zentrale Bereiche an, soweit sie von der Akzeptanz Gottes wegführen. Wer das Gefühl für Achtung verloren hat, also ἀ-σεβής ist, der zerstört sein und der anderen Leben.

Die sechste Strophe summiert die negativen Elemente der philosophischen Gegner. In jedem Kolon werden einschlägige Worte verwendet. Der Autor warnt direkt vor wertlosem und unnützem Gemurmel, indem er das abwertende γογγυσμός aus 1:10b in 1:11a wieder aufnimmt. Die dadurch vorgenommene Verdoppelung bewirkt eine unüberhörbare Akzentuierung. Ausdrücklich wird aufgefordert, die Redekunst (γλῶσσα) nicht zum Niederreden (καταλαλιά) zu missbrauchen. Es ist bekannt, dass die Redetechnik (λαλεῖν) ein Ausbildungsbereich in der philosophischen Bildung war.[134] Diese Fertigkeit wurde offensichtlich dazu verwendet, um Personen wie den Autor und dessen Gleichgesinnten argumentativ fertig zu machen. Man sieht sich latenten und unwahren Angriffen ausgesetzt. Die Gegner waren mächtig, und argumentativ überlegen. Mit dem Hinweis, dass ein verlogener Mund die Seele, d.h. den Menschen, töten kann, schließt die Strophe.

In der siebenten Strophe wird die Rede nicht mehr erwähnt, doch wird deren in 1:11d angedeutete Wirkung, nämlich der Tod, ausführlich erörtert. Die Quintessenz für unsere Überlegungen lautet: „Gott hat den Tod nicht gemacht noch erfreut er sich am Untergang der Lebenden;" 1:13a.b.

6. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Verfasser entwickelt seine Argumente aufbauend in sieben Strophen, wobei die siebente Strophe wiederum in drei Schwerpunkte unterteilt ist. Diese Strophen werden ihrerseits metrisch, stilistisch und

[133] Vgl. M.V. Fabbri, *Creazione e salvezza nel Libro della Sapienza. Esegesi di Sapienza 1,13-15* (Rom: Armando 1998); H. Engel, „Gerechtigkeit lieben oder den Tod. Die lternativen der Lebensentscheidung nach dem Buch der Weisheit," in *Leben trotz Tod* (eds. M. Ebner *et al.*, JBTH 19, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener 2005) 173-93.

[134] Vgl. Epiktet, Diss. II.13.21: λαλεῖν οὖν οὐ μεμελέτηκας; καὶ τί ἄλλο ἐμελέτας ἐν τῇ σχολῇ; zitiert nach T. Vegge, *Paulus und das antike Schulwesen. Schule und Bildung des Paulus* (BZNW 134, Berlin: de Gruyter 2006) 509, und Fn 43.

inhaltlich auf drei Megastanzen aufgeteilt, wobei es dem Autor gelingt, auch mittels dieser poetischen Gestaltung weitere differenzierende Akzente zu setzen. Obgleich jede Strophe einen Schwerpunkt bzw. mehrere Akzente besitzt, sind sie ineinander verschränkt.

6.1. *Die Akzente der Strophen*

In der ersten Strophe stellt der Autor nachdrücklich den *Herrn* in den Mittelpunkt und zeigt damit das Gesamtziel, da ohne ihn und sein Wirken all das Folgende kein Fundament hätte. Eindringlich wirbt er für die Zuwendung, wobei sich schon andeutet, wo Spannungen zu erwarten sind. Wer sich recht zu Gott verhält, der wird ihn auch finden.

Gleich eingangs wird in der zweiten Strophe der Gefahrenherd benannt: es sind die gut und systematisch Gebildeten, die wegen ihrer Spekulationen, welche ohne Berücksichtigung Gottes auskommen, auf der Suche nach der unverzichtbaren Weisheit in die Irre gehen. Gleichzeitig zeigt sich, dass es nicht bei den Gedankenspielen bleibt, sondern konkrete Übeltaten folgen.

In der dritten Strophe wird die erste Dimension des heiligen Geistes — ein außerhalb hellenistischer Philosophie anzusiedelndes Konzept — in den Mittelpunkt gestellt, der gegen Hinterlist und Uneinsichtigkeit steht: Dummheit schließt auf Geist gegründete Kultur und Klugheit aus.

Die zweite Dimension des Geistes, die Menschenfreundlichkeit, führt zur Weisheit, doch ist es gerade der Geist, der verführerisches und verfälschendes Reden der Philosophen und Repräsentanten „akademischer" Schulen als irreführend bloß stellt. Letztlich ist es aber Gott, der seine Position als umfassende Autorität in Anspruch nimmt.

Die dritte Dimension des Geistes ist seine Beziehung zum *Herrn*. Er ist einerseits Souverän über das All, er kümmert sich aber auch um all das, was in diesen philosophischen Lehren als Welterklärung angepriesen wird. Selbst wenn es nicht öffentlich vertreten wird, bekommt er es zu Ohren, da er sich darum bemüht.

Die sechste Strophe warnt vor den zerstörerischen Gefahren verführerischer Reden und Lehren. Sie dienen nur dazu, andere fertig zu machen und können sogar das Leben nehmen.

Mit einer Warnung beginnt der erste Abschnitt der siebenten Strophe: man möge doch nicht so dumm sein, mit eigenen Händen den Untergang zu forcieren. Der nächste Argumentationsschritt hebt hervor, dass Gott den Tod nicht wollte. Und der dritte Akzent stellt die Hoffnung in den Mittelpunkt: Gott hat alles zum Sein geschaffen und für den Hades, für den Tod, gibt es in seiner Schöpfung keinen Platz.

6.2. *Die Einordnung der Einheit*

Abschließend werden Überlegungen angestellt, ob 1:1b-14d von allem Anfang an im Hinblick auf das ganze Buch der Weisheit konzipiert wurde, oder ob der Abschnitt eigenständig sein könnte.

Weish 1,1b-14d präsentiert sich als ein Thesenpier, das mit Lob und Tadel, Aufmunterung und Zurückweisung, Zustimmung und Negierung für die eigene Position wirbt. Es zeigen sich in diesem Abschnitt die klassischen Elemente der profanen Rhetorik. Wenn man die Gattung des logos protreptikos nicht kennen sollte, könnte man an dem relativ kurzen Text die ihn kennzeichnenden Kriterien ablesen.

Die Ausführungen von 1:1b-4b werden durch 1:1a.15 mit einer „modernen" Klammer versehen, wenden sich diese Kola doch an jene, die damals das öffentliche Leben prägten und so faktisch die Lebensgestaltung massiv beeinflussten: die Entscheidungsträger (οἱ κρίνοντες τὴν γῆν; 1:1a) werden daher gleich am Anfang angesprochen. Ihre Sorge sollte der „Gerechtigkeit" / δικαιοσύνη, welche zur Verfasserzeit mit sehr vielen bekannten Konnotationen verbunden wurde, gelten. „Gerechtigkeit" bildet hier die terminologische Zusammenfassung der positiven Grundregeln des Zusammenlebens. Der zweite Teil der Klammer hält vor Augen, dass es eine Hoffnung gibt, denn die Gerechtigkeit ist ohne Ende und hört niemals auf, ist eben ἀθάνατος.[135]

Es ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass zu dem kurzen Vers 1:15 in der Vetus Latina als 1:15b zu lesen ist „iniustitia autem mortis est acquisitio," das schon von Grimm[136] folgend ins Griechische übersetzt wurde: ἀδικία δὲ Θανάτου περιποίησίς ἐστιν. Der Gedanke, dass die Ungerechtigkeit faktisch mit der Aneignung des Todes gleich zu setzen ist, würde sehr gut zur Klammer (1:1a.15[a]), weniger gut zum Ziel der Argumentation der siebten Strophe passen. Daran zeigt sich, dass im Gegensatz zu vielen neuzeitlichen Auslegern schon sehr früh 1:1b-14d als in sich geschlossen angesehen worden war und ein flüssiger Übergang zum Rest gesucht wurde. Einen solchen versucht auch 1:16 — eine Prosapassage, welche also schon von da her deutlich aus dem

[135] Die metaphorische Verwendung von θάνατος ist nicht ungewöhnlich (vgl. F.V. Reiterer, „Tod und Lebensende nach Sira," in *Human Body in Death and Resurrection* [eds. T. Nicklas *et al.*, DCLY 2009, Berlin: de Gruyter], im Druck) und die prägnante Vorstellung von „Unsterblichkeit", wie sie im christlichen Kontext gesehen wird, noch nicht ausgebildet; vgl. J.J., Collins, „The Root of Immortality. Death in the Context of Jewish Wisdom," *HThR* 71 (1978) 177-92; J. Day, „The Development of Belief in Life after Death in Ancient Israel," in *After the Exile, FS R. Mason* (eds. J. Barton and D.J. Reimer, Macon: Mercer Univ. Press 1996) 231-57.

[136] C.L.W. Grimm, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (KEH.Apokr 6, Leipzig: Hochhausen & Fournes 1860) 63f.

poetischen Rahmen fällt — herzustellen und konzentriert sich mit der Anwerbung des Todes auf einen Gedanken, der in 1:12a behandelt wurde:

> Die Pietätlosen aber rufen ihn (den Hades) mit Händen und mit Worten, ihn behandeln sie wie einen Freund, ihn eignen sie sich an und sie schließen ein Trutzbündnis mit ihm, weil sie es sich verdienen, dessen Anteil zu sein (Weish 1:16).

Das Thema steht aber im Gegensatz zu 1:13a-b.14a-d.

Der Schriftsatz 1:1b-14d ergibt ohne weiteren Kontext einen guten Sinn und ist in sich abgerundet und verständlich. Er kann ohne weiters einmal selbständig gewesen sein. Zugleich verknüpfen ihn viele Querverbindungen mit dem restlichen Buch.

ELECTION AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON[1]

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Like most of his predecessors in the Jewish wisdom tradition, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon classifies humankind in binary terms: individuals are either righteous or unrighteous, wise or foolish. In older Israelite wisdom literature, whose universalist outlook was generally uninterested in the historical traditions of ancient Israel, this binary classification of humankind in no way implied that wisdom and righteousness are the sole property of God's chosen people, Israel. Rather, the cosmopolitan quality of the ancient Near Eastern Wisdom tradition, in which Israel's sages took part, suggested that anyone regardless of ethnic or religious identity could achieve wisdom. This lack of interest in Israel's historical traditions by Jewish sages ends abruptly with Ben Sira, who attempts to reconcile the universal impulse of ancient Near Eastern Wisdom with the particularity of Israel's Torah. An analogous problem faces the author of the Wisdom of Solomon in his presumed Alexandrian Diaspora setting during the early Roman period.[2] For Pseudo-Solomon the question becomes how to reconcile the particular traditions of Israel's special relationship to God with Greek philosophy. In this paper, I wish to pose two questions to the Wisdom of Solomon. First, in his division of humanity into two groups, does Pseudo-Solomon associate righteousness with Jews and ungodliness

[1] Among the conferees who offered numerous valuable suggestions, I would like to single out Matthew Goff for reading and commenting on a written draft of this article. In addition, I am grateful to Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, my colleague at the University of Virginia, for generously sharing her insights. Finally, I thank the Department of Religious Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for awarding me a William D. McLester grant, to make possible my participation in the Fourth International Conference on the Deuterocanonical Books.

[2] On the provenance and date of composition, see D. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation and Commentary* (AB 43, Garden City: Doubleday 1979) 20-25. J.J. Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 1997) 179 argues for a date between 30 BCE and 70 CE.

with non-Jews?[3] And second, if, as I will argue, the author does not suggest such a division along ethnic lines, what then is the criterion by which the author distinguishes human beings?

PSEUDO-SOLOMON'S BINARY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME

Let me begin by surveying the terms with which the author draws his binary portrait of humankind. While various source-critical approaches to the book's composition have been proposed, the current structure of the book "flows," such that it seems prudent to interpret the work as a unity. Nonetheless, in my survey of the data, as well as in my subsequent analysis, I will employ the following three-fold division of the book: Book of Eschatology, chaps 1-5; Book of Wisdom, chaps 7-9; Book of History, chaps 11-19. Chapters 6 and 10 serve as transitions between the three divisions of the work.[4]

The binary classification of humanity begins in the Book of Eschatology. In chapters 1-5, the principle categories are the "ungodly" (ἀσεβής; 1:9; 3:10; 4:3; 5:14) and the "righteous man" (δίκαιος; 2:10, 12; 4:7; 4:16; 5:1; cf. plural 5:15). The ungodly are also referred to as the "unrighteous" (ἄδικος; 3:19; 4:16) and the "foolish" (ἄφρων; 3:2).[5] In contrast, the author refers to the righteous man as "wise" (σοφός; 4:17), as being counted "among the sons of God" (ἐν υἱοῖς θεοῦ), and as having his "lot" (ὁ κλῆρος) "among the saints" (ἐν ἁγίοις; 5:5). The author also uses parent-child language to describe the relationship of the righteous man to God: he is a "child of the Lord" (παῖδα κυρίου; 2:13) and "God is his father" (πατέρα θεόν; 2:16).

The Book of Wisdom (7-9) emphasizes the figure of wisdom and how to attain her. As a result, the binary scheme established in chapters 1-5 is essentially non-existent. While the author does not mention the ungodly group from the Book of Eschatology, he does refer to "the wise" (σοφός; 7:15; cf. 6:24), who, once they are inhabited by wisdom, become "friends" (φίλος; 7:27) of God. Moreover, Solomon prays that, through

[3] Elsewhere I have argued that Ben Sira does not equate wisdom and righteousness with Jews alone and folly and unrighteousness solely with non-Jews. See G.S. Goering, *Wisdom's Root Revealed: Ben Sira and the Election of Israel* (JSJSup 139, Leiden: Brill 2009).

[4] Most commentators discern a tripartite division of the book, although not all agree on the exact extent of each section. For a slightly different demarcation of the units, see Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 9-12.

[5] After they see the salvation of the righteous man, the ungodly also apply the term "foolish" (οἱ ἄφρονες; 5:4) to themselves. For the text of the Wisdom of Solomon, I have followed the edition of J. Ziegler, *Sapientia Salomonis* (2nd ed., Septuaginta 12/1, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1980).

divine wisdom, he might be counted, like the righteous man in the Book of Eschatology, among God's children (παίδων σου; 9:4).

Chapter 10 continues once again the binary classification scheme established by the Book of Eschatology. The author alludes to Noah, Abraham, Lot, Jacob, and Joseph as "righteous" (δίκαιος; 10:4, 5, 6, 10, 13). These figures are contrasted with the "unrighteous" (ἄδικος) Cain (10:3), the "nations" (ἐθνῶν) who were confused at Babel (10:5), the ungodly (ἀσεβῶν) in Sodom and Gomorrah (10:6-7), and the "enemies" (ἐχθρῶν) who opposed Jacob (10:12). Alluding to the exodus in the final verses, the author refers to the Israelites as "a holy people and a blameless race" (λαὸν ὅσιον καὶ σπέρμα ἄμεμπτον; 10:15), "holy ones" (ὁσίοις; 10:17), and "the righteous" (δίκαιοι; 10:20; cf. 11:14). In contrast the author describes the Egyptians as "a nation of oppressors" (ἔθνους θλιβόντων; 10:15), "enemies" (ἐχθροὺς; 10:19; cf. 11:5), and "the ungodly" (ἀσεβεῖς; 10:20; cf. 11:9; 16:18; 19:1).

The Book of History (11-19) maintains, for the most part, the focus of chapter 10 on the exodus and utilizes numerous contrastive terms to describe these two groups.[6] The author continues to allude to the Egyptians as "the ungodly" (ἀσεβεῖς; 11:9; 16:18; 19:1; cf. 10:20), "enemies" (ἐχθροὺς; 11:5; 12:22; 16:8; 18:7), and "foes" (τοὺς ὑπεναντίους; 11:8; 18:7, 8). In a short digression, the author refers to the indigenous inhabitants of Canaan as "ungodly" (ἀσεβής; 12:9) and "unrighteous" (ἄδικος; 12:12). In contrast, the author alludes to the Israelites as "righteous" (δικαίοις; 11:14; 12:9; 18:7) and as "the holy nation" (ἔθνος ἅγιον; 17:2). He underscores the contrast between the two groups by numerous oppositions: 18:7 contrasts the deliverance of "the righteous" (δικαίων) with the destruction of "the enemies" (ἐχθρῶν), 17:2 distinguishes the "holy nation" (ἔθνος ἅγιον) from the "lawless" (ἄνομοι; 17:2), and many verses contrast "those people" (ἐκεῖνοι) with "these people" (αὐτοὶ; 11:10; 16:3, 4, 5; 17:20; 18:1, 4).

As with the righteous man in the Book of Eschatology, several allusions to Israel in the Book of History suggest a close relationship between Israel and the deity. The author alludes to Israel as "your people" (σου τὸν λαὸν; 12:19; 16:2; 16:20; 18:7, 13; 19:5, 22) and "your holy ones" (τοῖς δὲ ὁσίοις σου; 18:1, 5). Like the righteous man, the Israelites are characterized as God's "sons" (τοὺς υἱούς σου; 12:19, 21; 16:10, 26; 18:4) and God's "children" (οἱ σοὶ παῖδες; 19:6).[7] Moreover, the author claims that a genetic relationship exists among (at least some of) the righteous people—"the holy children of good people" (ὅσιοι παῖδες ἀγαθῶν; 18:9)—and, through the several references to the Israelites using

[6] As in chapter 10, the author refrains from mentioning peoples by name, but for the reader familiar with the Septuagint, he clearly alludes to the Israelites, Egyptians, and Canaanites in the exodus and the conquest.

[7] Cf. "children of God" (θεοῦ παίδων) in 12:7 and "children" (τέκνα) in 16:21.

first person, plural pronouns (e.g., "our ancestors"; πατράσιν ἡμῶν; 18:6; cf. 12:21-22; 15:1; 18:8), the author identifies himself as a descendant of the holy people of Israel.[8]

One may draw several conclusions from this survey of terms which the author uses to classify human beings into two groups. First, the binary scheme predominates in the Book of Eschatology and in the Book of History, but is essentially absent in the Book of Wisdom. The absence of the classification scheme in the Book of Wisdom is not surprising, given its emphasis on the figure of wisdom and how to attain her. Second, the Book of History uses many of the same terms first introduced in the Book of Eschatology (e.g., righteous/unrighteous, children of God/ ungodly, enemies). Third, the possessive pronouns that the author uses to describe the righteous intimate their close relationship to the deity. And finally, the author closely identifies himself with the righteous.

THE ELECT, WISDOM, AND THE DIVINE-HUMAN RELATIONSHIP

In my survey, I have thus far omitted one important term—the elect. One may infer from the possessive pronouns used to describe the relationship between the righteous and the deity that the righteous are God's elect (see, e.g., 15:1-2; 16:20; 18:5, 7). In addition to these possessive pronouns, the author employs the metaphors of friendship, filial relation, and love to describe the association between the righteous and God. Whereas the ungodly call Death a "friend" (φίλος; 1:16), the righteous through wisdom become "friends of God" (φίλους θεοῦ; 7:27). Likewise, in contrast to the ungodly (ὁ ἀσεβῶν) who, along with their ungodliness (ἡ ἀσέβεια), are "hateful" (μισητός) to God (14:9-10), God "loves" the righteous, who are his sons (οἱ υἱοί σου οὓς ἠγάπησας κύριε; 16:26).[9] Thus, the status of the righteous as the elect of God is suggested by their friendship, as well as by their child-parent relationship of love with the deity.

We need not, however, make this identification between the righteous and the elect based on inference alone. On several occasions, Pseudo-Solomon describes explicitly the righteous as God's elect, each time echoing biblical texts that describe Israel's divine election. In the Book of Eschatology, the author suggests that God's grace and mercy are

[8] As J.M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE — 117 CE)* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1996) 188-89 has observed.

[9] The author further suggests the elect status of the righteous man by the fact that his "lot" (ὁ κλῆρος) exists among "the saints" (ἐν ἁγίοις; 5:5). Ben Sira frequently uses the notion of a lot or portion to describe the status of the elect; see Goering, *Wisdom's Root Revealed*, 96-101.

with "his elect" (τοῖς ἐκλεκτοῖς αὐτοῦ),[10] a phrase which stands in poetic parallelism with "his holy ones" (τοῖς ὁσίοις αὐτοῦ; 4:15; cf. LXX Ps 104:6; 104:43; 105:5; 1 Chron 16:13; Tob 8:15; 2 Macc 1:25). In the Book of Wisdom, Solomon recounts how God "chose" (προείλω) him for kingship (9:7; cf. LXX Deut 7:6-7; 10:15).[11] Finally, in the Book of History, the author describes the moment in which the Egyptians are punished and the Israelites rescued as the point at which God "called [Israel] to himself" (προσκαλέομαι; 18:8; cf. LXX Exod 3:18; 5:3).

The author uses the same language of friendship, kinship, and love from his portrait of the relationship between the elect and God to describe the relationship between the individual and Wisdom (6:12, 17; 8:18). Solomon, whose experience is promoted as paradigmatic, is said to "love" (φιλέω) wisdom (8:2)[12] and describes his relationship with wisdom as one of "kinship" (ἐν συγγενείᾳ σοφίας; 8:17) and "friendship" (ἐν φιλίᾳ αὐτῆς; 8:18). After understanding the advantages of wisdom, Solomon "sought" (ζητέω) her for himself (8:18).

The description of Solomon's experience with wisdom suggests that human initiative functions as the antecedent to Wisdom's consequent and reciprocal movement. Wisdom is easily discerned by "those who love her" (τῶν ἀγαπώντων αὐτὴν), and found by "those who seek her" (τῶν ζητούντων αὐτήν; 6:12; cf. 6:14).[13] Once the human initiative has been taken, Wisdom makes a corresponding advance: Wisdom "hastens to make herself known to those who desire her" (φθάνει τοὺς ἐπιθυμοῦντας προγνωσθῆναι; 6:13), goes around "seeking" (ζητοῦσα) those who are worthy of her, "appears" (φαντάζεται) to them and meets (ὑπαντᾷ) them (6:16), and, finally, makes them "friends of God" (φίλους θεοῦ; 7:27). Thus, Wisdom's role in election occurs subsequent to human initiative.

As in the Wisdom-human relationship in the Book of Wisdom, so also in the divine-human relationship in the Book of Eschatology human initiative takes precedence. At the very beginning of the book, the author exhorts the rulers of the earth to "seek" (ζητήσατε) the Lord, because he is "found" (εὑρίσκεται) by those who do not put him to the test (1:1-2).[14] In Ben Sira's "Hymn in Praise of the Ancestors," the elect

[10] See also 3:9, where, however, the text is uncertain.

[11] In 7:10, the author employs the same verb in order to recount how Solomon "chose" wisdom over light.

[12] In 8:3, God is said to "love" (ἠγάπησεν) wisdom, too.

[13] The older Israelite wisdom tradition also described wisdom as something which could be "found": LXX Prov 1:28; 2:5; 3:13; 8:9, 17; Job 28:12, 13, 20.

[14] Similarly, God "manifests" (ἐμφανίζεται) himself to those who do not distrust him (1:2). In the Book of History, God's word sustains those who trust in him (16:26). Likewise, at the moment of their election, the Israelites "agreed to the divine law with one accord" (τὸν τῆς θειότητος νόμον ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ διέθεντο; 18:9). In contrast to those who seek God and find him, the Book of History describes those who desire to "find" God through the natural world but fail (13:6, 9).

are those "found" ("εὑρίσκω") by God (Sir 44:17, 19; 45:1 [ET 44:23]).[15] Pseudo-Solomon reverses the direction of seeking and finding, in order to emphasize human initiative. While in much of the biblical tradition election is portrayed in terms of divine initiative in the establishment of the divine-human relationship, the Wisdom of Solomon describes election more in terms of a mutual relationship, in which human initiative plays an important role.

THE IDENTITY OF THE ELECT

From the references to election in all three parts of the book, it is apparent that the righteous are identified as the elect, while the unrighteous constitute the nonelect. The Book of History in particular—with its allusion to the Israelites as God's people and the Egyptians (and to a lesser extent the Canaanites) as the ungodly—may leave the impression that Pseudo-Solomon views God's elect as the Jews alone. That is, one might easily interpret the author's classification of humans into two opposing categories along purely ethnic lines. This is essentially the view of John Barclay: "It thus emerges with unmistakable clarity that God's favour rests preferentially on his people," by which Barclay means the Jews.[16] Barclay argues that "the prevailing ethos [of the book is] antagonistic, with non-Jews presented mainly in the guise of 'enemies', 'aliens' or 'fools'."[17] Barclay's argument depends on his assertion that the universal vision is mostly present in the Book of Wisdom, with the result that the particularistic vision of the Book of Eschatology and the Book of History "drowns its integrative potential in a sea of polemic."[18] The universal scope of chapters 6-9 is not much in dispute. According to the Book of Wisdom, all that exists, both small and great, was made by God, who shows concern for them all alike (6:7). Moreover, all humans share certain characteristics: they are mortal (θνητὸς), descended from Adam, formed in the womb of a mother, and breathe common air (7:1-6).[19] The author exhorts presumably Gentile rulers of the earth (6:1-2) to heed his instruction, so that they may learn wisdom and not transgress (6:9). This suggests, then, that Gentiles have the capacity to attain wisdom and thereby avoid the fate that befalls the ungodly in chaps 1-5. Pseudo-Solomon indicates that Gentile rulers can

[15] B.L. Mack, *Wisdom and the Hebrew Epic: Ben Sira's Hymn in Praise of the Fathers* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1985) 20, 24.

[16] Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 181-91. The quote may be found on p. 190.

[17] *Ibid*., 181.

[18] *Ibid*., 183-4. The quote may be found on p. 184.

[19] Ben Sira also suggests that despite the elect status of some, all humans share a fundamental trait: they are all created from the dust of the earth (Sir 33:10).

be made holy (ὁσιωθήσονται) by observing holy things (6:10). This universal vision, however, is not limited to the Book of Wisdom; it may also be found in the Book of Eschatology and the Book of History.[20]

The Book of Eschatology asserts God's universal concern for his creation. The deity created all things that they might exist (1:11) and made "humankind" (ἄνθρωπος) in general for incorruption (2:23). Moreover, the creator distributed his *pneuma* over the entire world (πνεῦμα κυρίου πεπλήρωκεν τὴν οἰκουμένην; 1:7), an idea paralleled by Ben Sira's notion that God dispensed wisdom to the entire world, including all flesh (Sir 1:9-10). For Pseudo-Solomon, God's *pneuma*, or his wisdom, is "that which holds all things together" (τὸ συνέχον τὰ πάντα; 1:7).[21] In addition, chapters 1-5 speak positively of non-Jews. The author alludes to Enoch as "one who pleased God" (εὐάρεστος θεῷ) and "was loved" (ἠγαπήθη) by God (4:10; cf. 4:14). Finally, like the Book of Wisdom, the Book of Eschatology addresses the presumably Gentile "rulers of the earth" (οἱ κρίνοντες τὴν γῆν; 1:1), suggesting that they too can attain wisdom and achieve righteousness. The assertions that God is "found" (εὑρίσκεται) by those who do not put him to the test and that God "manifests" (ἐμφανίζεται) himself to those who do not distrust him are not limited to Jews.

Similarly, the universal vision permeates the Book of History. As in the Book of Wisdom, the Book of History suggests that all humans have a common origin in the earth ("born out of the earth"; ἐκ γῆς γενηθεὶς; 15:8) as well as the ability to reason to God from his creation (13:1-9). Moreover, God's universal concern for humanity is expressed by the fact that his word heals all people (ὁ σός κύριε λόγος ὁ πάντας ἰώμενος; 16:12). As Michael Kolarcik has demonstrated, the principal of justice lends the Book of History a universal cast.[22] Because God loves all things he made (11:24) and has placed his immortal spirit in all things (12:1), he shows mercy to all, correcting little by little and giving opportunities for repentance (11:23; 12:2; cf. 12:16). Finally, as with Enoch in the Book of Eschatology, chapter 10 deems as righteous several non-Israelite figures, such as Noah and Lot (10:4-6). The presence of universal sentiments in

[20] My point is not to deny that particularism also forms a strand in the work, but rather to show that universalism permeates the entire book. As Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora* (2nd ed., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2000) 201 has aptly observed, "There is… a fundamental tension between universalism and particularism in the Wisdom of Solomon." See idem, "Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition: The Case of Hellenistic Judaism," *CBQ* 60 (1998) 11-14; reprinted in *Encounters with Biblical Theology*, ed. John J. Collins (Minneapolis: Fortress Press 2005) 117-28. Compare the remark of Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 46.

[21] See below.

[22] M. Kolarcik, "Universalism and Justice in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *Treasures of Wisdom: Studies in Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom* (eds. J. Vermeylen and N. Calduch-Benages, BETL 143, Leuven: Peeters 1999) 289-301.

the first and third parts of the book undermines Barclay's argument that the particularism of the Book of Eschatology and the Book of History overwhelms the universalism of the Book of Wisdom.

Moreover, the antagonism discerned by Barclay especially in chapters 1-5 and 10-19 does not necessarily divide along ethnic lines. Because the ungodly characterize the life of the righteous poor man as "dissimilar" (ἀνόμοιος) and his ways as "turned backwards" (ἐξηλλαγμέναι; 2:15), Barclay reads the Book of Eschatology as "a reflection of conflict between Jews and non-Jews."[23] Yet even he acknowledges that the specific language of attack on the ungodly suggests that the opponents themselves may be Jews. The ungodly wish to eliminate the righteous man because he accuses them of "sins against the law" and against their "training" (ὀνειδίζει ἡμῖν ἁμαρτήματα νόμου καὶ ἐπιφημίζει ἡμῖν ἁμαρτήματα παιδείας ἡμῶν; 2:12).[24] As John Collins argues, these accusations make most sense if lodged against Jews who would be expected to uphold the law and their Jewish training.[25] Moreover, as I noted earlier, the positive allusion to Enoch suggests that the terms righteous and unrighteous do not correspond to Jew and Gentile, respectively.[26]

The emphasis on the Israelites and Egyptians in the Book of History is more problematic. Collins interprets the author's reluctance to identify historical heroes by name to mean that Pseudo-Solomon views Israel as a universal example of righteousness: "The history of Israel provides a paradigmatic example of the experience of righteous individuals or a righteous people, but it is only an illustration of the workings of the universe."[27] Chapters 11-19 are "not treated...as the unique and exceptional history of Israel."[28] Barclay counters that, "The anonymity of the characters is not designed to establish a broad typology capable of including the righteous of all nations. It is a stylistic and rhetorical device, in the Alexandrian tradition of literary allusion; the biblically informed audience will know well enough to whom 'God's people'

[23] Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 185-86.

[24] *Ibid*., 186 n 9; 109.

[25] Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 194-95. Collins cites approvingly P. Heinisch, *Das Buch der Weisheit* (Münster: Aschendorff 1912) 41.

[26] Even non-wisdom biblical texts do not always draw the distinction between the elect and others solely along ethnic lines. See, e.g., the story of the Israelite Achan who is treated like part of the anti-elect in Josh 7 and the story of the non-Israelite Rahab who is treated as part of the elect. On the topic of election in the Hebrew Bible, see J. Kaminsky, "Did Election Imply the Mistreatment of Non-Israelites?," *HTR* 96 (2003) 402; and, more expansively, idem, *Yet I Loved Jacob: Reclaiming the Biblical Concept of Election* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2007).

[27] J.J. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 201.

[28] *Ibid*., 198.

refers."[29] It is not clear, however, why with Barclay we should take the figure of Solomon in the Book of Wisdom as a universal exemplar but not the Israelites in the Book of History.[30] David Winston's argument that the Egyptians and Canaanites stand for contemporary Alexandrians and Romans, against which the author polemicizes, suggests an intermediate possibility.[31] While I doubt that the author polemicizes against all Alexandrians, I suspect that the ancient Egyptians receive extensive treatment because Pseudo-Solomon desires to distinguish his own Jewish community from contemporary Egyptians who were despised by Greeks.

As a community, Jews were never granted citizenship in Alexandria, but rather possessed a certain measure of autonomy to govern their own affairs, as did other ethnic minorities.[32] If the Wisdom of Solomon is correctly dated to the early Roman period, it is possible to read the author's Israelite/Egyptian contrast in light of the Roman imposition of the poll tax (λαογραφία) in 24/23 BCE.[33] Whereas Greek citizens of Alexandria were exempt from the tax, native Egyptians and members of the Jewish community were not. Hellenized Jews such as Pseudo-Solomon shared especially with educated Greeks a great disdain for Egyptians. For example, many Greeks and most Hellenized Jews would have scorned Egyptian animism.[34] After the imposition of the poll tax,

[29] Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 190. Barclay cites Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 139-40 on Alexandrian allusiveness.

[30] Barclay (*Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 189, n. 13) suggests that in recounting the Exodus story the author of Wisdom of Solomon attacks not just the ancient Egyptians but "the nations" (τὰ ἔθνη; 12:12; 14:11; 15:15) in general. But the last two of these instances concern the idols of the nations, and the first refers to God's destruction of the indigenous inhabitants of the land of Canaan. None of these examples indicate a wholesale judgment on non-Jews.

[31] Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 45.

[32] For reconstructions of the history of Jews in Alexandria, see V. Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews* (repr. ed., Peabody: Hendrickson 1999); J. Modrzejewski, *The Jews of Egypt: From Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian* (1st English ed., Philadelphia: JPS 1995); Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 137-42; and more recently M.-F. Baslez, "The Author of Wisdom and the Cultured Environment of Alexandria," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research* (eds. A. Passaro and G. Bellia, DCLY 2005, Berlin de Gruyter 2005) 33-52; L. Mazzinghi, "Wis 19:13-17 and the Civil Rights of the Jews of Alexandria," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 53-82; and G. Bellia, "Historical and Anthropological Reading of the Book of Wisdom," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 83-115.

[33] Cf. 3 Macc 2:28. For an excellent discussion of the book's Alexandrian setting, as well as an argument for the "fiscal reform" of 24/23 BCE as the background for Pseudo-Solomon's work, see Baslez, "The Author of Wisdom."

[34] Barclay (*Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora*, 184, n. 6) interprets Pseudo-Solomon's critique of idolatry as an attack on Gentile religiosity in general. But Collins (*Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 200-01) points out "that much of this polemic can be paralleled in the writings of the Stoic and Cynic philosophers… Both in the book of

the author must have been horrified to find his fellow Jews treated in a manner identical to Egyptians and distinct from Greeks, whom they considered cultural equals.[35] In this light, one may interpret the strong antithesis between the Israelites and Egyptians developed in the Book of History not as an attack on all Gentiles—not even on all Alexandrians and Romans—but as an attempt to demonstrate how much educated Jews and Greeks share in common, namely, their mutual disregard for Egyptians.[36]

If this line of interpretation be correct, then Pseudo-Solomon does not define his binary classification of humanity along ethnic lines, as Barclay assumes. Both righteousness and unrighteousness may be associated with Jew and non-Jew alike. But if the distinction between the ungodly and the righteous is not an ethnic one, what is it?

UNIVERSAL HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

The principle difference between the two groups, I suggest, is that the righteous elect possess a specialized knowledge of the deity and his world that the unrighteous nonelect do not possess. This is not to say that the elect have knowledge and the nonelect have none, since, like the purveyors of ancient Israelite wisdom literature and Greek natural theology, Pseudo-Solomon held to the notion of a universally available human knowledge. Rather, it means that the author understands that two levels of knowledge exist. The first level consists in a universal knowledge available to all human beings, which the author refers to as "wisdom." Wisdom in this sense has much in common with Greek philosophy.

As Winston has argued, the context for Pseudo-Solomon's thought may be found in Middle-Platonism, which flourished around 80 BCE to 220 CE, the supposed time of the composition of Wisdom of Solomon.[37] Middle-Platonism maintained traditional Platonic teachings about the transcendence of God and yet incorporated into classical Platonism, among other things, Stoic notions of the cosmic *pneuma*. The concept

Wisdom and in Philo the polemic must be seen in the context of attempted rapprochement between Greek and Jewish wisdom. This rapprochement was never uncritical. Some elements of pagan religiosity were profoundly offensive even to the most Hellenized Jews. But these elements were also offensive to enlightened Greek philosophers. They did not require 'cultural antagonism' toward the entire Gentile world."

[35] Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 143-44.

[36] As Collins (*ibid.*, 157) points out, the Wisdom literature of the Hellenistic Diaspora "explores common ground between Jews and Gentiles." In Pseudo-Solomon's case, this "common ground" includes their mutual disdain for Egyptians.

[37] Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 33.

promoted by the Middle-Platonists of an intermediate sphere between the transcendent deity and the material world served as a close parallel for Pseudo-Solomon's view inherited from Proverbs and Sirach of Wisdom as a divine-human intermediary.[38]

In terms resonant of the Stoic *pneuma*, the author describes Wisdom as "a benevolent spirit" (φιλάνθρωπον γὰρ πνεῦμα σοφία; 1:6)[39] that emanates from the deity (7:25-6), permeates the world and holds all things together (πνεῦμα κυρίου πεπλήρωκεν τὴν οἰκουμένην καὶ τὸ συνέχον τὰ πάντα; 1:7).[40] As Collins observes, wisdom was a natural point of common ground between Jewish tradition and Greek philosophy. Proverbs had already described a role for Wisdom in the creation of the universe (Prov 8), and the Wisdom of Solomon continues this notion (7:22).[41]

Given the author's understanding of Wisdom's universality, it is not surprising that 13:1-9 implies that one is able to obtain knowledge of the creator by observing his cosmos.[42] Pseudo-Solomon attributes "ignorance" (ἀγνωσία) of God to the inability to "know" (εἰδέναι) the deity from "the good things that are seen" (ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἀγαθῶν); the parallel line emphasizes the point: the ignorant did not "recognize" (ἐπιγινώσκω) the artisan while "paying heed" (προσέχω) to his "works" (τοῖς ἔργοις) (13:1). The implication is that all humans, even the ignorant, can develop knowledge of God through observation of nature.[43]

The rest of the passage (13:1-9) confirms this view that the author maintains the existence of a kind of knowledge that is universally available to all through observation of nature and furthermore suggests that such knowledge should bring humans to a greater awareness of the creator.[44] Those ignorant of God mistake the created elements for gods

[38] See Collins, "Natural Theology and Biblical Tradition," 5.

[39] On *philanthropos*, see Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 43-6.

[40] See Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 196-97; Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 104.

[41] Collins (*Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 197) and Winston (*Wisdom of Solomon*, 176) compare the notion of wisdom as an artisan to the concept of nature as a creative agent in Stoicism. See also Pseudo-Solomon's assertion that God created the world by means of his "word" (ἐν λόγῳ σου) and through his "wisdom" (τῇ σοφίᾳ σου; 9:1-2).

[42] For a discussion of divine knowledge in the Wisdom of Solomon, see Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 205-09.

[43] Wisd 16.16 asserts that the ungodly refuse to know God (ἀρνούμενοι γάρ σε εἰδέναι ἀσεβεῖς). This suggests that they have the opportunity to know God, but choose not to.

[44] As Collins (*Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 199) puts it: "The hand of God can, of course, be discerned in the workings of the cosmos. It is precisely from the greatness and beauty of creation that the creator is recognized (13:1). Wisdom involves the recognition of God through the works of creation, since this is required for a full understanding of the world."

themselves (13:2). Instead of deifying nature, proper reasoning from nature should lead one to "perceive" (νοέω) the greatness of the creator (13:3-5). In this sense, Pseudo-Solomon engages in a rhetorical strategy of what Thomas Lee terms "amplification":[45] contemplating the grandeur of nature should lead to a recognition of the superior grandeur of the deity. Pseudo-Solomon suggests that these people cannot be blamed completely for their failure to discern the creator from his works (13:6-7), but neither should they be wholly excused (13:8). Given the universal availability of knowledge from the natural world, they should have arrived at a recognition of God.

The fact that those living in ignorance of the deity fail to perceive the creator suggests that the universally available knowledge of the deity accessible through his creation is somehow insufficient. The author offers numerous examples of the insufficiency of human reason. The most developed example, perhaps, is that of the ungodly in the Book of Eschatology. The principle failure of the ungodly lies in the fact that they "reason incorrectly" (λογισάμενοι οὐκ ὀρθῶς; 2:1; cf. 2:21) about the finality of death. Failing to appreciate both immortality (2:1-5) and the fact that wisdom pervades the universe, the ungodly assume, incorrectly, that "reason" (ὁ λόγος) begins and ends with each human life (2:2). They suppose that they can, without consequences, dispose of the righteous man whose accusations are "inconvenient" for them (2:12-20). They suppose this precisely because they lack knowledge of divine mysteries (οὐκ ἔγνωσαν μυστήρια θεοῦ; 2:22), namely, that God created humans for "incorruption" (ἀφθαρσία; 2:23). Pseudo-Solomon implies that the ungodly have the opportunity to develop a deeper knowledge about immortality through observation of what happens to the righteous: they will "see" (ὁράω) the end of the wise, but will fail to "understand" (νοέω) what the Lord intended for them (4:17; cf. 4:14; ET 4:15), namely, an immortal existence beyond death. Only in the post-mortem judgment scene in chapter 5 do the ungodly recognize that they did not "know" (ἐπιγινώσκω) the way of the Lord (5:7).

The examples of the Sodomites and Egyptians also demonstrate the insufficiency of human reason. In chapter 10, the residents of Sodom and Gomorrah fail to take advantage of universally available knowledge. The author says that they "passed wisdom by" (σοφίαν γὰρ παροδεύσαντες) and for this reason could not "recognize the good" (μὴ

[45] T.R. Lee, *Studies in the Form of Sirach 44-50* (Atlanta: Scholars 1986) 116 employs the term "amplification" to a technique used by Ben Sira in the hymn "In Praise of the Ancestors of Old" (Sir 44-50). Pseudo-Solomon's strategy is similar to the one employed by Ben Sira in his Hymn on Creation (Sir 42:15-43:33). Cf. Rom 1:18-23; Philo, *Decal*. 52-55.

γνῶναι τὰ καλά; 10:8a).[46] Pseudo-Solomon describes the Egyptians as "lawless" (ἄνομοι), in contrast to the "holy nation" (ἔθνος ἅγιον; 17:2) of Israel, through whom the world was given the "light of the law" (νόμου φῶς; 18:4). In this context, "without law" suggests a failure to act in accordance with the universal natural law. The "magic arts" (μαγικῆς ... τέχνης) of the Egyptians, as well as their wisdom (φρόνησις) failed them (17:7). All of these examples illustrate the author's contention that naturally available human reason proves to be insufficient.

Not only is human reason frequently insufficient for developing a deeper understanding of the deity, but as the example of idolatry demonstrates, a lack of sufficient knowledge can lead to greater evils. After the description of human failure to recognize the creator through his creation (13:1-9), the author launches into his critique of idolatry (13:10ff). The juxtaposition of these passages suggests that idolatry results from human ignorance, corresponding to the deification of the natural world in 13:2-3, although later Pseudo-Solomon asserts that the idolater "knows" (οἶδεν) that he is sinning (15:13).[47] For this reason, idolaters are judged more harshly than those who merely fail to perceive the creator through his creations. The lives of idolaters are worth less than clay because they "are ignorant" (ἀγνοέω) of the one who created them (15:9-11). Whereas the merely ignorant in 13:1-9 are "little to be blamed" though not excused (13:6, 8), idolaters face harsh punishment, since their lack of divine knowledge ("to err about the knowledge of God" τὸ πλανᾶσθαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γνῶσιν and "ignorance" ἄγνοια) leads to such ills as child sacrifice, adultery, murder, theft, and so on (14:22-29). In the case of the ungodly in the Book of Eschatology, their ignorance leads them to oppress the righteous man. This act of wickedness, in turn, "blinded" (ἀποτυφλόω) the ungodly (2:21), a sight metaphor that nonetheless suggests their inability to gain a sufficient understanding of God's secret purposes (2:22).

The most disdainful portrait of human reason appears in Wisd 9:13-18. The passage begins with rhetorical questions about the limits of human knowledge, a common motif in Israel's wisdom tradition (9:13), as von Rad pointed out.[48] Verse 14 supplies the expected negative answer: "the reasoning (λογισμοὶ) of mortals is worthless." Humans who struggle to understand earthly matters, the passage continues, can

[46] Moreover, the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah left behind a reminder so that others would learn from their mistakes (10:8b).

[47] The tension between ignorance and willful sin in the author's treatment of idolatry is just one of the many unresolved tensions in the book.

[48] See, e.g., Job 28 and the Words of Agur in Prov 30:1-4. G. von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (trans. J.D. Martin, London: SCM 1972) 97-110.

expect to acquire on their own no knowledge about the heavenly realm (9:16).[49]

As Collins has observed, the disparagement of human reason in 9:13-18 stands in tension with the implication in 13:1-9 that humans are generally capable of arriving at a proper understanding of God. One possibility is to understand this tension as follows. While 9:13-18 disparages human reason, the passage also offers a solution to the problem of the limits on universally available knowledge: no one can truly comprehend the divine will, unless, of course, God grants them "wisdom" (σοφία) from on high (9:17).[50] In other words, the author suggests that human reason apart from a divine gift of Wisdom is unlikely to succeed. As 17:1 puts it, "uninstructed souls" (ἀπαίδευτοι ψυχαὶ) go astray. Therefore, despite the universal availability of a general wisdom, humans are unlikely to find their way to God unless they receive instruction in specialized wisdom. Pseudo-Solomon grants that these uninstructed souls are ignorant, in part, because God's judgments are "hard to describe" (δυσδιήγητοι; 17:1). That is, the difficulty in gaining sufficient knowledge derives from the difficulty of the subject matter itself. Therefore, a divinely given wisdom is necessary in order to truly know God and understand his ways.

Despite human reason's insufficiency (9:13-18), the author nonetheless seems to view universal human reason as *necessary*. It is necessary in order to recognize the need for greater specialized knowledge. In 8:19-21 Solomon speaks of his life before he received a gift of divine wisdom.

> But I perceived (γινώσκω) that I would not otherwise have possession [of Wisdom] unless God gave [her to me]—and this was insight (φρόνησις) to know (εἰδέναι) whose gift [she was]—and so I entreated the Lord and begged him (8:21).

Then follows Solomon's prayer for wisdom in chapter 9. In 8:19-21, thus, Solomon refers to the naturally available knowledge that he possessed before his divine gift of wisdom. Moreover, this human reason permitted him to understand both the importance of the specialized knowledge that he lacked as well as its ultimate source. Thus, while insufficient, the naturally available human reason seems necessary for humans to recognize their need for divine wisdom.

[49] And I should note that this passage disparages all human reason, not just that of non-Jews.

[50] The final verse of the passage suggests that Wisdom saves humans on earth (9:18), a point which serves as a transition to chapter 10, a series of illustrations about Wisdom's saving work among humans.

SPECIALIZED DIVINE KNOWLEDGE AND ELECTION

Given the insufficiency of human reason by itself, the author asserts that a second level of knowledge becomes necessary for a proper understanding of God and God's world. Unfortunately, the terminology for this knowledge can be easily confused with the terminology for generally available human reason; both are referred to as "wisdom" (σοφία; 9:4). Nonetheless, this second-level knowledge may be distinguished from generally available knowledge through contextual analysis. In contrast to first-level knowledge, this second-level knowledge is portrayed as a divine gift, which one must, nonetheless, generally seek out.[51] The author develops two paradigms for the attainment of specialized knowledge.

Solomon's Reception of Wisdom

The figure of Solomon provides a first paradigm for how humans may acquire special wisdom. In Solomon's case, wisdom came as a divine gift (7:7, 17) of specialized knowledge that transcends the naturally available human reason. He received "unerring knowledge of what exists" (τῶν ὄντων γνῶσιν ἀψευδῆ; 7:17),[52] and as a result, he "perceived" (γινώσκω) things both "hidden" (κρυπτός) and "visible" (ἐμφανής; 7:21). Solomon's reception of this wisdom leads to his "friendship" (φιλία) with God (7:14), that is, his membership in the elect. While the author portrays Solomon's Wisdom as a divine gift, nonetheless Solomon had to seek it out (7:7; 8:2, 9, 18, 21). In the Solomonic model the individual takes the primary initiative in seeking out wisdom and thus a relationship with God.

The author urges the "rulers of the earth" to seek wisdom according to the Solomonic paradigm. In 6.1, he exhorts them to "understand" (σύνετε) and to "learn" (μάθετε). Analogous to a divine gift, Pseudo-Solomon offers his own instruction to the rulers, so that they may "learn wisdom" (ἵνα μάθητε σοφίαν; 6:9; cf. 6:22). Like Solomon, however, they must "desire" (ἐπιθυμέω) and "long" (ποθέω) for wisdom in order to "be

[51] My hypothesis that Pseudo-Solomon envisions two levels of knowledge as a distinguishing characteristic of the elect and nonelect may help explain what Winston ("Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *The Ancestral Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism, Essays of David Winston* [ed. G.E. Sterling, Providence: BJS 2001] 87-88) terms the "bifocal perspective" of Wisdom's transcendence and immanence.

[52] Contrast this "unerring knowledge" with the insufficient human reason which can lead to error discussed above. In 7:18-20, the author describes this unerring knowledge as a complete understanding of the universe.

instructed" (παιδεύω; 6:11).[53] This instruction results in the same "unerring knowledge" (7:17) of hidden and visible things (7:21) received by Solomon. By observing the unerring knowledge available through the author's wisdom teaching, the Gentile rulers can also become part of the elect ("made holy"; ὁσιωθήσονται; 6:10). As a result of the emphasis on human initiative in the Solomonic paradigm, anyone, Jew or Gentile, who seeks out wisdom can obtain it and become part of the elect. Thus, the Solomonic model of election is potentially universal.

This Solomonic paradigm highlights one of the unresolved tensions in the book. The question of which comes first—wisdom or righteousness—forms a kind of chicken and egg dilemma. Wisd 1:4 asserts that wisdom will not reside in a "devious soul" (κακότεχνον ψυχὴν) or in a "body enslaved to sin" (σώματι κατάχρεῳ ἁμαρτίας). This suggests that a person must be righteous—or at least not be unrighteous—before she can attain a higher level of knowledge. Similarly, 7:27 indicates that wisdom enters the "souls of the holy" (ψυχὰς ὁσίας). Like 1:4, this verse suggests that a person must first have a holy soul before wisdom will enter. But 7:27 goes on to say that wisdom makes persons "friends" (φίλους) of God (i.e., righteous). This indicates that Wisdom itself is what makes an individual part of the elect, a friend of God.[54] But just how holy or righteous must one be before Wisdom will take up residence?

The example of Solomon does not help much in resolving this tension. Because of his innate cleverness (εὐφυής) as a child, he says, a "good soul fell to my lot" (ψυχῆς τε ἔλαχον ἀγαθῆς; 8:19). One may interpret this to mean that souls preexist as good and bad.[55] Yet Solomon understood that, even though he possessed a good soul, he would not obtain wisdom unless God granted it (8:21). The overarching importance of wisdom is later emphasized by Solomon when he suggests that even one regarded as perfect among humans counts as nothing without divine wisdom (9:6). Thus, the author seems to imply that a person requires some sort of *propaideia*—such as a good soul or righteousness—in order to receive wisdom, but it is not clear whether human reason will suffice or if instead one must achieve some sort of righteousness on one's own first.

[53] Compare the goal of an "instructed spirit" (πνεῦμα παιδείας) in 1:5.

[54] Collins (*Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 197) suggests that these statements should not be read as contradictory: "The point is that the presence of wisdom is an identifying mark of the righteous."

[55] The potential "correction" of v. 20 does not nullify the notion of souls preexisting as good and bad. On the preexistence of souls in the book, see Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 25-32.

Israel's Reception of the Torah

In addition to the Solomonic paradigm, Israel's reception of the Mosaic Torah offers a second paradigm for the acquisition of specialized knowledge. The Book of History alludes to a gift of "the incorruptible light of the law" (τὸ ἄφθαρτον νόμου φῶς; 18:4). That this law should be identified with the second-level knowledge is evident from its description as "incorruptible" (ἄφθαρτος). In 12:1, God's spirit, a synonym for wisdom, is also described as incorruptible. The σωρίτης (chain argument) of 6:17-20 suggests that heeding Wisdom's laws offers assurance of "incorruption" (ἀφθαρσία), which in turn brings one near to God (6:18-19).[56] In 15:3, the author asserts that to "know" God (τὸ ἐπίστασθαί σε) is "complete righteousness" (ὁλόκληρος δικαιοσύνη; 15:3).[57] Thus, the Mosaic Torah should be considered one manifestation of the specialized knowledge that leads to righteousness and incorruption.

As with the wisdom that Solomon received, the law comes to Israel as a divine gift. But unlike Solomon Israel does nothing to receive the law.[58] Strikingly, the author suggests that while the law was given to Israel as a divine gift it was nonetheless intended for the entire world.[59] This suggests a universal dimension to the law. Collins argues that the

[56] Compare the near synonym "immortality" (ἀθανασία), to which wisdom leads (8.13, 17). Collins (*Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 197) notes that the *sorites* is incomplete: it should conclude by connecting the end to the beginning: "the beginning of wisdom makes one near to God."

[57] Israel's own possession of a specialized wisdom through the gift of the law illustrates certain advantages that they accrue over the Egyptians. The night of judgment on the Egyptians was made known beforehand to the Israelites (ἐκείνη ἡ νὺξ προεγνώσθη πατράσιν ἡμῶν; 18:6), and as people in the know, the Israelites expected their own deliverance as well as the destruction of the Egyptians (18:7). In contrast to the Egyptians who forgot the plagues that had happened to them only moments earlier (19:4-5), the Israelites remembered (ἐμέμνηντο) and therefore praised God for deliverance (19:9-10).

[58] M. McGlynn, *Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom* (WUNT II/139, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2001) 27, 182-84 suggests that Israel demonstrated initiative when, thirsty in the wilderness, she "called upon" (ἐπεκαλέσαντό) God (11:4). McGlynn points out that the author uses the same verb to describe Solomon's prayer, with the result that wisdom comes to him (7:7). In the former case, however, there is little reason to think that the Israelites receive anything other than water to quench their thirst. In Pseudo-Solomon's account of the giving of the law in chap. 18, although it is said that the Israelites "agreed to the divine law with one accord" (τὸν τῆς θειότητος νόμον ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ διέθεντο; 18:9), the order of narration suggests that their initiative occurs subsequent to the divine decision to bequeath the law.

[59] On the universalism of the law, cf. Isa 2:2-3; 42:6; 49:6; 2 Esd 7:20-24; 14:20-22; and perhaps Sir 17. See my discussion of Sir 17 in *Wisdom's Root Revealed*, 81-84, 91-94, 194-98.

"law" in Wisdom of Solomon probably refers to "the natural law known to all."[60] And it is true that the author does not refer to specific Jewish customs, such as Sabbath, circumcision, or dietary laws. But whereas the natural law requires no specific act of divine magnanimity beyond the original emanation of wisdom from the deity, the allusion here to the Mosaic law portrays it primarily as a divine gift. Therefore, in Pseudo-Solomon's view, the Mosaic Torah is similar to the natural law, in the sense that it is intended for all humanity, but the two are not identical.[61]

In this second model, then, the deity takes the primary initiative in establishing a relationship with the elect. As a result of God's initiative, Israel comes to possess specialized knowledge of God and his universe through a divine gift of the law. Whereas in the Solomonic model the individual takes the primary initiative in seeking out wisdom and thus a relationship with God, in the Israelite model human initiative matters little. While the Solomonic model of election is universal and open to anyone, Israel's historical election is essentially unique and irreplicable.[62] Both paradigms, nonetheless, lead equally to membership in the body of the elect.

Thus, for the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, possession of a specialized knowledge of God distinguishes the elect from the nonelect, a notion that appears in all three parts of the book. While the author ultimately maintains the necessity of specialized divine knowledge and a role for the elect, he does not restrict membership in the elect to Jews alone.

KNOWING VERSUS SEEING

Pseudo-Solomon's emphasis on knowledge as the distinguishing characteristic between the elect and the nonelect provides an interesting point of comparison to the views of the roughly contemporaneous Jewish philosopher and exegete Philo of Alexandria (ca. 20 BCE–ca. 50 CE). Philo's allegorical interpretations of Jewish scripture have often been interpreted as a universalized adaptation of Judaism, although more accurately the universal and particular impulses coexist in Philo's

[60] Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 200. See, further, Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 192-93.

[61] On the tricky question of the relation between the natural law and the Law of Moses in Wisdom of Solomon, see in the present volume the article by Luca Mazzinghi.

[62] Thus, Collins (*Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 202) gets it right when he observes, "While Israel is presented as the paradigm of the righteous, it is not necessarily an exclusive paradigm."

corpus as they do in the Wisdom of Solomon.[63] The universal impulse in Philo's thought appears in his use of the collective term "Israel" (Ἰσραήλ) as a reference to "those who see God."[64] This interpretation likely originated in a false etymology, such as איש ראה אל ("a man saw God/a man who sees God").[65] For Philo, Israel consists in those who pursue a relationship with God through a visual mode: the philosophical quest to see God.[66] Moreover, Philo does not restrict membership in the category Israel to persons descended from Jews or to those who uphold the particular Jewish traditions. Theoretically, then, anyone can embark upon the quest to see God and become a member of Israel.[67] In his *De posteritate Caini* ("On the Posterity of Cain"), Philo describes the unique association between the elect and God based upon his etymological understanding of the term Israel: "the elect class of Israel belongs to the sovereign. For the one who sees God (ὁ ὁρῶν τὸν θεὸν) has been allotted and apportioned to the one who is seen (τῷ ὁρωμένῳ)."[68] Thus, for Philo a differential in ocular perception demarcates the elect from the nonelect.

[63] See, e.g., *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum* (vol. 1, eds. V. Tcherikover and A. Fuks, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1957) 77-78; and Y. Amir, *Die hellenistische Gestalt des Judentums bei Philon von Alexandrien* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1983) 3-51. Other scholars have argued, however, that Philo particularizes philosophy by defining it in terms of Jewish scriptures; see, e.g., D. Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1992) 113-26; A. Mendelson, *Philo's Jewish Identity* (BJS 161, Atlanta: Scholars 1988) 138. Part of the ambiguity evident in the secondary literature stems from the complexity of Philo's own corpus and philosophy. Both impulses—the universal and the particular—are present in Philo's work.

[64] See, e.g., *Leg.* 3:186, 212; *Her.* 78; *Abr.* 57. For the texts of Philo, I used Thesaurus Linguae Graecae Digital Library, University of California, Irvine.

[65] Whether Philo derived this etymology himself or utilized an existing tradition is debated. See E. Birnbaum, *The Place of Judaism in Philo's Thought: Israel, Jews, and Proselytes* (BJS 290, Atlanta Scholars 1996) 67-77.

[66] *Ibid.*, 5.

[67] In contrast, Philo uses the collective term "Jews" (Ἰουδαῖος) in a more restrictive sense to designate the people that trust in God and observe certain laws (νόμοι) and customs (ἔθη). See *Spec.* 2:165-7; *Virt.* 64-5; *Legat.* 115. Whereas membership in Israel is potentially universal, membership among the Jews is limited to those who believe in God and practice Jewish laws and customs. This would seem to indicate a more particularistic outlook on Philo's part. But Philo also suggests that Jews will embrace anyone who is prepared to enter the covenant. See *Decal.* 58; *Spec.* 1:16-20; *Virt.* 177-9. Moreover, these laws and customs are not construed as divine commandments; rather, they form a path that leads to God. In theory, then, anyone may follow this path to the creator of all. *Spec.* 2:165; *Virt.* 64; *Legat.* 115. See Birnbaum, *Place of Judaism in Philo's Thought*, 13, 164-6, 172, 220-24. Thus, the category Jews, like the category Israel, is potentially universal. For Philo, then, the tension between the universal and particular works itself out in his definitions of Israel and the Jews, and in the two associated modes by which one may develop a relationship with God.

[68] *Post.* 91-3. Birnbaum, *Place of Judaism in Philo's Thought*, 138.

Whereas Philo defines membership in Israel through the philosophical quest to see God, Pseudo-Solomon defines the elect primarily in cognitive terms: the elect are those who possess a specialized divine knowledge. In fact, the author of the Wisdom of Solomon tends to be suspicious of visual acuity. In 13:1, he laments that those who are ignorant of God were unable "from the good things that are seen" (ἐκ τῶν ὁρωμένων ἀγαθῶν) to arrive at a knowledge of God. Similarly, the ungodly in the Book of Eschatology will "see" (ὁράω; 2x, 4:17-18) what becomes of the righteous but will nonetheless fail to understand the divine intention.[69] Thus, for Pseudo-Solomon, while observation of the natural world, and the human reason obtained from it, may be a necessary precondition for the reception of a greater wisdom, sight nonetheless proves to be a potentially misleading mode of perception.

CONCLUSION

Pseudo-Solomon's understanding of election rests less on divine determinism and divine caprice and more on human initiative in the divine human relationship. One might even say that humans elect God. Moreover, what separates the elect from the nonelect is a specialized divine knowledge. Unfortunately, nowhere does the author specify the content of the specialized knowledge. Nonetheless, knowledge is something that all humans share, by virtue of being human beings. All mortals can observe the natural world and as such reason about the creator. Unfortunately, such reason often proves insufficient, and some humans end up worshipping the creation rather than the creator. Despite this insufficiency, a more perfect wisdom is available to all who seek it, regardless of ethnic identity or religious affiliation. While the experiences of Solomon and the ancient Israelites are paradigmatic, the author's vision, like that of Philo, is nonetheless potentially universal, in that any human may seek the specialized wisdom that will permit her or him to know more sufficiently the deity and his cosmos.

[69] Compare the potentially positive uses of "see" (ὁράω) in 5:2 and 12:27.

JACOB'S LADDER AND AARON'S VESTMENTS
TRACES OF MYSTICAL AND MAGICAL TRADITIONS IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM

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The general character of *Sapientia Salomonis* and the different influences which shaped it are a matter of dispute. The present paper seeks to contribute to this discussion, as it investigates some points of encounter between the Book of Wisdom and traditions known from ancient Jewish mystical and magical texts. Its special focus is on Wisdom's retelling of Jacob's dream in Wisdom 10:10 and the function attributed to the High priest Aaron and his robe in Wisdom 18:21-25. Before entering the discussion of these particular texts, however, a general remark seems in place.

The Book of Wisdom is traditionally ascribed to Solomon, as its Greek title demonstrates: Σοφία Σαλωμῶνος, or Σοφία Σαλωμῶντος. This claim of Solomonic authorship is supported by the book itself, even though the name of King Solomon does not appear throughout the whole text, thanks to several clear references, especially in chapter 9:[1]

> You preferred me as king of your people and judge of your sons and daughters; you said that I should build a shrine on your holy mountain, an altar in the city of your encamping, a copy of the holy tent that you prepared beforehand from the beginning […] Then my deeds will be acceptable, and I will judge your people justly and be worthy of the throne of my father. (Wisdom 9:7-8.12)

Thus, it is Solomon who is speaking in the first person in chapter 7 as follows:

[1] In general, the English translation of passages from the Greek bible is quoted from NETS (*A New English Translation of the Septuagint and the other Greek Translations Traditionally Included under that Title* [eds. A. Pietersma and B.G. Wright, New York and Oxford: OUP 2007]). Where my understanding of the Greek text differs from that of NETS in a detail important to my approach to the text, I adapted the translation accordingly.

> May God grant me to speak with judgment, and to think thoughts worthy of what has been given to me; because he himself is the guide even of wisdom and the corrector of the wise. For both we and our words are in his hand, both all understanding and skill in crafts. For he himself gave me an unerring knowledge of the things that exist, to know the constitution of the world and the activity of the elements; the beginning and end and middle of times, the alterations of the solstices and the changes of the seasons, the cycles of the year and the constellations of the stars, the natures of animals and the tempers of wild animals, the violent forces of spirits and the thoughts of human beings, the varieties of plants and the powers of roots; and all things, both what is secret and what is manifest [ὅσα τέ ἐστιν κρυπτὰ καὶ ἐμφανῆ ἔγνων], I learned, for she that is the fashioner of all things taught me, namely wisdom. […]. (Wisdom 7:15-22)

Clearly, the latter passage presents Solomon as endowed with very special knowledge and powers, picturing him as a hermetic sage and exorcist.[2] This characterization, absent from the Biblical image of Solomon, is part of an ongoing transformation of Solomon, underway since the late Second temple period, into a figure esoteric and magic traditions are closely attached to.[3] Traces of this transformation appear for the first time in the Old Greek translation of 1 Kings (= LXX 3 Kingdoms),[4] which was carried out in the 2nd century BCE.[5]

Since the Book of Wisdom is therefore one of the earliest witnesses for the esoteric reception of Solomon, it seems not surprising that the book incorporates traditions, which later re-appear in Jewish magical and mystical texts, demonstrating at the same time that the joint transmission of magical and mystical traditions is present already at a very early stage of the history of Jewish literature.[6]

JACOB'S DREAM (WISDOM 10:10)

In chapter 10, the Book of Wisdom a retelling of Jacob's dream in Bethel from Gen 28:12-13. The text reads as follows:

> When a righteous man fled from his brother's anger, she [i.e. wisdom] guided him on straight paths; she showed him a divine kingdom [ἔδειξεν

[2] See P.A. Torijano, *Solomon the Esoteric King: From King to Magus, Development of a Tradition* (JSJSup 73, Leiden: Brill 2002) 90-95.

[3] See Torijano, *Solomon the Esoteric King*, 225-30 and *passim*.

[4] See Torijano, *Solomon the Esoteric King*, 27-33 and 225-30.

[5] See P.D. McLean, "The Kaige Texts of Reigns: To the Reader," in *NETS*, 271-76, 271.

[6] Compare G. Scholem, *Die jüdische Mystik in ihren Hauptströmungen* (5th ed., Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 330, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1993) 54-55.

αὐτῷ βασιλείαν θεοῦ], and gave him knowledge of holy ones [καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ γνῶσιν ἁγίων]. (Wisdom 10:10)

Obviously, the "righteous man" to whom this verse and its continuation refer is Jacob, but the connection of the last two sentences of this cited passage "she [i.e. wisdom] showed him a divine kingdom and gave him knowledge of holy ones" to the story told in Gen 28 seems less clear. Some scholars suggested instead Jacob's legacy in Gen 48-49 as the Biblical point of departure for the Wisdom 10:10, i.e. the story about Jacob's blessing of Joseph's sons Ephraim and Manasseh and Jacob's blessing of his sons.[7] However, this seems rather improbable, mainly on account of the observation that the passage in question is preceded by a reference to Jacob's flight from Esau (Gen 27:41-45), and is immediately followed by references to Jacob's stay with Laban (Gen 29-30), his successful departing from Laban (Gen 31) and finally his wrestling by the Jabbok (Gen 32). Since the retelling of the Book of Genesis in Wisdom 10 generally follows the sequence of events as told in the book of Genesis, we should infer that this is here the case as well, and that, therefore, 10:10 refers indeed to Jacob's dream. Differently from the Biblical text, the Book of Wisdom regards wisdom (σοφία) as the driving force behind the scene, not only regarding Jacob's dream but throughout the whole retelling of the Book of Genesis in chapter 10. Therefore, it is σοφία which makes Jacob's dream happen.

Regarding the content of the dream, the meaning of "divine kingdom" (βασιλεία θεοῦ) and "knowledge of holy ones" (γνῶσις ἁγίων) certainly needs clarification. No literal parallels of this retelling of Gen 28 seem to exist, neither in Hebrew or Aramaic, nor in Greek sources of Jewish background. We may consider whether the saying that Jacob saw a divine kingdom could be connected to the tradition that Jacob/Israel was seeing God, attested in the text entitled "Prayer of Joseph" and, most prominently, in Philo's writings.[8] However, this latter tradition is based on Gen 32:31 ("I have seen God face to face") and on the (pseudo-) etymological explanation of the name "Israel" as "a man who saw God" (= איש ראה אל),[9] and it is thus not at all connected to Jacob's dream in Bethel. Moreover, due to the links with the Biblical story of the wrestling by the Jabbok, this tradition hardly implies that Jacob saw a "divine kingdom," as Wisdom 10:10 has it.

[7] E.g., see A. Schmitt, *Weisheit* (NEB, Würzburg: Echter 1989) 51-52.

[8] See J.Z. Smith, "The Prayer of Joseph," in *Religions in Antiquity. Essays in Memory of Erwin Ramsdell Goodenough* (ed. J. Neusner, Leiden: Brill 1968) 253-94, 265-66 and K.P. Sullivan, *Wrestling with Angels: A Study of the Relationship between Angels and Humans in Ancient Jewish Literature and the New Testament* (AGAJU 55, Leiden: Brill 2004) 98-101.

[9] Seder Eliyahu Rabbah 27, compare Smith, "The Prayer of Joseph," 267.

Another exegetical tradition which should be taken into consideration as the possible background of Wisdom 10:10 is attested in Numbers Rabbah:

> *And he [i.e., Jacob] dreamed and behold a ladder etc., and behold, the Lord stood above it etc. [Gen 28:10-13].* — Happy the mortal, said R. Hoshaya, who beheld such a thing! The (divine) king and His attendants standing beside him and guarding him [המלך ופמליא שלו נצבים עליו ומשמרים אותו]! (Numbers Rabbah 4.1)[10]

According to this tradition, Jacob saw God in the appearance of a king with angels as his attendants.[11] However, the description of the vision in Numbers Rabbah seems to lack the more general and abstract connotation of the term βασιλεία, although the use of this word in Wisdom 10:10 certainly implies God's ruling as a king. This observation brings us to favor a further explanation, which seems to correspond best to the whole range of associations connected with the expression in question: Most probably, Wisdom 10:10 refers to Jacob's ascent to heaven.

Although Jacob, unlike Enoch or Elijah, is not generally connected to a heavenly journey in Jewish tradition, a number of sources attest at least that a discussion on this issue was going on. Most evidently, some texts explicitly deny that Jacob indeed ascended to heaven, as for instance the following passage from Leviticus Rabbah:

> *And he dreamed, and behold, a ladder set up on the earth etc. and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it* [Gen 28:12]. — These angels, explained R. Samuel b. Nahman, were the guardian Princes of the nations of the world. […] R. Berekiah and R. Helbo, and R. Simeon b. Yohai in the name of R. Meir said: It teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, showed Jacob the Prince of Babylon ascending and descending, of Media ascending and descending, of Greece ascending and descending, and of Edom ascending and descending. Then the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Jacob: "You also ascend." Thereupon our father Jacob was afraid, and thought: Perhaps, heaven forefend, in the same way as these are to come down, so also am I? Said the Holy One, blessed be He, to him: *"Fear thou not, O Jacob my servant* [Jer 30:10].

[10] The translation is quoted from: Midrash Rabbah: Numbers, translated by J.J. Slotki. A parallel version is contained in Tanhuma *BeMidbar* 19.

[11] For the use of פמליא as "angels" see P. Schäfer, *Rivalität zwischen Engeln und Menschen: Untersuchungen zur rabbinischen Engelsvorstellung* (Studia Judaica 8, Berlin: de Gruyter 1975) 41.

> Once you ascend there will be no descent for you!" He would not believe, and did not ascend. (Leviticus Rabbah 29.2)[12]

Besides this midrash and its parallel versions,[13] the motif of Jacob being asked by God to ascend the ladder into heaven, but fearfully denying this request reappears in a number of further midrashim.[14]

A further source which should be regarded in the context of the question, whether Jacob ascended to heaven, is preserved in Tanhuma Buber:

> What is the difference between the dreams of the righteous and the dreams of the wicked? The dreams of the wicked are not in heaven and not on earth as is written: *Pharaoh had a dream; and behold, he stood on the river* [Gen 41:1]. […] But the dreams of the righteous are in heaven and on earth, since you find that Joseph said to his brothers: *There we were, binding sheaves in the field* [Gen 37:7]. — This is on the earth. And why in heaven? Since it is written: *And behold, the sun, the moon, and eleven stars bowed down to me* [Gen 37:9]. Accordingly, this is the case regarding our father Jacob: *Then he dreamed, and behold, a ladder [was set up on the earth, and its top reached to heaven]* [Gen 28:11]. (Tanhuma Buber, *Wayyetze* 6)

According to this passage, Jacob indeed was in heaven: While Pharaoh, during his dream, was standing on the river, i.e. he was neither in heaven nor on earth, Joseph was during his dream both on earth, binding sheaves with his brothers, and in heaven, being greeted by the heavenly lights. Like the latter, Jacob was in heaven and on earth, as hinted by the ladder he saw during his dream.

While the quoted midrash seems to have at least a metaphoric undertone, the following passage from *Midrash Shir ha-Shirim Zuta* leaves no doubt that Jacob's heavenly journey was a real one, and it thus provides an even closer parallel to Wisdom 10:10:

> The Holy one, blessed be He, will show Israel the hidden things above and the realms of the heaven. Rabbi Jacob said: Learn this from Jacob, to whom He said: *Arise, go up to Bethel and live there* [Gen 35:1]. This teaches that the Holy One, blessed be He, showed him one ascend above another and showed him the celestial realms. (Shir ha-Shirim Zuta 1.4)

[12] The translation is quoted from: Midrash Rabbah: Leviticus, translated by J. Israelstam and J.J. Slotki.

[13] See the references in J. Kugel, "The Ladder of Jacob?" *HTR* 88 (1995) 209-27, 213 n. 13.

[14] See Smith, "The Prayer of Joseph," 287 n. 1. An analysis of the "Ladder of Jacob" is provided by Kugel, "The Ladder of Jacob."

The quoted passage refers to Bethel as the place of Jacob's dream and to the ladder Jacob saw, as is demonstrated by the expression "one ascent above another" (עליה למעלה מעליה). Being the closest parallel to Wisdom 10:10, this passage introduces an element which is absent from the sources analyzed so far: According to *Shir ha-Shirim Zuta*, Jacob's ascent was step-wise. This finally brings us to a further literary corpus, the *Hekhalot* literature.

The step-wise ascent of the mystic to heaven is a typical feature of these texts. However, the *Hekhalot* literature does not explicitely refer to Jacob in this context, but rather draws on traditions connected with Enoch or Ezekiel's visions of the *merkava*. Nevertheless, the motif of Jacob's ladder holds an important place in it. That this motif is deduced from Gen 28:12 was demonstrated in detail by Bill Rebiger.[15] Most prominently, Jacob's ladder appears in *Hekhalot Rabbati* as the *axis mundi* (שפוד שמים וארץ, "the axis of heaven and earth") which connects the whole cosmos:

> I will tell them the secrets, which are hidden and concealed […] and the axis of heaven and earth, to which all ends of the earth and of the world […] are being knotted, stitched, tied and attached […] and the way of the ladder […] the foot of which stands on the earth and the top of which reaches the right foot of the throne of the majesty. (SHL §201)[16]

Apart from being the axis connecting the whole cosmos, the ladder (סולם) is referred to as a way (נתיב), which in the context of *Hekhalot* means the way of the mystic, the יורד מרכבה.[17] Thus, although Jacob's name does not appear, the story of Jacob's dream obviously was one of the key texts of early Jewish mysticism. At the same time, the mystical exegesis of Gen 28:12 seems to be the closest parallel to the tradition preserved in Wisdom 10:10.

The observation of a mystical background may help to illuminate yet another expression which appears in the Book of Wisdom's retelling of Gen 28:12, namely that Jacob in and by his dream gained γνῶσις ἁγίων. This latter expression has often been understood as "knowledge of holy things." Thus Winston, following Burrows, considered γνῶσις ἁγίων as a possible reference to a tradition found in the Testamentum Levi,

[15] See B. Rebiger, "Das Leitermotiv in der Hekhalot-Literatur," in *Jewish Studies between the Disciplines — Judaistik zwischen den Disziplinen. Papers in Honor of Peter Schäfer on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday* (eds. K. Herrmann *et al.*, Leiden: Brill 2003) 226-42, *passim*.

[16] A German translation can be found in *Übersetzung der Hekhalot-Literatur* (Teil 2: §§ 81–334, eds. P. Schäfer *et al*., TSAJ 17, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1987).

[17] Rebiger, „Das Leitermotiv," 235.

according to which Jacob's dream in Bethel consisted of a vision of the heavenly temple:[18]

> And when we came to Bethel, my father Jacob saw in a vision concerning me [i.e., Levi] that I should be a priest for them to God. (TL 9:3)[19]

Additionally, one may refer to a Rabbinic midrash on Gen 28:12-13, contained in Genesis Rabbah, which is even more explicit in this direction:

> Bar Qappara taught: No dream is without its interpretation. *And behold a ladder* [Gen 28:12] symbolizes the stairway [of the temple]; *Set up on the earth*—the altar, as is says, *An altar of earth thou shalt make unto Me* [Ex 20:21]; *And the top of it reached to heaven*—the sacrifices, the odor of which ascended to heaven; *And behold the angels of God*—the High priests; *Ascending and descending on it*—ascending and descending the stairway. *And behold the Lord stood beside him* [Gen 28:13]—*I saw the Lord standing beside the altar* [Am 9:1]. (Genesis Rabbah 68.12)[20]

The quoted passages demonstrate the existence of a tradition, according to which Jacob's dream was about the heavenly temple. However, and although the Book of Wisdom in 9:8 does indeed mention the heavenly temple, it seems very problematic to identify ἅγιοι in Wisdom 10:10 as a reference to this tradition, especially due to the following observations, which clarify the meaning of γνῶσις ἁγίων:

- In Wisdom 10:10, γνῶσις ἁγίων stands in a synonym parallelism with βασιλεία θεοῦ. Being the counterpart to θεός, ἅγιοι seems to refer to divine beings, i.e. "angels."
- In a similar way, ἅγιοι is paralleled with υἱοί θεοῦ in Wisdom 5:5.[21]
- Prov 9:10 and 30:3 suggest that γνῶσις ἁγίων as well as its Hebrew equivalent דעת קדושים is not an occasionally phrased expression, but a *terminus technicus* of Jewish wisdom literature. Prov 30:3 parallels the wisdom (σοφία) originating in God with the knowledge owned by the holy ones: θεὸς δεδίδαχέν με σοφίαν καὶ γνῶσιν ἁγίων ἔγνωκα, "God

[18] D. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon* (AB 43, New York: Doubleday 1979) 217.

[19] The translation is quoted from: H.W. Hollander and M. de Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary* (SVTP 8, Leiden: Brill 1985) 155.

[20] The translation is quoted from: *Midrash Rabbah, Translated into English with Notes, Glossary and Indices* (3rd ed., eds. H. Freedman and M. Simon, London: The Soncino Press 1961), Genesis II, translated by H. Freedman. For an analysis of this text see M. Niehoff, "A Dream which is not Interpreted is Like a Letter which is not Read," *JJS* 43 (1992) 58-84, 72-73.

[21] See M. Neher, *Wesen und Wirken der Weisheit in der Sapientia Salomonis* (BZAW 333, Berlin: de Gruyter 2004) 144.

> has taught me wisdom, and I have gained knowledge of holy ones." Similarly, the Greek translation of Prov 9:10 דעת קדושים בינה as βουλὴ ἁγίων σύνεσις ("counsel of the saints is understanding") shows that the translator understood דעת קדושים as a *genitivus subjectivus*, i.e. knowledge owned by the saints.

In light of these observations we should conclude that the passage καὶ ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ γνῶσιν ἁγίων can not be translated "and gave him knowledge of holy things," but has to be understood as "and gave him knowledge of holy ones." As a consequence, according to this passage Jacob obtained "participation in the knowledge of the angels" during and due to his dream.[22]

That Jacob got aware of knowledge originally destined and restricted to the angels is voiced by further texts as well, especially the "Prayer of Joseph," a Greek text of Jewish origin.[23] According to the "Prayer of Joseph," Jacob read in the tablets of heaven.[24] He could do so because he himself was an angel who had descended to earth:

> I, Jacob, who am speaking to you, am also Israel, an angel of God and a ruling spirit.[25]

Thus, following the "Prayer of Joseph," Jacob is the earthly name of a person whose angelic name is Israel. It is this tradition, which finds its continuation in one of the *Hekhalot* texts, according to which Israel is an angel standing in the center of heaven and leading the heavenly choir.[26] On the other hand, this concept is absent from the Book of Wisdom, since it contains no hint that Jacob was thought of as an angel, and although he was given knowledge of the angels, the Book of Wisdom most obviously perceives him as a man.

If we try to receive a conclusion out of the comparison of the traditions analyzed so far, showing significant joint features as well as important differences, the following picture emerges:

- According to Wisdom 10:10 and *Shir ha-Shirim Zuta* 1:4, Jacob is a man who in his dream received heavenly knowledge.

[22] "Partizipation an der Gnosis der Engel," D. Georgi, "Weisheit Salomos," in *Unterweisung in lehrhafter Form* (JSHRZ 3, Gütersloh: Mohn 1980) 391-478, 438.

[23] Only a few lines of this text are preserved, thanks to their quotation in Origen's writings.

[24] Smith, "The Prayer of Joseph," 258.

[25] Smith, "The Prayer of Joseph," 256.

[26] Scholem, *Die jüdische Mystik*, 67, and cf. Smith, "The Prayer of Joseph," 264.

- In the "Prayer of Joseph," Jacob/Israel, being an angel, *per se* owns heavenly knowledge.
- The *Hekhalot* texts combine both traditions: Israel is an angel, and the ladder seen by Jacob in his dream is a paradigm for the ascent through which the mystic gains heavenly knowledge.

Thus, on the one hand, Wisdom 10:10 is the earliest witness for a mystical reception of Gen 28:12, and one of the few attestations that Jacob made a heavenly journey,[27] demonstrating that the mystical reception of this Biblical verse was not an innovation of the *Hekhalot* texts, but relies on earlier traditions. On the other hand, there is no direct continuation from the mystical exegesis embedded in the Book of Wisdom to *Hekhalot* mysticism.

Regarding *Shir ha-Shirim Zuta*, a midrashic composition which apparently was redacted at a relatively late date (10th century), the tradition contained in Wisdom 10:10 is a further indication that this composition made use of ancient sources.

THE PRIESTLY VESTMENTS (WISDOM 18:20-25)

In chapter 18:20-25, the Book of Wisdom retells the Biblical story of the revolt of the Israelites against Moses and Aaron, originally known from Num 17:6-15. According to the text in Numbers, the Lord himself reacted and started to attack the rebellious Israelites by means of a plague. Aaron, on the other hand, with the help of incense, made atonement for the people and thus stopped the plague. Although usually presenting rather brief summaries of the biblical stories, at this very point the Book of Wisdom is much more detailed than Numbers: According to Wisdom 18:21, Aaron used "the weapon of his own ministry, prayer and propitiation by incense," the following verse says that Aaron "by his word […] subdued the chastiser, calling to mind the oaths and covenants given to the fathers" (Wisdom 18:22). Verses 23-25, however, seem to present an additional and different version of how Aaron stopped the plague, depicted in this texts in a personalized form[28] as "bitter anger" (κολάζων, v. 22) and "destroyer" (ὀλεθρεύων, v. 25):

> For when the dead had already fallen on one another in heaps, he intervened, held back the anger, and cut off its way to the living. For on his full-length robe the whole world [ὅλος ὁ κόσμος] was depicted, and the glories of the

[27] Thus, Segal does not even list Jacob among the "ascending heroes" of Hellenistic Judaism, see A.F. Segal, "Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and their Environment," in *ANRW* 2.23.2 (Berlin: de Gruyter 1980) 1333-94, 1354.

[28] This personalization has its biblical point of departure in Exod 12:23; see Schmitt, *Weisheit*, 78.

> fathers were engraved on the four rows of stones, and your majesty was represented on the diadem on his head. From these the destroyer withdrew, these he feared; for merely the experience of anger was enough. (Wisdom 18:23-25)

While in the first version of the story, contained in verses 20-22, it is the "typical sapiential" feature of "the intercessory power of the just man which can effectively turn away the destructive powers of divine punishment,"[29] it is the vestments of the high priest by means of which the "destroyer" is repelled, according to the second version of the story in verses 23-25.[30] From the parts of Aaron's vestments which are listed in the Hebrew text of Exod 28 as well as in the description of the garments of the High priest in m. Yoma 7:5[31] the following are mentioned in the passage under discussion: The full-length robe (ποδήρους ἐνδύματος, MT מְעִיל), the four rows of stones (τετραστίχος λίθοι) on the breastpiece (MT חֹשֶׁן), and the frontlet (διάδημα κεφαλῆς, MT צִיץ), upon which the words קֹדֶשׁ ליהוה were engraved, according to Exod 28:36, or solely the Tetragrammaton, according to Late Second Temple sources.[32] Regarding the content of this inscription, Wisdom 18:24 speaks of μεγαλωσύνη σου "your greatness." In any case, due to the apotropaic function of these vestments, the destroyer is unable to pass Aaron the High priest. Thus, according to Wisdom 18, the priestly vestments in themselves own an effective magical force, independent from the ritual carried out.

That the priestly vestments are perceived of as having an effective force is not a feature unique to the current text, but it is attested in sources from the corpus of rabbinical literature as well. The latter, however, usually relate the effective force of the vestments to the

[29] L.G. Perdue, *Wisdom and Cult: A Critical Analysis of the Views of Cult in the Wisdom Literatures of Israel and the Ancient Near East* (SBLDS 30, Missoula: Scholars Press 1977) 224.

[30] It has been suggested by Schwenk-Bressler that the formulation "by his word [λόγῳ] he [i.e. Aaron] subdued the chastiser…" (Wisdom 18:22) alludes to the priestly *logeion* (U. Schwenk-Bressler, *Sapientia Salomonis als ein Beispiel frühjüdischer Textauslegung: die Auslegung des Buches Genesis, Exodus 1-15 und Teilen der Wüstentradition in Sap 10-19* [BEATAJ 32, Frankfurt: Lang 1993] 290), and that, as the consequence of this, the priestly vestments are referred to already in verse 22. In light of the continuation in the second part of verse 22, however, which explains Aaron's use of the word as "…calling to mind [ὑπομνήσας] the oaths and covenants given to the fathers" and was obviously meant to involve a speech act, this seems rather improbable.

[31] See M.D. Swartz, "The Semiotics of the Priestly Vestments in Ancient Judaism," in *Sacrifice in Religious Experience* (ed. A.I. Baumgarten, Leiden: Brill 2002) 57-80, 61-63.

[32] E.g. Josephus, *Antiquitates* III vii 6; Philo, *Vita Mosis* 2:115; 2:132.

function of atonement,[33] and not to apotropaic magic, as can be seen in the following passage from the Babylonian Talmud:

> R. Anani bar Sasson said: Why is the passage about the sacrifices [i.e. Lev 7] placed next to the passage about the priestly vestments? To tell you that just as the sacrifices atone so do the vestments atone. (b. Zebah. 88b)

Other sources, Jewish hellenistic as well as rabbinic, illustrate that the priestly vestments were explained in a symbolic way. Most prominently, this is the case in both Josephus' and Philo's writings.[34] According to Philo's Life of Moses, the robe of the High priest is an image of the air, while the pomegranates on the robe represent earth and water respectively, and the bells are symbols of the harmony between the two. Similarly, links connect the ephod with the heaven, and the twelve stones on the breastpiece with the signs of the zodiac.[35]

Most obviously, this symbolic element is already contained in the way, in which Wisdom 18 perceives the priestly vestments,[36] telling that on the High priest's full-length robe "the whole world" (ὅλος ὁ κόσμος) was depicted. However, this element is not the central focus of the interpretation in the Book of Wisdom, and it serves only as the basis for the effective magical forces the vestments own. This marks a clear difference between Josephus' and Philo's perception of the priestly garments on the one hand, and the concept which stands behind Wisdom 18, on the other.

Further sources which ascribe a magic function to the priestly vestments do not seem to have been identified so far. In this regard, however, the *Sefer ha-Malbush* ("The Book of the Garment") should be

[33] Compare the instrumental dimension is ascribed to the priestly vestments in the Avodah piyyutim, see Swartz, "The Semiotics of the Priestly Vestments," 72-76.

[34] Josephus, *Antiquitates* III vii 7; Philo, *Vita Mosis* 2:109-135; *Spec. Leg*. 1:84-97; compare B. Ponizy, "High-Priestly Ministration of Aaron according to the Book of Wisdom," in *Goldene Äpfel in silbernen Schalen; Collected Communications to the XIIIth Congress of the International Organization for the Study of the Old Testament, Leuven, 1989* (eds. K.-D. Schunck and M. Augustin, Frankfurt: Lang 1992) 135-46, 143-44 and Swartz, "The Semiotics of the Priestly Vestments," 68-69. For a comprehensive analysis of Philo's cosmological interpretation of the Temple see U. Früchtel, *Die kosmologischen Vorstellungen bei Philo von Alexandrien: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Genesisexegese* (ALGHJ 2, Leiden: Brill 1968) 69-112. On the basis of both Josephus' and Philo's writings, St. Jerome developed his own symbolic explanation of the vestments, see R. Hayward, "St. Jerome and the Meaning of the High-Priestly Vestments," in *Hebrew Study from Ezra to Ben-Yehuda* (ed. W. Horbury, Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1999) 90-105.

[35] See Philo, *Vita Mosis* 2:117-124.

[36] "Der kosmologische Symbolismus in Sap 18 ist deutlich älter als die allegorische Auslegung Philos, aber doch auch eindeutlig verwandt," Georgi, "Weisheit Salomos," 467.

mentioned, a Jewish mystical-magical composition in Hebrew language, dated by Scholem to the 7th century CE.[37]

The main focus of *Sefer ha-Malbush* is the magical-mystical ritual of "putting on the name" (לבישת השם), basically consisting of putting on a robe made from the skin of a gazelle and a frontlet from metal, both inscribed with magical names. Thanks to these vestments, the magician gains the magical power he seeks for. Judging from both the context as well as the expressions used in the relevant passages it is entirely clear, that the vestments referred to in *Sefer ha-Malbush* are thought of as actual realizations of the High priest's vestments which are described in Exodus and in the Mishna. Thus, *Sefer ha-Malbush* provides a clear attestation for the magical interpretation of the vestments of the High priest and suggests that the account in Wisdom 18:23-25 should be seen as part of an broader stream of interpretation and re-interpretation.

Moreover, the observation that Wisdom 18:23-25 preserves an magical interpretation of the high-priestly vestments is not only important for the understanding of this piece of Wisdom literature, but it also provides valuable information regarding the origins of Jewish magic: It has been suggested that magical rituals were regarded, at least to some extant, as "substitutes" of rituals originally bound to the temple of Jerusalem,[38] attesting a "transition from Temple to magical ritual."[39] Wisdom 18:23-25, written at a time, when the temple of Jerusalem was still functioning with the ministry of the High priest still taking place in it, leads to a somewhat different picture. The passage demonstrates that the magical interpretation of the High priestly ritual was already in existence before the destruction of the Temple and its cult.

CONCLUSION

Looking at the traditions regarding Jacob's dream and the vestments of the High priest, which surface in the Book of Wisdom, we have to realize

[37] See G. Scholem, Article "Kabbalah," in *Encyclopedia Judaica* (CD-ROM edition 1997), "beginning of the geonic era". The oldest manuscripts of this composition date to the 11th century CE. Although the high importance of this composition was noted since long ago, it was edited for the first time only recently by Irina Wandrey, *"Das Buch des Gewandes" und "Das Buch des Aufrechten:" Dokumente eines magischen spätantiken Rituals, ediert, kommentiert und übersetzt* (TSAJ 96, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2004).

[38] M.D. Swartz, "Sacrificial Themes in Jewish Magic," in *Magic and Ritual in the Ancient World* (eds. P. Mirecki and M. Meyer, RGRW 141, Leiden: Brill 2002) 303-15, 307-15. A very detailed and well balanced analysis of the interpretation of the cultic tradition of the Jerusalem temple in Jewish magic is provided by D. Salzer, *Biblia magica: Der Gebrauch biblischer Anspielungen in den magischen Texten der Kairoer Geniza* (Dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin 2008) 335-64.

[39] Swartz, "Sacrificial Themes," 315.

that this composition has some strong links with the mystical and magical tradition of Judaism. Thus, on the one hand side, the Jewish magical and mystical literature may provide important insides into some passages in the Book of Wisdom. On the other hand, however, the Book of Wisdom contributes some important information to the question, how and where we may find the background out of which these traditions developed.

"THE TASTE OF PARADISE" INTERPRETATION OF EXODUS AND MANNA IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM

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INTRODUCTION

One of the main literary methods of early Jewish literature is the rewriting of previous material.[1] Like in the other main wisdom book of our deuterocanonical corpus, in Ben Sira, where a separate section, the so called Praise of the Fathers deals with biblical persons or stories, in the Book of Wisdom a separate section discusses the role of Wisdom from the patriarchs to the story of Exodus. But unlike the other texts in this early Jewish literature, the Book of Wisdom does not really rewrites the previous narratives, neither interprets them but uses them as a source of reference. In the first part of the book this type of connections can be displayed with passages of Isaiah, Proverbs, Qohelet.[2] The last part of the book is connected mainly to the story of Exodus. The theme of Exodus has already a prominent role in the canonical books, mostly in those which deal with the problem of the Exile and Restoration[3] and this

[1] See the debate on the term rewritten Bible e.g. in A. Klostergaard Petersen, "Rewritten Bible as a Borderline Phenomenon—Genre, Textual Strategy, or Canonical Anachronism?," in *Flores Florentino. Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Early Jewish Studies in Honour of Florentino Garcia Martínez* (eds. A. Hilhorst *et al.*, JSJSup 122, Leiden: Brill 2007) 285-306.

[2] For the demonstration of the close relationship between Isaiah and the Book of Wisdom see M.J. Suggs, "Wisdom of Solomon 2,10-5: A Homily Based on the Fourth Servant Song," *JBL* 76 (1957) 26-33, and P.C. Beentjes, "Wisdom of Solomon 3,1–4,19 and the Book of Wisdom," in *Studies in the Book of Isaiah: Festschrift Willem A.M. Beuken* (eds. J. van Ruiten and M. Vervenne, BETL 143, Leuven: Peeters 1997) 413-20. On Proverbs and the Book of Wisdom see R.J. Clifford, "Proverbs as a Source for Wisdom of Solomon," in *Treasures of Wisdom. Studies in Ben Sira and the Book of Wisdom. Festschrift M. Gilbert* (eds. N. Calduch-Benages and J. Vermeylen, BETL 143, Leuven: Peeters 1999) 255-65.

[3] On the interpretation of Exodus within the Bible see W. Johnstone, "Exodus," in *A Dictionary of Biblical Interpretation* (eds. R.J. Coggins and J.L. Houlden, London:

problem is further discussed in the early Jewish literature. The Book of Wisdom uses the Exodus motive as a point of thematic comparison. Consequently the last part of the whole composition, chapters 11-19, became a theological elaboration of the Exodus story.

These are the literary motives, but what is the reason to use Exodus? Samuel Cheon studied this part of the Book of Wisdom and from his analysis he gained the conclusion that the whole book was written as a type of consolation and reinforcement for the Jews of Egypt in the time of oppression during the revolt in Alexandria in 38 CE.[4] If we accept his supposition, Exodus as the main story of Israel's historiography concerning Egypt forms not by chance almost the half of the themes of the Book of Wisdom, but it should be the most accented part of the whole book. Nevertheless, this is not a unique thematic without precedents. There is a special Egyptian group of Jewish authors who rewrote the Exdous story in a historical perspective before the Book of Wisdom was written. Two historians, Artapanos, Eupolemos, and Ezekiel the tragedian worked in the 2nd or 1st century BCE, most probably in Alexandria used the story of Exodus in their books.[5] The question is, whether the special historical circumstances proposed by Cheon was the only or real reason of the author to use the Exodus story. In this paper I reconsider the special role of Exodus and the interpretation of Manna in the Book of Wisdom.

EXODUS IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM

Presentation of Exodus creates a problematic task for the interpreter of the Book of Wisdom. The text mentioning the stories of Exodus has two sections grown very close together: 10:1-21 and 11:1-19:17. Our

Trinity 1990) 222-26. *Restoration. Old Testament, Jewish and Christian Perspectives* (ed. J.M. Scott, JSJSup 72, Leiden: Brill 2001).

[4] "Pseudo-Solomon's biblical interpretation carried out a function to provide the self-understanding of the Alexandrian Jewish community just after the riot against the Jews in 38 CE. It not only intended to provide hope and consolation for his community, but also to counteract the anti-Semitic prejudice of the Gentiles." S. Cheon, *The Exodus Story in the Wisdom of Solomon. A study in Biblical Interpretation* (JSPSup 23, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1997) 149. He follows the arguments of D. Winston, *The Wisdom of Solomon. A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (AB 43, Garden City: Doubleday 1979) 20-25. On the date see also M-F. Baslez, "The Author of Wisdom and the Cultured Environment of Alexandria," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research* (eds. A. Passaro and G. Bellia, DCLY 2005, Berlin: de Gruyter 2005) 33-52.

[5] The analysis of the anti-Egyptian tone of their works and its connection to the Book of Wisdom is presented most recently by G. Schimanowski, *Juden und Nichtjuden in Alexandrien. Koexistence und Konflikte bis zum Pogrom unter Trajan (117 n. Chr.)* (Münsteraner Judaistische Studien 18, Berlin: LIT 2006) 69-82

understanding of the thematic and aim of the author depends on the separation of these sections. Therefore it is necessary to give a closer analysis of the structure and relation of these sections.

The structure of the whole book was divided by most of the scholars into three main parts. Winston's sudivisions are followed by most scholars[6] (I highlight here only those subdivisions important for our discussion).[7]

A. Wisdom's Gift of Immortality (1-6:21)
B. The Nature and Power of Wisdom and Solomon's Quest for Her (6:22-10:21)
    10:1-21 an Ode to Wisdom's Saving Power in History
C. Divine Wisdom or Justice in the Exodus (11-19)
    11:1-14 first antithesis
    11:15-12:22 excursus 1
    13-15 excursus 2
    16:1-19:9 second-seven antitheses
  19:10-12 Review of God's wonders
    19:13-17 Egypt is blameworthy
    19:18-21 transposition of elements
    19:22 doxology

As we can see, 10:1-21 is not only separated from 11:1ff as a subdivision, but they are given as parts of two different main sections. There is a scholarly debate on the relation of these two sections. In the following I discuss the relation of the two sections, first the aspect of the so called *Ode to Wisdom* is discussed, then the *Seven antitheses* based on the Exodus story.

An Ode to Wisdom

There are several reasons to follow this arrangement represented by Winston. James Reese had three arguments:[8]

1. 10:1-21 ends „with the explicit mention of Wisdom in the previous couplet enabling men to praise God's saving power".
2. 11:1 should be red with an intransitive meaning of the verb: "Their works prospered in the hand of a holy prophet." In this case there is a different subject to that of the previous section.

[6] Cf. the historical survey of scholarship on the literary structure of the Book of Wisdom in M. Kolarcik, *The Ambiguity of Death in the Book of Wisdom 1–6: A Study of Literary Structure and Interpretation* (AnBib 127, Rome: Pontificio Istituto Biblico 1991) 1-28.

[7] Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 10-12.

[8] J.M. Reese, "Plan and Structure in the Book of Wisdom," *CBQ* 27 (1965) 391-99.

3. There is a wordplay between εὐόδωσεν and διώδευσαν (11:1 and 11:2) which connects these verses.

With some reservations of the arguments Cheon accepts this arrangement,[9] and has two other points:

1. The hymn of 10:20-21 closes the unit.
2. Verses 1 and 14 in chapter 11 contain reference to Moses forming a frame for the first antithesis.

On the other hand A.G. Wright[10] favors another arrangement. According to him 10:1-11:1 and 11:2-14 are separated. His arguments are:

1. 11:1 is the summary of the previous scene;
2. The transitive reading of 11:1 makes Wisdom to be the subject of the sentence: "She made their affairs prosper through the holy prophet."
3. The wordplay referred to by Reese is the type of a hook word: "a word or idea at the end of one paragraph is taken up at the beginning of the next to tie the two paragraphs together."[11]
4. According to the number of the verses this is the middle of the whole book.[12]

Lester Grabbe called chapter 10 a transitional chapter. Moyna McGlynn also connects 10:1-21 to the second part of the book.[13]

Concerning the inner structure of 11:1/2-14 there are also more solutions. Reese suggests that 11:1-3 is an introduction to the last part of the book (11:4-14; 16,1-19:22).[14] Wright, on the other hand, states that 11:1-4 is the introduction of 11:5 and 11:2-5 is the introduction of the whole 11:6-19:22.[15]

Division between 10:21 and 11:1 preferred by Winston, Reese, Cheon and others does not seem to me convincing. Neither should I follow the separation between 11:1 and 11:2 argued by Skehan and Wright. Rather I suppose that the third main part of the book (C) starts at 10:1. Part C has

[9] Cheon, *Exodus Story*, 29.

[10] A.G. Wright, "The Structure of the Book of Wisdom," *Bib* 48 (1967) 165-84.

[11] Wright, "Structure," 170.

[12] Making this division he followed P.W. Skehan, "The Text and Structure of the Book of Wisdom," *Traditio* 3 (1945) 1-12.

[13] M. McGlynn, *Divine Judgement and Divine Benevolence in the Book of Wisdom* (WUNT 139, Tübingen: Mohr 2001) 22-23; L.L. Grabbe, *Wisdom of Solomon* (2nd ed., T&T Clark Study Gudies, London: T&T Clark 2007) 21.

[14] Reese, "Plan and Structure," 397.

[15] Wright, "Structure," 177-184.

10:1-11:4 the *Ode to Wisdom* as the first subdivision. The second subdivision is the *Seven antitheses* on God's justice (11:5-19:17) with the two inclusions. The third subdivision is the Transformation of Creation 19:18-21. And at the end there is the doxology (19:22). Consequently Winston's sketch of structure would be changed like this:

A. Wisdom's Gift of Immortality 1-6:21
B. The Nature and Power of Wisdom and Solomon's Quest for Her 6:22-9:18
C. Divine Wisdom or Justice in the Exodus 10:1-19:22
   - 10:1-11:4 An Ode to Wisdom's Saving Power in History
   - 11:5-19:17 Seven antitheses with two excursa
   - 19:18-21 Transposition of elements
   - 19:22 Doxology

There are several reasons to form 10:1-11:4 as a unit. a) The main problem of the previous divisions discussed before is that they cut through the presentation of Wisdom's work in the life of Israel from the patriarchs on. As the third main topic of the book,[16] references to the patriarchs and to Moses during the Exodus should be kept together. Similar to the Praise of the Fathers, here a type of list can be detected in a form of an Ode. There are six couplets introduced by αὕτη (*she*) referring to Wisdom. In 11:1 the transitive reading of the verb εὐόδωσεν makes more sense comparing the previous couplets than the intransitive reading. If there were an αὕτη here it would make the situation obvious. But even without this demonstrative pronoun a seventh couplet can be outlined which describes what the Israelites did in following the instruction of Wisdom given indirectly through the "Holy prophet." b) In my solution 11:5-14 forms the first antithesis. As we can see, all of the antitheses begin with the negative reference to the wicked enemies of Israel. This type of text starts in verse 5. If one of the verses 1-4 were the starting point, the first antithesis would not follow this compositional order. c) I do not agree with Cheon's theory of a frame made by referring to Moses in verse 1 and 14.[17] First of all, Moses is also referred to some other verses further on. In this concern however it is more important that there is no frame type arrangement in the other antitheses. It would be too artificial to force this literary tool on the text here. d) My fourth argument supporting a new division is that verse 4 has the same theme as that of the first antithesis which makes a perfect

[16] The first theme is immortality of the soul, the second is the nature of divine wisdom. Cf. also Kolarcik's literary structures in Kolarcik, *Ambiguity of Death.*

[17] Cheon, *Exodus Story*, 27-29.

point of connection with 11:5-14.[18] This leads us to the next problem of structure.

The structure of the presentation of the work of Wisdom in section 10:1-11:4, in the so called *Ode to Wisdom*, should indicate a similar method of presentation further on. Wisdom is the subject of the events listed, she is the one who acts and arranges everything. She is the one who kept the first and fallen father, Adam, and gave him strength (10:2-3). She is the one who saved the only righteous, Noah by a piece of wood (10:4). She discovered the sole righteous among the mingled wicked nations, Abraham, and kept the only righteous, Lot in the impious citied destroyed by fire (10:6-8). She led the righteous, Jacob from the wrath of his brother and gave him the knowledge of holiness, luck and help (10:10-12). She saved the righteous, Joseph from the power of sin, and gave him royal rights (10:13-14). From 10:15 the text mentions the deeds of the "elected servant," that is Moses. Wisdom moved into Moses himself. In the wandering wonders and sings are mentioned, the pillar of cloud and of fire are referred. Crossing the Red sea, the song of the sea, and the making of water in Massah and Meribah are listed (11:4). All of them were performed by Moses with the help of Wisdom. As the next step we would expect the giving of the Torah at Sinai, but at this point the text changes its character and syntax. The narrative of 3rd person singular is changed into a discussion of 2nd person singular. From 11:5 on, there is no Wisdom anymore, but God is the subject of the actions. Up to this point there was a more or less historical line of the original Exodus events, but from here the wonders mentioned are changed and mingled. The structure of these passages is different from the previous one. Furthermore, if it is true, as Winston states, that "the central figure of the Book of Wisdom is Sophia,"[19] how can we explain its total lack from the passage chapters 11-19?

My supposition is that the long passage, 11:5-19:17 is a separate entity inserted carefully into the sequence of the previous list of 10:1-11:4. This list of the deeds of Wisdom for the ancient heroes of Israel ends with the making of water in Massah and Meribah (10:4). The first antithesis starts with the same topic, the comparison of this making of water in Massah and Meribah with the water of Nile turned into blood.[20] The question is, how and why it is connected in this way to the previous part of the book? To answer this question we have to go on to discuss this textual unit.

[18] McGlynn, *Divine Judgement*, 20 claims as others, that the writer of the Book of Wisdom connects one part of his discussion with what follows. See also M. Gilbert, "The Literary Structure of the Book of Wisdom. A Study of Various Views," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 19-32. 31.

[19] Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 59.

[20] Of course there is no toponym mentioned.

Seven Antitheses Based on Exodus

As I already mentioned, a type of list can be detected in the Book of Wisdom, like the Praise of the Fathers in Bern Sira. But unlikely in the Book of Wisdom the line of the list was brought to an end with the Exodus. There is another dissimilarity to the Praise of the Fathers, the Book of Wisdom does not deal with persons, or at least does not identify certain persons.[21] It speaks in general terms and even Moses, the main hero of Exodus does not appear by name in the description of the Exodus story.[22] Due to this non-figurative presentation the wandering in the wilderness became a non-historical story. On the other hand, by some reflections to immortality and eternal life, this story gains an eschatological dimension.[23] If we take these points into consideration, the main purpose of the use of Exodus, namely "to provide the self-understanding of the Alexandrian Jewish community just after the riot against the Jews in 38 CE" proposed by Cheon is questioned, though should not be totally changed.[24]

In the presentation of the Exodus material the text does not use a historical or chronological order. Seven stories are referred to: 1) making water at Massah and Meribah; 2) giving of the quails; 3) hailing by the bronz serpent; 4) giving of the manna; 5) leading by the fire pillar; 6) redemption from the death of the firstborns; 7) splitting of the water of the Read sea. There are different definitions to the technique used by the author during the presentation of the stories, but none of the officially known terms are satisfactory. It is not a midrash, nor a targum, nor a pesher, neither a rewritten Bible.[25] Cheon designated it as "reshaping of the Biblical story," but even this carefully chosen term does not describe precisely what we face with.[26] This is rather a conscious theological application of the different themes, a formulation of a series of antitheses between righteous and wicked, between good and bad lives. As Cheon formulates:

[21] Concerning the avoidance of the proper names in Wisdom see Reider, *Wisdom*, 39-40; Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon,* 139-40; Cheon, *Exodus Story*, 100-11.

[22] He is called the "holy prophet," but has only the role of a tool used by Wisdom to lead the people of Israel. Cf. 11:1.

[23] See Kolarcik, *Ambiguity of Death*. J.J. Collins, "The Reinterpretation of Apocalyptic Traditions in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 143-57, esp. 151-55 points out that the worldview of Wisdom of Solomon is "very different form that of the apocalypses emanating from the land of Israel" (154).

[24] See note 4 above. Cheon, *Exodus Story*, 149.

[25] Cf. the discussion of Grabbe, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 30-47 on possible genres of interpretation in the Book of Wisdom, esp. 39-43 on midrash.

[26] Cheon, *Exodus Story*, 150-151.

> The Israelites in the biblical text become the protagonists, the righteous, in Pseudo-Solomon's text, tested by God, persecuted by their enemies and helped by creation. The Egyptians in the Bible become the antagonists, the wicked, who oppress the righteous, are punished by God and are attacked by creation.[27]

Not the story of the Exodus is interpreted but the literary and theological goal and explanation is interpreted or enlightened by episodes of the Exodus story. Here we can follow the suggestion of Angelo Passaro, who draws attention to the *leitmotiv* of the Book of Wisdom: "God uses the κόσμος for the benefit of his people."[28] In his exegesis of chapter 16 Passaro points at the heart of the whole theological presentation of the Book of Wisdom which is in the Song of Moses, Deut 32:39-43.

> See now that I, even I, am he; there is no god besides me. I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal; and no one can deliver from my hand. For I lift up my hand to heaven, and swear: As I live forever, when I whet my flashing sword, and my hand takes hold on judgment; I will take vengeance on my adversaries, and will repay those who hate me. I will make my arrows drunk with blood, and my sword shall devour flesh—with the blood of the slain and the captives, from the long-haired enemy. Praise, O heavens, his people, worship him, all you gods! For he will avenge the blood of his children, and take vengeance on his adversaries; he will repay those who hate him, and cleanse the land for his people.

16:13 refers to this passage: "For you have power over life and death; you lead mortals down to the gates of Hades and back again." God of Israel is unique and the life of Israel and the life of the other nations exclusively depend on his mighty power. How can one be convinced that it is so? The seven antitheses make a paramount picture of the lot or destiny of righteous and wicked, good and bad. It is presented in a situation closely connected to the place of the author and reader, in the Exodus story.

In the sequence of the seven antitheses there are the two so called insertions or excursuses (11:15-12:22 and 13-15). The main topic of both excurses is idolatry which is also condemned in the Song of Moses, in the specific verse of Deut 32:39, as it is formulated in 12:13. Though there is no explanation for the interruption of the sequence of the antitheses, the excurses fit into the theological concept of the sequence.

[27] Cheon, *Exodus Story*, 150.

[28] A. Passaro, "The Serpent and the Manna or the Saving Word. Exegesis of Wis 16," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 179-93, esp. 180.

The Use of Exodus

Another explanation of the use of the Exodus story can be given at this point. As we saw already, the author of the text does not pay too much attention to the historical or literary sequence of the biblical Exodus story. Dissimilar to the previous Hellenistic Jewish historians the author restricted his choice of historical references to the book of Exodus. But even in the book of Exodus he focused his attention on the first part of the wandering story. Namely the texts he referred to belong to the events before the giving of the Law at Sinai. The core of the whole Exodus story is the giving of the Law at Sinai, how is it possible that this scene was neglected here? Though there is no direct reference to the Sinai event but there are numerous indirect connections:

1. The part of the wandering portrayed by the author is the event summarized in the first part of the first commandment: "I am the LORD your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery." (Ex 20:2). 12:13 ("For neither is there any god besides you") echoes the second part of this first commandment: "you shall have no other gods before me" (Ex 20:3).
2. The two excursus (12:1-15:19) describe idolatry in details and condemn it as the second commandment does: "You shall not make for yourself an idol, whether in the form of anything that is in heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth" (Ex: 20:4).
3. Close connected to idolatry the swear and giving the name of god to an idol is mentioned in 13:10; 14:29-31, but the praise of Gods holy name is presented in 10:20 as the negative and positive allusions to the third commandment: "You shall not make wrongful use of the name of the LORD your God, for the LORD will not acquit anyone who misuses his name" (Ex 20:7).
4. The fourth commandment concerning the Shabbat is represented only doubly indirect. The two types of reasons for keeping of the Sabbath can be found in the Exodus story itself, and in the reference to the new creation in 19:18-21.

Consequently we can argue that the first four commandments of the Law given at Sinai are essentially presented in this theological discussion of the Book of Wisdom. And if we take into consideration the sentence of 18:4 ("your children … through whom the imperishable light of the law was to be given to the world") the presentation of Israel's fate become the presentation of the light of the Law. In the passage 11:5-19:17 the people who are led by Wisdom—as it is clear form 10:1-11:4—following the Law are juxtaposed to people who do not follow the Law

of God. Therefore the observation of God's law by Israel presented as a general idea in the passage.

In the time of the author of the Book of Wisdom, the Law given at Sinai is identified with the Torah itself. And if Torah is Wisdom, as Ben Sira attributed, then we can conclude that Wisdom is presented in another form in this third part of the book as well.[29] Consequently the use of the Exodus stories could have been an indirect way to present Wisdom. And by this rhetorical-literary method the series of the seven couplets of the *Ode of Wisdom* in 10:1-11:4 and the series of the *Seven antitheses* of 11:5-19:17 come to be closely linked. This supposition is reinforced by the possibility of a main division before chapter 10, and a section division between 11:4 and 11:5, and supported by the possibility of a frame proposed by Gilbert.[30]

MANNA IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM

The theological-philosophical use of the Exodus story in the Book of Wisdom is coloured by the specialities of the above described situations. One of the most interesting and far leading special events is the giving of the manna. The story is presented in an antithesis of chapter 16, where the natural elements of the world destroy man but the supernatural gift of God can save His people.

> 15. But from your hand flight is impossible, 16. for godless men who denied knowing you were scourged by the might of your arm, pursued by unusual downpours and relentless hail and thunderstorms, and utterly wasted by fire. 17. Most incredible of all, in water which quenches everything, fire was the most dynamic force, for the cosmic order champions the righteous. 18. At once moment the flame was tempered, so that it might not burn up the beasts sent against the godless, the better for them to see and perceive that it was by God's judgement that they were pursued; 19 at another, even amid the water it flared up beyond the ordinary force of fire, to destroy the fruits of an unrighteous land. 20. By contrast, you spoonfed your people with angel food, and unwearyingly furnished them from heaven bread already prepared, equivalent to every pleasure, and suited to every taste. 21. For your sustenance displayed your sweetness toward your children, and serving the desire of him that tasted it, changed its nature in accordance with what anyone wished. 22. But the snow and ice(-like food) endured fire and did not

[29] On the Logos-Sophia problematic see Winston, *Wisdom*, 33-40; B.L. Mack, *Logos und Sophia. Untersuchungen zur Weisheitstheologie im hellenistischen Judentum* (StUNT 10, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1973).

[30] According to Gilbert ("Literary Structures," 30) 10:1-21 and 19:10-22 belong together as a frame, an introduction and a conclusion. They belong together not only in a larger content but in small details, like the common mention of the men of Sodom (10:6-8 and 19:14-15).

> melt, that they might know that fire destroyed the fruits of their enemies, flaming in the hail and flashing in the storm; 23 and this fire again has forgotten even its own power, in order that the righteous be fed. 24. For creation, serving you its maker, tenses itself for punishment against the unrighteous, and slackens into benevolence on behalf of those who trust in you. 25. Therefore, at that time, too, changing into all things, it served your all-nurturing bounty in accordance with the wish of those who were in want, 26. that your sons whom you love, O Lord, might learn that it is not the varieties of fruit which nourish a man, but that your word preserves those that trust in you. 27 For that which was not destroyed by fire, melted straightaway when warmed by a fleeting sunbeam, 28. so that men might know that one must rise before the sun to give you thanks, and make petition at the crack of dawn. 29. For the hope of the ungrateful will melt away like the winter's frost, and drain off like water that goes to waste.

From the ten plagues the negative pair of the positive manna is thunderstorm. Manna is to feed the righteous, and the thunderstorm is to destroy their enemies. Both cases are described as direct intervention of God into the life of men. In both cases God's intervention was from the spheres above (heaven and sky), but the results were the opposite. In both cases ice (hail and snow) and fire (thunder fire and sunbeam), opposing elements and their extraordinary behaviours (vv. 22; 26) were involved to let man know the power of God. To escape from the hand of God is impossible, says the author in verse 15, but to be in the hand of God, where his people is, means a special source of life. As Angelo Passaro formulates:

> The theme of the manna, synonymous with power, allows the author of Wisdom to introduce and interpret the gift of the manna in the context of the cosmos which, placed in a state of obedience to its creator, always "defends the righteous" (Wis 16:17).[31]

This message belongs to the general aim of the seven antitheses.[32]

On the other hand the passage bears another important parallel not connected to the ten plague. This parallel was presented between manna and the Word of God. Verse 26 alludes to Deut 8,2-3 that man shall not live by bread alone but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of

[31] Passaro, "Serpent and Manna," 185. According to Passaro in the framework of 21-25 "the manna represents the mutation of those very natural laws which, as has been seen, are not sufficient on their own to protect man. So the reflection of the power of God is not limited to the anthropological sphere but embraces the whole cosmos" (186).

[32] On the structure and meaning of the seven antitheses see McGlynn, *Divine Judgement*, 170-74.

God. Here the Hebrew text connects the manna with the word of God.[33] The interpretation of manna as the heavenly bread on an allegorical way may identify it with the Word of God itself. But as Winston and others already pointed at, the author of the Book of Wisdom avoided the use of allegory.[34] Consequently it has to bear a typological or symbolic meaning here. Dumoulin says "the manna represents for man the sensible experience of the works that the Word fulfils in him."[35] Passaro adds to this cautious formulation that "what manna signified for the desert generation, the Word now signifies for the present one."[36] Manna is described as:

a) the meal of the angels,
b) a bread already prepared,
c) coming from the heaven,
d) equivalent to every pleasure,
e) suited to every taste,
f) all-nurturing gift of God.

In all these characteristics manna could be understood as the symbol of the Word of God, his Torah. Wim Beuken claims that the author of the Book of Wisdom has written his text to enforce the heavenly origin of the Manna.[37] Using this heavenly origin the author of the Book of Wisdom in the whole passage (together with the direct reference to Deut 8:2-3) forms a typological milieu for what is coming in the desert of Sinai: Word from the heaven. Furthermore, the formulation of the last verses of chapter 19 connects manna with the absolute knowledge, with the knowledge of immortality (19:21).[38] In so doing the Book of Wisdom endows manna with abilities previously unknown. At this point it seems to be necessary to compare the manna interpretation of the Book of Wisdom to that of the other early Jewish writings.

[33] According to Cheon, (*Exodus Story*, 66) this parallel is simply a teaching, an instruction to the Israelites. But McGlynn, *Divine Judgement*, 199 claims that manna is the "visible sign of God," and Tora is, than, at the very least, a concrete expression of Wisdom. See also the discussion of Torah and Sophia in Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 33-38.

[34] Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 62, 103. This effort to give symbolic meanings can be followed in verse 28, where the thaw of the manna warns the people to pray in the morning. See Cheon, *Exodus Story*, 67.

[35] P. Dumoulin, *Entre la manne et l'eucharistie. Étude de Sg 16,15-17,1a* (AnBib 132, Roma: Pontifico Istituto Biblico 1994) 112.

[36] Passaro, "Serpent and Manna," 183-84.

[37] W. Beuken, "De hemelse herkomst van het manna en zijn betekenis," in *Brood uit de hemel. Lijnen van Exodus 16 naar Johannes 6 tegen de achtergrond van de rabbijnse literatuur* (eds. W. Beuken *et al.*, Kampen: Kok 1985) 68.

[38] This question we will discuss later.

Use of Manna in Early Jewish Texts

There is a rich tradition and elaboration of the topic of the manna in the contemporary Jewish tradition. Most of them originate from the Egyptian Jewry. Almost all of these texts were written or composed later than the Book of Wisdom.

First of all the *Septuagint* translation of Ps 78:24-25 has to be mentioned. This historical Psalm recalls the wandering in the wilderness with the giving of the manna in verses 24-25. The text is 77:24-25 in the LXX and says:

> καὶ ἔβρεχεν αὐτοῖς μαννα φαγεῖν
> καὶ ἄρτον οὐρανοῦ ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς
> ἄρτον ἀγγέλων ἔφαγεν ἄνθρωπος

Verse 24 reads ἄρτον οὐρανοῦ "bread of the heaven" instead of "corn of the heaven" of the Hebrew text which makes the nature of the manna more concrete. But the main difference between the two texts is in the translation of לֶחֶם אַבִּירִים as ἄρτον ἀγγέλων "bread of the angels." The Hebrew word אַבִּירִים means "strong, powerful, chief,"[39] in this context however it has to denote something different. The context may hint to some type of divine being though angels are not characterised. Consequently the LXX translation tries to clarify the Hebrew text for its readers creating a new dimension for the interpretation of the manna. The Book of Wisdom uses the LXX translation of the Hebrew Bible, which indicates its earlier composition. In this case the writer of Wisdom could have been aware of the expression "bread of the angels" in Psalm 78 and used it for his own theological purposes.

Among the *Sybilline Oracles Book Three* seems to be the oldest together with the so-called fragments.[40] As Collins noted, one of the basic messages of *SibOr* 3 is that "those who keep the law of God will ultimately prosper, while those who do not will come to destruction."[41] This topic has close connection to the message of the Exodus interpretation of the Book of Wisdom. There is another connection, and that is the condemnation of idolatry. Like in the second digression (13-

[39] L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner, *The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament* (Leiden: Brill 1994) 6. See also *mighty one, hero* in D.J.A. Clines ed., *The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew. Vol. I.* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1999) 106-07.

[40] The time of writing of the first part of Book Three (vv. 1-45) and the Fragments is the late Hellenistic, early Roman period. Cf. J.J. Collins, "The Sibylline Oracles," *Jewish Writings in the Second Temple Period* (ed. M.E. Stone, CRINT 2/2, Assen: Van Gorcum and Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1984) 357-81, esp. 370.

[41] J.J. Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem. Jewish Identity in the Hellenistic Diaspora* (New York: Crossroad 1983) 63.

15) of the Book of Wisdom, idolatry is the supreme sin mentioned in these *Sybillines*.

In the third fragment of the *Sybillines* we read a comparison between the fool Egyptians and those who follow God.

> 56 Therefore on you the flash of gleaming fire
> Is coming, you shall be with torches burned
> the livelong day through an eternal age,
> At your false useless idols feeling shame.
> 60 But they who fear the true eternal God
> inherit life, and they forever dwell
> alike in fertile field of Paradise,
> feasting on sweet bread from the starry heaven.[42]

According to this text, in Paradise the righteous will be fed by γλυκὺν ἄρτον ἀπ᾽ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος.[43] This bread from heaven is not else than the manna. It is sweet and given as the food of eternity. The immortal righteous receives it after he finishes his mortal life. This is an angelic food. The tradition is used but not elaborated in this fragment which means that it was taken over from previous literature, most probably from the Book of Wisdom. In this case, the date of this fragment should be later than the Book of Wisdom.

A later contemporary of the writer of the Book of Wisdom is *Philo of Alexandria*. In his interpretations of the Biblical traditions Philo several times and in different contexts expands the pericope on the manna, and deals with the nature of the manna.[44]

In his allegorical commentary *De mutatione nominum* Philo analyses the variety and relations of the states of soul denoted by the different individuals of the Biblical narrative. He discusses the nature of the Greek educational ideas on philosophy and that of the Biblical ideas. In saying that God gives the virtues and abilities to men as gifts he cites the giving of the manna as follows:

> (258) Why then need you still wonder that God showers virtue without toil or trouble, needing no controlling hand but perfect and complete from the very first? And if you would have further testimony of this can you find any more trustworthy than Moses, who says that while other men receive their food from earth, the nation of vision alone has it from heaven. (259)The

[42] Verses 60-64 is cited by Lactantius, *De ira dei* ii 13 [L., 6, 324].

[43] Text is as it is given in J. Geffcken, *Die Oracula Sibyllina* (GCS 8, Leipzig: Hinrich [repr. Berlin, 1967]).

[44] P. Borgen, *Bread from Heaven. An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna int he Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo* (NovTSup 10, Leiden: Brill 1965) presents a detailed discussion of Philo's references to the manna.

> earthly food is produced with the cooperation of husbandmen, but the heavenly is sent like the snow by God the solely self-acting, with none to share his work. And, indeed it says, "Behold, I rain upon you bread from Heaven" (Ex 16:4). Of what food can he rightly say that it is rained from heaven, save of heavenly wisdom which is sent from above on souls which yearn for virtue by Him who sheds the gift of prudence in rich abundance, whose grace waters the universe, and chiefly so in the holy seventh which he calls the Sabbath?[45]

The nature of the bread from heaven is explained by Philo as being not an object but an intellectual or spiritual reality. It is wisdom which can be received by the soul of men. It is heavenly wisdom given by God. Philo further emphasizes the heavenly origin of the "food of the soul" in his *Legum allegoriae* (III 162-168):

> (162) That the food of the soul is not earthly but heavenly, we shall find abundant evidence in the Sacred Word. "Behold I rain upon you bread out of heaven…" (Ex 16:4). You see that the soul is fed not with things of earth decay, but with such words as God shall have poured like rain out of that lofty and pure region of life to which the prophet has given the title of "heaven"… (168) Such men have the privilege of being fed not with earthly things but with the heavenly forms of knowledge.

According to Philo manna is the "food of the soul" and it is the "heavenly form of knowledge (σοφία)." Wisdom is the "one true food of us all" says Philo on Deut 8,2 in *De Congressu Quaerendae Euriditionis Gratia* 174, and identifies it with the divine word.[46]

Philo's allegorical identification of the manna with the wisdom of God is more direct than in the language of the Book of Wisdom. The aim of the two authors on the other hand is the same: to ensure the reader that wisdom is of heavenly (divine) origin. Peder Borgen argues that Philo uses the Palestinian haggadic and homiletic traditions in his manna interpretation,[47] but the *midrashim* (*Exodus Rabba*, *Mekhilta*, *Petirat Moshe*) he refers to are much later than Philo. Therefore it seems to be more reasonable to suppose that Philo has more to do with the tradition used, shared or started by the Book of Wisdom.

In the *Biblical Antiquities* of Pseudo-Philo (*LAB*)[48] the giving of the manna is described very short (chapter 10), but later in chapter 19,

[45] Text is cited as it is in the LCL.

[46] By this identification Philo implies manna as (a symbol of) the Torah. Cf. C.H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1953) 336.

[47] Borgen, *Bread from the Heaven*.

[48] *Biblical Antiquities* was written at the end of the 1st century CE, somewhat after 70. Cf. F.J. Murphy, *Pseudo-Philo, Rewriting the Bible* (Oxford: University Press 1993)

where the death of Moses is presented the text adds an interesting new data to the text of the Deuteronomy:

> 10) …He shewed him also the place from whence it rained manna for the people, and even unto the paths of paradise.[49]

In this situation Moses is at the border of life and death. He is already on the top of the mount Horeb (!) and God shows him different things. Not only the land which Moses is not allowed entering, but also supernatural places, like the source of all the waters, the future temple and sacrifices in it. In this list we find the manna and the way to paradise in one sentence. If the list itself is not enough, the combination with paradise surely strengthens the heavenly origin of the manna. Manna is not connected directly with wisdom by Pseudo-Philo, but he combined its knowledge with the knowledge of supernatural and future things which implies a type of wisdom. On the other hand the manna–paradise combination implies the idea of eternal life in the semantic field of manna, something similar we can explore in the expression of the last sentences of the Book of Wisdom in 19:21. Αμβροσία, the nectar of eternal life is used in this verse as the synonym of manna. Consequently Book of Wisdom could have been the source of the combination of the two issues in *LAB*.

In the *Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch*[50] has a passage on the twelve calamities and the coming of the Messiah from chapter 26 on. In chapter 29 we read about nourishment for all that will be left:

> And those who are hungry will enjoy themselves and they will, moreover, see marvels every day. For winds will go out in front of me every morning to bring the fragrance of aromatic fruits and clouds at the end of the day to distil the dew of health. And it will happen at the time that the treasury of manna will come down again from on high, and they will eat of it in those years because these are they who will have arrived at the consummation of time. (29:6-8)

The situation presented by *2 Baruch* is connected to the time, when the Messiah, the "Annointed One will begin to be revealed." The Book of Wisdom describes the situation as a time when "you exhibited kindness to your people" (16:2). In both cases special nourishment characterizes this period. The "food of angels" (16:20) is paralleled to "aromatic fruits"

262-70 and H. Jacobson, *A Commentary on Pseudo-Philo's Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum* (Leiden: Brill 1996) 1: 199-210.

[49] The text is cited from the translation of M.R. James, *The Biblical Antiquities of Philo Now First Translated from the Old Latin Version* (London: SPCK 1917).

[50] *2 Baruch* was composed after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE in the same situation as *LAB*.

and "dew of health." This special food came from "in front of me" (that is God Himself) says *2 Baruch*, or "from the heaven" as the Book of Wisdom describes (16:20). Differing from the Book of Wisdom, *2 Baruch* calls the food explicitly manna. Its characterization further interprets the presentation of the "angelic food" of the Book of Wisdom by using the enigmatic expression the "treasury of manna" and the description of those who will eat it as those "who will have arrived at the consummation of time." The manna interpretation of *2 Baruch* underlines the type of eschatological meaning presented by the Book of Wisdom. To participate in the treasury of the manna is not a normal situation or time, but a moment of consummation, as it is presented in Wisd 19:18-21.[51]

The *Greek or Slavonic Baruch* which was produced after the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 CE presents an apocalypses which deals with reward and punishment. In the heavenly revelation shared by Baruch during his ascension he saw a Phoenix. When he asked what this bird eats, he was told: "The manna of heaven and the dew of earth" (6:11).[52] The episode is portrayed to have taken place in the second heaven. A heavenly beast can eat heavenly food, so it corresponds to the expression of "food of the angels" given in the Book of Wisdom 16:20. Though the book of Baruch has no eschatological character,[53] it connects the manna with heaven and afterlife according to the previous interpretation of the Book of Wisdom.

The *Life of Adam and Eve* is hard to date with any certainty but uses some traditions referred to by Josephus which put this text around the end of the 1st century CE.[54] The textual tradition of this text is also very complicated. The scene and sentence we are interested in was preserved only in the Armenian, Georgian and Latin versions.[55] Before Adam died Eva and Seth went to the gate of the Paradise to have a fruit from the tree of life, but they were not let in by Michael and they could bring only

[51] Cf. also W. Weren, "Jezus en het manna," in *Brood uit de hemel*, 90-107, esp. 104.

[52] In the Slavonic version the "dew of earth" is not mentioned, but it appears in both versions in 10:9. Concerning the food of the phoenix cf. R. van den Broek, *The Myth of the Phoenix According to Classical and Early Christian Traditions* (Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'Empire romain 24, Leiden: Brill 1972) 335-56.

[53] Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem,* 232; M.E. Stone, "Apocaliptic Literature," in *Jewish Writings in the Second Temple Period,* 383-441, esp. 411.

[54] On the problem of this composition see M. de Jonge and J. Tromp, *The Life of Adam and Eve and Related Literature* (GAP, Sheffield: Academic Press 1997) 65-78 and *Literature on Adam and Eve. Collected Essays* (eds. G.W. Anderson *et al.*, SVTP 15, Leiden: Brill 2000).

[55] De Jonge and Tromp, *The Life of Adam and Eve*, 28-44; M. de Jonge, "The Literary Developement of the Life of Adam and Eve," in *Literature on Adam and Eve*, 239-51. To the Greek version see J. Tromp, *The Life of Adam and Eve in Greek. A Critical Edition* (PVTG 6, Leiden: Brill 2005).

some spices which were outside of the Paradise. 4:1-3 runs in the Armenian text as follows:

> 1) They *sought* and they did not find *vegetable sustenance like that which was in the Garden.* 2) *Eve said*[56] "...because God established this vegetable food as food for the beasts that they might eat on the earth, but our food is that which the angels eat. 3) Arise, let us repent for forty days; perhaps God will pity us and give *us* food which is better than that of the beasts so that we should not become like them."[57]

The text speaks about the "food of angels" (4:2) which is only in the paradise and can be reached only in the end time. The topic seems to be common in this period and confirms the concept of the previous documents on the eschatological nature of the manna.

Joseph and Aseneth is supposed to have a broad time of composition between 100 BCE and 117 CE.[58] In this nice novel on Joseph and his Egyptian wife, after her conversion Aseneth receives a honeycomb which is described as follows:

> 16:14 …This honeycomb is the spirit of life. The bees of the paradise of delight have made it from the pure water of the roses of life, which are in the paradise of God. The angels of God eat from it, as do all the chosen ones of God, and all the children of the Most High, for it is the honeycomb of life, and all who eat from it will not die for all eternity.

The honeycomb is a food of the angels in heaven (paradise). It is called elsewhere the "bread of life" (8:5.11; 15:5; 16:15; 19:5; 21:21), and used together with the "cup of immortality." By eating the honeycomb Aseneth receives immortality. The description of the honeycomb is very similar to that of the manna,[59] though no element of the Exodus tradition is used in *Joseph and Aseneth*.[60] On the other hand the transfer of the

[56] In the Latin version Adam is the one who speaks.

[57] Translation is from M.E. Stone, *The Penitence of Adam* (CSCO 429-30, Scriptores Armeniaci 13-14, Leuven: Peeters 1981) electronic version: http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/anderson/vita/english/vita.arm.html#per4.

[58] R. Chesnutt, *From Death to Life: Conversion in Joseph and Aseneth* (JSPSup 16, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press 1995) 80-85; Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 105-10.

[59] Scholars frequently identify the honeycomb with manna. C. Burchard, *Untersuchungen zu Joseph und Aseneth: Uberlieferung-Ortbestimmung* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1965) 130; K.-G. Sandelin, "A Wisdom Meal in the Romance of Joseph and Aseneth," in *Wisdom as Nourisher: A Study of an Old Testament Theme, its Development Within Early Judaism and its Impact on Early Christianity* (ed. *idem*, Abo: Abo Akademi 1986) 152-57.

[60] The equation of manna with honeycomb is challenged by M. Hubbard, "Honey for Aseneth: Interpreting a Religious Symbol," *JSP* 16 (1997) 97-110 and A.E. Portier-

honeycomb from the mouth of God's messenger makes an identification of the honeycomb with Wisdom possible.[61] By this equation similarity between the interpretation of manna and honeycomb become more evident. Despite the silence on manna in *Joseph and Aseneth* the nature of the honeycomb presented in the novel seems to be borrowed from the tradition of the Book of Wisdom.[62]

All of the *Targums* describe the manner of the gift of the manna that "God let it come down." Only *Tagum Jerushalmi* Exod 16:4 expands the Hebrew text with a theological addition that manna was "hidden in the beginning."[63] Verse 15 continues that "and now the Lord gives it to you as food." In this 3rd-4th century *targum* the tradition of the manna became complete. If it was hidden at the beginning than it was created by God before the time of Creation like Wisdom as it is stated by the Book of Wisdom. A pre-existent food can feed the angels. It is ambrosia the food of the angels the immortal beings. This food cannot come from somewhere else than from heaven as it is stated in the Book of Wisdom.

As we have seen the heavenly origin or heavenly form of the manna, its nature as the food of the angels or ambrosia, its connection with Wisdom and immortality became a common sense in the period after the writing of the Book of Wisdom. It is impossible to prove that the Book of Wisdom was the source of some of these ideas, but we can claim that it played a prominent role in their spreading in Egypt and Palestine.

THE TASTE OF PARADISE

By the use of the term "the food of angels" at the beginning of his presentation of the manna event, and by the use of the reference to the manna as "ambrosia" at the very end of his whole book,[64] the author connects manna with immortality. Immortality is one of the main theological topic displayed by the author in the Book of Wisdom (1:15; 20:23; 3:4; 4:1; 6:18-19; 8:13,17; 15:3; 12:1; 18:4).[65] For these passages we

Young, "Sweet Mercy Metropolis: Interpreting Aseneth's Honeycomb," *JSP* 14 (2005) 133-57.

[61] Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 236; R.S. Kraemer, *When Aseneth Met Joseph: A Late Antique Tale of the Biblical Patriarch and His Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered* (New York: Oxford University Press 1998) 26.

[62] As Collins, *Between Athens and Jerusalem*, 236 noted: "The main difference between Joseph and Aseneth and the Wisdom of Solomon is that the latter uses a philosophical idiom which Joseph and Aseneth relies on narrative symbolism."

[63] Discussion of the Targums on manna see in W. van Beuken, "Moses en het manna," in *Brood uit de hemel*, 74-89, esp. 82-88.

[64] The climax of the book is the last sentence before the closing doxology. This verse ends the section concerning the change of the world order. It is about Manna.

[65] Winston, *Wisdom of Solomon*, 25-32.

can conclude as Gilbert did, that "Wisdom confers immortality on man, because love of wisdom impels man to obey its laws (6:17-19). To obtain wisdom is therefore to be assured of immortality (8:17)."[66] According to 19:21 to eat manna „assures the eater of immortality."[67] Consequently manna is not simply the Word of God, or the Law to which man has to obey. It is not simply a typology to provide the present generation a valuable parallel from the past how God's Word can feed the faithful man with all the sufficient things. But it is the special Word of God which gives the opportunity of those who received it and obeyed to it to gain immortality, to get in contact with the heavenly order.

Thus can we say that manna is Wisdom? It would be natural after the analysis above. But the author of the Book of Wisdom makes a very fine distinction not to use this direct allegory. In the whole chapter 16 we have a *leitwort*: γεῦσις, "taste." It appears in verses 2.3.20. The taste of the manna is changed to everyone's liking in 16:21. But the author also speaks about the sweetness of the manna, and as ambrosia which is a honey-like nectar. The taste of the manna is what man can feel when he eats it. Consequently what man can receive on this world is not immortality itself, it is not the world to come itself, but it is the taste of paradise. As the taste provides the eater the promise of nourishment, Wisdom provides the opportunity of immortality. So we can say that according to the author *Wisdom is the taste of paradise*.[68] This is again another form, how wisdom is presented in the third section of the Book of Wisdom.

The writer tries to confess the readers that the situation they are living in the present is somehow comparable to the situation in the time of the Exodus. As in the wilderness God protected his people from the enemies, gave them food and drink to live by transforming the elements of the world, in the present God will transform the elements to give life and protection to His people as well. It is not a new earth and new heaven,[69] but those who are led by God's wisdom will experience already here in this world the taste of the coming world, the taste of paradise.

[66] M. Gilbert, "Wisdom Literature," in *Jewish Writings in the Second Temple Period*, 311. "Thus wisdom is the pledge of immortality and its active presence in the world can do nothing but good for the people of whom it makes God's friends" (310).

[67] Gilbert, *Wisdom Literature*, 312.

[68] "Thus from the biblical tradition we learn of God's supernatural sweetness, manifested in God's words and God's wisdom," Portier-Young, "Sweet Mercy Metropolis," 49.

[69] Cf. the discussion of the transformation of cosmos in the Book of Wisdom by J.J. Collins, "The Reinterpretation of Apocalyptic Traditions in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *The Book of Wisdom in Modern Research*, 143-55, esp. 151-54.

INDEX OF MODERN AUTHORS

Adorno, F. 46
Alexander, P.S. 59
Allison, D.C. 90
Alonso Schökel, L. 116
Amir, Y. 8, 158, 181
Anderson, G.W. 213
Anderson, H. 50
Armetta, F. 55
Arnim, H.F. 110
Augustin, M. 193
Barclay, J.M.G. 5, 117, 166, 168, 170f
Barraclough, R. 48
Barthélemy, D. 3
Barton, J. 161
Baslez, M.-F. 2, 171, 198
Baumgartan, A.I. 192
Baumgarten, W. 209
Beauchamp, P. 20, 95, 108-110, 117, 158
Beckwith, R.T. 62
Beentjes, P.C. 197
Bellia, G. 1, 38, 92, 104, 126, 171, 198
Bernini, F. 109
Beuken, W. van 208, 215
Bickermann, E. 50
Birnbaum, E. 181
Bizzeti, P. 137
Blischke, M.V. 128, 132, 141, 149, 153
Boccaccini, G. 52
Borgen, P. 210f
Broek, R. van den 213
Burchard, C. 97f, 214
Burfeind, C. 97
Burkes, S. 2
Busto Saiz, J.R. 58
Bückers, H. 158
Calabi, F. 43, 48
Calduch-Benages, N. 9, 23, 94, 121, 169, 197
Caquot, A. 121
Cardellini, I. 39
Carmignac, J. 122
Carson, D.A. 59
Carteron, H. 114
Cazeaux, J. 57
Chazon, E.G. 6
Cheon, S. 35, 83, 116, 198, 200f, 203f, 208
Chesnutt, R. 214
Cleary, J.J. 42
Clifford, R.J. 76, 197
Clines, D.J.A. 18, 209
Coggins, R.J. 197
Collins, J.J. 1f, 4f, 8, 10f, 13-15, 17-19, 21, 23, 27, 36f, 47, 52f, 70, 72, 76, 105, 117, 122f, 161, 163, 169-173, 178-180, 203, 209, 213-216
Colson, F.H. 115
Conti, M. 103
Conybeare, F.C. 78
Cook, S.L. 122
Crenshaw, J. 24f
Cross, F.L. 48
Dawson, D. 181
Day, J. 71, 161
Delcor, M. 1, 121
Dell'Omo, A. 118
Denis, A.-M. 89
DeSilva, D.A. 50
Dever, W. 71
DeVries, S. 63-65
Diels, H. 107
Dietzfelbinger, C. 85f
Dihle, A. 144
Dillon, J. 8, 44, 61, 76
Dochhorn, J. 7
Dodd, C.H. 211
Duensing, H. 95
Duling, D.C. 78-80
Dumoulin, P. 92, 208

Dupont-Sommer, A. 85, 132, 152
Ebner, M. 159
Egger-Wenzel, R. 131
Elgvin, T. 1, 3, 6, 16, 19f
Engel, H. 8, 10, 84, 87, 92, 126-128, 130f, 134, 142, 149, 151, 156, 158f
Enns, P. 116
Eynikel, E. 83
Fabbri, M.V. 9, 117, 159
Fabry, H.-J. 18
Falk, D. 4
Farias, D. 45f, 50
Farmer, W.R. 83
Federici, T. 114
Festa, N. 107f
Festugière, A.-J. 108f
Fichtner, J. 108
Fink, U.B. 97
Fitzmyer, J.A. 88
Fletcher-Louis, C.H.T. 10, 14
Flückiger, F. 42
Focke, F. 37
Foerster, W. 108, 112-114
Fohrer, G. 119
Freedman, H. 189
Frey, J. 13
Frishman, J. 6
Früchtel, U. 193
Fuks, A. 181
Gammie, J.G. 62, 76
García Martínez, F. 1
Gärtner, E. 129
Geffcken, J. 210
Gemoll, G. 129, 144, 147, 152, 157
George, S. 151
Georgi, D. 83, 104, 129, 190, 193
Gigante, M. 42
Gilbert, M. 2, 8-12, 18, 37-41, 44, 57f, 94, 113, 118, 120f, 202, 206, 216
Goering, G.S. 164, 166
Goff, M.J. 1, 3, 6, 11, 13, 15-17, 20
Goldstein, J.A. 114
Goodman, D. 84, 88
Goodman, M. 117
Goodrick, A.T.S. 102
Gorez, J. 90
Grabbe, L.L. 5, 8, 18, 200, 203
Graf, F. 94
Grelot, P. 132
Grimm, C.L.W. 39, 104, 115, 161
Gründer, K. 128, 145
Guillaume, Ph. 28
Hadot, J. 85
Hanson, P.D. 119f, 122
Harner, P. 119
Harrington, D.J. 1, 3, 14, 86
Hauser, A.J. 28
Hayward, R. 193
Heinemann, L. 126
Heinisch, P. 104, 170
Hellholm, D. 122
Hempel, C. 7
Hengel, M. 51f
Hentschel, G. 8, 127
Herrick, G. 67
Herrmann, K. 188
Hilhorst, A. 197
Hiltbrunner, O. 151
Hollander, H.W. 189
Holtzmann, J. 104
Horbury, W. 193
Horsley, R.A. 42, 45
Horst, P.W. van der 52f
Houlden, J.L. 197
Hubbard, M. 214
Humphrey, E.J. 97
Hübner, H. 9, 38, 83, 91-93, 125-127, 142. 146, 151, 155
Israelstam, J. 187
Jacobson, H. 212
James, M.R. 212
Johnson, M.D. 96
Johnstone, W. 197
Jonge, M. de 189, 213
Kaiser, O. 100, 138, 157
Kaminsky, J. 170
Kenik, H.A. 65, 68
Kepper, M. 126
Kleinknecht, H. 42, 149
Klostergard Petersen, A. 197
Knibb, M. 122
Koch, K. 122

Koehler, L. 209
Koester, H. 42
Kolarcik, M. 8f, 24, 126, 158, 169, 199, 201, 203
Kraemer, R.S. 215
Kugel, J.L. 2, 23, 187
Kuntzmann, R. 57
Lange, A. 3, 13f, 17
Laporte, J. 57
Larcher, C. 2, 4, 11, 20, 23, 37-40, 45, 51, 57, 83, 91f, 94, 103f, 108, 112f, 116
Lauterbach, J.Z. 34
Le Donne, A. 75, 80
Lee, T.R. 174
Levine, L.I. 117
Lichtenberger, H. 83
Liddel, H.G. 116
Liesen, J. 9, 94
Long, A.A. 42
Luttikhuizen, G.P. 2, 16
Macaskill, G. 16
Mach, M. 91, 99f
Mack, B.L. 168, 206
MacKenzie, S.L. 157
Manfredi, S. 121
Manicardi, E. 39
Marböck, J. 49
Martens, J.W. 42, 46, 48k
Martin Hogan, K. 2, 8f, 11f
Martin, J.D. 29, 175
Marucci, C. 50
Mazzanti, A.M. 43
Mazzinghi, L. .38f, 41f, 55, 57, 117, 171, 180
McGlynn, M. 9, 57, 61, 68, 70, 75, 179, 200, 202, 207f
McLean, P.D. 184
Mendelson, A. 181
Mercier, C. 89
Metzger, B.M. 95
Meyer, M. 194
Milik, J.T. 3
Mirecki, P. 194
Mitsis, P. 42
Mittag, P.F. 150
Modrzejewski, J. 171
Moenikes, A. 127
Monsengwo Pasinya, L. 43, 46
Moule, C.D.F. 55
Muñoz León, D. 58
Murphy, F.J. 211
Murray, J.O. 76
Myre, A. 48
Najman, H. 45, 59
Naro, M. 55
Neher, M. 45, 189
Neusner, J. 42, 185
Nickelsburg, G.W.E. 19, 24, 26, 29, 36
Nicklas, T. 161
Niehoff, M. 189
Nobile, M. 23, 122
North, W.E.S. 7
O'Connor, M. 17
Odenhall, D.H. 119
Oegema, G.S. 83
Offerhaus, U. 93, 103f
Parry, D. W. 13, 20
Passaro, A. 1, 38, 55, 61, 92, 104, 126, 171, 198, 204, 207f
Paul, A. 51f
Perdue, L.G. 27, 62, 126, 192
Perrenchio, F. 131
Pfleiderer, E. 105
Philonenko, M. 1, 85, 98
Pietersma, A. 182
Pistone, R. 104
Plöger, O. 122
Pohlenz, M. 42
Ponizy, B. 193
Portier-Young, A.E. 215f
Prato, G.L. 49, 57
Prigent, M. 96
Priotto, M. 39, 56
Puech, E. 20
Rad, G. von 28, 29, 67, 105, 119, 122, 175
Radice, R. 42, 51
Raurell, F. 139
Ravenna, A. 114
Reale, G. 43
Rebiger, B. 188
Reddit, P.L. 50
Reese, J.M. 10, 37, 94, 105, 131, 137, 157, 199f

Reeve, C.D.C. 76
Reider, J. 102, 115, 203
Reimer, D.J. 161
Reiterer, F.V. 127, 130, 131, 133, 138, 145, 150, 161
Rice, G. 65
Richardson, W. 47
Ricks, S.D. 20
Ritter, J. 128, 145
Rivaud, A. 112
Robin, L. 107
Robinson, J. 78
Rompay, L. van 6
Rubinkiewicz, R. 89
Ruiten, J.T.A.G.M. van 2, 197
Runia, D.T. 9, 11
Russel, D.S. 119
Saake, H. 148
Sacchi, P. 119
Salzer, D. 194
Sandelin, K.-G. 214
Sänger, D. 97
Santos Otero, de A. 95
Scarpat, G. 2, 44, 50, 68, 104
Schäfer, P. 186, 188
Schiffman, L.H. 3
Schimanowski, G. 198
Schlosser, J. 57
Schmidt, F. 90
Schmitt, A. 83, 92f, 125, 128f, 135, 138, 142, 185, 191
Schnabel, J.E. 49
Schneemelcher, W. 95
Schofeld, M. 43
Scholem, G. 184, 190, 194
Schroer, S. 125
Schunck, K.-D. 193
Schwenk-Bressler, U. 11, 93f, 129, 192
Scott, J.M. 198
Scott, R. 116
Segal, A.F. 191
Shekan, P.W. 200
Simon, M. 189
Sisti, A. 116
Skemp, W.T.M. 87
Slotki, J.J. 186f
Smith, J.Z. 185, 187, 190
Spicq, C. 44
Squilloni, A. 40, 43
Sterling, G.E. 39, 51, 53, 177
Stern, M. 38
Stone, M.E. 209, 213f
Striker, G. 42, 53
Strugnell, J. 1, 14
Stuckenbruck, L.T. 6f
Suggs, M.J. 197
Sullivan, K.P. 10, 185
Swartz, M.D. 192
Sweet, J.P.M. 55, 103
Tcherikover, V. 171, 181
Termini, C. 43, 45f, 48, 50
Tigchelaar, E.J.C. 4, 6, 9, 13, 16, 19
Tiller, P.A. 7
Tobin, T. 12, 15, 76
Torijano, P. 62f, 78-80, 184
Tromp, J. 213
Trublet, J. 117
Tuschling, R.M.M. 99
Ulrich, E. 13
Vallauri, E. 102
Vegge, T. 159
Verbeke, G. 145
Vermeylen, J. 23, 121, 169, 197
Vervenne, M. 197
Vílchez Líndez, J. 83, 102f
Vogels, W. 9
Walsh, J.T. 64, 66f
Waltke, B.K. 17
Wandrey, I. 194
Watson, G. 42
Weeks, S. 87
Weische, A. 128, 131, 139, 157
Weren, W. 213
Werner, W. 8, 10, 127, 142, 157
Wernicke, K. 94f
Whittaker, G.H. 115
Wilken, R.L. 57
Williamson, H.G.M. 59
Wills, L.M. 24
Winston, D. 2, 9f, 18f, 37-39, 47, 69f, 77, 104f, 110, 114f, 128f, 163f, 171-

173, 177f, 189, 198-200, 202f, 206, 208, 215
Wold, B.G. 6, 11, 13-15, 17
Wright, A.G. 138, 200
Wright, B.G. 18, 24, 183
Zapotoczky, K. 150
Zenger, E. 8, 125, 127
Ziegler, J. 164
Ziener, G. 103f, 111

INDEX OF CITED PASSAGES

1. Old Testament

Genesis
1 ..... 10, 15, 20, 102, 118
1-3 ..... 2, 6, 9, 11-13, 16kf 20
1:1 114
1:1-2 113
1:1-2:4 113
1:20 12
1:27 ..... 10, 12, 15
1:27 LXX 11
1:28 6
2-3 17
2:4 10
2:4a 117
2:7 ..... 11-13, 15f
2:7 LXX 12
2:9 6
2:15 6
2:17 11
2:18, 24 11
3:6 6
3:17, 19 11
3:18 7
3:22 10
3:23 98
4:12 7
9:16 12
18:8 ..... 89f
19:3 ..... 89f
22:1 140
27:41-45 185
28 185
28:10-13 186
28:11 187
28:12 ..... 188, 191
28:12-13 ..... 184, 189
29-30 185
31 185
32:31 185
35:1 187
37:7.9 187
41:1 187
48-49 185

Exodus
3:18LXX 167
5:3LXX 167
7:5 113
9:13-15LXX 113
9:13-35 83
12:23 191
16:4 211
16:4.14.31LXX 92
16:11-36 83
16:13-15 92
16:14HB/LXX 93
16:21 94
16:23 93
16:31bLXX 93, 98
20:2.3.4.7 205
20:21 189
24:11b 88
28:36 192
34:28-39 88
41:45.50 97
46:20 97

Numeri
11:4-6 92
11:7LXX 92f
11:8LXX 92f
12:31 116
17:6-15 191

Deuteronomy
7:6-7LXX 167
8:2 211

8:2-3 ..... 207f
9:9 88
9:18 88
10:15LXX 167
17:14-20 67
32:28 143
32:39-43 204

Judges
6 ..... 85f
6:11-24 84
6:21 99
6:21-22 85
13:15 85
13:16b 85
13:20b-23 85

1 Samuel
4 65
7:1-2 65

2 Samuel
7:8-16 71
7:13 71
7:16 ..... 71, 75
12:24-25 72

1 Kings
1-10LXX 64
1:1-2:12 61
2:6 64
2:9 64
2:25 64
2:26-27 64
2:34 64
2:35a-o 63
2:46a-l 63
3 4
3:1-15 61
3:2 65
3:3-14 65
3:7 74
3:16-28 65
3:46 64
4:29 70
4:29-34 64
5:1-8:66 61
5:13 66
6:2-8 66
6:11 66
7:13-40 66
7:46-50 66
8:14 66
8:16 66
8:18 66
8:20 66
8:24-26 66
8:27-29 66
8:31-32 66
8:33-34 66
8:37 66
8:41 66
9:15-10:29 61
10-11 32
10:1-10 66
10:1-13 61
11:1-8 67
11:11 67
11:14-24 67
11:41 32
11:41-43 67

1 Chronicles
16:13LXX 167
22:1 62

2 Chronicles
1-9 61

Nehemiah
9:6 89
9:15LXX 92

Tobit
6:6 G^{I} 87
8:15 167
12:19 87
12:15 G^{II} 87f

Esther
8:12 150

Job
28 175
28:12.13.20LXX 167

Psalms
2:1-2 68
2:7 72
17 80
21/20:2.14 142
45/46:2 142
53/54:3 142
58/59:12.17 142
72 80
77:19-20LXX 92
77:22LXX 92
77:24LXX 92
77:24.25LXX 91f, 99, 209
78:24-25 91
78:24-25LXX 209
89:26 72
89:36-37 71
91 79
103:20 91
104:6LXX 167
104:43LXX 167
104:40LXX 92
105:5LXX 167
119 (118):105 ..... 41f
148:8LXX 94

Proverbs
1:28LXX 167
2:5LXX 167
3:13LXX 167
6:23LXX 41
8 ..... 27, 32
8:9.17LXX 167
8:16-17 70
9:10 ..... 189f
16:15 88
30:1-4 175
30:3 189

Wisdom of Solomon
1-6 ..... 31, 33, 57
1:1 ..... 5, 40, 169
1:1-4 136
1:1-6-21 ..... 199, 201
1:1a 127, 132f
1:1a.15 161
1:1b 132, 143
1:1b-4b 136, 140f, 145
1:1b-11d 157
1:1b-14d 132, 134, 161f
1:1b-2:4b 141
1:1c 132, 143
1:1c.2a.2b 132
1:1c-14d 135
1:1-2 167
1:1-5 ..... 137, 151
1:1-6:1 131
1:1-11 127
1:1-15 ..... 125, 127, 131, 137-139
1:2 167
1:2a 132
1:2a-4b 143
1:2a.4a.6c.10a.11c.13a 147
1:2b 144
1:2-6 31
1:3b 144
1:3 55
1:3a 152
1:3b 152f
1:3-5 151
1:4 ..... 141, 178
1:4a 151, 155
1:4ab 144, 147
1:5 178
1:5a 129, 152
1:5c 152f
1:5abc 147
1:5-7 149
1:5-8 ..... 135, 146, 148, 154
1:6 ..... 68, 150, 173
1:6a 129, 146, 151, 155
1:6b 151, 155
1:6c 154, 155
1:6c-e 153
1:6c-8b 147
1:6d 155
1:7 ..... 70, 169, 173
1:7a 129, 151, 153f

1:7b 154-156
1:8ab 154
1:9 164
1:9a 157
1:9a-10b 157
1:9a-14d 136, 155, 159
1:9b 158
1:10a-14b 156
1:10b 158
1:11 169
1:11-15 131
1:11a-d 157, 158
1:12-15 127
1:12a 162
1:12a-14d 157
1:12b 158
1:13 ..... 7, 9f, 132
1:13a-b.14a-d 162
1:14 ..... 9f, 32, 109, 113, 132
1:14a 147
1:14b 117, 132, 147, 157
1:14c 157
1:14d 127, 157
1:15 ..... 8, 33, 132f, 215
1:16 ..... 132, 136, 161f, 166
1:16-2:20 8
2 33
2:1 ..... 55, 174
2:1-5 174
2:1-24 131
2:2-3 12
2:2.17.20 136
2:10.12 164
2:11.12 ..... 39, 153
2:12 ..... 39, 170
2:12-20 174
2:13 ..... 18, 164
2:13-18 19
2:15 170
2:16 ..... 19, 164
2:16c 19
2:17 11
2:18 19
2:21 ..... 55, 174f
2:21-24 131
2:22 ..... 4, 23, 30f, 174f
2:23 ..... 7, 9f, 15, 41, 55, 169, 174, 215
2:24 11
3:1-4 70
3:1-4:20 ..... 31, 131
3:2 ..... 8, 164
3:4 215
3:7 18
3:9 ..... 4, 18, 167
3:10 ..... 8, 164
3:13-14 11
3:19 ..... 11, 164
4:1 ..... 11, 215
4:3 164
4:7 164
4:10.14 169
4:14 174
4:15 ..... 167, 174
4:16 164
4:17 ..... 8, 164, 174, 182
4:18 182
4:20 131
4:24 74
5 30
5:1 ..... 20, 164
5:1-23 131
5:2 182
5:4 164
5:5 ..... 19, 164, 166, 189
5:7 174
5:9-14 16
5:14 164
5:15 164
5:15-23 ..... 23, 31
5:17.20 117
5:17-23 ..... 9, 16
5:17b 30
5:17b-20 102
5:23 131
6-10 30
6:1 ..... 5, 40, 177
6:1c 154
6:1-2 168
6:1-11 68
6:1-21 131
6:4 ..... 39f, 42, 44, 54
6:4, 18 39

6:7 168
6:9 ..... 168, 177
6:9.11 136
6:10 ..... 169, 178
6:11 178
6:12.17 167
6:13 ..... 69, 167
6:14 167
6:16 167
6:17-19 216
6:17-20 ..... 69, 179
6:18 41
6:18-19 ..... 10, 179, 215
6:19 8
6:20 69
6:22 177
6:22-9:18 201
6:22-10:21 199
6:24 164
7-9 ..... 33, 61
7-10 ..... 32f, 57
7:1-6 168
7:1 ..... 11, 16f, 68
7:1-12 32
7:1-9:18 68
7:3 68
7:5-6 68
7:6 11
7:7 ..... 69, 177, 179
7:7-22 4
7:10 167
7:14 ..... 69, 177
7:15 164
7:15-22 184
7:15-30 ..... 69f
7:16 136
7:17 ..... 104, 177
7:17-18 4
7:17-21 ..... 55, 81, 178
7:18-20 177
7:20 54
7:21 ..... 81, 177
7:22 173
7:22-26 38
7:23 150
7:25 ..... 130, 173
7:26 ..... 11, 140, 173
7:27 ..... 32, 111, 164, 166f, 178
7:29 74
7:29-30 56
8:1 58
8:2 ..... 167, 177
8:3 167
8:4 54
8:7 ..... 7, 130
8:7-8 69
8:9.18.21 177
8:8.18 136
8:13 ..... 179, 215
8:17 ..... 8, 179, 215f
8:18 167
8:19.20 69
8:19-21 ..... 176, 178
8:21 176
9 ..... 27, 30
9:1 ..... 32, 136
9:1-18 71
9:2-3 6
9:3 73
9:4 ..... 165, 177
9:5 ..... 11, 72
9:6 ..... 30, 178
9:6-7 72
9:7 ..... 167, 183
9:8 ..... 72, 183, 189
9:10 ..... 23, 32
9:11 ..... 41, 56
9:12 ..... 72, 183
9:13-18 ..... 175f
9:14 175
9:17 ..... 39, 41
9:17-18 75
10 ..... 34, 54, 58
10:1 ..... 11, 17
10:1-21 ..... 198, 200, 206
10:1-11:1 200
10:1-11:4 ..... 201, 205f
10:1-19:9 101
10:1-19:22 201
10:2-3 202
10:3 165
10:4-6 ..... 169, 202

10:4-6.10.13 165
10:6-8 ..... 202, 206
10:7 ..... 56, 165
10:8ab 175
10:10 183-191
10:10-12 202
10:12 165
10:13-14 202
10:15 ..... 47, 165, 202
10:17 ..... 41, 165
10:19 165
10:20 165
10:20-21 200
11-19 ..... 5, 9, 23, 32f, 55, 57
11:1 203
11:1-2 200
11:1-14 ..... 199f
11:1-19:17 198
11:2-14 200
11:4 ..... 179, 202
11:5 ..... 34, 137, 165, 202
11:5, 13 34
11:5-14 202
11:5-19:17 ..... 201f, 205f
11:6-14 34
11:6-19:22 200
11:8 165
11:9 165
11:9b 157
11:10 165
11:13 34
11:14 165
11:15-12:22 ..... 199, 204
11:15-12:27 44
11:16 34
11:17 ..... 102, 112, 115
11:17-12:27 35
11:20 ..... 130, 137
11:20d 106
11:23 169
11:24 169
12:1 ..... 10, 169, 179, 215
12:1-15:19 205
12:2 169
12:7 165
12:9 ..... 136, 165
12:12 ..... 165, 171
12:15.17 130
12:16 169
12:17 130
12:19 ..... 44, 150, 165
12:19-22 35
12:21 ..... 165f
12:22 ..... 140, 165f
12:27 182
13-15 ..... 199, 204, 209
13:1 ..... 54, 182
13:1-9 ..... 169, 173, 175f
13:2 174
13:2-3 175
13:3-5 174
13:4 130
13:6-8 ..... 174f
13:6.9 167
13:10ff. 175
14:4-6 137
14:9-10 166
14:11 171
14:13-14 8
14:16 39
14:22-29 175
14:30 ..... 137, 143
15:1 166
15:1-2 166
15:3 ..... 8, 77, 137, 179, 215
15:4 141
15:4-5 137
15:8 ..... 137, 169
15:8-11 12
15:9-11 175
15:13 ..... 113, 175
15:15 171
16:1-4 34
16:1-19:9 199
16:1-19:22 200
16:2 ..... 165, 212
16:2.3.20 216
16:3.4.5 165
16:5-14 35
16:6 ..... 39, 56
16:8 165
16:10.26 165

16:11 ....39, 56
16:12 ....56, 136
16:13 204
16:15 207
16:15-22 206
16:15-29 35
16:16 173
16:16-19 83
16:17 207
16:17.22.23b 102
16:18 165
16:20-23 ....83, 92, 95
16:20 ....83, 91, 93, 165f, 212f
16:20b 84, 92
16:20c 92f, 95
16:21 ....165, 216
16:21a 93
16:22 94
16:23-24 94
16:23-29 207
16:24 ....9, 101, 117
16:24-25 93
16:24 ff 111
16:25 117
16:26 ....166f
16:27 94
16:29 92
17:1 176
17:1-18:4 ....35, 40
17:2 ....165, 175
17:7 175
17:12 56
17:12-13 55
17:20 .... 40f, 54, 56, 165
18:1 ....40, 165
18:1-4 ....40, 165
18:3 ....41, 56
18:4 ....10, 38, 40-42, 47, 54-58, 165, 175, 179, 205, 215
18:4c 37
18:4, 9 39
18:5 ....165f
18:5-25 35
18:6 ....166, 179
18:7 179
18:7.8 ....165f
18:8 ....166f
18:9 ....39, 165, 167, 179
18:13 ....19, 165
18:15 56
18:15.22 136
18:20-25 ....191f
18:21-25 183
18:23-25 194
18:24-25 137
19:1 165
19:1-9 35
19:3 137
19:4-5 179
19:5.22 165
19:6 ....9, 101, 165
19:6c 117
19:9-10 179
19:10-12 ....103, 199
19:10-21 101
19:10-22 206
19:11 116
19:13-17 199
19:13-22 35
19:14-15 206
19:18 ....55, 101-105, 111f, 115f, 123
19:18-21 ....35, 199, 201, 205, 213
19:19-21 103
19:20 54
19:21 .... 94f, 100, 208, 212, 216
19:22 ....117, 121, 199, 201

Ben Sira
Prol 3 146
1:9-10 169
17 179
17:7 6
32:19 143
33:10 168
39:25-31 9
42:15-43:33 174
44:17.19 168
45:1 168
45:23 140

Isaiah
2:2-3 179

2:30 42
5 25
6 25
19 25
42:6 179
42:8-9 118
43:16-19a 119
43:18-19 118
44:6-8 118
45:5 17
45:11-12 113
46:8-11 118
46:13 118
48:3-7 118
48:7 119
48:13 113
49:6 179
51:5 118
59:17-19
63:7-64:11 119
65:17 ..... 119f
66:22 ..... 119f

Jeremiah
2 25
22:28 25
23:29 25
30:10 186

Baruch
3:15-4:3 25
3:15-4:4 27

Ezekiel
1-3 25

Daniel
2:18-19, 27-30, 47 3
12:3 18

Hosea
13:4LXX 113

Amos
9:1 189

Jonas
4:11 28

2 Maccabees
1:25 167
2:28 171
4:11 150
6:22 150
7:18 102
7:28 114
14:9 150

2. New Testament

John
6 96

Romans
1:18-23 174

1 Corinthians 10:3ff 96

Revelation
2:17 98
2:17b 96

3. Pseudepigrapha

1 Enoch
1-5 29
69:11 19
104:14 18

3 Enoch
43:1 18

2 Baruch
29:6-8 212
29:8 96

Greek or Slavonic Baruch
6:11 213
10:9 213

3 Maccabees
3:15.18 150

4 Maccabees
1:1 50
2:9-10 50
5:12 150
5:25 50
5:34-35 50
12:13 104

The Life of Adam and Eve
4:1-3 214
4,2 96

Sibylline Oracles
3.frg.1-45 209
3. frg.56.60 210
7:149 96

1 Esdras
8:10 150

2 Esdras
7:20-24 179
14:20-22 179

Testament of Abraham
4:6-9 90
4 (A) 4:9 99
4:10 91
4:15 90

Testament of Levi
8:5 95
14:3-4 41

Testament of Gad
5:10 34

5 Ezra
1:17-19 96

Apocalypse of Abraham
12:1-2 89
13 89

Joseph and Aseneth
8:5.11 214
14:1-17:6 96
15:5 ..... 99, 214
16 100
16:8b 98
16:9 98
16:11 98
16:14 214
16:14b 98
16:15 214
16:16 99
19:5 214
21:21 214

Letter of Aristeas
31 52
161 52
168-169 52

4. Dead Sea Scrolls

1Q26 1
4Q415-18, ... 1, 3
4Q415 11 5 4
4Q416 1 ..... 9, 14, 20
1 12 16
1 11-12 9
2 ii 6 18
2 iii 7-8 17
2 iii 11 4
2 iii 11-12 6
2 iii 21 11
2 iv 1 11
4Q418 43 4 13
55 1 17
55 8-11 18
69 ii 6 ..... 16, 18
69 ii 7 20
69 ii 9 9
69 ii 13 14
69 ii 13-14 18
69 ii 81-81a, 127 20
77 2 5
81 1.2 ..... 4, 14

81 3 6
81 4-5 19
81 13 6
103 ii 9 17
123 ii 3-4 ..... 3k
126 ii 6-7 18
221 2-3 4
4Q417 1 i 5
1 i 3-4 3
1 i 6-8 4
1 i 13-18 13
1 i 16.17 14
1 i 17 ..... 16k
1 i 18-19 5
1 15-16 14
1 17-18 17
2 i 10-12 18
2 ii 11 5
4Q171 3 1-2 10
4Q196 17 i 2 87
4Q287 4 2 6
4Q422 1 i 9-10 6
4Q423 ..... 1, 3
4Q423 1 ..... 5f, 11, 16f
1 1 6
1 2 6
1 3 7
1 1-3 6
2 i 7 6
3 2 5
4Q402 4 12 3
4Q504 8 4-6 6
1Q27 1i 3-4 3
1QS xi 3-4 3
iii 15 3
iii 18 14
iii 23 4
iv 6-14 18
iv 7, 22-23 10
iv 25-26 5
CD ii 9-10 3
iii 20 10
x 6 13
xiv 6-8 13
1QSa i 6-7 13
1QH iv 15 10
v 19-20 14
xvi 24-25 7
xix 13-14 3
11QPsAp 78-80

5. Philo

Leg. 1.31 12
1.105-7 8
3:186, 212 181
3.95-96 11
115 181
Opif.
3 48
25 11
26, 82 115
44 9
69 12
134 ..... 11f
Aet. 35 9
Vit. Mos.
1.162 48
2.11.48 48
2:109-135 193
2:115 192
2:117-124 193
2:132 192
2:216 38
2.267 92
2.4 48
2.48 48
28, 156 110
Ios. 29 46
De specialibus legibus I, 328 112
Spec. 1:16-20 181
1:84-97 193
2.37 46
2:165-167 181
Ebr. 80 46
Prob. 46 ..... 46f, 55
Abr. 3 48
57 181
276 47
De Abr. 118 89
Quaestiones in Genesim
4:9 89

Praem. 55 48
Migr. 130 48
De providentia I, 22 107
De incorruptibilitate mundi
XXI, 108-109 109
Decal. 52-55 174
58 181
Her. 78 181
Virt. 64-65 181
177-179 181
Post. 91-93 181
De mutatione nominum 258-59 210
Legum allegoriae III 162-168 211
De Congressu Quaerendae Euriditionis
Gratia 174 211

6. Josephus

Antiquitates
I xi 2 90
1,11,3 90
III vii 6 192
III vii 7 193
V viii 3 86
V vi 85
8:4-50 79
8:46-48 79

7. Pseudo-Philo

Liber Antiquitatum Biblicarum
10 212
11:1 41
26:2 86
19:5a 95
19:10 212
35:6 85
42:7 86
42:8ab 86
42:9b 86

8. Early Christian sources

Justin
Dial. 57 90

Lactantius
De ira dei ii 13 210

Theodoret of Cyrus
Quaest. Gen. 69 90

9. Rabbinic sources

Genesis/Bereshit Rabba
1:9 114
2:2 89
48:11,14 90

ExodR on Exod 16:4 92

Wayyikra Rabba
18:5 34

Mishna
m. Yoma 7:5 192

Talmudim
b. BMes 86b 90
b. Shebu 15b 79
b. Yoma 75a 91
b. Zebah. 88b 193
j. Shab 6.8b 79
j. Erub 10.26c 79

Targum Neofiti 1 90

Pseudo Jonathan
Gen 18:8 90
Exod 16:15 96

Seder Eliyahu Rabbah 27 185

Leviticus Rabbah 29.2 187

Tanhuma (Buber)
Wayyetze 6 187
BeMidbar 19 186

Shir ha-Shirim Zuta 1.4 ..... 187, 190

Genesis Rabbah 68.12 189

Targum Jerushalmi Exod 16:4.15 215

10. Classical Greek and Roman Sources

Plato
Timaeus
37d 11
48e 112
Politicus 294a 63
Republic 3.415a 73
5.462a-e 74
5.473d 74
5.475c 74
585b12-c5 76
610-611 76
6.499b1-c2 73
7.510c-e 74
7.518c-d 74
7.521b1 73
3.415c3-5 73

Epiktet
Diss. II.13.21 159

Sophocles
frg 12 148

Diodorus Siculus
40.3.4 38

Antigone
450f 42

Pseudo-Phocylides
176 53
201-204 53

Chrysippus frg. 314 42
frg. 323 43

Pindar frg. 169 42
Ol. 1.95 94
Pyth. 9,104-106 94

Ovidius
Metamorfosi I, 430 109
4,249-251 94

Plutharch
De Stoicorum repugnantiis 11 43
De Alex. M. fortuna aut virtute I, 6 46

Hesiod
frg. 23a21 94

Homer
Il. 5,342 94
19,38-39 95
Od. 5,135 94

Cicero
Leg. 1, 6, 18 43
I, 7, 23 44
I, 23 46
De natura deorum II, 154 46
De finibus 3, 19, 62s 46
Resp. III, 22,33 47

Zeno
frg. 162 43
frg. 332 43
frg. 614 43
frg. 1003 43

Macarius Magnes
Apocrit. 4.27 90